On appositives
On appositives

PhD thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD at the
University of Groningen
on the authority of the
Rector Magnificus Prof. E. Sterken
and in accordance with
the decision by the College of Deans.

This thesis will be defended in public on

Monday 20 April 2015 at 11:00

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I wish to acknowledge and thank my promotor Jan-Wouter Zwart and my co-promotor Mark de Vries for their comments on this manuscript. I have endeavoured to incorporate as many of their suggestions as possible. Thanks to the members of my thesis committee, Lisa Cheng, Jack Hoeksema, and Jim McCloskey, for reading and approving the manuscript, and for providing useful feedback. I also offer my thanks to Emir Maier and Dennis Ott, who provided useful critique of early formulations of the arguments presented herein. Thanks also to Charlotte Lindenbergh for help with the Dutch summary.

I wish to acknowledge my informants. For the British English judgements I am indebted to my friends and family in England. Thanks to Brendan and Swantje for the German judgements. For the Turkish judgements, my thanks go to the Güneş family (teşekkür ederim!).

This thesis represents the terminus of a journey that started in February 2011, when I became a promovendus at Groningen University. As such, I wish to acknowledge those I met en route. I extend my gratitude to my peer group colleagues in Groningen, Bernat Bardagil Más, Javi Fernández, Marlies Kluck, Charlotte Lindenbergh, Dennis Ott, Pavel Rudnev, and Craig Sailor, and to Anikó Lipták in Leiden. Thanks to Marcel den Dikken, Jason Merchant, Dennis Ott, Radek Šimík, Tanja Temmerman, and Gary Thoms for providing comments on drafts of articles that I have had published during my promovendus period.

In 2013, I spent five months at the University of California, Santa Cruz. I wish to thank Jim McCloskey for supervising my study during this time. My thanks also extend to the other staff at UCSC, and especially to the graduate students for their warm welcome.

I am most indebted to Güliz Güneş. My last note of thanks is hers.

This research was conducted as part of the *Incomplete Parenthesis* project, which was funded by the European Research Council.
### Glossary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/2/3</td>
<td>1st/2nd/3rd person</td>
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1

Introduction

1.1 Defining apposition

In traditional grammars, *apposition* is a family resemblance concept of which there is a paragon (see 1) and various ‘resemblances’ thereof (Matthews 1981:236).

(1) The Big Apple, New York, is a huge city.

Generative linguists are tasked with positing a formal definition for *apposition* that, while unable to correspond with its informal family resemblance usage exactly, is nonetheless intuitive and also empirically and theoretically justified. I aim to provide such a definition herein. Thus, this thesis focuses on appositions and their resemblances, which together I call *appositives*.

Influential in many generative attempts to define *apposition* has been the functional distinction between *reformulative* and *attributive* apposition. Reformulative appositions provide additional and often more informative names for their *anchors* (see 1, where the anchor is boldfaced), while attributive appositions predicate properties of them (see 2).

(2) The Big Apple, a magical place, is a huge city.

Recent analyses have proposed that the functional distinction between reformulative and attributive appositions is indicative of syntactic differences

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¹ Heringa (2011) traces this distinction as far back as Poutsma (1904). For discussion of this distinction and formal analyses based thereupon, see Smith (1964), Motsch (1966), Burton-Roberts (1975), Klein (1976), McCawley (1998), Heringa & De Vries (2008), Cardoso & De Vries (2010), Heringa (2011), among others.
between them. For instance, Cardoso & De Vries (2010) follow McCawley (1998) in supposing that reformulative appositions display ‘what you see is what you get’ (WYSIWYG) syntax, while attributive appositions are derived from appositive relative clauses. In other words, they propose that New York in (1) is merely a referential noun phrase, while a magical place in (2) is a predicate nominal that is contained within a parenthetical relative clause whose copula and relative pronoun are unpronounced (see 3, where, for now, I enclose unpronounced material in chevrons).

(3) **The Big Apple**, *<which is> a magical place*, is a huge city.

Other analyses encode this supposed syntactic dissimilarity in other ways. Heringa (2011), for example, proposes that reformulative appositions are contained within small clauses whose subject is obligatorily unpronounced (see 4a) while attributive appositions are derived from underlying finite parenthetical copular clauses (see 4b).

(4) a. **The Big Apple**, *<it> New York*, is a huge city.

   b. **The Big Apple**, *<it is> a magical place*, is a huge city.

Conversely, Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b) maintain that both reformulative and attributive appositions are derived from underlying finite parenthetical clauses and that the differences observed between the two types of apposition can be ascribed to their position within this underlying clause: reformulative appositions and their anchors are base-generated in the same syntactic position within their respective clauses (see 5), while attributive appositions are base-generated as postcopular elements in finite parenthetical copular clauses (see 4b).^2

(5) **The Big Apple**, *New York <is a huge city>*, is a huge city.

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^2 For Döring (2014), the ellipsis that purportedly derives the surface appearance of appositional constructions involves extraction of the remnant of ellipsis above the ellipsis site, as (i) shows. Meanwhile, Ott (2014a, b) remains ambivalent about how this supposed ellipsis operation applies. In order to avoid committing to a particular analysis of how ellipsis is licensed in appositional constructions in this introductory chapter, I simply represent elliptical constructions as displaying the same word order that they would display if ellipsis did not occur.

(i) Pete visited **The Big Apple**, [New York], *<Pete visited t1>*. last summer.
What the abovementioned analyses have in common is that, while they ascribe to reformulative and attributive appositions dissimilar *internal* syntax (this term refers to appositions’ internal constituency), they ascribe to them the same *external* syntax (this term refers to appositions’ relation to their hosts). In the case of Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and Heringa (2011), both types of appositions are proposed to share a special kind of ‘parenthetical coordinative’ relationship with their anchor. (For the sake of exposition, I represent this simply as $\&P$ in 6 and 7. I also omit the parenthetical coordinator.) For Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b), the clauses in which they claim that reformulative and attributive appositions are contained are syntactically unconnected to their hosts. Rather, these are *orphaned* clauses that interpolate into their hosts by non-syntactic means (see §6.2 for a discussion of orphanage).

(6) Cardoso & De Vries (2010)
   a. $[\&P [\textbf{The Big Apple},][\text{New York},]]$ is a huge city.
   b. $[\&P [\textbf{The Big Apple},][<\text{which is}> \textbf{a magical place},]]$ is a huge city.

(7) Heringa (2011)
   a. $[\&P [\textbf{The Big Apple},][<\text{it}> \text{New York},]]$ is a huge city.
   b. $[\&P [\textbf{The Big Apple},][<\text{it is}> \textbf{a magical place},]]$ is a huge city.

In my pursuit of an adequate definition for *apposition*, I will also take the functional distinction between *reformulative* and *attributive* apposition as indicative of syntactic variance. However, unlike the abovementioned recent approaches to apposition, I will demonstrate that there are differences in both the *internal* and *external* syntax of reformulative and attributive apposition. In other words, I will show that these two types of appositions have neither their internal nor external syntax in common.

With respect to reformulative appositions, I will use syntactic and semantic diagnostics to show that they are syntactically coordinated with their anchors. The coordination that I advocate is not the special kind of parenthetical coordination utilised by Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and Heringa (2011) however: it is regular coordination of the type that coordinates noun phrases in an utterance like *Bill and Ben slept*. While past analyses have been reluctant to entertain the notion that reformulative
apposition involves regular coordination (for pertinent remarks on this topic, see Burton-Roberts 1975), I will show that reformulative apposition displays all the syntactic hallmarks of regular coordination. I thus propose that reformulative apposition is a syntactic exaptation of coordination, and that pragmatic factors give rise to the prosodic and interpretative differences that pertain between regular and appositional coordination.

With respect to attributive appositions, I use syntactic and semantic diagnostics to show that Heringa (2011) and others are correct to claim that attributive appositions are postcopular elements of finite parenthetical copular clauses in which all other material is rendered unpronounced (see 4b). Specifically, I claim that these copular clauses are Force phrases (Rizzi 1997), which are syntactic units that are used to commit speech acts. With respect to their external syntax, I claim that these parenthetical clauses adjoin to a maximal syntactic projection within their host clauses (see 8). I argue that their status as independent Force phrases makes these parenthetical clauses opaque: no syntactic or compositional semantic relations can be established across the boundary between them and the host clauses to which they adjoin (precisely how Forcehood engenders opacity is demonstrated in §3.2). As a result, their adjunction to their hosts is unconstrained from the perspective of syntax and compositional semantics. All constraints that dictate to which maximal syntactic projection they may adjoin therefore arise from extraneous factors, which are prosodic or pragmatic in nature, or else pertain to how non-pronunciation is licensed.

\[(8) \quad [\text{DP} [\text{DP The Big Apple.}] [\text{ForceP <it is> a magical place,}]] \text{ is a huge city.}\]

There is a twist to this tale, however. I argue that, while the functional distinction between reformulative and attributive apposition is instructive, it does not correspond with the abovementioned syntactic distinction between appositional coordination and Force phrasal adjunction in a one-to-one fashion. Rather, there is an occasion when conflict between function and syntax structure arises.

The source of this conflict stems from utterances like (9) below. From a functional perspective, the relationship that pertains between the appositive noun phrase and its anchor in (9) is one of reformulation, as *Pete* provides a
more informative name for the individual denoted by the specific indefinite noun phrase *a masked man*.

(9) **A masked man, Pete,** danced with Miranda.

I will show that, in certain environments, referential appositive noun phrases like *Pete* in (9) are postcopular elements of Force phrasal adjuncts that are underlying *truncated clefts* (Mikkelsen 2005), as in (10). Here lies the conflict: although they function to reformulate their anchors, referential appositive noun phrases sometimes display the Force phrasal syntax associated with attributive appositions.

(10) \[ DP \{DP A masked man, it was Pete,\} \] danced with Miranda.

To resolve this conflict, I abandon the idea that the functional distinction between reformulative and attributive apposition has ontological significance for the formal characterisation of *apposition* (although I do not deny its utility as a suitable guideline). Rather, I claim that *apposition* should be defined with reference to syntactic schemata alone.

This brings me back to the main goal of this thesis, which is to define *apposition*. I claim that apposition is best defined with respect to *appositional coordination*. That is to say, I propose that ‘true’ appositions are conjoined with their anchors, and that regular and appositional coordination are dissimilar only insofar as regular conjuncts denote dissimilar referents or concepts (see 11a), while appositional conjuncts denote the same referent or concept (see 11b).

(11) a. Joop eats \[vla or poffertjes\] every Friday.

   b. Joop eats \[vla, or custard\] every Friday.3

This definition of *apposition* is stated in (12).4

---

3 Both *vla* and *poffertjes* are sweet Dutch foodstuffs. While many Dutch nationals might say otherwise, I am convinced that *vla* and English custard are identical (a comparison of the recipes for each certainly suggests so).

4 The reader will notice that I formulate my definition of appositions in (12) in a disjunctive fashion, where part of the disjunctive statement is ‘if β denotes a member of the set of referents or
(12) Definition of apposition
Where \( \alpha \) is an initial conjunct, \( \beta \) is a non-initial conjunct, and \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are coordinated:
If \( \beta \) denotes the same referent or concept as \( \alpha \), or if \( \beta \) denotes a member of the set of referents or concepts denoted by \( \alpha \), then \( \beta \) is an apposition.

The definition of \textit{apposition} in (12) entails that the ‘attributive appositions’ discussed above are not actually appositions after all. Rather, they form a subset of a group of Force phrasal adjuncts that I claim includes a variety of parenthetical structures such as \textit{and-parentheticals} (Kavalova 2007, see 13a), \textit{exclamative epithets} (Güneş 2015, see 13b), \textit{vocatives} (13c), and others. (Indeed, I will claim that ‘attributive appositions’ are actually derived from copular clausal \textit{and-parentheticals} in chapter three.)

(13) a. Joseph will – [\text{VP} \text{[ForceP \text{and he'll regret it –}] [\text{VP file for divorce}]}].
   b. Sam has, [\text{PerfP} \text{[ForceP \text{the lucky sod,}] [\text{PerfP been promoted}]}].
   c. Tim’s objection, [\text{VP} \text{[ForceP \text{my dear,}] [\text{VP was duly noted}]}].

Defining apposition with respect to a particular syntactic schema has both immediate terminological and taxonomic repercussions. With respect to terminology, it is confusing to continue to refer to the appositives exemplified by (2) as ‘attributive appositions’ when my definition in (12) denies them appositional status. Thus, new terminology is required. I will call \textit{reformulative appositions} simply \textit{appositions} henceforth, which reflects Burton-Roberts’ (1975) and McCawley’s (1998) use of the term. To maintain a connexion with the previous literature, I will call \textit{attributive appositions} simply \textit{attributions} hereafter. The reader should keep in mind that, for me, \textit{attributions} are appositives that conform to a particular syntactic schema: \textit{attributions} are postcopular elements in reduced finite parenthetical copular clauses that adjoin to their hosts. Thus, the terms \textit{attribution} and \textit{attributional} will no longer refer to appositives that appear to ascribe a property to their anchors. To talk about this property-ascribing function, I concepts denoted by \( \alpha' \). This statement is included to account for the existence of appositions that are \textit{hyponyms} of their anchors, which I will introduce shortly, in §1.2.
will always use the phrase *attributive function* from now on. Also, the term *appositive* henceforth refers to those constructions to which an appositional or attributional syntactic analysis is not yet applied. In other words, I use *appositive* to refer to constructions that, before they are disambiguated by syntactic tests, are structurally ambiguous between appositional coordination and Force phrasal adjunction.

With respect to the taxonomic repercussions, defining *apposition* with respect to a coordination schema that is syntactically identical to regular coordination establishes novel opposition to the inclusion of appositions in classificatory works on parenthesis such as Dehé & Kavalova (2007). This opposition arises because, on my account, appositions are not ‘parenthetical’ in any theoretically relevant sense, unless of course one deems second conjuncts of regular coordination to be ‘parenthetical’ too.

1.2 The main themes of the thesis

Having now provided a rough outline of how I achieve the main research objective of this thesis, which is to provide an empirically and conceptually adequate formal definition of *apposition*, I will now summarise the thesis’ main themes in more depth.

1.2.1 Structural ambiguity in appositive constructions

The first theme that I wish to mention is how to control for structural ambiguity. As I have already mentioned, the informal distinction between the reformulative and attributive function of appositives provides a reasonable but slightly imprecise diagnostic of an appositive’s syntactic structure. In the case of the attributive function, the diagnostic is completely precise: if on the surface an appositive $\alpha$ appears to attribute a property to its anchor, the application of various syntactic and semantic diagnostics (which I will list and apply in §3) show that $\alpha$ is the postcopular element in a reduced parenthetical predicative copular clause. In the case of the reformulative function, the diagnostic is less precise: if on the surface an appositive $\alpha$ appears to provide another name for its anchor, the application of various syntactic and semantic diagnostics (which I will list and apply in §2) will typically show that $\alpha$ is coordinated with its anchor. As I have already
discussed in §1.1, the exception in the reformulative case is constructions in which referential appositive noun phrases reformulate anchors that are either specific indefinite noun phrases (see 14a) or definite individual concepts (see 14b). If diagnostics for appositional syntax are applied to these constructions, then they appear to pattern with appositions, whereas if diagnostics for attributional syntax are applied to such constructions, then they appear to pattern with attributions. This is because such constructions are structurally ambiguous between appositions (see 15) and attributions that are derived from truncated clefts (see 16).

(14) a. Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the tap on.
    b. The salesman of the year, Grant, will win a car.

(15) a. ([&P [DP Someone[,]][DP Pete,]]) keeps leaving the tap on.
    b. ([&P [DP The salesman of the year[,]][DP Grant,]]) will win a car.

(16) a. ([DP [DP Someone[,]][ForceP <it is> Pete,]]) keeps leaving the tap on.
    b. ([DP [DP The salesman of the year[,]][ForceP <it {is/will be}> Grant,]]) will win a car.

If structural ambiguity were only observed in this small subset of appositive noun phrases, then one could feasibly retain the reformulative/attributive functional distinction as a reliable means for diagnosing appositional or attributional syntax. Problematically however, it often happens that appositives are ambiguous with respect to their reformulative or attributive function. In such cases, one cannot utilise the functional reformulative/attributive distinction to diagnose syntax structure in the first place. This type of ambiguity arises in constructions that contain appositive noun phrases that display the same definiteness as their anchors. The utterances in (17) provide exemplars. When sufficient contextual information is absent, one cannot be sure whether the capital of England in (17a) provides an additional name for its anchor or ascribes the property of being the capital of England to it. In such cases the same situation that arose with the examples in (14) would arise here: if diagnostics for appositional syntax are applied to such constructions then they appear to pattern with appositions, whereas if diagnostics for attributional syntax are applied to such constructions then
they appear to pattern with attributions. This is because such constructions are structurally ambiguous between appositions (see 18) and attributions that are derived from predicative copular clauses (see 19).

(17) a. London, the capital of England, is a wonderful place.
    b. A certain donkey, an ass, is owned by a farmer that beatboxes.

(18) a. [\&P [DP London,][DP the capital of England,]] is a wonderful place.
    b. [\&P [DP A certain donkey,][DP an ass,]] is owned by a farmer that beatboxes.

(19) a. [DP [DP London,][ForceP <it is> the capital of England,]] is a wonderful place.
    b. [DP [DP A certain donkey,][ForceP <it is> an ass,]] is owned by a farmer that beatboxes.

Consequently, the ambiguity observed in (14) and (17) must be controlled for. I introduce two means of control in the chapters to come. The first delimits appositions, and is introduced in §2.1.1. Appositions are delimited by inserting apposition markers (Burton-Roberts 1975, otherwise known as reformulation markers in Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007) into otherwise structurally ambiguous appositives like those in (14) and (17). Apposition markers are coordinators like or and parentheticals that modify appositions qua their status as communicable strings (such markers are that is to say, formally speaking, in other words, and so on). The second means of control delimits attributions, and is introduced in §2.2.5. Attributions are best delimited by inserting temporal adverbs such as now, often, or frequently into otherwise structurally ambiguous appositives (Quirk et al. 1972, O’Connor 2007, Heringa 2011, Döring 2014). Because they modify tense, these temporal adverbs expose the underlying finite clausal structure that characterises attributional syntax.

Once otherwise structurally ambiguous appositives are disambiguated by the insertion of apposition markers or temporal adverbs, the application of syntactic and semantic diagnostics ceases to return equivocal results, and two
natural syntactic classes – appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts – are delimited.

1.2.2 *A taxonomy of appositives*

Another theme that runs through the thesis is *taxonomy*. I endeavour to sort appositives of various kinds into appositions and non-appositions, according to the definition of *apposition* in (12). In chapter two, in which I provide evidence that appositions are conjuncts, I develop the taxonomy of appositions that is represented in the hierarchy in (20) and exemplified by the utterances in (20a-i).

(20)

```
appositions
  /     \
subclausal  clausal
  /     \
|     |
|     |
|identification| reformulation| hyponymy| reformulation|
|     |
|vacuous| non-vacuous| vacuous| non-vacuous|
|     |
|elliptical| non-elliptical| elliptical| non-elliptical|
|     |
|g| e| h, i| f|
```

Examples from the hierarchy above:

a. Brendan *confusticates*, or *perplexes*, Swantje.
b. Two *boys*, namely *Bill and Ben*, have just arrived.
c. The *band*, and especially the *bassist*, is tired of touring.
d. We’re *rich*, that is to say, we *needn’t work*.
e. That the boss *fired her*, *fired Mary* that is, is unacceptable.
f. That *he was fired*, *that John was fired*, is a shame.
g. The *last pizza slice*, i.e. *the sixth*, was reserved for me.
h. That *he was fired*, *that John was*, is bad.
i. That *he was fired*, *John*, is bad.
Up until now, I have characterised appositions as *reformulating* their anchors, where *reformulation* refers to appositions’ rechristening of the referents or concepts that their anchors denote. One of the more noticeable aspects of the hierarchy in (20) is its introduction of a more subtle conception of reformulation that also includes *identification* and *hyponymy* (see §2.2.6 for details).

Because appositions of all syntactic categories can perform it, reformulation in the sense conveyed so far in this introductory chapter is the paradigmatic function that appositions perform. This paradigmatic reformulative function is more accurately described as *conventional reformulation*: appositions that perform this function provide another conventional name for their apposition; a name that does not change depending upon the context. The *identificational* function introduced in the hierarchy in (20) refers to reformulation that is context-sensitive. This sensitivity to context is observed in (20b), as the denotation of the anchor *two boys* may change depending upon the context. In (20b), the anchor has the same referent as the set \{Bill, Ben\}, as the apposition makes clear. The *hyponymy* function introduced in the hierarchy in (20) refers to the exemplification or particularisation of a member contained within the set that the anchor denotes (Quirk et al. 1985, Heringa 2011). In the hyponymy example in (20c) for instance, the bassist from the band is exemplified by the apposition. Note that this hyponymy function is not reserved for plural entities alone: appositions can introduce hyponyms of anchors that denote complex concepts, as the example in (21) illustrates.

(21) The soldier *tortured*, in particular *waterboarded*, the captive.

As the hierarchy in (20) shows, clausal appositions may perform a reformulative function, but not an identificational or hyponymous one. This is because, when taken as real world objects, the propositions or speech acts that clauses denote are insensitive to context and are also not complex. For instance, the proposition *Sam has a nice house* is not a set of propositions that includes *Sam has a nice kitchen* as a member (but the former proposition may entail the latter one, however). As such, utterances like (22) are unacceptable.
Another feature that the hierarchy in (20) introduces is the notion that appositions can be *vacuous* ($\S$2.2.1-2.2.2 for details). Vacuity is observed in appositions when a subconstituent in the apposition reformulates a subconstituent in the anchor. This contrasts with regular *non-vacuous* appositional constructions, in which the entire apposition reformulates (or identifies, or is a hyponym of) the entire anchor. The utterances in (20e) and (20f) provide examples of vacuous appositions. In (20f) for instance, only the underlined noun phrase *John* in the apposition performs a reformulative function (specifically, it reformulates the pronoun *he* in the anchor). The rest of apposition is merely echoic and utilised for its structural form alone.

Lastly, the hierarchy in (20) also introduces *ellipsis* into the taxonomy of appositions (see $\S$2.2.2 for details). Two conditions must be met for licensing ellipsis in appositions. Firstly, appositions must display information-structurally *given* material, which only occurs in vacuous appositions. Secondly, because the structural configurations that license ellipsis are only observed in noun phrases and clauses, such appositions must be noun phrases or clauses. Noun phrase ellipsis is observed in (20g), verb phrase ellipsis is observed in (20h), and clausal ellipsis is observed in (20i). The underlying structures for these utterances are represented in a rough form in (23a-c) respectively.

Because constructions like (20i) have received much attention in the previous literature, usually under the guise of *background* and *afterthought* constructions (see Ott & De Vries 2012 and references therein), I devote ample space to them in $\S$2.2.2. Because appositions that display nominal and verbal ellipsis are uninteresting from a theoretical perspective, they will receive scant attention in the chapters to come.

While the appositives listed in (20) show substantial variation in their surface appearance, the application of syntactic and semantic diagnostics to
each type of construction exposes a common property; namely, that each
displays a coordinative syntactic structure. Thus, the inclusion of the
hierarchy in (20) in this introductory chapter serves to highlight the main
benefit of defining *apposition* in syntactic terms: the definition can embrace
many constructions that are pretheoretically understood as mere
‘resemblances’ to appositions, and it does so in a principled way.

The taxonomy of attributions that I advocate in this thesis is less complex
than the taxonomy for appositions that I have just described. As mentioned
earlier, attributions are merely bifurcated according to the type of the clause
that underlies them, which is either a *predicative* copular clause (see 24a), or
a *truncated cleft* copular clause (see 24b).

(24) a. **Kristian**, *<he is>* an old friend, lives in Paris.
b. **Someone**, *<it was>* probably Pete, has left the door open.

I have suggested already that the copular clauses from which attributions are
derived comprise a subset of Force phrases that adjoin to their hosts, an
inexhaustive list of which was provided in (13). With regards to discovering
which other appositives should be included within this set of Force phrasal
adjuncts, I devote chapter four to *appositive relative clauses* (see 3, which is
repeated below in 25), to which much discussion has been devoted in the
literature, and whose place in past taxonomies of appositives has varied
substantially.

(25) **The Big Apple**, *which is a magical place*, is a huge city.

Within the framework of this thesis, appositive relatives must occupy one of
three possible taxonomic slots. They are either restrictive modifiers of null
nominal appositions (see 26a), restrictive modifiers of null nominal
attributions (see 26b), or stand-alone Force phrasal adjuncts (see 26c). If
either (26a) or (26b) pertain, then appositive relatives plus their null heads
are noun phrases (De Vries 2002, 2006a, Šimík 2008, Cardoso & De Vries
2010, and Lassiter 2011). If (26c) pertains, then appositive relatives are stand-
alone clauses (Emonds 1979, Potts 2002, Arnold 2007, Del Gobbo 2007, and
others).
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(26) a. \[\&P [DP The Big Apple,][DP (that city) which is a magical place,]] is a huge city.
   b. \[DP [DP The Big Apple,][ForceP (and it is) [DP (a city) which is a magical place,]]] is a huge city.
   c. \[DP [DP The Big Apple,][ForceP which is a magical place,]] is a huge city.

To assess the status of appositive relative clauses, I compare them to relative constructions that, by virtue of their head noun phrases being overt, are unmistakably appositional (see 27a) or attributional (see 27b). I demonstrate that appositive relative clauses display properties dissimilar to both appositional and attributional relative constructions. From this, I conclude that appositive relatives conform to the schema exemplified by (26c): they are stand-alone clausal parenthetical adjuncts.

(27) a. Billy, i.e. the guy that I know from work, has been fired.
   b. Pete, frequently someone that eats too much, felt sick after dinner.

While this conclusion reflects Potts’ (2002), Arnold’s (2007), and others’, the eliminative method that I pursue to reach this conclusion, as well as the introduction of appositional and attributional relatives as constructions that are distinct from appositive relative clauses, is novel.

Once the place of appositive relative clauses as stand-alone Force phrasal adjuncts is secured, one arrives at the taxonomy of Force phrasal adjuncts that is represented in (28) below and exemplified by the utterances in (28a-i).
(28) Force phrasal adjuncts

subclausal
  (a, b)

clausal

  copular clausal
  non-copular clausal

truncated cleft
  elliptical
  non-elliptical

predicational
  elliptical
  non-elliptical

category

internal syntax

type of
copular clause

ellipsis

Examples from the hierarchy above:

a. Sam has, the lucky sod, been promoted.

b. Tim’s objection, my dear, was duly noted.

c. The record holder, currently Bill, is always held in high esteem.

d. Someone, (and) it was probably Pete, left the fridge door open.

e. Bob, my assistant, is demanding a pay rise.

f. Bob, {who/he} is my assistant, is demanding a pay rise.

g. Sandra wants to win, which she no doubt will.

i. Jo – (and) she loves to do this – keeps leaving Harry post-it notes on the bathroom mirror.

When unified, the hierarchies in (20) and (28) create the taxonomy of appositives represented in (29) below.
It should be noted that, while the hierarchy in (29) represents how each of the appositives discussed in this thesis relate to one another, it does not represent an exhaustive taxonomy of appositives. This is because, according to my use of the term, *appositives* refers to ‘appositions and their resemblances’ (see §1.1), and is therefore an informal family resemblance term that roughly denotes a group of constructions for which an exhaustive taxonomy cannot be fashioned. As such, there no doubt exist Force phrasal adjuncts that many scholars would never consider to be *appositive* in any
sense. On the other hand, there may also exist parenthetical structures that certain scholars might consider to be appositive that are not present in the hierarchy in (29) (some candidate structures are mentioned in chapter seven).

1.2.3 Extensibility

Another important theme in this thesis is extensibility: to what extent does the syntactic definition of apposition in (12) inform semantic and pragmatic theories about appositive constructions? I address this question directly in chapter five, where I discuss the pragmatics of appositive structures. In that chapter, I endeavour to show that my syntactic analysis also accounts well for certain pragmatic phenomena that have thus far escaped adequate explanation by semanticists and pragmatists. In particular, I attribute the non-uniform pragmatic behaviour of appositions summarised in Koev (2013:15-37) to the syntactic division between ‘true’ appositions (as defined in 12), which are typically subclausal and hence unable to bear illocutionary force, and attributions/appositive relative clauses, which are underlying Force phrases and hence marked to bear illocutionary force. I propose that the force-bearing nature of attributions makes for their suitable use as building blocks of conversation; a function for which appositions, as regular conjuncts, cannot usually be used. Once a suitable model of the discourse is emplaced (I use an informal model of my own creation), the dissimilarity I mentioned above between those appositives that bear force and those that do not can be utilised to show that the heterogeneity in the pragmatic behaviour of appositives is expected, and engendered by the syntax. To my knowledge, an attempt to explain these pragmatic data by recourse to syntax has not been made before.

1.3 The structure of the thesis

Unlike the bulk of this introductory chapter, much of the remainder of this thesis is organised around syntactic schemata rather than themes. The thesis is organised in this fashion because much of the legwork will involve accruing empirical support for the idea that appositions are second conjuncts of regular coordination and that attributions and appositive relatives are
Force phrasal adjuncts. As such, the syntax of appositions is my concern in chapter two, the syntax of attributions is my concern in chapter three, and the syntax of appositive relative clauses is my concern in chapter four. Once sufficient evidence is accrued to support my syntactic bifurcation of appositives into appositions and non-appositions (as per the definition in 12), I extend my account into the domain of pragmatics in chapter five, and then consider but ultimately reject three conceptual alternatives to my analysis in chapter six. Chapter seven concludes the thesis.

1.4 Data sources

Empirical evidence for my analysis comes almost exclusively from English and Turkish. Unless stated otherwise, all examples are procured from introspection. Judgements on English data come from me, a native speaker of the East Midlands dialect of British English, and at most nine other native speakers of British English (all non-linguists from England). Judgements on Turkish data come from seven native Turkish speaking informants (one linguist, six non-linguists, all from Turkey). I choose to concentrate on English and Turkish for three reasons. The first is ease of access to informants. The second is control: my knowledge of both languages is sufficient enough to control for extraneous factors that might pollute judgements. The third reason is breadth. The likelihood that ‘genetic closeness’ explains why two languages pattern similarly with respect to some property $x$ is lessened the more genetically unrelated two languages are. If recourse to ‘genetic closeness’ is implausible, then the probability that an analysis that captures the behaviour of two unrelated languages with respect to $x$ has universal scope, and hence correctly describes and explains some aspect of grammar that is common to all languages, is increased. Resultantly, the likelihood that the analyses advanced in this thesis, which capture the behaviour of appositives in both English and Turkish, have universal scope is greater than the likelihood that analyses that capture the behaviour of appositives in English and (say) Dutch have universal scope. This is because English displays greater phylogenetic affinity with Dutch than with Turkish. Needless to say, a theory that fits two unrelated languages is not a universal theory by default, as coincidental similarities that the languages in question display might bias one’s analysis. Resultantly, the theory could prove to be
completely unsuitable for a third unrelated language and hence not universal at all. While I hope that the analyses I advance hereafter make correct predictions for a third unrelated language (and a fourth, and a fifth...), I cannot say with any confidence that they will. Future research must decide.
2

Appositions

In §2.1, I outline and defend the claim that subclausal appositions are coordinated with their anchors. I extend this analysis to clausal appositions in §2.2.1, and discuss how clausal appositions and ellipsis interact in §2.2.2. In §2.2.3, I discuss the notion of extending the ‘biclausal’ analyses from §2.2.2 to the subclausal appositions from §2.1, and highlight its infeasibility. §2.2.5 and §2.2.6 are devoted to miscellanea that pertain to appositions: §2.2.5 continues the discussion from §2.1 about delimiting appositions from attributions, while §2.2.6 deals with the pragmatics of appositions and related constructions.

2.1 Appositions as second conjuncts

The main claim I defend in this chapter is that appositions are coordinated with their anchors. I aim to show that, from a syntactic perspective, this coordination is identical to ‘regular’ coordination with and or or, insofar as it obeys the coordinate structure constraint (Ross 1967) and requires its conjuncts to exhibit the same semantic type. I suggest in §2.2.6 that the dissimilarities observed between regular and appositional coordination are created by pragmatic factors alone.

I begin by providing evidence that appositions and their anchors are coordinated.

2.1.1 Semantic balance

My analysis of appositions does not require me to commit to a particular syntactic account of coordination. As such, I remain ambivalent about coordination phrases’ internal syntax. However, I maintain that coordination phrases display the same semantic type as their conjuncts (Zhang 2010), and that conjuncts must display the same compositional semantic type (e, (e, t), etc.) as each other, in accordance with a semantic formulation of William’s
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(1981) law of coordination of likes. Also, I assume that asyndetic conjuncts are always separated by an unpronounced coordinator. This assumption arises from the observation that such coordinators are always optional:

(1) John {,/and} Mary {,/and} Frank, and Polly have been fired.

Constraints on extraction aside (see §2.1.3), the demand for semantic balance is the sole constraint that is placed on what can be coordinated. If balance is obtained, elements of any semantic type can be coordinated:

(2) a. John and Bill went home.
   b. The red and white flag was raised.
   c. She went out and around the building.
   d. He was tarred and feathered.

If appositions are second conjuncts as I maintain, one predicts that appositions can display any semantic type, provided that balance between anchors and their appositions pertains. This prediction is borne out, as the examples below show.5

(3) a. The Big Apple, New York, is a huge city.
   b. Pete, i.e. the guy that we met in the pub last night, is at the door.
   c. All campanologists, i.e. all bell ringers, dream of ringing at St. Paul’s cathedral.
   d. Every unmarried man in the room, every bachelor, is here for a date.
   e. No philatelist, that is no stamp collector, would willingly sell her Perot Provisional.
   f. Ben drew a stereometric, i.e. three-dimensional, representation.

5 While appositions can be propositions (i.e. clauses) if their anchor is also propositional (as the example in 3j shows), I postpone any discussion of clausal appositions until §2.2 due to certain complicating factors that accompany them. Resultantly, the current subsection (§2.1) deals only with subclausal appositions.
g. Brendan **confusticates**, that is *perplexes*, Swantje.
h. The wind blows **abaft**, or *behind*, the boat.
i. Alan studied **there**, *at Oxford*, for about four years.
j. I **could murder a brew**, that is to say *I’d love a cup of tea.*

To my knowledge, there are three potential counterexamples to my claim that appositions and their anchors are always semantically balanced. I will now show that these counterexamples are only apparent, and that in each case semantic balance actually does pertain.

Constructions exemplified by (4) below provide the first potential counterexample. Here it looks like a referential noun phrase anchor is coordinated with a propositional apposition.

(4) **The rumour**, i.e. *that the company is firing staff*, is false.

In such constructions, the clause in the apposition is interpreted as modifying an implicit noun phrase that is coreferent with the anchor. That these appositional clauses are modifiers is demonstrated by the obligatory presence of the complementiser *that* and the nominal affix {-mA} in English and Turkish respectively, as (5) and (6) show. Thus, I treat such appositions as noun phrases that contain restrictive relative clauses, following Aboh (2005), Kayne (2010), Arsenjević (2009), and Haegeman (2012).

(5) **The rumour**, i.e. *(the rumour) *(that)* the company is firing staff*, is false.

(6) Politikaci-nin vaad-i-ne, parti-si-nin vergi-ler-i
politician-GEN pledge-POSS-DAT party-POSS-GEN tax-PL-ACC
düşür-* (me)-si-ne, inan-mak zor.
lower-NM-POSS-DAT believe-INF hard
‘**The politician’s pledge,** *that his party will lower taxes*, is hard to believe.’
If the analysis outlined above is correct for examples like (4) then semantic balance is restored, as in such constructions two referential noun phrases are coordinated (as in 5).

The second potential counterexample comes from constructions exemplified by (7). Here, a copula anchor appears to coordinate with a non-constituent that includes the raising verb *deem* and an infinitival clause minus its predicate. This is another case of imbalance.

(7) The Spartans were (or were deemed to be) a fierce race of warriors.

I suggest that such cases display right node raising (RNR, Postal 1974), which refers to the absence of a contiguous string α on the rightmost edge of a constituent, where α would be identical to a linearly successive string β if α were present. RNR is observed in the example in (8b) below.

(8) a. Someone who likes the Beatles will always view with suspicion someone who dislikes the Beatles.

b. Someone who likes, will always view with suspicion someone who dislikes, the Beatles.

As Valmala (2013) points out, RNR is not a syntactically uniform phenomenon, and is derived by either extraction (Ross 1967) or backwards deletion (Wilder 1997) / multidominance (McCawley 1982). For reasons that are discussed in §6.2.1 but which are irrelevant for now, I will assume that the multidominance form of RNR applies in appositive structures.6 This form of RNR can be used to derive constructions in which balanced but non-constituent anchors and appositions appear to be coordinated (for the sake of exposition, the schemata in 9 and 10 are simplified):

(9) a. Just before John’s, that is to say just after Mary’s, defence we drank some tea.

---

6 For independent evidence that RNR may apply to parenthetical-like insertions such as *insubordinations*, see De Vries (2013b:161-162).
b. John met the sovereign of, i.e. the queen of, England on Saturday.

Once the multidominance analysis of RNR is applied to the example in (7), semantic balance is restored, as both conjuncts are underlyingly unary predicates.\footnote{Note that the RNR analysis utilised in the main text also extends to what Döring (2014:136) calls \emph{multiple-argument} appositions in German, such as (i). Specifically, the construction in (i) can be analysed as involving coordinated verb phrases, where the participle verb is shared by both conjuncts.}

\begin{exe}
\begin{tabular}{l}
(i) Ich habe jemandem etwas, nämlich dem Karl das Buch, gegeben.  \\
I have someone.DAT something.ACC namely the.DAT Karl the.ACC book given  \\
'I have given \textbf{something to somebody}, namely \textbf{the book to Karl}.'
\end{tabular}
\end{exe}
(10) The Spartans were (or were deemed to be) a fierce race of warriors.

To outline the third potential counterexample to my claim, I must return to the examples in (3) to consider their semantic function. In these examples, each apposition provides a different (and typically more informative) description of the element denoted by their anchors. In (3e) for instance, the apposition no stamp collector provides a more informative name for the quantified noun phrase no philatelist. This is the reformulative function of appositions (see chapter one).

However, certain purported nominal appositions display a different function. Rather than provide additional names for the referents denoted by their anchors, these appositions are interpreted as attributing properties to them. This is observed in (11), where the addition of a racer informs us that Kristian’s bicycle is contained in the set of racers that exist in the world. Such purported appositions display an attributive function (see chapter one).

(11) Kristian’s bicycle, a racer, was stolen.

That a racer in (11) attributes a property to Kristian’s bicycle is indicative of its semantic status as a unary predicate. If the ascription of predicatehood to ‘attributive appositions’ is valid, then my claim that appositions are always coordinated with their anchor is undermined because in constructions like (11) it looks like a referential noun phrase anchor is coordinated with apposition of a different semantic type; namely, a predicate. To explain this, I
must either concede that appositions are not coordinated with their anchors after all, propose that coordination can be imbalanced in certain environments, or claim that ‘attributive appositions’ are not coordinated with their anchors.

I choose the final option, and maintain that ‘attributive appositions’ are not coordinated with anchors. As mentioned in chapter one, I claim that such appositives are predicates of reduced finite copular clauses, and hence display the syntax roughly sketched in (12) below, which is repeated from chapter one.

(12) \[DP [DP \textbf{The Big Apple}] \text{[ForceP (it is) a magical place]}) \text{ is a huge city.}\]

Because I wish to exclude these attributive appositives from the set of appositions proper, I will call them attributions from now on. Attributions are the focus of chapter three. However, before I set them aside for later I must provide some means by which to distinguish attributions from appositions, so that one does not confuse the two.\(^8\)

As the example in (11) has demonstrated, not all appositive noun phrases are ambiguous with respect to their potential appositional or attributional syntactic status: their definiteness respective to their anchor exposes their true nature. This fact is encapsulated in the diagnostic below:

(13) Where \(\alpha\) is the anchor and \(\beta\) is the appositive noun phrase:

\[
\text{If } \beta \text{ is indefinite and } \alpha \text{ is not, then } \beta \text{ is an attribution.}
\]

Utilising the diagnostic in (13), one can delimit the appositive noun phrases in the exemplary cases in (14) as attributions, where the anchors are a definite kind and a definite individual respectively while the appositive noun phrases are indefinite.

\(^8\) It should be noted here that the methods that I provide to distinguish appositions from attributions in (13) and (16) do not provide evidence for a syntactic distinction between the two. This evidence is supplied in the remainder of chapter two and in chapter three. Thus, for the time being, the reader must trust me that a syntactic distinction between appositions and attributions indeed pertains.
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(14)  
   a. The lion, a species of the genus Panthera, is a ferocious beast.  
   b. Kristian’s new bicycle, a racer, has a flat tyre.

Unfortunately, the diagnostic in (13) cannot distinguish attributions from appositions in cases where the appositive noun phrase is definite (see 15a-b) or where both the anchor and the appositive noun phrase are indefinite (see 15c-d). It is these cases that must be disambiguated (in lieu of the context providing sufficient delimitation).

(15)  
   a. London, the capital of England, is a filthy city.  
   b. A masked man, Pete, kissed Miranda at the party.  
   c. A rose, a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for romance.  
   d. A particular girl that Ben likes, a student, is coming to our party.

The method of delimitation that I pursue utilises apposition markers (see Burton-Roberts 1975 for a similar test), and is encapsulated in (16) below. Because the diagnostic in (16) encompasses the diagnostic in (13), one may treat (16) as supplanting (13).

(16)  
   Where $\alpha$ is the appositive noun phrase:  
      If $\alpha$ can host an apposition marker, then $\alpha$ is an apposition. Otherwise, $\alpha$ is an attribution.

Apposition marker is the term for material that accompanies appositions. The linear position of markers relative to their apposition is either flexible or fixed. In those cases where its position is fixed, a marker must precede its apposition:

(17)  
   a. Cottonopolis, (that is to say) Manchester (that is to say), is a cold city.  
   b. Cottonopolis, (formally) Manchester (formally), is a cold city.

(18)  
   a. Cottonopolis, (or) Manchester (*or), is a cold city.  
   b. Cottonopolis, (i.e.) Manchester (*i.e.), is a cold city.
Apposition markers are optional (for exceptions to this generalisation, see the particularisation constructions in §2.2.6). If one removes the markers from the examples in (17) and (18) for instance, acceptability is retained.

For fixed markers like or, the coordination analysis that I pursue provides them a syntactic locus: they are the realisation of the coordinator. Those markers that may precede or follow their appositions are parentheticals that modify appositions qua their property of being utterable strings (formally speaking, that is to say, etc.)\(^9\).\(^{10}\)

Utilising the diagnostic in (16), the appositions in the ambiguous examples from (15) can be disambiguated as appositions by inserting apposition markers into them, as (19) shows.

(19)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. **London**, or the capital of England, is a filthy city.
  \item b. **A masked man**, i.e. Pete, kissed Miranda at the party.
  \item c. **A rose**, or a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for romance.
\end{itemize}

One sees that this method of disambiguation works simply by comparing the appositive noun phrases’ interpretation. In (19a) for example, the capital of England is disambiguated as another name for the entity that London denotes. In (15a) however, the same noun phrase is ambiguous between another name for the entity that London denotes and a property that London exhibits.

To summarise: I started this subsection (§2.1.1) by presenting evidence from constraints on semantic balance in coordination to support my claim that appositions are coordinated with their anchors. This claim appeared to be undermined by three sources: alleged complement clause appositions, semantically imbalanced non-constituent appositions, and certain appositive noun phrases that, while syntactically balanced with their nominal anchors, look like unary predicates that are coordinated with entity anchors in a semantically imbalanced fashion. To show that my ‘semantic balance’ claim

\(^9\) Note that the parenthetical apposition markers exemplified in (17) in the main text, of which Heringa (2011:56) provides an inexhaustive list from English, Dutch and German, are called reformulation markers in the much of literature on discourse and pragmatics (see for instance Güllich & Kotschi 1995, Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007).

\(^{10}\) For a discussion of attribution markers, see §2.2.5.
was not undermined, I argued that alleged complement clause appositions are actually noun phrases, I proposed that non-constituent appositions are derived by right node raising, and I excluded predicate nominal ‘appositions’ from the set of appositions proper. With regards to the predicate nominal ‘appositions’, I proposed that they are *attributions*, which are predicate nominals in reduced clausal adjuncts. To ensure that attributions are not mistaken for appositions later on, I outlined a means by which the two can be distinguished. This method of delimitation concerned apposition markers: appositive noun phrases that are potentially ambiguous between appositions and attributions are delimited as appositions when they are accompanied by an apposition marker.

2.1.2  *C-command and extraction*

Having introduced a satisfactory delimiter of appositions, I now return to providing evidence for my claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated.

First, one observes that appositions can be bound by many of the same *c-commanding* binders that second conjuncts of regular coordination can, as a comparison of the *a*-examples (appositional constructions) and *b*-examples (regular coordination) in (20) to (23) demonstrate. This observation provides further support for equating the two construction types.

(20)  **Negative polarity items** (NPIs)

a. Paul hasn’t received *penny-one, anything*, from his bank.

a’. Paul hasn’t received *anything, penny-one*, from his bank.

b. Grant doesn’t own any knives or any forks.

(21)  **Modal auxiliaries**

a. Lucy might visit the **Big Apple**, i.e. **New York**, in September.

b. Lucy might visit **New York and New Jersey** in September.
(22) Sentential negation
   a. Pete can’t touch his nest egg, i.e. his trust fund, until he is twenty five.
   b. Pete can’t touch his trust fund or his inheritance until he is twenty five.

(23) Quantifiers
   a. Every competitor on the cookery TV programme was told that his entry, that is to say his jam roly-poly with custard, was too stodgy.
   b. Every cricketer remembers his first century and his first maiden over.

C-command is a prerequisite for extraction, as the landing site of extraction must c-command its base position. In regular coordination, extraction is licit only if applied equally to both conjuncts or to subconstituents thereof (Ross 1967). This is demonstrated in (24) to (26) below. In the a-examples extraction occurs equally (i.e. ‘across the board’) and acceptability is retained, while in the b-examples extraction does not apply ‘across the board’ and unacceptability arises.

(24) a. [Sturgeon eggs and truffles], I’ve tried $t_1$ before, but foie gras I haven’t.
   b. * [Sturgeon eggs], I’ve tried $t_1$ and truffles before, but foie gras I haven’t.

(25) a. [Which country], do you hate the roads of $t_1$ and the traffic of $t_1$ the most?
   b. * [Which country], do you hate the roads of $t_1$ and the traffic of {it/that country} the most?

(26) a. It’s [England], that we hate the roads of $t_1$ and the traffic of $t_1$ the most.
   b. * It’s [England], that we hate the roads of $t_1$ and the traffic of {it/that country} the most.
Extraction from appositions is constrained in precisely the same manner as regular coordination: it must occur across the board. This is illustrated in the examples below, which fit the same template as those in (24) to (26).

(27) a. [Sturgeon eggs, i.e. caviar], I’ve tried it before, but foie gras I haven’t.
    b. * [Sturgeon eggs], I’ve tried it, i.e. caviar, before, but foie gras I haven’t.

(28) a. [Which country], do you hate the motorways of it, or as the Americans say the ‘highways’ of it, the most?
    b. * [Which country], do you hate the motorways of it, or as the Americans say the ‘highways’ of {it/that country}, the most?

(29) a. It’s [England], that we hate the motorways of it, or as the Americans say the ‘highways’ of it, the most.
    b. * It’s [England], that we hate the motorways of it, or as the Americans say the ‘highways’ of {it/that country}, the most.

To summarise: I have demonstrated in this subsection (§2.1.2) that appositions and their anchors display the same behaviour as conjuncts of regular coordination with respect to c-command. Like second conjuncts of regular coordination, appositions or subconstituents thereof can be bound by c-commanders such as negative polarity items, modals, sentential negation, and quantifiers. Also, extraction of an anchor or a subconstituent thereof is permitted only if an equally-sized constituent within an apposition (or the apposition itself) is extracted too, or vice versa. That this same constraint on extraction is observed with regular coordination provides further support for my claim that appositions are coordinated with their anchors.

2.1.3 Morphological case

Heringa (2011) provides a detailed overview of how morphological case is realised on nominal appositions and attributions (which he calls identificational and attributive appositions respectively) in a number of
languages, including Icelandic, Norwegian, English, German, Czech, Hungarian, Russian, and Japanese.

From the resulting data, which constitute his chapter six, he concludes that the case realised on nominal appositions is identical to the case realised on their anchors. I refer the reader to Heringa (2011:175-213) for examples.

The sentence in (30) provides an example from German (ibid.:178).

(30) Ich habe mit unserem Chef, d. h. Herrn Müller, gesprochen.
    ‘I spoke to our manager, i.e. Mr. Müller.’

This distribution of case is expected on an approach that treats anchors and their appositions as coordinated, as *ceteris paribus* conjuncts of regular coordination realise the same case, as (31) shows.

(31) Ich habe mit Herrn Müller und Herrn Weber gesprochen.
    ‘I spoke to Mr. Müller and Mr. Weber.’

It is worth pointing out that Heringa’s conclusion extends from inflectional languages to agglutinative ones like Turkish, in which morphological case is an *adphrasal* (Klavans 1982) reflex of structural CASE alone. In (32) for example, the apposition *karısı* must display the same case as the anchor *Havva*, which is accusative.

(32) Adem Havva-yı, yani karı-sı-{ni/*Ø}, düğün-de öp-me-di.
    ‘Adem did not kiss Havva, i.e. his wife, at the wedding.’

To summarise: the data presented in this subsection (§2.1.3) has illustrated that morphological case is realised on anchors and their appositions in the same manner that morphological case is realised on conjuncts of regular coordination. This further supports my equation of the two construction types.
2.1.4 Word order in Turkish

The structure of Turkish appositions reflects that of English: the anchor precedes the apposition and fixed apposition markers, such as coordinators, precede the apposition.

(33) Kuzen-ler-in, (ve) özellikle Barış (*ve), sen-in gel-me-n-i ist-iyor.
    Cousin-PL-POSS and especially Barış and you-GEN come-NM-POSS-ACC want-PROG 'Your cousins, and especially Barış, want you to come.'

This word order is predicted on the current approach, as coordination is the only head-initial subclausal structure in Turkish (see Zwart 2005, 2009a, and Griffiths & Güneş 2014 for evidence).

2.1.5 Presuppositions

Referential noun phrases trigger presuppositions that the entities denoted by them exist. Such presuppositions are hence existential. Existential presuppositions can often be plugged (Karttunen 1973). When this occurs, the entity denoted by the noun phrase in question is understood as existing in some person’s mental world or a hypothetical world, rather than existing in the actual world in which the conversation is set.

Noun phrases coordinated by and can be plugged, as the examples below show. In (34aB), mana and life-force can be understood as existing only in the minds of the cult members. In (34b), a de dicto reading is available for the noun phrases an Italian and a Spaniard, according to which Mary does not know the specific men that she wants to date simultaneously; she only knows that one should be Italian and the other should be Spanish. In (34c), the existence of Timon and Pumbaa is trapped inside the hypothetical world of their own christening, while in (34d) the professor and the actresses’ accrual of wealth occurs inside the world of their book’s publication.
(34)  
  a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff.  
      B: I know! I heard they think that mana and life-force are in the air around us!  
  b. Mary wants to date an Italian and a Spaniard simultaneously.  
  c. If two children are christened Timon and Pumbaa and Disney Inc. finds out about it, they will sue Timon and Pumbaa’s parents.  
  d. If a professor and a famous actress publish a book, they will make a lot of money.

If anchors and appositions are coordinated as I claim, then two expectations arise. First, appositions should be plugged in all environments in which their anchors are plugged, and second, both anchors and appositions should be plugged in those environments in which regular conjuncts are usually plugged (such as those environments exemplified in 34). As the examples in (35) demonstrate, both expectations are met. In each example, the plugged reading observed for regular coordination in (34) is available for the anchor and apposition.11

(35)  
  a. A: That cult believes some silly stuff.  
      B: I know! I heard they think that mana, that is magical power, is in the air around us.  
  b. Mary wants to date an Italian, that is a rich one.  
  c. If a child is christened Bambi and Disney Inc. finds out about it, they will sue Bambi, that is the child’s parents.  
  d. If a professor, that is a famous one, publishes a book, he will make a lot of money.

It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that presupposition projection and semantic scope are different phenomena. In (36a) for instance, Mr. Smith is within the scope of negation, while the existential presupposition that it triggers (there exists Mr. Smith) is not plugged by it. Appositions show identical behaviour to this, as (36b) illustrates.

11 Note that the examples in (35b-d) are modified from examples discussed in Wang et al. 2005 (35b and 35d) and Geurts 1997 (35c).
It seems to me that, since Potts (2005), there has been confusion in the literature about the presupposition projection behaviour of appositions (see Wang et al. 2005, Harris & Potts 2009, Nouwen 2014). This confusion has in part arisen from the fact that some appositive noun phrases are ambiguous between attributions (i.e. reduced parenthetical copular clauses) and true appositions. On their copular clause reading, copular clausal parentheticals are most often interpreted as unplugged, which is caused by the copula’s stativity (Asher & Lascarides 2003). As I have shown in this subsection, this unplugged reading is not inherent to appositive noun phrases, however: true appositions can be plugged. The presence of an apposition marker resolves any ambiguity, and disambiguates otherwise ambiguous appositives as appositions, as mentioned in §2.1.1.

To summarise: like regular coordinated noun phrases, anchors and their appositions can be interpreted as plugged in worlds that are not the actual world in which a conversation is set. That appositional constructions pattern with regularly coordinated noun phrases in this respect provides further support for my claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated.

2.1.6 Prosody

In this subsection (§2.1.6), I discuss the prosody of appositions. For the sake of exposition I adopt the indirect access variant of the autosegmental-metrical approach to prosody, in which syntactic faithfulness constraints (MATCH, Selkirk 2011) compete with constraints on prosodic well-formedness.

According to MATCH and the coordination approach to appositions, subclausal appositions should be prosodically realised as phonological phrases (φs), as the operation MATCH PHRASE always matches subclausal constituents to φs. Conversely, clausal appositions, which I will discuss in detail in §2.2.1, should be realised as intonation phrases (ιs), as MATCH CLAUSE always matches clausal constituents to ιs.

To my knowledge, no quantitative studies on English exist to confirm or refute this prediction (and intuitions appear to vary to an unreliable extent).
However, this prediction has been partially confirmed by Güneş & Çöltekin (to appear), who investigate the prosody of subclausal appositions in Turkish. In particular, Güneş & Çöltekin investigate nominal appositions like (37), whose apposition marker is absent.

   Emir-ACC nephew-POSS-ACC car-INST play-DAT take-PROG-PL
   ‘They are taking Emir, my nephew, to the play by car.’  (ibid.:7)

They report that these appositions display prosodic excursions on their left and right edges that show greater similarity to the excursions observed on regular φs (such as host clause arguments) than those observed on regular ιs (such as the Turkish equivalent of attributions, which are known as ki-clauses). Furthermore, Güneş & Çöltekin observe that excursions on nominal appositions’ left edges are less similar to φ-boundaries than those on their right edges. The authors propose that the stronger boundary observed on the left edge of nominal appositions is caused by a desire to establish prosodic separation between two alike elements (in this case, two coreferent elements), in order to satisfy Richards’ (2010) distinctness condition on linearisation, or some constraint similar to it.

While Güneş & Çöltekin neither compare the prosody of nominal appositions to that of regular second conjuncts nor investigate whether or not prosodic realisation differs if apposition markers are present, I treat their results as encouraging for the claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated. If nominal appositions were actually remnants of clausal ellipsis as some analyses maintain (see §2.2.1), one would expect them to be intonated in the same manner as the host clauses in which they are contained: as ιs. That these appositions are realised as similar to φs casts a (small) shadow of doubt upon such analyses.

Of course further research is required before prosodic data can be considered as decisive in favour of one syntactic analysis of appositions or another. Whether or not Güneş & Çöltekin’s results for Turkish translate to English is unknown. It might be the case that their experiments are irreproducible for English, which, as an intonation language (unlike Turkish), displays a dissimilar sensitivity to prosodic constituency. While Truckenbrodt (2014:325) comments that subclausal appositions in German
do not display the ι-boundaries that they should if they were underlyingly clausal (or more particularly, assertoric) – which provides additional yet anecdotal evidence for the coordination approach to appositions – his conclusions are not derived from a quantitative study, and also there no is expectation that German prosody mirrors English prosody in this regard.\footnote{In intonation languages like English and German, appositions and their anchors can each bear sentential-like stress, as (i) shows (where small caps represents sentential-like stress). When one considers that more than one instance of sentential-like stress is observed elsewhere in utterances from these languages (for instance, in utterances that display multiple foci, as in iiB below), this fact about appositional constructions is unproblematic for my coordination analysis, which requires that multiple instances of sentential-like stress are permitted within a single assertion under certain circumstances. Thanks to Dennis Ott (p.c.) for drawing my attention to this issue. (i) \textbf{JOHN}, i.e. \textit{my BOSS}, is a slave driver. 
(ii) A: Someone stole something.
B: Yeah, \textbf{JOHN} stole \textit{THE BOOK}.}

To summarise: in this subsection (§2.1.7), I discussed the results of experiments carried out by Güneş & Çöltekin on Turkish parentheticals which hint towards the conclusion that subclausal appositions are intonated more like phonological phrases than intonational phrases – something that the coordination analysis of appositions partially predicts. Unexplained by the coordination analysis that I have presented is why, from an intuitive standpoint, subclausal appositions must be set-off from the utterance that surrounds them by prosodic boundary tones while regular subclausal second conjuncts are only optionally prosodically set-off in languages like English. Having excluded the possibility that subclausal appositions are underlyingly clausal (as they would be intonated as is if they were),\footnote{Syntactic evidence that the subclausal appositions that were discussed in this section are not derived from underlying clauses is provided in §2.2.3.} I must conclude that prosody is sensitive to the pragmatic dissimilarities that pertain between subclausal appositions and regular subclausal second conjuncts (see §2.2.6 for a discussion of these pragmatic dissimilarities). How this interaction between prosody and pragmatics can be captured in formal terms is unclear to me, however. (Note that Dehé 2014 contains some pertinent discussion on this topic.)
2.1.7  Appositions as second conjuncts: a summary

In this section (§2.1), I demonstrated that anchors and appositions display the same behaviour as final conjuncts of regular coordination with respect to semantic balance, c-command effects, the realisation of morphological case, word order, and how their existential presuppositions are resolved. Results from a prosody experiment undertaken on Turkish were also used to illustrate that subclausal appositions are intonated more like one would expect if they are syntactically subclausal in that language.

That regular coordination phrases and anchor/apposition phrases display the same behaviour follows naturally from my proposal that anchor/apposition phrases display the same syntax as coordination phrases.

2.2  Considerations for the coordination approach to appositions

The data and arguments listed in §2.1 represent the ‘ideal’ form of my proposal that appositions are coordinated with their anchors. However, as with any dataset and theory based thereupon, the reality of the situation is more complicated. In this subsection (§2.2), I discuss a number of outstanding issues with appositions that went unmentioned in §2.1.

2.2.1  Clausal appositions

The ‘ideal’ form of my proposal that was expounded in §2.1 deliberately neglected the syntax of clausal appositions. Clausal appositions went unmentioned not because they weaken the coordination approach to appositions, but because they introduce a complicating factor, which is ellipsis.

The next four subsections (§2.2.1-2.2.4) aim to expiate this deliberate neglect. To provide a brief overview of these subsections: I first introduce the two classes of clausal apposition that are observed in English, which I call assertoric and vacuous. Because vacuous clausal appositions can host ellipsis while their assertoric counterparts cannot, assertoric appositions will be set aside. In §2.2.2, I introduce stripped vacuous clausal appositions, in which all but one constituent remains unpronounced (Hankamer & Sag 1979). A comparison of the examples in (38) provides a preview of what vacuous
clausal appositions look like (a proper introduction to both assertoric and vacuous clausal appositions immediately follows this overview), and illustrates the difference between the unstripped and stripped subtypes.

(38) a. That he's ill (that John's ill) is worrying.  
    b. That he's ill, John, is worrying.

I then compare two approaches to stripping. For some, remnants survive ellipsis because they move above the ellipsis site (Merchant 2003). For others, remnants need not move to survive ellipsis (Morgan 1973). These two alternatives are schematised below (where strikethrough denotes ellipsis).

(39) a. \([\text{remnant}_1 \ [\text{ELLIPSIS SITE } W \ X_1 Y_1 Z]]\).  
    b. \([\text{ELLIPSIS SITE } W X \ \text{remnant } Y_1 Z]\).

On the assumption that extraction from within an elliptical clause is sensitive to islands,\(^{14}\) and remnants of clausal ellipsis are topicalised elements (Griffiths & Lipták 2014, Weir 2014), I will demonstrate that the sister ellipsis approach to stripping in (39a) is infeasible for stripped clausal appositions like (38b). Because no plausible contemporary formulation of the scattered ellipsis approach in (39b) exists (to my knowledge), I adopt it with trepidation, and describe some of the constraints that must be placed upon it.

At this juncture, the reader might wonder “are the appositions from §2.1 derived from stripped vacuous clausal appositions like (38b), rather than ‘low’ coordination structures?” In §2.2.3, I discuss the extent to which an analysis that claims that subclausal appositions are derived from their stripped clausal counterparts captures the relevant data. I will show that this ‘clausal coordination plus ellipsis’ account is inferior to the ‘subclausal coordination’ approach to appositions that I outlined in §2.1.

\(^{14}\) An influential strand of research on ellipsis typified by Lasnik (2001) has suggested that ellipsis permits island obviation in structural environments where, if ellipsis did not occur, island sensitivity would be observed. However, the current research on ellipsis is now converging on the conservative hypothesis that ellipsis does not repair islands. For particularly convincing support along these lines, see Barros et al. (2014). For highlights of the debate on the purported reparative effect of ellipsis, see Merchant (2001, 2004, 2008), Fox & Lasnik (2003), and Griffiths & Lipták (2014).
My overview of §2.2.1-2.2.4 complete, I now begin my discussion of clausal appositions in earnest by properly introducing the two main types: assertoric and vacuous. First, consider the assertoric clausal apposition in (40) below (see Meyer 1987 for additional examples and discussion).

(40) Sam is a procrastinator, that is to say he evidently spends far too much time running pointless errands when he should be working.

These appositions provide an alternative phrasing of the speech act that the anchor is used to commit. In such cases, the form of the apposition and its anchor is irrelevant. In addition to providing reformulations of their anchors, assertoric appositions can enter into rhetorical relations with their anchors. In the example in (40) for instance, the apposition provides both an alternative phrasing of the speech act for which the anchor is used (as Sam runs pointless errands and Sam is a procrastinator can be used to commit identical acts) and a reason for why Sam is a procrastinator (i.e. Sam is a procrastinator because he runs pointless errands). A similar function is observed in the example in (41), where both the anchor and the apposition describe the concept of being tremendously wealthy, and where the apposition can also be interpreted as a consequence of suddenly acquiring vast wealth.15

(41) We've won the lottery, that is to say we fortunately needn't worry about money anymore.

Now consider clausal appositions that are not assertoric, such as those in (42), which reformulate their hosts in a repetitious and asinine manner. These appositions are used merely as 'hosts' for a relationship of equivalence that holds between two subclausal items (one in the anchor, the other in the apposition). Hereafter, I refer to these items as the correlate and the subapposition respectively. Prosodic prominence is observed on the

15 It should be noted that clausal appositions of this type can bear other illocutionary forces too, as the erotetic example procured from the internet in (i) below shows. I use assertions in the main text as exemplary cases.

(i) What politicians have been the biggest "busts"? In other words, who failed to meet expectations the most?
subapposition, while the remainder of the apposition is deaccented. Even though the ‘true’ anchor in these cases is the entire first clause (i.e. Granny is dead in 42b), I reserve boldface for the correlate in these constructions. I also refrain from denoting with small caps the focal prominence that subappositions bear. (This is simply to avoid mark-up overkill.)

(42) a. The Big Apple is a nice city; that is to say New York is a nice city.
    b. Granny is dead; or rather Granny is now at peace.
    c. John saw her yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday, that is to say.
    d. John spoke to a woman yesterday; he spoke to Mrs. Smith yesterday, to be precise.

The licit use of markers like rather in these types of appositions highlights their function as reformulations of their anchors. Besides the item that bears focal prominence, the words used in such appositions are employed for their form alone. In terms of content, these appositions are vacuous with respect to illocutionary force.

Thus, it appears that the appositions in (42) are echoic phrases that merely repeat a precedent constituent but with minor deviations. Bearing this in mind, one expects that vacuous clausal appositions cannot ‘echo’ material that linearly follows them. This expectation is met, as the examples in (43) demonstrate. In (43a) for instance, the precedent material because x had been rude can be echoed in the apposition, but the successive constituent Pete was angry cannot.

(43) a. Because she’d been rude – because the waitress had been rude (*Pete was angry) – Pete was angry.
    b. That someone had to be fired – that the cleaner had to be fired (*is unfortunate) – is unfortunate.

One also expects the converse situation to pertain, namely that vacuous clausal appositions must echo the entirety of their anchors. The examples in (44) show that this expectation is also met. In (44), for instance, the entire
clause *John gave x to Mary* must be echoed. Merely echoing a portion of the anchor that contains the correlate is illicit.

(44) *John gave it to Mary, that is he gave the book *(to her).

From the data in (43) and (44), the generalisation below arises:

(45) Vacuous second conjuncts must display syntactic and semantic parallelism with the conjunct with which they are coordinated, *modulo* the deviation that pertains between subappositions and their correlates.

To summarise: so far in my study of clausal appositions, I have divided clausal appositions into two types. *Assertoric* clausal appositions rephrase the assertive content of their anchors, and as such may display a different form and narrow semantic composition to their anchors. Conversely, *vacuous* clausal appositions are echoic in nature, and must conform to a parallelism requirement that their assertoric counterparts need not.

2.2.2  *Ellipsis in vacuous clausal appositions*

In the previous subsection, I discussed a subclass of clausal appositions that I called *vacuous* clausal appositions (see the examples in 42 to 44). As I already mentioned, these appositions are used merely as hosts for a relationship of equivalence that holds between the *correlate* and the *subapposition*. Correlates can be deictic expressions, specific indefinites, or conventional denotations. This is exemplified by the examples in (46) to (48) respectively. In these examples, I use sentential subjects and embedded interrogatives as anchors so that the reader is assured that clausal coordination occurs. I also enclose clausal appositions in brackets, as this is an orthographic strategy that is commonly employed in written English. Also, apposition markers are absent for brevity’s sake.
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(46) a. That he was fired \((\text{that the cleaner was fired})\) is unfortunate.
b. That John’s been there \((\text{that he’s been to Oxford})\) surprises me.
c. Lucy wonders whether he ever tries to be that anymore \((\text{whether he ever tries to be romantic anymore})\).

(47) a. That John saw something eerie \((\text{that he saw a ghost})\) is unlikely.
b. Bob asked if Lucy kissed a boy from her class \((\text{if she kissed Bill})\).

(48) a. That the Big Apple is big \((\text{that New York is big})\) is unsurprising.
b. Amy asked me if Granny is now at peace \((\text{if she’s dead})\).
c. Bob wonders whether Brendan confusticates Swantje \((\text{whether he perplexes her})\).

Vacuous clausal appositions display the same information structural division between discourse-old and discourse-new information that is observed in elliptical environments. As such, one expects that elliptical operations like verb phrase ellipsis are permitted in vacuous clausal appositions. This expectation is met:

(49) a. That he’ll be fired \((\text{that the cleaner will})\) is unfortunate.
b. Bob asked if a certain someone was late \((\text{if Amanda was})\).
c. That the Big Apple is big \((\text{that New York is})\) is unsurprising.

As mentioned in §2.2.1, one also expects that stripping, which “deletes everything in a clause under identity with corresponding parts of a preceding clause, except for one constituent” (Hankamer & Sag 1976:409), is permitted in vacuous clausal appositions. Again, this expectation is met, as the examples in (50) show. (In these examples, I have removed the brackets and underlining in the appositions so that a more conventional orthographic representation is obtained.)

(50) a. That he was fired, the cleaner, is unfortunate.
b. Bob asked if a certain someone was late: Amanda.
c. That the Big Apple is expensive, New York, is unsurprising.
The utterances in (50a-b) have already been discussed the literature (see Ott & De Vries 2012 and references therein). The notion that these constructions are derived from clausal coordination (i.e. vacuous clausal appositions) plus ellipsis is encapsulated in the **biclausal analysis**, whose recent advocates are Ott & De Vries (2012) and De Vries (2013a).16

The abovementioned authors advance a biclausal analysis of the constructions in (50) in which the italicised elements (I call them remnants hereafter) survive ellipsis because they move above the ellipsis site:

(51) \[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{APPOSITION remnant}_1 [\text{ELLIPSIS SITE W} X \ldots Y Z].
\end{array}
\] (sister ellipsis)

As I mentioned already, the schema in (51), which is repeated from the introductory part of §2.2.1, represents the **sister ellipsis** approach to clausal ellipsis. This ellipsis is structurally identical to that which Merchant (2004, 2008) claims derives *fragment answers* such as (52B).

(52) A: Who did Mary kiss?
B: \[\text{John}_1 [\text{she kissed}_t].\]

Griffiths & Lipták (2014), Weir (2014), and Griffiths (2015) maintain that fragments are remnants that are extracted to the same syntactic projection to which topicalised elements move in non-elliptical environments. As a **root transformation** (Emonds 1970), topicalisation is permitted only in root clauses, peripheral adverbial clauses (Haegeman 2012), and clausal complements of bridge verbs (Temmerman 2013, Griffiths 2015). Topicalisation is not permitted in strong islands such as sentential subjects and embedded interrogatives in English. For de Cuba (2007), these facts are linked: islandhood is caused by the absence of an elaborated *left periphery* (Rizzi 1997), which hosts topicalised elements.

If indeed topicalisation is banned inside islands, then Ott and De Vries’ analysis incorrectly predicts that examples like (50a) are unacceptable.17 This

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16 While these authors do not discuss constructions like (50c) in the main text, I assume that each would advocate a biclausal analysis of them.

17 Note that, in Ott & De Vries’ analyses, the constraint mentioned in the main text – namely, that the only landing-site available for remnants of clausal ellipsis is the syntactic projection that hosts
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is because the remnant *the cleaner* must be ‘topicalised’ for ellipsis to be licensed, but topicalisation is disallowed because the apposition is a sentential subject and hence an island, as shown below (where the dashed arc denotes the ellipsis site):

\[(53) \quad * \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{CP} \\
\text{TP} \\
\text{&P} \\
\text{CPANCHOR} \\
\text{that he was fired} \\
\text{&}_0 \quad \text{CPAPP} \\
\text{the cleaner} \quad \text{CP} \\
\text{that } t_1 \text{ was fired} \\
\text{VP} \\
\text{is unfortunate}
\end{array}
\]

Note that this analysis cannot be rescued by proposing that the apposition is underlyingly complex, as in (54a), because such a suggestion contravenes the parallelism requirement from (45). Even if the parallelism requirement could be contravened, the topicalisation that is required to derive the elliptical clause in (54a) is illict in non-elliptical environments, as (54b) demonstrates.

\[(54) \quad a. \text{ That he was fired, } [\text{the cleaner} _1 \ [\text{that } t_1 \text{ was fired is unfortunate}], \text{ is unfortunate.} \\
\quad b. \quad * \text{ The cleaner} _1 \ [\text{[island that } t_1 \text{ was fired]} \text{ is unfortunate.}
\]

A feasible alternative to sister ellipsis is to propose that remnants need not move to survive ellipsis:

\[(55) \quad [\text{APPPOSITION} \ [\text{ELLIPSIS SITE W--X remnant Y--Z}]]. \quad \text{(scattered ellipsis)}
\]

As mentioned already, the schema in (55), which is repeated from the introductory part of §2.2.1, represents *scattered* ellipsis. If indeed it exists, topicalised elements in non-elliptical environments – is not emplaced. Consequently, examples like (50a) in the main text are unproblematic for them.
then to my knowledge the syntactic licensing constraints upon this type of ellipsis are not fully formalised (though see Tancredi 1992 and Fernández 2013 for discussion). Because I will later show that regular subclausal appositions are not derived from a biclusal structure, I need not explicate nor endorse a full-fledged theory of scattered deletion here: broad brushstrokes will suffice. ¹⁸

To be charitable, I assume that the necessary conditions on licensing scattered deletion can be formulated and justified. In other words, I claim that all conceptual reasons for discarding scattered ellipsis outright are suppositious. For instance, advocates of the notion that ellipsis is licensed in the syntax might dismiss the feasibility of scattered ellipsis because it seems to target non-constituents. This is untrue. Whether minimal or maximal projections, [W], [X], [Y], and [Z] from the schema in (55) are each constituents ([Y Z] is an additional non-terminal constituent that is suitable for elision), and therefore each is a potential target for ellipsis. One might also claim that, to derive (55), at least three applications of ellipsis are required, which is uneconomical in comparison to the one application of ellipsis that is required on the sister ellipsis approach. This claim assumes that something called ‘ellipsis’ applies as a computational operation. One can reject this assumption. In its stead one might suggest that, included in the feature-bundles that comprise syntactic heads, is a feature (call it [+V]) that instructs the articulatory component of the grammar to superimpose onto it a pronounceable vocabulary item. The absence of [+V] in a feature bundle is ‘ellipsis’ (see Carrera Hernández 2007 for a proposal that is similar to this). If this notion is correct, then the same number of [+V] features furnish a syntactic structure that is derived from sister or scattered ellipsis; this is the amount of [+V]s that is required to pronounce the (top copy of) the remnant. Resultantly, neither approach to ellipsis is conceptually more economical than the other.

¹⁸ Whether scattered deletion is comparable to dependent ellipsis (Williams 1997, Ackema & Szendrői 2002, Carrera Hernández 2007), according to which heads in second conjuncts (and heads of complements thereof) can remain unpronounced, is difficult to ascertain. Dependent ellipsis appears unsuitable for stripped clausal appositions, as it incorrectly predicts that the elision of subject determiners is possible (see Ackema & Szendrői 2002):

(i) * He was hired yesterday, the boss was fired yesterday.
While the conceptual reasons to favour sister ellipsis are unconvincing, empirical reasons to favour it might still be found. However, for the case of stripping in vacuous clausal appositions, these empirical advantages are unobserved. Indeed, the empirical observations discussed in (53) and (54) appear to disfavour sister ellipsis. In the upcoming paragraphs, I ignore sister ellipsis and instead describe (without properly formulating) the constraints that must apply to scattered ellipsis to ensure that it captures the behaviour of stripped vacuous clausal appositions.

Recall that the parallelism requirement from (45) requires that vacuous appositions must be as large as the anchor with which they are coordinated. This means that, underlyingly, the apposition in the example in (56) below must be as large as its entire host clause, regardless of whether or not elision occurs.

(56)  That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired.

Underlying representation:
   a. That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired is a shame.
   b. * That he was fired is a shame; that the cleaner was fired.

If examples like (56) are stripped, as in (57), unacceptability arises (see De Vries 2012 for similar constructions from Dutch).19

(57)  a. * That he was fired is a shame, the cleaner.
     b. * Because a publisher liked his work, Pete was happy: Penguin.

In order to account for the unacceptability of the examples in (57), a construction-specific constraint like (58) is required (a similar construction-

19  The asterisk that accompanies (57a) is challenged by Jan-Wouter Zwart (p.c.), who deems (57a) acceptable. I must therefore note that the judgement reported for (57a) reflects Gundel’s (1988:133), with which I and the vast majority of my British English informants agree (though whether or not the results of an experiment with a sample size large enough to obtain statistical significance supports this judgement is another matter entirely).
specific constraint for stripping that utilises ‘[E]-features’ is introduced in Merchant 2003).  

(58) Remnants of scattered ellipsis must be immediately contained in clauses that are conjuncts (where α is immediately contained in a clause β iff α is not contained in a clause γ that β embeds).

(to be modified)

The constraint in (58) thus permits scattered ellipsis in vacuous clausal appositional constructions that fit the schema in (59a), but bans scattered deletion in those constructions that fit the schema in (59b).

(59) a. …[&P [CPANCHOR …] &0 [CPAPP …remnant…]]… 
b. * …[&P [CPANCHOR …] &0 [CPAPP …[CP …remnant…]]…]

When the correlate in constructions like those in (57) is contrastively focussed, these constructions become acceptable (cf. Ott & De Vries 2012, 2014, and De Vries 2013a). This is shown in the b-examples in (60) and (61). Because their sets of alternatives is more easily retrieved from the context, I have used correlates that are conventional denotations (i.e. proper names) in these examples, rather than deictic expressions and specific indefinites. I allow the reader to confirm for herself that, once a suitable context is emplaced, contrastive focus saves with the same ease constructions that display deictic and indefinite correlates such as those in (57).

20 Mark de Vries (p.c.) suggests that, if one maintains that vacuous clausal appositions like those in (57) are derived by sister ellipsis, then the constraint advanced in (58) is unnecessary. This is because one can appeal to island-sensitivity to account for the unacceptability of utterances like those in (57). Specifically, one can say that (57a) (for instance) is unacceptable because it requires illicit extraction across an island boundary, as (i) below shows.

(i) * That he was fired is a shame, [[the cleaner] [ISLAND that t. was fired] is a shame].

It seems to me that, even if the sister ellipsis approach to stripping in vacuous clausal appositions were feasible, the constraint in (58) would still be needed for an independent reason however, which is to account for the unacceptability of utterances like (ii), in which no island-violating extraction is observed on a sister ellipsis analysis like (iii).

(ii) * I think he will like it here, I think Pete. 
(iii) * I think he will like it here, I think [Pete, t₁ will like it here].
(60) a. * That Bill was fired is a shame, the deputy manager.

   A: That Bob was fired is a shame, you say?
   b. B: No, that BILL was fired is a shame, THE DEPUTY MANAGER.

(61) a. * Because Bob kissed Lucy, Pete’s jealous: my sister.

   A: Because Bob kissed Mary, Pete’s jealous, you say?
   b. B: No, because Bob kissed LUCY, Pete’s jealous – MY SISTER.

That contrastive focus repairs these constructions is unexpected on the scattered ellipsis approach as currently conceived. Because of this, the constraint on scattered ellipsis in (58) must be modified to account for the reparative effect of contrastive focus:

(62) Non-contrastively focussed remnants of scattered ellipsis must be immediately contained in clauses that are conjuncts (where α is immediately contained in a clause β iff α is not contained in a clause γ that β embeds).

(final version)

I do not offer here any speculative remarks about how the constraint in (62) can be theoretically justified. Resultantly, (62) must remain as a mere description of a pattern of acceptability that is observed in stripped vacuous clausal appositions.

To summarise: in this section (§2.2.2), I discussed ellipsis in vacuous clausal appositions. I paid particular attention to stripped clausal appositions, in which only the subapposition is pronounced. I compared two analyses of how reduction is engendered. The first maintains that ellipsis is licensed only if the remnant of ellipsis (the subapposition) moves above the ellipsis site: this is the sister ellipsis approach. The second maintains that ellipsis can be licensed without the need for such movement: this is the scattered ellipsis approach. Because the sister ellipsis approach faces seemingly insurmountable problems, I favoured the scattered ellipsis approach to stripped clausal appositions, regardless of the absence of the necessary formal rigour to underpin it. As such, I will adopt it as a background
assumption in the next section (§2.2.3), where I explore the feasibility of treating subclausal appositions as a subclass of stripped vacuous clausal appositions.

2.2.3  

Subclausal appositions as stripped vacuous clausal appositions?

As I mentioned in the introduction to §2.2.1, one may wonder whether subclausal appositions such as *New York* in (63a) are derived from stripped vacuous appositions such as (63b), whose underlying syntax is shown in (63c). In this subsection, I show that this idea cannot be correct.

(63)  

a.   The Big Apple, New York, is huge.

b.   The Big Apple is huge, New York.

c.   [&P [CP The Big Apple is huge] [CP New York is huge]].

If this line of analysis were correct, then *stylistic reordering* must derive (63a) from (63b). This operation, like other stylistic reordering operations (Sauerland 1998, Chomsky 2001a, Sauerland & Elbourne 2002, Embick & Noyer 2001, Göbbel 2007), reorders a phrase (in this case, *is huge*) rightwards without semantic repercussions and often in violation of Ross’ 1967:185 *right roof constraint*, as (64) demonstrates, where ‘Ω’ represents the reordered element’s base position.

(64)  

Before reordering:  

[&P [CP The Big Apple is huge] [CP New York is huge]].

After reordering:  

[&P [CP The Big Apple Ω₁] [CP New York is huge]] [is huge₁].

This ‘clausal’ coordination analysis of appositions captures many of the properties I utilised in §2.1 to support my ‘low’ coordination analysis of appositions. In §2.1.1, I used the observation that semantic balance must pertain between appositions and their anchors (see the examples below that are modified from 3) to support the notion that appositions and their anchors are directly coordinated.
(65)  a. All campanologists, all bell ringers, dream of ringing at St. Paul’s.
    b. Every unmarried man in the room, every bachelor, is here for a date.

On the clausal coordination analysis, the fact that semantic balance pertains between appositions and their anchors is accidental, and arises from the fact that subappositions and their correlates occupy identical positions in their respective clauses:

(66)  a. \( \&P [CP \text{All campanologists } \Omega_1, [CP all bell ringers dream of ringing at St. Paul’s] ], [dream of ringing at St. Paul’s]_1. \)
    b. \( \&P [CP \text{Every unmarried man in the room } \Omega_1, [CP every bachelor is here for a date] ], [is here for a date]_1. \)

In §2.1.2, I demonstrated that appositions can be bound by c-commanding binders (see the examples below, which are repeated from 20 to 23). I considered these data as evidence for my 'low' coordination approach, as second conjuncts of regular coordination can be c-commanded into, too.

(67)  a. Paul hasn’t received penny-one, anything, from his bank.
    b. Lucy might visit the Big Apple, New York, in September.
    c. Pete can’t touch his nest egg, his trust fund, until he is twenty five.
    d. Every competitor on the cookery TV programme was told that his entry, his jam roly-poly with custard, was too stodgy.

The clausal coordination approach would also account for the data in (67) in a straightforward manner. On this analysis, appositions like anything in (67a) are bound by unpronounced instances of their binders within elliptical clauses, as (68) shows. Resultantly, anything is not c-commanded by the pronounced token of negation in the host clause after all.

(68)  \( \&P [CP \text{Paul hasn’t received penny-one } \Omega_1, [CP Paul hasn’t received anything from his bank] ], [from his bank]_1. \)
The same argument seems to apply to the extraction data from (28), which are repeated in a modified form in (69) below. In §2.1.2, I utilised the observation that only ‘across the board’ extraction of appositions (or subconstituents thereof) is licit to support my claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated in a low fashion.

(69)  
   a. Which country do you hate the motorways of, or the 'highways' of, the most?
   b. * Which country do you hate the motorways of, or the 'highways' of {it/that country}, the most?

According to the clausal coordination approach however, the parallelism constraint from (45) gives the impression that ‘across the board’ extraction is permitted in appositional constructions. In (69a), wh-movement occurs separately in two independent clauses:21

(70)  
   [&P [CP [Which country] do you hate the motorways of t_1 Ω_2], or [CP which country, do you hate the 'highways' of t_3 the most]], [the most]? 

Thus, (69b) is unacceptable because the anchor and the vacuous clausal apposition are not parallel. As (71) demonstrates, the anchor is a wh-question, while the apposition is a declarative clause.

(71)  
   * [&P [CP [Which country] do you hate the motorways of t_1 Ω_2], or [CP you hate the 'highways' of {it / that country} the most]], [the most]? 

Each of the other connectivity effects (Merchant 2001) that were used to support the low coordination analysis of appositions in §2.1 receives an explanation on the clausal coordination approach that is the same as the explanation provided above to explain the observations that appositions can be c-commanded and extracted from. This includes the fact that appositions receive the same case as their anchors, the fact that appositions are plugged

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21 Many thanks to Dennis Ott (p.c.) for bringing my attention to the possibility of (70) in the main text.
Appositions in the same intensional environments as their anchors, and the fact that appositions are introduced by a left-branching head (i.e. a coordinator) in head-final languages like Turkish.

However, while the clausal coordination analysis can capture many of the properties displayed by subclausal appositions, the strict similarities between subclausal appositions and stripped clausal appositions that it predicts to pertain are not observed. To see proof of this, let us first consider the constructions in (72).

(72)  

a. The chief, or main, problem is the military.  
b. Bren confusticates, i.e. perplexes, Swantje.  
c. The wind blows abaft, or behind, the boat.

On the clausal coordination analysis, the examples in (72) are structurally identical to the unacceptable constructions in (73) modulo the reordering operation that brings the purported subapposition adjacent to its correlate.\(^{22}\)

(73)  

a. * The chief problem is the military, or main.  
b. * Bren confusticates Swantje, i.e. perplexes.  
c. * The wind blows abaft the boat, or behind.

The difference in acceptability between the examples in (72) and (73) is unexpected on the clausal coordination account. To account for this discrepancy, an advocate of the clausal coordination analysis must claim that reordering feeds ellipsis. In other words, she must claim that the ellipsis that derives the examples in (72) is licensed only when a reordering operation brings the clausal apposition adjacent to its correlate:

(74)  

Ellipsis licensed:  
\[ \&P [\text{CP Bren confusticates } \Omega_1], [\text{CP Bren perplexes Swantje}], [\text{Swantje}]_1. \]

Ellipsis not licensed:  
\[ \&P [\text{CP Bren confusticates Swantje}, [\text{CP Bren perplexes Swantje}]]. \]

\(^{22}\) Note that the examples in (73) in the main text are unacceptable regardless of whether the italicised elements are contrastively focussed or not.
However, it appears that the converse holds in other environments; that reordering bleeds ellipsis. In constructions like (75) for instance, the presence of the preposition contained within the apposition is mandatory:

(75) Which country do you hate the motorways of, or rather the 'highways' *(of), the most?

Interestingly, of’s absence is strongly preferred in regular stripped clausal appositions, as (76) demonstrates. Thus, it seems that ellipsis of of is licensed only if reordering does not occur.

(76) Which country do you hate the motorways of the most; or rather the 'highways' *(of)?

Although theories of feeding and bleeding could be fashioned so that the clausal coordination analysis of subclausal appositions can be maintained, the hypothesis that low coordination derives subclausal appositions while clausal coordination derives stripped clausal appositions is more parsimonious on this occasion. On this more parsimonious hypothesis, the examples in (73) are unacceptable simply because attributive adjectives, transitive verbs, and prepositions never make for suitable remnants of ellipsis (as the fragment answers in 77 to 79 illustrate). Conversely, the examples in (72) are acceptable because subclausal constituents of any type can be coordinated, provided that semantic balance pertains. The mandatory presence of of in (75) can be explained in exactly the same manner.

(77) A: I heard that our least-pressing problem is the military.
B: * No, main.

(78) A: I’ve been told that Brendan combobulates Swantje.
B: * No, confusticates.

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23 For my British English informants, the presence of of in constructions like (76) in the main text creates unacceptability in cross-speaker environments:

(i) A: Which country do you hate the motorways of the most?
B: You mean the 'highways' *(of), right?
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(79) A: The captain reckons that the wind blows astern the boat.
    B: * No, abaft.

The clausal coordination approach also predicts that a strict correspondence pertains between regular subclausal appositions and stripped clausal appositions with respect to the elision of prepositions in languages like German. As is well-known, German disallows the elision of prepositions in clausal ellipsis environments if the preposition’s noun phrase complement displays the same case as its correlate in the antecedent clause (Merchant 2001, 2004):

(80) Sie hat mit jemandem geredet, aber ich weiß nicht *(mit) wem.
    She has with someone.DAT spoken, but I know not with who.DAT
    ‘She has spoken with someone, but I don’t know who.’

If both subclausal appositions and stripped clausal appositions were derived from clausal ellipsis, then the same constraint observed in (80) should apply to them. While prepositions cannot be omitted in stripped clausal appositions, as the example in (81) that is modified from Ott & De Vries (2012:129) shows, they can be omitted in subclausal appositions, as (82) demonstrates (82 is based on an example from Döring 2014:132, who judges such constructions as slightly degraded).

(81) Ich habe den ganzen Tag auf ihn gewartet, *(auf) den Ad.
    I have the whole day for him.DAT waited, for the.DAT Ad.
    ‘I waited for him the whole day, for Ad.’

(82) Peter hat mit jemandem, (mit) einem Jamaikaner, gesprochen.
    Peter has with someone.DAT with a.DAT Jamaican.DAT spoke
    ‘Peter spoke with someone, a Jamaican.’

The fact that the preposition can be omitted in the subclausal apposition example in (82) but not in the stripped clausal apposition example in (81) is difficult to account for if one adopts the notion that both constructions involve clausal ellipsis. This discrepancy is straightforwardly explained on the current approach however: (82) does not involve clausal ellipsis. Rather,
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It involves low coordination of either preposition phrases (in the case where the preposition is present in the apposition) or noun phrases (in the case where the preposition is absent from the apposition).

In addition to incorrectly predicting that strict similarities pertain between subclausal and stripped clausal appositions, the clausal coordination approach requires that reordering renders ellipsis obligatory. In (83a), in which no reordering occurs, ellipsis is optional, while in (83b) reordering occurs and ellipsis becomes obligatory.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{enumerate}
\item That John's been fired, (that) my brother (has been fired), is sad.
\item That John, (that) my brother (*has been fired),'s been fired is sad.
\end{enumerate}

Again, an advocate of clausal coordination can claim that stylistic reordering bleeds optional ellipsis in constructions like (83b). However, when one considers that stripping is an optional process in all other environments, such a claim must be met with suspicion. Coupled with the fact that a simpler analysis is available (namely, that subclausal appositions are derived from 'WYSIWYG' low coordination), the clausal coordination analysis of appositions must be rejected.

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that a somewhat different biclausal analysis of appositions can be pursued that does not involve clausal coordination. This analysis maintains that, regardless of whether they arise adjacent to their anchors or at the edge of the clauses that contain their anchors, appositions are the remnants of stripped clauses that are syntactically unconnected to their host clauses. On such an analysis, the examples in (84) display the syntax in (85), where no coordination is observed.

\textsuperscript{24} The fact that that can be retained in (83b) in the main text demonstrates that right node raising is possible in vacuous clausal appositions. Thus, in (i) below, been fired is shared by both that John has and that my brother has. Although the possibility of right node raising greatly increases the number of possible surface permutations for sentences that contain vacuous clausal appositions, it does not impact upon analyses of how stripped vacuous clausal appositions are formed. Because of this, I will ignore them hereafter.

(i) [That John has, that my brother has, been fired] is sad.
This is an orphanage analysis (cf. Döring 2014, Ott 2014a, b). It maintains that the host utterance (i.e. *Mary visited the Big Apple at Easter* in 85a) is constructed in complete isolation to the elliptical clause (i.e. *Mary visited New York* in 85a). According to this approach, the precedence relations that persist between *Apple* and the unpronounced token of *Mary* in (85a) are not established in syntax. Rather, they are established when the host and the elliptical clauses (orphan clauses) are articulated.

For the moment, let us assume that orphanage is conceptually desirable. This is a charitable assumption: in §6.2 I show that, in reality, adoption of the orphanage approach to parentheticals requires adoption of a number of unorthodox assumptions. In the remainder of this subsection, my objective is simply to illustrate that the orphanage analysis exemplified by (85) is, like clausal coordination analysis, inferior to the low coordination approach to appositions that was advanced in §2.1.

With respect to connectivity effects, the orphanage analysis is identical to the clausal coordination analysis. As such, the clausal coordination and orphanage analyses capture equally well the behaviour of appositions with respect to semantic balance, c-command and extraction, morphological case matching, presupposition projection, and the distribution of reflexives. In one respect the orphanage analysis is favoured over the clausal coordination analysis, as its advocates need not make recourse to a nebulous 'stylistic reordering' operation to ensure that appositions can appear adjacent to their anchors. Rather, a pragmatic condition (see Ott 2014a, b) dictates that orphaned elliptical clauses can only interpolate into their hosts either adjacent to their anchors, or at the edge of the clauses that immediately contain their anchors.

The main issue with this biclausal orphanage analysis of appositions is that it requires that ellipsis is sometimes optional, sometimes partly optional
and partly obligatory, and sometimes obligatory. To see this, first consider the example in (86) below.

(86) Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, this candidate.

The derivation for (86) cannot be (87a-b) on the orphanage account, as independent clauses cannot be introduced by complementisers like whether. (The sister ellipsis derivation in 87a, which is utilised by Döring 2014, is illicit for another reason: it requires topicalisation in a clause that does not permit it.)

(87)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Sister ellipsis}
\begin{enumerate}
\item * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, \[ CP \text{this candidate}_1 \[ \text{whether } t_1 \text{ is the right choice} ] \].
\end{enumerate}

\item \textit{Scattered ellipsis}
\begin{enumerate}
\item * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, \[ CP \text{whether this candidate is the right choice} \].
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

Bearing this in mind, one might entertain the notion that the correct derivation for (86) is (88), where the elliptical clause is a root clause:

(88)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Sister ellipsis}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, \[ CP \text{this candidate}_1 \[ t_1 \text{ is the right choice} ] \].
\end{enumerate}

\item \textit{Scattered ellipsis}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, \[ CP \text{this candidate is the right choice} \].
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

Problematically, the root clause sources in (88) provide incorrect interpretations. The derivations in (88) are equivalent in meaning to (89a), while the construction in (86) is actually interpreted as equivalent to (89b).
(89) a. Lucy wonders whether [this candidate] is the right choice. He is the right choice.
   b. Lucy wonders whether [this candidate] is the right choice. She wonders whether he is the right choice.

If one relinquishes the idea that syntactic isomorphism must pertain between the host clause and the elliptical clause (contrary to the parallelism requirement in 45), then the elliptical clause could perhaps be copular clausal:

(90) *Sister ellipsis*
   a. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [this candidate, \([\{he/it\} \, is \, t]_1\)].

   *Scattered ellipsis*
   b. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, \([\{he/it\} \, is \, this \, candidate\]_1\).

However, such constructions are not only nonsensical if ellipsis does not occur (as the example in 91 shows), but they incorrectly predict that the appositions in the constructions exemplified by (86) are always assigned predicate case. While this claim cannot be tested in English, the fact that Turkish appositional constructions that are structurally similar to the example in (86) must be assigned a non-predicate case (i.e. not nominative case) provides evidence that the claim is false (see 92, where Ayşe’s pregnancy exists in Ali’s mental world alone).

(91) * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice; \{he/it\} is this candidate.
Resultantly, it appears that orphaned elliptical clauses must always be full-fledged. In other words, the elliptical clause in the derivation of (86) must be the complex clause observed in (93) on the orphanage approach. Because extraction of the remnant crosses an island boundary in such derivations (as 93a shows), only the scattered ellipsis approach to reduction is feasible in such constructions (i.e. only the derivation in 93b is feasible).

(93)  

Sister ellipsis  

a. * Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [\text{CP} this candidate \text{1} \\
Lucy wonders [\text{ISLAND} whether t1 is the right choice]].

Scattered ellipsis  

b. Lucy wonders whether he’s the right choice, [\text{CP} Lucy wonders [\text{ISLAND} whether this candidate is the right choice]].

As the reader can confirm, the derivation in (93b) is acceptable (albeit redundant) when ellipsis does not occur. The same cannot be said for the derivation that the orphanage approach to appositions dictates underlies the construction in (94a) however, which is (94b). As (94b) shows, ellipsis appears to be partly optional and partly obligatory in such examples; had to be fired is optionally elided, while is unfortunate is obligatorily elided.

(94)  

a. That someone had to be fired (the cleaner) is unfortunate.

b. That someone had to be fired [[(that) the cleaner (had to be fired)] (*is unfortunate)] is unfortunate.

In the variation upon (94a) that is provided in (95a), ellipsis is no longer partly optional. Rather, it is obligatory, as (95b) shows.
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(95)  a. That someone *(the cleaner)* had to be fired is unfortunate.
    b. That someone [[(that) the cleaner (*had to be fired)] (*is unfortunate)] had to be fired is unfortunate.

To my knowledge, no form of clausal ellipsis is fully optional (93b), partly optional and partly obligatory (94b), and fully obligatory (95b) depending upon the linear position of the elliptical clause. While interpolated yet unconnected elliptical clauses might prove to be an exception to this rule, the most parsimonious conclusion to draw from the data in (93) to (95) is that the biclausal orphanage approach is infeasible because it places *ad hoc* constraints on ellipsis. A simpler analysis is this: those appositions that arise on the right edges of clauses that contain their anchors are remnants of stripped vacuous clausal appositions (where stripping is created by scattered ellipsis), while those appositions that arise adjacent to their anchors are directly coordinated with their anchors in a low, WYSIWYG fashion.

2.2.4  Clausal appositions: a summary

In §2.2.1 to §2.2.3, I discussed clausal appositions. I paid particular attention to *vacuous* clausal appositions, in which ellipsis can be licensed. I demonstrated that stripped vacuous clausal appositions are best understood as derived from *scattered* (rather than *sister*) ellipsis. I also explored the feasibility of the idea that subclausal appositions of the type that were analysed in §2.1 are derived from stripped clausal appositions, and concluded that this idea is infeasible. The same conclusion was reached about the *biclausal orphanage* approach to appositions, which utilises ‘biclausal plus ellipsis’ syntactic derivations in a similar manner to the ‘clausal coordination’ analysis of subclausal appositions. Ultimately, the discussion in §2.2.1 to §2.2.3 served to emphasise that, while the existence of clausal appositions muddy the low coordination analysis of subclausal appositions presented in §2.1, the low coordination analysis remains superior to its biclausal competitors.25

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It should be noted that the vacuity observed in the vacuous clausal appositions that were the focus of the previous three subsections is not restricted to them. In reality, vacuity can be seen in second conjuncts of all types, as (i) and (ii) exemplify. This lack of restriction is expected, as there is no reason that echoicicy should be reserved for clauses alone.
2.2.5  **Appositions and epistemic and evaluative adverbs**

In the ‘ideal’ form of my coordination analysis of appositions advanced in §2.1, I outlined a way to delimit structurally ambiguous appositive noun phrases as appositions (rather than attributions) that involved adding elements to the appositive noun phrase to force a ‘reformulative’ interpretation. More specifically, I claimed that the presence of *apposition markers* in appositive noun phrases disambiguates them as appositions. This claim was encapsulated in the diagnostic from (16) in §2.1, which is repeated in (96) below.

(96) Where \( \alpha \) is the appositive noun phrase:

If \( \alpha \) can host an apposition marker, then \( \alpha \) is an apposition. Otherwise, \( \alpha \) is an attribution.

While I provided a way to disambiguate ambiguous appositive noun phrases as appositions by introducing new elements, I did not provide a way to disambiguate such appositive noun phrases as *attributions* by introducing new elements. This oversight was not accidental. Other scholars have suggested that the presence of epistemic and evaluative adverbs in appositive noun phrases disambiguates them as attributions (Cardoso & De Vries 2010:18, Heringa 2011). In this subsection, I aim to show that, contrary to these authors’ claim, epistemic and evaluative adverbs such as *probably* and *unfortunately* do not provide a straightforward means of delimitation after all.

The reasoning behind using epistemic and evaluative adverbs to delimit appositive noun phrases as attributions runs as follows. Appositions that look subclausal on the surface actually are subclausal underneath (see §2.1), while attributions that look subclausal on the surface are actually remnants

(i) That the boss **fired her** – *fired Mary*, that is to say – was completely unexpected.

(ii) That John **has ignored her** – *has ignored Mary* – is impolite.

Thus, vacuous clausal appositions are a subclass of vacuous appositions more generally (or *vappositions*, to coin a term), as I mentioned in chapter one. I focussed on clausal ‘vappositions’ in §2.2.1 to §2.2.3 because contemporaneous scholars – whose conclusions I sought to question – have been concerned with only them. While their existence helps to strengthen coordination analyses of appositions, a deeper investigation into subclausal ‘vappositions’ must be left for future research.
of elliptical copular clauses (as per their definiens). Epistemic and evaluative adverbs select for propositions, and as such can only modify appositive noun phrases that are underlyingly clausal. Because attributions but not subclausal appositions are underlyingly clausal, the presence of epistemic or evaluative adverbs delimits appositive noun phrases as attributions.

While this method of delimitation works as a ‘rule of thumb’, complicating factors make it unreliable as decisive means of disambiguation. The first complicating factor is that epistemic adverbs do not always modify clauses; they can modify definite and indefinite noun phrases in an ‘in-situ’ manner (Bogal-Allbritten 2013). In other words, the adverbs possibly, perhaps, and probably do not scope over the entire sentence in utterances like those in (97). Rather, these adverbs only scope over the noun phrases that they immediately precede.26

(97) a. Mate ate possibly the most expensive pizza in Amherst.
    b. Mary drank perhaps {an/the} American bourbon.
    c. Mary is meeting with probably a nurse practitioner.

(Bogal-Allbritten 2013:51)

To ensure that the output of their concatenation with epistemic adverbs is semantically well-formed, Bogal-Allbritten claims that these noun phrases are type-shifted to intensional properties. However, their syntactic category remains constant (i.e. these noun phrases remain DPs). If epistemic adverbs can indeed modify noun phrases in this manner, then they cannot be employed to delimit definite and specific indefinite appositive noun phrases as attributions. This is because the presence of such adverbs is not necessarily indicative of underlying clausal structure. The epistemic adverb could be

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26 Heringa (2011:99-101) dismisses the idea that epistemic adverbs can modify noun phrases ‘in-situ’. He claims that, even when they are observed adjacent to noun phrases, epistemic adverbs always modify tensed clauses in which such noun phrases are contained. To support this claim, Heringa argues that epistemic adverbs cannot appear adjacent to noun phrases in small clauses, which are tenseless:

(i) * They considered [his death probably a suicide].

Heringa 2011:99)

While it is indeed unacceptable with broad-focus, the example in (i) is acceptable for me if narrow focus is observed on a suicide. Thus, the interpretation of (i) is (roughly) ‘they considered his death something, and that something is probably a suicide’. The examples from Bogal-Allbritten (2013) in the main text are interpreted similarly.
either be (i) modifying a type-shifted noun phrase (i.e. an apposition, as in 98a), or (ii) modifying an underlying clause (i.e. an attribution, as in 98b).

(98) a. \[ \text{[SP [DP Someone,] [DP probably [DP Pete]]]}, has been fired. \\
     b. \[ [DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it was probably Pete]], has been fired. \\

In English and Turkish, it appears that the option exemplified by (98a) is never utilised. In both languages, definite and specific indefinite appositive noun phrases cannot host apposition markers and epistemic adverbs simultaneously, as the examples from English in (99) verify. 27

(99) a. * London, in other words allegedly the capital of England, is a filthy city. \\
     b. * A masked man, i.e. probably Pete, kissed Miranda at the party. \\
     c. * A rose, or evidently a perennial of the genus Rosa, is a symbol for romance.

In Turkish, appositive noun phrases cannot simultaneously host epistemic adverbs and display the same case as their non-subject anchors. Such appositive noun phrases must display nominative case, as (100) shows. This indicates that the appositive noun phrase in (100) is a predicate nominal (as predicate nominals in Turkish display nominative case) and hence an attribution.

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27 Pavel Rudnev (p.c.) observes that an example like (99a) in the main text is acceptable if the epistemic adverb allegedly is intonated with longer-than-usual boundary pauses (as indicated orthographically with brackets in (i) below).

(i) London, in other words the capital of England (allegedly!), is a filthy city.

In (i), the adverb comments upon the consequences of using the apposition (i.e. 'it’s only an allegation that another name for London is the capital of England'). Thus, one must distinguish between the conventional use of epistemic adverbs (as in 99a in the main text), and the metalinguistic use (as in (i) above). In the remainder of this subsection, I ignore this metalinguistic use of epistemic and evaluative adverbs, and concentrate solely on their conventional use.
If the derivation exemplified by (98a) were an option for English and Turkish, then the asterisked cases in (99) would be acceptable. That they are unacceptable suggests that the schema exemplified by (98a) is banned. Future research must determine whether or not (and why, if so) the derivation exemplified by (98a) is universally illegitimate. For now, I will maintain a cautious stance that epistemic adverbs should not be used to delimit definite and specific indefinite appositive noun phrases as attributions cross-linguistically.

Stripped vacuous clausal appositions also create additional complications for the idea that epistemic and evaluative adverbs can be used to delimit ambiguous appositive noun phrases as attributions.

As I already mentioned in §2.2.1, vacuous clausal appositions such as (101) are echoic in nature.

(101) John saw Mary yesterday; he saw his ex-wife yesterday, that is to say.

Like echoic clauses such as the protasis in (102B), these appositions can host semantically vacuous epistemic and evaluative adverbs, provided that they ‘echo’ epistemic and evaluative adverbs that are exhibited in an antecedent clause (compare 103a and 103b).

(102) A: Howard’s probably sick.

B: Well if [ECHO Howard’s probably sick], then you’ve gotta do his job for him!
(103) a. **John unfortunately saw Mary yesterday; he unfortunately saw his ex-wife yesterday**, that is to say.
    b. **John saw Mary yesterday; he (*unfortunately) saw his ex-wife yesterday**, that is to say.

For me and my British English informants, the stripped counterpart of (103a) is unacceptable if the epistemic adverb survives ellipsis (where the appositive is interpreted as *John unfortunately saw his ex-wife*, not *she is unfortunately his ex-wife*):

(104) * **John unfortunately saw Mary yesterday; unfortunately his ex-wife.**

The unacceptability of (104) shows that, as a discourse-old item, the token of *unfortunately* that is displayed in the apposition in (104) must undergo stripping (the same requirement holds for Turkish). Note that this differs from cases of stripping in regular coordination environments, in which discourse-new non-echoic epistemic and evaluative adverbs can survive ellipsis, as (105) shows (Merchant 2003).

(105) Abby speaks passable Dutch, and {probably/possibly/fortunately} Ben speaks passable Dutch, too.

The fact that echoic epistemic and evaluative adverbs cannot survive stripping in English and Turkish clausal appositions might not pertain cross-linguistically; the constraints on stripping in clausal appositions in other languages might be less stringent, and hence might permit discourse-old epistemic and evaluative adverbs to survive stripping. Once again taking a cautious stance, I suggest that the fact that epistemic and evaluative adverbs might in some languages survive ellipsis in clausal appositions makes their use as delimiters of attributions unreliable.

On a more positive note, the presence of temporal adverbs in appositive noun phrases can straightforwardly delimit such noun phrases as attributions (Quirk et al. 1972, O’Connor 2007, Heringa 2011, Döring 2014):
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(106) a. **Ben, then my housemate,** would always forget to wash up.
    b. **Frank, once a footballer,** retired when he injured his knee.
    c. **Karl, now my nemesis,** stole my ideas.

The reasoning behind the use of temporal adverbs to delimit appositive noun phrases as attributions is the same as before. Because attributions are remnants of elliptical clauses while appositions are subclausal, the presence of temporal adverbs delimits attributions because such adverbs only modify tensed clauses. Beyond the fact that the presence of temporal adverbs forces ‘predicate nominal’ interpretations of the italicised noun phrases in (106), evidence that temporal adverbs cannot modify appositions comes from the observation that apposition markers and temporal adverbs cannot co-occur:28

(107) a. * **Sally, that is to say then John’s wife,** moved to London in 2005.
    b. * **Obama, i.e. now the president of the USA,** is an ineffectual leader.

The observations in (106) and (107) therefore give rise to an additional diagnostic:

(108) Where α is the appositive noun phrase:
    If α can host a temporal adverb, then α is an attribution. Otherwise, α is an apposition.

It should be noted here that Acuña-Fariña (2000) claims that temporal markers (and other adverbs that expose underlyingly clausal structure) and

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28 Mark de Vries (p.c.) suggests that *subordinators* (Heringa 2011:103) such as *whether* and *(a)though* could also be utilised to delimit ambiguous appositive noun phrases as attributions (cf. O’Connor 2008). While the addition of subordinators certainly exposes underlying clausal structure (compare (i) to (ii)), the resulting clausal structure is not, strictly speaking, one from which an attribution can be derived. This is because attributions are derived from *and*-parenthetics like (iii) (or so I argue in next chapter).

(i) A second-year student, a sophomore, knows more about linguistics than some third-year students.
(ii) A second-year student, although a sophomore, knows more about linguistics …
(iii) A second-year student, (and she is) a sophomore, knows more about linguistics …
Appositions can co-occur in appositive constructions. The examples he provides as evidence are listed in (109) below.

(109) a. Maureen, [that is to say/you know] (basically) a timid girl, stood up and expressed her opinions rather fiercely, I would say.

b. The president, that is to say currently Bill Clinton, is the commander in chief of the armed forces.

For me and my informants, the example in (109b) is unacceptable, while the example in (109a) is acceptable only when the purported apposition marker is you know. I suggest that you know (and similar phrases like I mean) also function as fillers, and are interpreted as such in utterances like (109a). If this is true then Acuña-Fariña’s (2000) contention that apposition markers fail to sufficiently delimit ‘true’ appositions from disparate appositive constructions is unwarranted. When the marker in question is controlled for – that is to say, when the marker cannot perform an additional function aside from reformulation – the generalisation in (96) withstands empirical scrutiny.

To summarise: in this section (§2.2.4), I resumed the discussion from §2.1 about how to delimit structurally ambiguous appositive noun phrases as either appositions or attributions. I discussed Cardoso & De Vries’ (2010) and Heringa’s (2011) suggestion that the presence of epistemic and evaluative adverbs delimits appositive noun phrases as attributions, and showed that complicating factors, such as the observation that epistemic adverbs can modify nouns and that epistemic and evaluative adverbs can survive stripping, make this diagnostic of attributionhood unreliable.

2.2.6 The function of appositions, and hyponymy

Each of the appositions discussed in §2.1 exemplify the reformulative (Blakemore 1993, 1996, 2007) function of appositions. As already seen, these appositions – of which (110) is a member – provide an alternative and often more informative ‘name’ for the element that their anchor denotes. Recall also from §2.1.1 that the element for which the apposition provides an alternative ‘name’ need not bear an atomic semantic type (i.e. e or t), as transitive verbs and adjectives, which bear the complex semantic types (e, (e, t)) and (e, t) respectively, can be rechristened too.
(110) **The Big Apple**, or *New York*, is a huge city.

Not mentioned in §2.1 is the fact that appositions are often able to ‘identify’ nominal anchors. This is illustrated in (111). Here, the speaker has two specific Shakespeare plays in mind, and the apposition serves to inform her interlocutor(s) of which plays they are.\(^{29}\)

(111) **Two Shakespeare plays**, (*or) *Hamlet and Macbeth*, are being performed at the Globe this week.

Unlike in (110), the apposition marker *or* cannot be used to introduce those appositions exemplified by (111). This suggests that an interpretative difference pertains between reformulation and identification. The difference seems intuitive enough: *the Big Apple* in (110) is maximally informative from a conventional perspective, while *two Shakespeare plays* is not. In other words, if the hearer knows the conventional meaning of *the Big Apple* (i.e. that it conventionally denotes the USA’s most populous city), the addition of the apposition *New York* is pragmatically redundant. Conversely, an alternative conventional denotation of the set *two Shakespeare plays* in (111) is not *Hamlet and Macbeth*: only contextual knowledge that the hearer possesses renders the apposition in (111) redundant (such an occasion would arise if the hearer already knows the schedule for the Globe theatre that week). Thus, while both appositions serve to aid the hearer’s association of the anchor with its intended signifié (to use Saussure’s term), reformulative appositions are used when the speaker assumes that the hearer has a lack of conventional knowledge, while identificational appositions are used when the speaker assumes that the hearer has a lack of contextual knowledge.

Beyond reformulation and identification, it appears that relations of *hyponymy* can be expressed with (non-)nominal appositions too (Heringa 2011). This is illustrated in the examples in (112) below.

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\(^{29}\) McCawley’s (1998:468) oft-cited example in (i) is another example of an *identificational* appositional construction.

(i) **A recent winner of the Illinois State Lottery**, *(namely)* *Albert Swenson*, has announced that he plans to move to Bermuda.
The soldier tortured, {and/but} in particular waterboarded, his captive.

Pete uses red, {and/but} especially crimson, paint in his artwork.

The appositions in (112) are instances of what Quirk et al. (1985) call *particularisation*. In such cases, the apposition is a *hyponym* of the concept denoted by its anchor. In other words, the appositions in (112) spell out the fact that waterboarding is a method of torture, and that crimson is a shade of red.

It is worth pointing out here that some ‘particularising’ appositions appear to affect the truth conditions of their host sentence, while others do not. In the examples in (112), the truth conditions of the host clause appear to be affected by the appositions’ presence. If the apposition were absent in (112a), the sentence would be true if the soldier applied other techniques of torture aside from waterboarding. However when the apposition is present, waterboarding must have been used. Conversely, in the example in (113), the apposition’s presence does not seem to affect the host clause’s truth conditions. Rather, the apposition merely spells out an implicature that was already present (as Cameron, as a politician, is a member of the set all politicians).

All politicians, {and/but} especially Cameron, are crooks.

As mentioned in the introductory paragraph of §2.1, I claim that pragmatic factors are responsible for the unusual interpretation of coordinators in appositional constructions, following Burton-Roberts (1993) and Blakemore (2007). The coordinator or provides a useful example case. In cases of regular coordination such as (114), or receives an exclusive interpretation, while in appositional constructions like (110), or receives a free choice interpretation (i.e. while both the names the Big Apple and New York must be associated with the place that is a huge city, it does not matter which of these names is utilised in the explication of 110).

They will hire John or Pete.
The exclusive reading of (114) is often attributed to how scalar implicatures are computed (Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979). On the assumption that \textit{or} in (114) is the logical connective \textit{v}, a scalar implicature of (114) is (115), which is logically 'stronger' than (114).

(115) They will hire John and Pete.

Because, on Gricean reasoning, the hearer will assume that the speaker would have said (115) if that is what she meant (roughly speaking), (115) is removed from the possible interpretations of (114). Consequently, only an exclusive interpretation of \textit{or} in (114) remains.

Similar Gricean reasoning extends to the coordinator that is observed in appositions like (110). If understood as involving the regular coordination of extensions, (110) either creates a logical contradiction or provides redundant information. More specifically, contradiction arises if (116a) is true and (116b) is false, or redundancy occurs if both (116a) and (116b) are true or false.

(116) a. [The Big Apple], is a huge city.
    b. [New York], is a huge city

Because cooperative speakers should be informative, one infers that appositional constructions therefore involve the coordination of names for extensions, rather than extensions themselves. On this interpretation, redundancy again arises if \textit{or} is understood as exclusive, as the truth value of a construction like (110) remains unaltered regardless of whether \textit{the Big Apple} or \textit{New York} is employed as the name for the extension of the entity that occupies (110)'s subject position. Thus, the utterance in (110) is only informative if \textit{or} is interpreted as inclusive. From this, the free choice interpretation of \textit{or} in (110) arises (cf. Levy & Potts 2015).

A similar explanation can be invoked for the coordinators observed in instances of particularisation such as (112). I suggest that the emphatic interpretation of such constructions is caused by the fact that, as examples of regular coordination, these utterances involve redundancy. Thus, one infers from this redundancy that an emphatic ancillary message is conveyed.
If one of the functions of appositions is the conveyance of relations of hyponymy, one might wonder if the sentences displayed in (117) also contain appositions.

(117) a. My family, excluding my grandmother, are expatriating to Rome.
    b. I think that all rodents, including all rats, should be exterminated.

Syntactic evidence suggests that the italicised strings in these constructions merely replicate the function of appositions: they are not ‘true’ appositions after all. To see this, let us consider how the constructions in (117) distribute with respect to ‘across the board’ extraction.

In §2.1.2, I utilised the observation that only across the board extraction of appositions (or subconstituents thereof) is licit to support my claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated in a low fashion:

(118) Which country do you hate the motorways of, or as the Americans say the ‘highways’ of (*{it / that county}), the most?

As (118) shows, particularisation constructions pattern identically to their reformulative counterparts with respect to across the board extraction, as (119) shows. This fact supports my claim that particularisation constructions are indeed appositions.

(119) Which country do you hate the roads of, but especially the motorways of (*{it / that county}), the most?

However, the inclusive/exclusive phrases from (117) pattern dissimilarly with respect to across the board extraction, as illustrated in (120) below. Here, phrases like it or that country, which appear to resume the wh-phrase which country, are optional.

(120) Which country do you hate the roads of ti, including the motorways of (*{it / that county}), the most?
This observation indicates that the gap displayed in (120) is *parasitic* (Ross 1967) on the *wh*-extraction in the host clause. The fact that optional parasitic gaps are often observed in adjuncts (see 121) suggests that the phrases introduced by *including* and *excluding* in the preceding examples are actually adjuncts rather than true appositions.

(121) a. Which memo did you burn without reading (it)?
   b. Which starter did you order after you tried (it)?

Before I conclude this subsection (§2.3.1), I wish to note that hyponymous appositions can be utilised to provide additional support for my claim that appositions are directly coordinated with their anchors. This evidence concerns *recoverability* under ellipsis.

In (122a), the ellipsis site, which is represented by Δ, is interpreted as *enjoy the company of friends especially Brendan*, while in (122b) the deictic element *the same* is understood as coreferent with *talk about ethics particularly free will*. This shows that appositions are recoverable under ellipsis.

(122) a. For the last few days Alice has enjoyed the company of *my friends*, especially *Brendan*, and I think that today she will Δ too.
   b. Professor Jones talked about *ethics*, particularly *free will*, for a long time last night, and I bet that he’ll do *the same* tonight too.

The need to recover the apposition can create incoherence. This is seen in (123). Here, *Brendan* cannot be writing songs with the band, because he is part of the band.

(123) # Pete has been writing songs with *the band*, particularly *Brendan*, and Brendan has too.

This behaviour is predicted on my coordination analysis of appositions, as no information about the second conjunct is lost under ellipsis or coreference in regular coordination:
To summarise: in this section (§2.2.6), I suggested that pragmatic factors are responsible for the differing interpretative functions of regular and appositional coordinators such as or. I also showed that appositionhood extends beyond reformulation and identification (i.e. synonymy) to constructions that exemplify their anchors. However, I warned that appositionhood should not be extended to adjuncts that are introduced by including or excluding, as such phrases fail to pattern like paradigmatic appositions with respect to ‘across the board’ extraction.

2.3 Concluding remarks on appositions

In §2.1 of this chapter, I advanced the idea that appositions (and not attributions) are directly coordinated with their anchors. I used distributional, syntactic, and basic semantic evidence to support this claim. If my analysis is correct, then appositions are not parentheticals in any real sense, unless one wishes to call the second conjuncts of regular coordination as such. The prosodic results available at the current time also hint towards this conclusion, and suggest that appositions are intonated differently to their regular coordination counterparts because appositions and their anchors share a referent, while regular conjuncts do not.

In §2.2, I discussed a number of disparate phenomena that serve to complicate (and thus potentially weaken) my claim that appositions and their anchors are coordinated. The majority of §2.2 was concerned with clausal appositions and the ellipsis operations that can be licensed therein. I discussed how the stripping that is observed in certain clausal appositions should be characterised, and assessed the claim – which competes with the claim from §2.1 – that regular subclausal appositions are actually constituents of clausal appositions in which ellipsis occurs. I concluded that this ‘clausal ellipsis’ analysis is inferior to the analysis advanced in §2.1. The final parts of §2.2 (namely, §2.2.5 and §2.2.6) were devoted to ‘miscellanea’ that are relevant to the study of appositions more generally. In §2.2.5 I showed that epistemic and evaluative adverbs make for unreliable delimiters of attributions, while in §2.2.6 I proposed that the coordinators observed in
Appositions are different from the coordinators seen in regular coordination in terms of their pragmatics alone (Burton-Roberts 1993, Blakemore 2007). This latter conclusion leads to the characterisation of apposition as a syntactic *exaptation* of coordination.
3

Attributions

The focus of this chapter is finite copulative parenthetical clauses (a subset of Kavalova’s 2007 and-parentheticals) in which only the postcopular phrase is pronounced. I call these reduced parenthetical clauses attributions. In §3.1, I introduce attributions and highlight the fact that, because they have two possible sources, which are predicative – ‘(John is) a doctor’ – and truncated cleft – ‘(It was) Pete’ – copular clauses, attributions can be non-referential or referential. In §3.2, I outline my syntactic analysis of attributions, which treats their source clauses as Force phrases that freely adjoin to their host, and which explicates the means by which the functional elements (i.e. the subject, auxiliaries, the copula) in these clauses are rendered unpronounced. In §3.3, I introduce means by which attributions can be delimited from similar-looking but ultimately dissimilar appositives. In §3.4-3.5, I provide evidence for the analysis of attributions outlined in §3.2.

3.1 Introductory remarks

The focus of this chapter is parenthetical clauses whose core is either (i) a predicational copular clause whose subject is a pronoun or (ii) a truncated cleft copula clause.

(1) He is a nice guy.  
(2) It’s Pete.

In predicational copular clauses, the subject denotes an entity and the postcopular item denotes a property. In truncated clefts, the subject denotes a property and the postcopular item denotes an entity (Mikkelsen 2005). In regular definite descriptions such as (3a), the predicate noun (man) is provided by regular vocabulary insertion. In the case of pronouns like it in (2), the predicate noun is retrieved via coreference with a salient property
contained within the surrounding discourse (Cooper 1979). As a consequence, the predicate noun phrase is not vocabulary-inserted and is therefore phonologically unrealised, as (3b) shows. The absence of a phonologically realised predicate noun phrase results in the determiner being realised as *it* rather than *the* (Elbourne 2001, and ultimately Postal 1966). In truncated clefts, the DP in (3b) is type-shifted to a unary predicate by Partee’s (1987) IDENT operator.

(3) a. DP  
\[\lambda [\text{man}(x)] \]  
\[\text{D}^0 \quad \text{NP} \]  
\[\text{the} \quad \text{man} \]  
\[\lambda P \chi [P(x)] \quad \lambda y [\text{man}(y)] \]  
  
\[\text{D}^0 \quad \text{NP} \]  
\[\text{it} \quad \text{Ø} \]  
\[\lambda P \chi [P(x)] \quad \lambda y [R(y)] \]  

Parenthetical versions of (1) and (2), and various permutations thereon, are commonplace, as the examples in (4) and (5) illustrate. Provided pragmatic coherence is obtained, these interpolations may occupy any position within their host that does not split up major prosodic constituents like verb, preposition, and noun phrases (these positions are called *niches* in Ross 1984). In each case, the precopular item is coreferent with an element contained within the host. Extending the terminology used in chapter one and two, I call this host element the **anchor**. For predicational parenthetical clauses the anchor must be definite, while for their truncated cleft counterparts the anchor must be specific indefinite or a generic definite individual concept such as *the winner of the tournament*. For both cases linkers like *and* can introduce the parenthetical (I let the reader confirm that this is true for the examples in 4 and 5).

(4) **Predicational**

a. **Ben** ((I think) he’s a nice guy) has baked us a cake.

b. **Ben** has ((I think) he’s a nice guy) baked us a cake.

c. **Ben** ((is he / d’you think he’s) a nice guy?) has baked a cake.

d. **Ben** has ((is he / d’you think he’s) a nice guy?) baked a cake.
e. **Ben** *(please tell me he’s a nice guy!)* has baked us a cake.

f. **Ben** has *(please tell me he’s a nice guy!)* baked us a cake.

**5** *Truncated cleft*

a. A masked man *(I think it was Pete)* has kissed Miranda.

b. A masked man has *(I think it was Pete)* kissed Miranda.

c. Someone *(was it / do you think it was Bo?)* has eaten the cake.

d. Someone has *(was it / do you think it was Bo?)* eaten the cake.

e. A masked man *(please tell me it was Pete!)* has kissed Miranda.

f. A masked man has *(please tell me it was Pete!)* kissed Miranda.

Turkish does not exhibit a pronominal counterpart of the truncated cleft pronoun observed in the English examples above. Instead, it displays a demonstrative phrase that is identical to Elbourne’s (2005) underlying schema for English pronouns, which is usually dropped, as (6) illustrates. Thus, the only difference between the examples in (4) and (5) and their Turkish counterparts is the absence of a pronoun in the truncated cleft cases. Note that the Turkish linker for finite parenthetical clauses is invariably the morpheme *ki*, which is optionally realised (Griffiths & Güneş 2014).

(6) Maske-li bir adam Merve-yi *(ki bence (maske giy-en Mask-COM a man Merve-ACC LINK for.me mask wear-NM)

bu adam) Ali-y-di) parti-de öp-tü.

this man Ali-COP-PST party-LOC kiss-PST

‘A man with a mask on *(I think (the mask-wearing man) was Ali)* kissed Merve at the party.’

Now consider the examples in (7) below. Because of their proximity to their anchors and because their anchors are noun phrases, one might at first glance consider the parentheticals in these examples to be *appositions*, i.e. phrases that are directly coordinated with their anchors (see chapter two).
Attributions

(7) a. Ben, a nice guy, baked me a cake.
   b. Pete, someone that always drinks too much, is a Town Planner.
   c. Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

Contrary to this first blush consideration, I claim that these parentheticals are copular clauses like (1) and (2) that are reduced down to their postcopular items. This claim is a specific variant of the more general proposal that certain appositives are underlyingly copular clausal, which is pursued in various guises by Motsch (1966), Klein (1976), Molitor (1979), Heringa (2011), Döring (2014), Ott (2014a,b), and others.

(8) a. Ben, he is a nice guy, baked a cake.
   b. Pete, he is someone that always drinks too much, is a lawyer.
   c. Someone, it is Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

As mentioned in chapter two, I call the items that survive reduction in the examples in (8) attributions. In the remainder of the current chapter, I formalise and provide evidence for my claim that the appositive elements in (7) are indeed postcopular items of parenthetical copular clauses.

3.2 A theory of attributions

The theory of parenthetical copular clauses that I pursue treats them as Force phrases that adjoin within their host clauses (cf. Arnold 2007, Koev 2013). To adequately explain what this means, I must first discuss the gap that separates the creation and utilisation of complex linguistic objects, and how Force phrases can bridge it.

Syntactic theory in a post-Chomskyan (1995) vein assumes the inverted Y-model of grammar. On this view, a concatenation operation called MERGE creates two-membered sets from tokens of lexical items or two-membered sets thereof. The module of grammar in which MERGE applies is syntax. MERGE proceeds stepwise. The product of successive applications of MERGE at any juncture in derivational time is a structured set that I will call a tree.

In Turkish, the copula suffixes to what its equivalent in English is the postcopular element. I continue to use postcopular to describe this element, even though it is, in terms of linearity, immediately precopular in Turkish.
(see 9a). If trees are clauses, verb phrases (i.e. vPs), referential noun phrases (i.e. DPs), or preposition phrases then they are phases (Abels 2012, following Chomsky 2001a), as (9b) shows. Phases are passed for assessment of their well-formedness to the syntax’s interfaces with the sound and meaning modules. If well-formed they are either reused in the syntax as atoms, or are ejected from the computational module altogether (Zwart 2009b, 2011).31 I refer to ejected trees or phases as roots. Roots are utilised in conversation to perform illocutionary acts (Austin 1962).32

(9) a. At derivational time $t_1$:
$$A \circ B = C$$
(where $\circ = \text{MERGE}$)

b. At derivational time $t_{i+1}$:
$$A \circ B = C$$
$$C \circ D = \text{DP}$$

If ‘roothood’ were the necessary and sufficient condition for the utilisation of a tree as an illocutionary act, one need not postulate that trees bear a syntactic feature that instructs the grammar to use them as such: roothood itself would provide this instruction. This view accords with the intuitive notion that roots are underspecified for their use. After all, it seems that declarative sentences like this dog bites can be used as assertions, warnings, admissions, and so on, depending upon the circumstances (Alston 1964).

31 To be precise, Zwart’s (2009b, 2011) system uses derivational layers, which for our purposes are equivalent to phases (though see Zwart’s work for discussion of their dissimilarities).

32 Note that the description in the main text does not demand that roots are phases. Assertoric acts must be truth-evaluable, and hence propositional, but opinions differ with regards to whether propositions must be syntactically clausal (or indeed phasal to any extent). This difference of opinion is especially evident in the literature on ellipsis, as Merchant’s (2013) overview makes clear. With respect to non-assertoric acts such as ouch!, hurrah!, and the lucky fucker (when used as an exclamative epithet, see the example below) the necessity for phasal syntax is even less apparent.

(i) John, the lucky fucker, got a decent job without even trying.
But if roothood is a necessary but insufficient condition for the utilisation of a tree as an act, one must maintain that trees bear a syntactic feature that instructs the grammar to use them as such. Koev (2013) and Krifka (2001, 2014) claim that this instruction is encoded as a syntactic feature that is generated as the head of a Force phrase (Rizzi 1997). The semantic module treats Force\textsuperscript{0} as a predicate such as ASSERT, DEMAND, QUESTION, etc. that takes a denotational meaning as its argument (Potts 2005, 2007, Maier 2014, and ultimately Searle 1969). Because all roots are topped by Force phrases, roothood and eligibility for utilisation as an act are causally unrelated. This view accords with the notion that underspecification for force is illusory, as speakers always intend to use the tree that they create for a specific act (if this intention were absent, why would the tree be built in the first place?).

Because there are occasions when acts are used as arguments in semantic composition, the hypothesis that illocutionary force is syntactically encoded has greater empirical reach than the hypothesis that roothood equates with illocutionary force. Krifka (2001), for instance, shows that acts can be quantified over (see 10). Because quantifiers may syntactically dominate the quantified act, this requires that acts can be dominated. Thus, acts cannot always be derived from roots.

(10) a. I hereby promise you to do everything you want me to.
   Possible interpretation: for everything \(x\) you want me to do, I hereby promise you to do \(x\).

b. What did every guest bring to the party?
   Possible interpretation: for every guest \(x\), what did \(x\) bring to the party?

A critic of the notion that force is syntactically encoded could attempt to account for the embeddability of acts by arguing that 'phasehood' is the necessary and sufficient condition for the utilisation of a tree as an act. However, because not all phases bear illocutionary force, a syntactic means by which to distinguish those phases that bear force from those that do not is independently needed.

Although it incorrectly predicts the nonexistence of embedded acts, the 'root' analysis of acts straightforwardly accounts for the observation that
variables contained within one act are outside of the scope of quantifiers contained within another (see 11): self-containment arises because acts do not share a syntactic connexion.33

(11)  # [Every dog], came in. It, was a Dachshund.

To capture self-containment, analyses that invoke illocutionary force operators like ASSERT must posit that ASSERT prevents the establishment of syntactic and hence compositional semantic dependencies across it. This is implemented by maintaining that all relevant lexical material within ASSERT’s syntactic scope is relativised to it (Koev 2013), as (12) demonstrates. (Sub/superscripts denote to which operator items are relativised in the examples below).

(12)  ForceP
    \[\text{ASSERT}^p\]
    TP
    \[\alpha^p\quad \beta^p\]

Operators such as negation are also relativised to ASSERT if within ASSERT’s syntactic scope. In these cases, elements that are bound by the operator are relativised to ASSERT indirectly. This is illustrated in (13), where \(\alpha\) is bound by the operator (as shown by the presence of the subscripted ‘\(q\)’ on each), and the operator is relativised to ASSERT (as shown by the superscripted ‘\(p\)’).

(13)  ForceP
    \[\text{ASSERT}^p\]
    TP
    \[\text{Op}^p_{q}\]
    \[\alpha_q\quad \beta\]

---

33 In exceptional cases, such as modal subordination and telescoping, the scope of a quantifier can extend across more than one act. See Roberts (1987) for details.
While acts themselves can be quantified over, the relativisation of operators and bindable elements to illocutionary force operators results in the self-containment of Force phrases. This semantic isolation arises because elements dominated by one ASSERT (or DEMAND, or QUESTION, etc.) cannot be relativised to a structurally higher one. In (14), $\beta$ cannot be bound by either DEMAND or the ‘op’ in Force$_1$P, as ASSERT intervenes.

![Diagram](14)

To recapitulate, because illocutionary acts participate in narrow semantic composition, which itself requires syntactic hierarchy, the claim that roots alone can be utilised as acts cannot be upheld, as certain acts can be dominated. This requires that the potential to bear illocutionary force must be ascribed to a property of trees other than their root status. For Koev and Krifka, this property is the exhibition of an illocutionary force predicate such as ASSERT. It seems to me that, in lieu of an alternative means by which to instruct the grammar that certain trees can be used to commit acts while others cannot, all syntactic theories based on Chomsky’s Y-model must postulate the existence of such predicates (or some similar functional element) to encode illocutionary force, as an appeal to phases alone is insufficient.\footnote{Since Hooper & Thompson (1973), an embedded clause’s ability to host main clause phenomena such as topicalised phrases has often been linked to its assertoric status (see Heycock 2006 for an overview). In the system advocated in this subsection, the assertoric status of such embedded clauses must be caused by the presence of Force$^0$. However, unlike with parenthetical adjuncts, which are opaque to c-command (see (i); for detailed discussion of this opacity, see §3.5.1), relations that depend upon c-command can be established across matrix/assertoric embedded clause boundaries, as (ii) shows.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item *[Force$_1$P [Every climber], [force$_2$P he is an experienced explorer], was found sipping cocoa at home].
\item *[Force$_1$P [Every climber]; thinks [force$_2$P this afternoon he should have aimed for the summit]].
\end{enumerate}
Following on from the above discussion, Krifka (2001) claims that the conjunction of alike acts is equivalent to their consecutive performance. This implies that *act-initial* coordinators are semantically vacuous. If they were not, they would be redundant, as they would encode a semantic operation that occurs in their absence. Their vacuity is evidenced by their optionality, as (15) demonstrates.35

(15) Pete drank a beer. (And) Brendan drank a whisky.

I take this vacuity as instructive, and claim that act-initial coordinators are discourse particles that are optionally generated as specifiers of Force phrases, as (16) illustrates.

\[
\text{ForceP}
\]

\[
\text{(and)}
\]

\[
\text{ASSERTP}
\]

\[
\text{TP}
\]

\[
\ldots
\]

The claim I made at the beginning of this subsection (§3.2), that parenthetical copular clauses are *Force phrasal* adjuncts, should now make sense. Because they are topped by a Force phrase, elements that are contained within parenthetical copular clauses cannot be bound by external operators, as this would require the head and tail of a dependency chain to be relativised to dissimilar force predicates. Because they are adjuncts, parenthetical copular clauses are not selected for by any host clause items.

To account for this dissimilarity with respect to opacity, I tentatively propose that the embedded *ASSERT* predicate in (ii) is relativised to the matrix *ASSERT* predicate. In other words, they display the same superscript:

(16) \[
[\text{ForceP1 ASSERTP} \text{Every climber thinks} ]\text{[ForceP2 ASSERTP this afternoon … ]]}
\]

The parasitism on ForceP2 that ForceP1 displays in (iii) arises in part because, without ForceP2’s presence, ForceP1 would be incomplete (*think* would be missing an object). This parasitism is not observed in (i) because the grammaticality of ForceP1 is not dependent upon ForceP2.

35 The fact that act-initial coordinators like *and*, *but* and *for* are semantically vacuous does not imply that they are useless. Such coordinators encode rhetorical relations such as *CONTRAST* (Asher and Lascarides 2003) that link items across the discourse.
Many regular adjuncts inhabit a fixed position within the clause to which they adjoin. Constraints operative on semantic composition demand that this position be fixed (cf. Ernst 2002). If it were not, meaningful utterances could not be produced. This is illustrated with formulae from predicate logic in the toy examples in (17). Because thin can combine with man in (17a), it provides a suitable input for the determiner. Resultantly, acceptability for the entire utterance is ensured. In (17b) however, the output of thin’s concatenation with the determiner phrase cannot compose with the verb phrase met Mary, and therefore unacceptability is observed.

(17)  

a. The thin man met Mary.

b. * Thin the man met Mary.

No such constraints operate on parenthetical copular clauses because they are, as Force phrases, semantically opaque. Thus, when a parenthetical copular clause and a host node concatenate, the host node is returned unaltered, from a semantic compositional perspective (cf. Potts 2005:125).
Resultantly, adjunction to any maximal projection in the host clause is possible for parenthetical copular clauses, though adjunction into niches is prosodically favoured.\textsuperscript{36}

(18) a. **Ben** has \((and \ he's \ a \ nice \ guy)\) baked us a cake.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{ForceP} \\
\text{ASSERT} \\
\text{TP} \\
\text{Ben} \\
\text{TP} \\
\text{has} \\
\text{VP} \\
\text{ForceP} \\
\text{baked us a cake} \\
\text{ForceP} \\
\text{assert} \\
\text{TP} \\
\text{he's a nice guy}
\end{array}
\]

Having now advanced my theory of the *external* syntax of parenthetical copular clauses (i.e. how they are related to the host clause into which they interpolate), I will next outline my theory of how reduction occurs to form *attributions*.

I claim that the reduction that occurs in parenthetical copular clauses to create attributions is engendered by one of two methods in English. The first is *sister* ellipsis (see §2.2.1 and §2.2.2), which is licensed only in parenthetical *wh*-questions. Thus, the application of sister ellipsis derives (19b) from (19a):

\textsuperscript{36} For Turkish, *ki* replaces the act-initial coordinator *and* in (18) in the main text. Because both lexemes are discourse markers, both occupy the specifier of the Force phrase. While syntactic heads branch rightwards in Turkish (\textit{contra} Kayne 1994), its specifiers branch leftwards. Thus, just as in English, *ki* linearly precedes the parenthetical that it introduces, just as act-initial *and* does in English.
(19) a. Someone (*but who is it?) has hacked into my email account.
b. Someone (*but [who, *is--*t, ?]) has hacked into my email account.

The second means of reduction is *left-edge ellipsis* (LE; Wilder 1997, Weir 2012, Fernández 2013, also see van Oirschot’s 1987:123 *periphery constraint*). This form of deletion operates upon contiguous strings of functional elements, and can therefore target non-constituents. It is an optional deletion process. As a ‘root’ operation (Aelbrecht et al. 2012), LE’s application is restricted to the left edge of Force phrases, where it applies rightward in a monotonic fashion. In other words, LE can target α only if α occupies a Force phrase’s left edge or α is linearly preceded by β, where β has been rendered unpronounced by LE. Like with the scattered ellipsis operation discussed in §2.2.1, extraction of the remnant of ellipsis is not a prerequisite for the application of LE.

My reasons to claim that copular clausal parentheticals are reduced by LE are properly explicated in §3.4.1, after a number of sources of ambiguity that muddy the theoretical landscape are dealt with in §3.3. In this subsection, let me provide one straightforward reason for why I adopt an LE analysis of the reduction that forms attributions: namely, the LE that occurs in independent sentences and the reduction that creates attributions display similar properties. For example, elision of determiners of predicate nominals can be licensed in both independent sentences reduced by LE and in attributions, as the utterances in (20) demonstrate.

(20) a. John is coming over later. *He’s a nice fellow. I should ask him to bring his wife too.*
b. *John, he’s a nice fellow,* is coming over later. I should ask him to bring his wife too.

As mentioned above, LE targets a contiguous string. Thus, act-initial coordinators are never present in independent sentences that display LE, as (21) shows, where a prosodic ι-boundary is maintained between *job* and *nice fellow* to ensure that the cross-sentential subclausal coordination interpretation (Neijt 1979) is unavailable. The fact that act-initial
coordinators are illicit in attributions, as the examples in (22) show, provides further evidence that attributions are derived by LE.

(21) John is a good candidate for the job.
    a. And he is a nice fellow.
    b. * And he is a nice fellow.

(22) a. John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job.
    b. * John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job.

The licensing of LE in a parenthetical copular clause α appears to be constrained by linearity. More specifically, LE is permitted in α only if α immediately linearly follows the item with which α’s subject corefers (this is discussed further in §3.4.1). If the hypothesis that attributions are underlyingly Force phrases that display total syntactic and semantic opacity from their hosts is correct, this constraint on licensing LE in parenthetical copular clauses must be pragmatic in nature. I concede that I have been unable to discover precisely what pragmatic principles govern this licensing constraint on LE. I hope future research can uncover them.37

Parenthetical copular clauses can also be reduced to their postcopular elements in Turkish. I claim that neither LE nor sister ellipsis is responsible for this reduction, however. Instead, reduction is engendered by presence of pro subjects and zero copulas, which are ubiquitous in non-parenthetical environments in this language.

To summarise: in this section (§3.2), I outlined my theory of attributions. I proposed that attributions are parenthetical copular clauses that are reduced down to their postcopular items. I claimed that parenthetical copular clauses are Force phrasal adjuncts (as per Koev 2013), whose adjunction within host clauses is syntactically and semantically unconstrained. As Force phrases, parenthetical copular clauses are opaque

37 Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that LE appears unable to delete the act-initial coordinator and the subject but not the copula, as (i) demonstrates:

(i) * John, and he is a devout man, prays daily.

On the LE approach that I advocate, one must claim that the copula’s morphological realisation is dependent upon the subject’s in English. If and how this claim can be substantiated must also be left for future research.
with respect to the syntactic and semantic dependencies that are established within their host clauses. I suggested that, in English, the reduction that occurs in parenthetical copular clauses to create attributions is engendered by two distinct mechanisms. I proposed that sister ellipsis derives wh-attributions such as (19b), while left-edge ellipsis (LE) derives declarative attributions such as (20b). Note that I do not preclude that LE can target parenthetical wh-clauses such as (19a) too. If it did, only the coordinator would be elided, as the wh-phrase is discourse-new (i.e. but who is it?).

The claims outlined above about how LE is licensed in and operates upon English attributions are summarised in (23) below.

(23) LE is licensed in an English parenthetical copular clause α iff:
   a. α immediately linearly follows the host item with which α’s subject corefers.
   b. All of the items from α’s left edge up to the postcopular element are elided (excluding parentheticals that interpolate into α).

In §3.4, I will provide evidence for my analysis of attributions, which I call the reduced copular approach henceforth. Before I undertake this task, I first draw attention in §3.3 to environments in which appositives that look like attributions are actually structurally ambiguous between attributions and other parenthetical types, most notably appositions.

**3.3 Sources of ambiguity**

In this subsection (§3.3), I discuss three environments in which appositive noun phrases are potentially structurally ambiguous between either (i) truncated cleft attributions and appositions (§3.3.1), (ii) predicative attributions and appositions (§3.3.2), or (iii) predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates (§3.3.3). For the first two cases, I demonstrate that the methods of disambiguation discussed in §2.1.1 and §2.2.5 (i.e. the presence of apposition markers or temporal adverbs) delimit appositive noun phrases as appositions and attributions, respectively. The purpose of §3.3.3 is simply to show that in certain environments appositive noun phrases are potentially ambiguous between predicative attributions
and secondary predicates. The method that I use to delimit such appositive noun phrases is discussed later, in §3.4.1.

3.3.1  **Truncated cleft attributions and appositions**

Recall from §2.1 that appositions are second conjuncts of coordination. One of the relations that can be modelled using coordination is *reformulation*, where an apposition provides an additional name for the referent denoted by its anchor:

(24)  *The Big Apple*, that is to say *New York*, is a huge city.

Recall also that reformulative relations may pertain between specific indefinite anchors and appositions, even if the anchors are indefinite and the appositions are definite, as (25) shows.

(25)  *Someone, Pete*, keeps leaving the door open.

Note that the surface structure of (25) is identical to the surface structure of the attribution in (8c) from §3.1. In other words, unless the context provides a means of disambiguation, one cannot tell whether *Pete* in (25) is coordinated with its anchor or is the postcopular element of a reduced truncated cleft parenthetical copular clause (this same form of ambiguity was discussed in chapter one and §2.1.1):

(26)  a.  \[SP [DP Someone][DP Pete]] keeps leaving the door open.
    b.  \[DP [DP Someone][ForceP it's Pete]] keeps leaving the door open.

As I illustrated in §2.1.1 and §2.2.5, there are two straightforward means by which to disambiguate such constructions. If apposition markers like *that is to say* or *i.e.* are present, then the derivation in (26a) pertains. However, if temporal modifiers like *often* are present, then (26b) pertains. Once delimited as a truncated cleft attribution by the presence of a temporal adverb, apposition markers are illicit, as the example in (27) below shows.

(27)  *Someone, (*namely) often Pete*, keeps leaving the door open.
It should be noted that the same ambiguity that is observed in (25) also arises in Turkish. In this language, the presence of *ki* disambiguates the parenthetical as a truncated cleft attribution (as *ki* is reserved for finite clausal parentheticals, see §3.1 and the example in 6), while the presence of *yani* ‘namely’ disambiguates the parenthetical as an apposition (as *yani* is reserved for appositions, see Griffiths & Güneş 2014).

3.3.2 Predicative attributions and appositions

A similar ambiguity to that which was observed in §3.3.1 is seen in constructions like (28), where the appositive is ambiguous between a referential and non-referential noun phrase.

(28) **London, the capital of England,** is a filthy city.

Here, one cannot tell whether *the capital of England* is coordinated with its anchor (in which case it would be referential) or is the postcopular element of a reduced predicational parenthetical copular clause (in which case it would be non-referential):

(29) a. [\&P [DP London][DP the capital of England]] is a filthy city.
    b. [DP [DP London][ForceP it's the capital of England]] is a filthy city.

The same means of delimitation used in the last subsection (§3.3.1) can be applied again here. If apposition markers like *i.e.* are present, then the derivation in (29a) pertains. However, if temporal adverbs are present, then (29b) pertains. Once delimited as a predicative attribution by the presence of a temporal adverb, apposition markers are illicit, as the example below shows.

(30) **London,** (*i.e.*) **currently the capital of England,** is a filthy city.

Again, the presence of *ki* or *yani* serves to disambiguate the Turkish equivalent of (28).
3.3.3  **Predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates**

*Circumstantial secondary predicates* are small clauses that contain a stage-level adjective (Carlson 1977) and a PRO subject (Chomsky 1981) that corefers with the subject of the clause in which it is contained:

(31) Brendan, came home [sc PRO, completely drunk].

Like other non-finite phrases such as (32a), circumstantial secondary predicates can be parentheticals, as the example in (32b) demonstrates.

(32) a. Brendan, *being drunk*, can’t find his way home.
    b. Brendan, *completely drunk*, fell asleep on his own front doorstep.

Note that (32b) is potentially ambiguous between a circumstantial secondary predicate and a predicative attribution, as the schemata in (33) show.

(33) a. Brendan, [PRO completely drunk], fell asleep…
    b. Brendan, [forceP he was completely drunk], fell asleep…

The same ambiguity arises in Turkish, provided that the relevant predicate is not the prosodic nucleus (if it is, the secondary predicate is disambiguated, as attributions cannot occupy their hosts’ nuclei, see Griffiths & Güneș 2014):

    Aylin completely drunk Ali-GEN door-POSS-LOC turn.up-PST
    ‘Aylin, *completely drunk*, turned up at Ali’s door.’

To disambiguate secondary predicates from predicative attributions in English, one must examine how they distribute within the host clause. As I already mentioned, I will return to this shortly, in §3.4.1.

It is worth mentioning here that I maintain that noun phrases cannot be circumstantial secondary predicates (*contra* McNally 1994). Rather, I claim that those that look like secondary predicates are headless *as*-PPs in their canonical position, as (35a) shows (see Emonds 1985 for further discussion).
I suggest that the elision of as is illicit when such phrases are reordered within the clause, as in (35b) and (35c) (where I intend the interpretation to remain constant in (35a–c)).

(35)  a. Bob has entered university [(as) a pauper].
    b. Bob, *(as) a pauper, has entered university.
    c. Bob has, *(as) a pauper, entered university.

To summarise: in this subsection (§3.3), I showed that, depending upon definiteness and the structural environment in question, appositive noun phrases are potentially structurally ambiguous between either (i) truncated cleft attributions and appositions, (ii) predicative attributions and appositions, or (iii) predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates. Attributions and appositions can be disambiguated by the presence of temporal adverbs and apposition markers respectively, as I already showed in chapter two. (Thus, §3.3.1 and §3.3.2 were essentially a repetition of §2.1.1 and §2.2.5, except that this time the emphasis was on the delimitation of attributions, rather than appositions.) Finally, the fact that, in certain environments, appositive noun phrases are potentially ambiguous between predicative attributions and circumstantial secondary predicates was briefly discussed in §3.3.3 above.

3.4 Distributional evidence for the reduced copular approach

Having in §3.3 once again emphasised that appositive noun phrases can be structurally ambiguous, I now return to the task at hand, which is to present evidence for the reduced copular analyses of attributions that I outlined in §3.2. In this subsection (§3.4), I provide distributional evidence for the reduced copular analysis. I begin in §3.4.1 by supporting my claim that left-edge (LE) ellipsis is responsible for reducing English declarative parenthetical copular clauses down to their postcopular elements (a task I could not complete in §3.2 because of the muddying influence of potentially ambiguous appositive noun phrases). In §3.4.2, I examine data of increasing distributional complexity and show that the patterns of acceptability that are observed therein are expected if the reduced copular approach to attributions is correct.
3.4.1 Distributional evidence for left-edge ellipsis

In this subsection (§3.4.1), I present evidence for my claims from §3.2 about how reduction is engendered in declarative parenthetical copular clauses, which are repeated from (23) in (36) below.

(36) LE is licensed in an English parenthetical copular clause α iff:
    a. α immediately linearly follows the host item with which α’s
       subject corefers.
    b. All of the items from α’s left edge up to the postcopular element
       are elided (excluding parentheticals that interpolate into α).

According to the generalisation in (36a), left-edge ellipsis (LE) is licensed only when a parenthetical copular clause is right-adjacent to its anchor. This gives rise to the prediction that attributions must appear right-adjacent to their anchors. This is borne out with predicative attributions, as the examples in (37) show.38

(37) a. Suzan, a sucker for a bargain, has been at the market for hours.
    b. * Suzan has been, a sucker for a bargain, at the market for hours.
    c. * Suzan has been at the market for hours, a sucker for a bargain.

One might claim that the generalisation in (36a) fails to account for the acceptability of constructions like (38a) below, where it seems that reduction occurs in a predicative parenthetical copular clause that is non-adjacent to its anchor.

38 Note that, in (37c) in the main text, the attribution is pronounced as contained within the intonational domain of its host clause (as the comma intends to represent). If pronounced as contained within an independent intonational domain, as is represented by the use of a colon in (i) below, the utterance in (37c) becomes acceptable.

(i) Suzan has been at the market for hours: A sucker for a bargain!

In such environments, (37c) is composed of two isolated utterances that are sequentially ordered in discourse (see (ii) below). As such, the purported ‘attribution’ is no longer parenthetical, and therefore LE can apply freely to it, as it can to any regular assertion. Resultantly, (ii) is reminiscent of what Ott & De Vries (2014) call an afterthought construction.

(ii) [ForceP Suzan has been at the market for hours:] [ForceP She is a sucker for a bargain!]
I propose that (38a) is licit because it is not an attribution but a *stripped clausal apposition* (see §2.2.2). As such, this parenthetical is the remnant of a stripping operation that occurs in vacuous clausal appositions:

(39) \[ \&P \left[ CP \text{London was in the news} \right] \left[ CP \text{the capital of England was in the news} \right] \].

Support for this claim comes from two sources. Firstly, (38a) can host an apposition marker like *that is to say*, as (38b) shows. That the appositive in (38a) can host an apposition marker is indicative of its status as an apposition, according to the conclusions of §2.1. Secondly, the example in (38a) is rendered unacceptable when the appositive noun phrase is disambiguated as an attribution by the presence of a temporal adverb like *currently*, as the example in (40) demonstrates.

(40) * London has been in the news again, currently the capital of England.

One might also claim that the generalisation in (36a) is too stringent because stage-level predicative adjective attributions can appear non-adjacent to their anchor:

(41) a. \textbf{Kristian} has, \textit{naked}, swum in the pool.
    b. \textbf{Kristian} has swum in the pool, \textit{naked}.

I claim that *naked* in (41) is a parenthetical circumstantial secondary predicate (see §3.3.3 above). As a non-finite clause in which no reduction occurs, this phrase is not subject to the generalisations in (36). Note that the patterns of interpolation in (41) provide the means mentioned in §3.3.3 by which to disambiguate parenthetical secondary predicates from predicative attributions: if the stage-level adjective appears non-adjacent to its anchor, it is a secondary predicate.
At first glance, the predictions that arise from (36a) are only partially borne out with truncated cleft attributions. While illicit in medial positions that are non-adjacent to their anchors (see 42b), truncated cleft attributions are licit in the final position, as the example in (42c) illustrates. This is contrary to expectation if the generalisations in (36) are correct.

(42)  
   a. Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open.  
   b. * Someone keeps, Pete, leaving the door open.  
   c. Someone keeps leaving the door open, Pete.

Again, I propose that (42c) is licit because it is not an attribution but a stripped clausal apposition:

(43)  
   \[ &P \{ CP \text{Someone keeps leaving the door open} \} \{ CP \text{Pete keeps leaving the door open} \} \] .

Once (42c) is disambiguated as an attribution by adding a temporal adverb like often, the predicted unacceptability arises, as (44a) shows. This unacceptability does not arise when often Pete is observed adjacent to its anchor however, as (44b) demonstrates.

(44)  
   a  * Someone keeps leaving the door open, often Pete.  
   b. Someone, often Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

The generalisations in (36) do not dictate that LE is limited to declarative parenthetical copular clauses. Thus, LE may occur in hortatives and polar questions:

---

39 Again, note that, in (44a) in the main text, the attribution is pronounced as contained within the intonational domain of its host clause (as the comma intends to represent). If pronounced as contained within an independent intonational domain, as is represented by the use of a full-stop in (i) below, the utterance in (44a) becomes acceptable.

(i)  
   Someone keeps leaving the door open. Often Pete.

In such environments, (44a) is composed of two isolated utterance that are sequentially ordered in discourse (see (ii) below). As such, the purported 'attribution' is no longer parenthetical, and therefore LE can apply freely to it, as it can to any regular assertion. Again, (ii) is reminiscent of what Ott & De Vries (2014) call an afterthought construction.

(ii)  
   [ForceP Someone keeps leaving the door open.] [ForceP It is often Pete.]
(45) a. You must nominate someone ((let it be) me, please!) as your heir.
   b. A masked man ((was it Pete?) kissed Miranda at the party.

According to the conclusions of §3.2, sister ellipsis is permitted when a parenthetical copular clause is a wh-question. These conclusions correctly predict that, even though they are reduced, parenthetical wh-questions may host a linker like but (see 46a), unlike their reduced declarative counterparts such as (22b) (repeated in 46b below), which are reduced by LE.

(46) a. A masked man (but [who1 [was it t1]?) kissed Mary at the party.
   b. * John, and he is a nice fellow, is a good candidate for the job.

I claimed in §3.2 that Turkish does not conform to the generalisations in (36), as its parenthetical copular clauses are not reduced by LE but by the presence of pro subjects and zero copulas. Because LE is licit only when parenthetical copular clauses’ subjects are adjacent to their anchors, English attributions, which I claim are formed by LE, are licit only when adjacent to their anchors. If Turkish attributions are not formed by LE, the prediction arises that Turkish attributions need not appear right-adjacent to their anchors. The example in (47), in which the object intervenes between a subject anchor and its apposition, shows that this prediction is borne out.

(47) Ali Bey Mine-yi, ki evli bir adam, taciz et-ti.
    Ali Mr. Mine-ACC LINK married a man harassment make-PST
    ‘Mr. Ali, a married man, harassed Mine.’

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that most scholars of Turkish, such as Erguvanlı (1981), Çağrî (2005), and Göksel & Kerslake (2005), but with the exception of Lewis (1967), assume that the linker ki is a relativiser. I claim that this assumption is mistaken, as ki-clauses (as they are called) pass no tests for relativisation of the ‘operator/gap’ ilk. As well as exhibiting island insensitivity, they are not nominalised, and their purported head noun displays no realisation of [+REL]-features and does not move. Moreover, the position where their ‘gap’ should be can be occupied by a referential expression (i.e. not a resumptive pronoun), as (48) shows. For additional
arguments that *ki*-clauses are equivalent to Germanic finite parenthetical copular clauses, see Griffiths & Güneş (2014).

(48) Ahmet, *ki* öğrenci-ler o salağ-ı çok sever-ler,
Ahmet LINK student-PL that idiot-ACC very love-3PL

okul-dan atıl-mış.
school-ABL fired-EVD

‘*Ahmet, the students love that idiot very much,* has been fired.’

To summarise: in this subsection (§3.4.1), I demonstrated that, once potentially ambiguous appositive noun phrases are disambiguated as (derived from) appositional constructions and set aside, my claim that declarative attributions are derived from LE captures the restricted distribution of the data at hand.

3.4.2  *Attributions and anchors*

We have already seen in previous subsections that, in ‘simple’ cases, (non-)referential noun phrases can be attributions. This is because such nominals make for suitable postcopular items. In the next two subsections (§3.4.2.1 and §3.4.2.2), I show that in more complicated cases the same argument (i.e. ‘good postcopular item equals good attribution’) correctly predicts which nominal attributions are acceptable.

3.4.2.1  *Nominal attributions that contain quantifiers*

Partee (1987) demonstrates that certain postcopular noun phrases may contain quantifiers. Those that can contain quantifiers can be attributions, as pointed out by Potts (2005:131), whose examples I use below in (49) and (50). This is expected on the reduced copular approach.

(49)  a. Hillary is no amateur climber.
    b. Ed’s house was at one time every colour of the rainbow.
    c. Tanya is everything to everyone around here.
We spoke with Hillary, no amateur climber, about the dangers.

Ed’s house, at one time every colour of the rainbow, now has aluminium siding.

We spoke with Tanya, everything to everyone around here, about the broken printer.

Potts (ibid.) reports that the examples in (51) are unacceptable. My informants and I disagree (see Heringa 2011:20 for additional discussion).

We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, every secretary in the department, about the broken printer.

Armin, Jaye, and Junko, all the phonologists at UCSC, attended the conference.

At first blush, the fact that these examples are acceptable (at least for a small group of British English speakers that includes me) is harmful for the reduced copular approach that I pursue, as these attributions cannot be postcopular items of predicative copular clauses:

Tanya, Ashley, and Connie are every secretary in the department.

Armin, Jaye, and Junko, are all the phonologists at UCSC.

I propose that the appositive noun phrases in (51) are acceptable because they are appositions, and not attributions. The fact that these appositive noun phrases can host apposition markers, as the examples in (53) show, supports this claim.

We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, in other words every secretary in the department, about the broken printer.

Armin, Jaye, and Junko, that is to say all the phonologists at UCSC, attended the conference.

Once disambiguated as attributions by the presence of temporal adverbs, unacceptability indeed arises, just as the reduced copular approach predicts:
(54) a. * We spoke with Tanya, Ashley, and Connie, now every secretary in the department, about the broken printer.
   b. * Armin, Jaye, and Junko, then all the phonologists at UCSC, attended the conference.

3.4.2.2 Quantified nominal anchors

In certain environments, the pronoun of a predicational copular clause can corefer with a noun phrase that is rendered non-specific by quantification, as (55a) shows. This pronoun can be paraphrased as in (55b). This paraphrase makes clear that such pronouns take non-specific indefinite antecedents but refer to them as though they are specific definites (this is their E-type usage).

(55) a. Every chess set comes with [a red pawn]. It’s a spare.
   b. The red pawn that every chess set comes with is a spare.

In generic statements, existential quantification can often be superfluous. This is observed in (56) below, where the quantifier can be omitted without altering the interpretation (as every man denotes all human males, as does the kind man).

(56) a. Every man feels the need to dominate others.
   b. Man feels the need to dominate others.

Provided that a generic interpretation is maintained, the singular pronoun of a predicational copular clause can corefer with the seemingly quantified noun phrase:

(57) a. Every man feels the need to dominate others. He is driven to it by his genetic predispositions.
   b. Man feels the need to dominate others. He is driven to it by his genetic predispositions.

The same superfluity is observed with generic statements and universal quantification, as the examples in (58) demonstrate. Again, provided that a
generic interpretation is maintained, the plural pronoun of a predicational copular clause can corefer with the seemingly quantified noun phrase.

(58) a. (It’s a known fact that) all biologists, wish to publish in *Nature*. They, are slaves to their ambition.
    b. (It’s a known fact that) biologists, wish to publish in *Nature*. They, are slaves to their ambition.

A similar effect is seen with quantifiers like *many* and *few* and plural pronouns (the *a*-example comes from Doron 1994:53):

(59) a. Mary has {many / few} friends. They, are leftists no doubt.
    b. Mary has friends. They, are leftists no doubt.

Quantified noun phrases like *several* *x* and *some* *x* can be interpreted as specific. When they are, they can be coreferent with the pronoun of a predicational copular clause:

(60) {Several / some} students still go to Dr. Brown’s lectures. They, are a tenacious little bunch.

In those cases when (i) a paraphrase like (55b) is impossible, (ii) quantification is not superfluous, and/or (iii) the quantified expression cannot be interpreted as specific, pronouns cannot refer to non-specific indefinite or quantified noun phrases, as (61) exemplifies.

(61) * {Every / no} climber, was found sipping cocoa in the lodge. He, is an experienced adventurer. (modified from Potts 2005:122)

Considering the behaviour of the pronouns in the examples above, the reduced copular approach predicts that one can make attribution constructions from (55) to (60), but not from (61). This is borne out:
(62) a. Every chess set comes with a red pawn, a spare.
    b. (Every) man, driven to it by his genetic predispositions, feels the need to dominate others.
    c. (All) biologists, slaves to their ambition, wish to publish in Nature.
    d. Mary has (few / many) friends, leftists no doubt.
    e. {Several / some} students, a tenacious little bunch, still go to Dr. Brown’s lectures.
    f. * (Every / no) climber, an experienced adventurer, was found sipping cocoa in the lodge.

3.4.2.3 Non-nominal attributions

Having assessed simple and complex nominal anchors and attributions, I now move on to examine their non-nominal counterparts.

Although not discussed directly, the previous sections of this chapter have already shown that adjectives and participle phrases can be attributions. I provide some additional examples in (63) below, along with a prepositional phrase attribution. As one would expect, these non-nominal phrases can be attributions because they can be postcopular items, as the examples in (64) show.

(63) a. The ex-convicts, in trouble with the police again, are suing the government for emotional damage.
    b. The researcher, seeing for the first time the complexity of the problem at hand, gave a small gasp of terror.
    c. Harriet, bolstered by her recent victory, has a renewed sense of confidence.
    d. The novel, entertaining Lucy less and less as time goes on, is bound for a second-hand bookshop.
(64) a. The ex-convicts are in trouble with the police again.
b. The researcher was seeing for the first time the complexity of the problem at hand.
c. Harriet was bolstered by her recent victory.
d. The novel is entertaining Lucy less and less as time goes on.

Conversely, whatever cannot be a postcopular item is predicted to form an unacceptable attribution. This is borne out for infinitivals, non-predicative adjectives, and (in)transitive verb phrases:

(65) a. She is *(soon) to depart for Africa
b. The president, *(soon) to depart for Africa, finished up her paperwork. (Loock & O'Connor 2013:336)

(66) a. * The president is former.
b. * The president, former, objects to the new legislation.

(67) a. * Hannah is {fell / kissed Fred}.
b. * Hannah, {fell / kissed Fred}, is the happiest girl I know.

As mentioned in §3.2, attributions are observed in Turkish whenever pro subjects and zero copulas are present. As seen in the previous sections of this chapter, zero copulas are licit with nominals and stage-level predicates. They are also licit with participle verbs, postpositional phrases, and individual-level predicate adjectives, as the examples in (68) and (69) demonstrate.

(68) a. Oku-muş-Ø.
    read-EVD-COP
    ‘(She had) read (it).’ [as a response to ‘had she read the letter?’]
b. Banyo-da-Ø.
    bathroom-LOC-COP
    ‘(She is) in the bathroom.’ [as a response to ‘where is Aylin?’]
c. Cok yetenekli!
very talented
‘(She is) very talented!’ [as a response to ‘what do you think of her?’]

Aylin LINK read-EVD-COP Ali-DAT letter-ABL mention-NEG-PST
‘Aylin, (she had) read (it), did not mention the letter to Ali.’

Aylin LINK bathroom-LOC-COP Ali-COM text-PROG-EVD
‘Aylin, (she is) in the bathroom, is text-messaging with Ali.’

c. Aylin, ki çok yetenekli-Ø, yeni bir galeri aç-mış.
Aylin LINK very talented-COP new a gallery open-EVD
‘Aylin, (she is) very talented, has opened a new gallery.’

Because they are not derived from copular clauses, finite parenthetical clauses that display only pro subjects, such as those in (70) and (71), are technically not attributions. However, they look like attributions, on account of the absence of an overt subject and copula.

(70) Erken gel-di.
early come-PST
‘(He has) arrived early.’ [as a response to ‘has he arrived yet?’]

(71) Aylin, ki erken gel-di, banyo-da-Ø.
Aylin LINK early come-PST bathroom-LOC-COP
‘Aylin, (she has) arrived early, is in the bathroom.’

3.4.2.4 Non-nominal anchors

If a non-nominal item α can corefer with a copular clause’s pronoun, the reduced copular approach predicts that α is a suitable anchor for an attribution.
As pronouns of copular clauses can corefer with clauses, the reduced copular approach correctly predicts that clauses make for suitable anchors of attributions, as the examples in (72) demonstrate.

(72) a. [Max is in custody for being in custody]. It’s a Kafkaesque situation by anyone’s standards.
   b. That Max is in custody for being in custody, a Kafkaesque situation by anyone’s standards, has made the local newspaper.

Aside from nouns and clauses, other parts of speech must either be made exceptionally salient in order to be suitable for coreference, or be referred to qua their property of being a string of sounds or symbols. Contrastive focus achieves the former, while postcopular elements that comment upon a word’s string-like properties achieve the latter:

(73) a. A: Does Pete use green paint in his artwork?
   B: No, he uses VERMILLION\textsubscript{i} paint. It’s a colour you would probably call ‘light red’.
   B: No, he CLOTHESLINED his brother last week. It’s a type of wrestling move.

(74) I tried to order VERMILLION\textsubscript{i} paint online but failed. It’s a hard word to spell!

In environments such as these, attributive adjectives and verbs can be used as anchors for (degraded) attributions (see 75 and 76), as the reduced copular approach predicts. Note that their ‘full’ parenthetical copular clausal counterparts display the same degradation, which is caused by their interpolation into a non-\textit{niche}.

(75) a. A: Does Pete use green paint in his artwork?
   B: ? No, he uses VERMILLION\textsubscript{i} ((it’s) a colour you’d call ‘light red’) paint.
    B:  ? No, he CLOTHESLINED, ((it’s) a type of wrestling move) his brother last week.

(76)  ? I tried to order VERMILLION, ((it’s) a hard word to spell!) paint online but failed.

3.4.2.5  Individual- and stage-level adjective attributions

The sentences in (77) below create an incoherent discourse because the pronoun it unsuccessfully attempts to act as a generic and specific noun phrase simultaneously. The pronoun is specific because it has a stage-level adjective predicated of it (which creates a specific reading) and is generic because it corefers with the generic noun phrase the dog.

(77)  * The dog, is the most popular house pet in America. It, is happy.
     (modified from O’Connor 2012)

Predictably, the same incoherence is observed if the copular clause in (77) is used as a parenthetical, as in (78a). This incoherence is also observed with attributions, as in (78b). This provides additional support for the reduced copular approach.

(78)  a.  * The dog (it is happy) is the most popular house pet in America.
    b.  * The dog, happy, is the most popular house pet in America.

When one observes the unacceptability of examples like those in (79) one might conclude that attributions cannot be non-nominal individual-level predicates. Such a conclusion would be harmful for the reduced copular approach, as predicational parenthetical copular clauses with non-nominal individual-level predicates are licit, as the examples in (80) show.40

40  Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that the acceptability of the examples in (79) is increased if evaluative adverbs like (un)fortunately are inserted in the non-nominal individual-level attributions, as (i) and (ii) demonstrate. While I cannot provide an explanation for why the presence of such adverbs increases acceptability, the fact that there exists a spectrum of acceptability for non-nominal individual-
(79)  a. * Michael, very talented, conducted the orchestra for many years.
    b. * Greg, slightly dim, only passed one exam in his whole life.

(80)  a. Michael (he was very talented) conducted the orchestra for many years.
    b. Greg (he was slightly dim) only passed one exam in his whole life.

Such a conclusion would be based on an overgeneralisation. In reality, non-nominal individual-level attributions are licensable, as the examples from Loock & O’Connor (2013) in (81) show. Note that for the sake of brevity I have shortened these examples, which are extracted from a bespoke corpus.

(81)  a. The man, dark and handsome, swept around the room like a movie star.
    b. He hated the tone in which she said it, so sharp and condescending.
    c. Her sweater, samphire green, showcased her curves.

Bearing the data in (81) in mind, I conclude that an additional factor that is unrelated to LE constrains the licensing of non-nominal individual-level attributions. Upon whether this factor is pragmatic (perhaps based on relevance or register) or prosodic I will not speculate here.

3.4.2.6 Free choice attributions

Truncated cleft copular clauses can be modalised to create a free choice reading. The reduced copular approach correctly predicts that attributions that have the same reading are permitted (Dayal 2004, Heringa 2011).41
(82) a. It can be any book.
   b. Pete must choose a book, *(it can be) any book.*

3.4.2.7 Distributional evidence for the reduced copular analysis: a summary

In this subsection (§3.4.2), I examined the possible permutations on constructions that contain attributions, which vary with respect to types of anchor (quantified nominals, non-nominals) and types of attribution (quantified nominals, non-nominals, free-choice). I demonstrated that, for each permutation, the patterns of acceptability that are observed are identical to those seen in regular copular clauses. Resultantly, this equivalence provides support for reduced copular approach to attributions that was outlined in §3.2.

3.5 Syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach

In this subsection (§3.5), I present syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach to attributions that I outlined in §3.2.

3.5.1 C-command

The reduced copular approach states that attributions are derived from parenthetical copular clauses that are Force phrases that are adjoined to their host clause (see §3.2). From this claim arises the prediction that relations that depend upon c-command cannot be established across the host-attribution boundary, as operators in one Force phrase cannot bind variables in another. This is borne out for negative polarity items, modal auxiliaries and sentential negation, as the examples in (83) to (85) respectively show.

this semantic constraint is operative on reduction is unclear to me, and must be left for future research. Thanks to Jack Hoeksema (p.c.) for drawing my attention to this issue.

(i) The dog was poisoned by *someone, *(it could be) anyone.*
(83)  a. It’s not the case that the ransom note was {someone’s/anyone’s} idea of a prank.
    b. It’s not the case that the ransom note, {someone’s/*anyone’s} idea of a prank, precludes a kidnapping.

(84)  Bob might call Jenny, a plumber, for help with his broken boiler.
Interpretation: Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny is a plumber.
* Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny might be a plumber.

(85)  Pete won’t visit Sally, an old friend, at the weekend.
Interpretation: Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally is an old friend.
* Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally isn’t an old friend.

For extraction to be licit, the landing-site of an extracted element must be contained within the same Force phrase as the base position. The reduced copular approach predicts that items cannot be extracted from attributions, as there is no permissible landing-site in the host that is contained within the Force phrase that contains the attribution. Such a ban on extraction is indeed observed, as the examples in (86) demonstrate (cf. McCawley 1998).

(86)  a. * Where₁ is Elizabeth, the queen of t₁, the country’s longest reigning monarch?
    b. * It is England₁ that Elizabeth, the queen of t₁, is the country’s longest reigning monarch.
    c. * England₁, Elizabeth, the queen of t₁, is the country’s longest reigning monarch.
    d. * Elizabeth, the queen t₁, has just been crowned [of England]₁.

Extraction from within the anchor alone is predicted to be licit, however, as the base and landing sites are contained within the same Force phrase. This is borne out:

(87)  It’s [the Labour party]₁ that Miliband is leader of t₁, a difficult job by anyone’s standards.
3.5.2 Bare nominals

Bare nominals are permitted as attributions in English, as the examples in (88) illustrate. This provides support for the reduced copular approach, as bare nominals are only licit as postcopular items of predicational copular clauses, as the examples in (89) demonstrate (Doron 1994). Evidence that the bare nominals in (88) are indeed attributions and not appositions is provided from the observation that they cannot host apposition markers.

(88) a. Kristian, (the) leader of our party, has been arrested for public disorder.
   b. Kristian, {namely/that is to say} *(the) leader of our party, has been arrested for public disorder.

(89) a. Kristian is (the) leader of our party.
   b. *(The) leader of our party is Kristian.

3.5.3 Differing illocutionary force

Ross (1967) notes that assertoric appositive relative clauses can appear in erotetic hosts. For him this observation is relevant because it demonstrates that appositive relatives cannot be underlingly coordinated with their hosts, as regular clausal conjuncts cannot display dissimilar illocutionary force (the examples below are taken from Potts 2005:198).

(90) a. Did the officer arrest Clyde, who was the subject of a long manhunt, before he could strike again?
   b. * Did the officer arrest Clyde before he could strike again, and {Clyde / he} was the subject of a long manhunt?

While Ross’s data provides persuasive evidence against the position that he wishes to disprove, it carries the presumption that appositive relatives are indeed assertoric. This presumption is not supported by the data in (90) itself, as assertions and non-assertoric subclausal constituents both display declarative syntax (for instance, one would not say that the restrictive relative in (91) is an assertion just because it displays declarative syntax and is...
contained within a question). Thus, evidence that the appositive relative clause in (90a) is an assertion must be obtained from alternative sources.

(91) Did the officer arrest the man that was a subject of a long manhunt before he could strike again?

The mirror version of (90a) is more informative, however. If a parenthetical that is contained within an assertion displays non-declarative syntax or is intonated as a question or a demand, then one can be assured that the parenthetical indeed does display a dissimilar illocutionary force to its host. And it appears that, while appositions cannot display a dissimilar illocutionary force to their hosts (see 92a), attributions can (see 92b-d).

(92) a. * The Big Apple (i.e. New York?) is a huge city.
    b. A masked man (who exactly?) kissed Miranda yesterday.
    c. A masked man (Pete, perhaps?) kissed Miranda yesterday.
    d. John (a plumber?) came to fix our boiler.

On the analyses I have outlined for appositions in §2.1 and attributions in §3.2, this distribution is expected. New York in (92a) is a noun phrase conjunct (see §2.1), which cannot be used as an independent question, while the parentheticals in (92b-d) are derived from copula clauses (see §3.2), which can:

(93) a. A masked man (who was it exactly?) kissed Miranda yesterday.
    b. A masked man (was it Pete, perhaps?) kissed Miranda yesterday.
    c. John (is he a plumber?) came to fix our boiler.

3.5.4 Morphological case

In Heringa’s (2011:175-213) study of the realisation of morphological case on nominal appositions and attributions, he concludes that, in German and Romanian, when predicative attributions are sufficiently disambiguated from their appositional counterparts, they receive the same case that postcopular items receive. The same pattern is observed in Turkish, where predicative
Attributions that are not realised with an inherent case are realised with nominative case, which is the same case that is realised on postcopular items (it is null in Turkish):

(94) a. Adem Havva-yı, ki karı-sı-{Ø/*nı}, düğün-de
   Adem Havva-ACC LINK wife-POSS-{NOM/ACC} wedding-LOC
   öp-me-di.
   kiss-NEG-PST
   ‘Adem did not kiss Havva, his wife, at the wedding.’

b. Havva karı-sı-{Ø/*nı}-dir
   Havva wife-POSS-{NOM/ACC}-COP
   ‘Havva is his wife.’

As postcopular elements, one expects that truncated cleft attributions also arise with default, postcopular morphological case. This expectation is met in Turkish, where presence of accusative case on a truncated cleft attribution whose anchor bears accusative case results in unacceptability (95). In such utterances, the attribution must bear nominative case, just like in (94).

(95) Maske-li bir adam Merve-yi (ki bence
   Mask-COM a man Merve-ACC LINK for.me
   Ali-{Ø/*yı}-y-di) parti-de öp-tü.
   Ali-{NOM/ACC}-COP-PST party-LOC kiss-PST
   ‘A man with a mask on (I think Ali) kissed Merve at the party.’

Data presented in a currently unpublished manuscript by Dennis Ott (Ott 2014c) shows that the abovementioned expectation is not met in German, however. In this language, truncated cleft attributions arise with the same morphological case as their anchors, as (96) shows.
(96) Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube den Peter, 
They have a. ACC homeless I think the. ACC Peter

verhaftet.

arrested

‘They have arrested a homeless person, I think Peter.’

(modified from Ott 2014c:16)

Assurance that the appositive in (96) is indeed an attribution (and not an 
apposition) is obtained from the observation that (96) cannot host an
apposition marker such as ‘d. h.’, which is the German equivalent of i.e. in 
English:

(97) Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, (*d. h.) ich glaube den 
They have a. ACC homeless i.e. I think the. ACC Peter, verhaftet, verhaftet.

Peter arrested

‘They have arrested a homeless person, i.e. I think Peter.’

Ott utilises data like (96) to suggest that ‘truncated cleft’ attributions do not
involve reduced truncated cleft copula clauses after all. Instead, he claims
that (96) involves ellipsis of a ‘regular’ clause, as (98) shows.

(98) Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube sie haben den Peter

verhaftet, verhaftet.

While the analysis that is represented by (98) straightforwardly explains the
presence of accusative case on the Peter in (96), which is assigned by the
elided instance of verhaftet, there are reasons to doubt its tenability. Firstly,
the non-elliptical counterpart of (98) in (99) is unacceptable. This means that
(98) must involve obligatory ellipsis, whose utilisation is conceptually
unwarranted in this scenario, since the struckthrough material is otherwise
optionally elided, as (100B) demonstrates.
(99) * Sie haben einen Obdachlosen, ich glaube sie haben den Peter verhaftet, verhaftet.

(100) A: Wen haben sie verhaftet?
Who have they arrested?

B: Ich glaube (sie haben) den Peter (verhaftet).
I believe they have the ACC Peter arrested.
‘I believe Peter.’

Secondly, it seems that referential attributions are always derived from truncated clefts in English. Support for this claim comes from the distribution of dependent tag questions (DTQs) in parenthetical environments. As (101) shows, parenthetical clauses such as regular transitive clauses (101a) and truncated clefts (101b) can license DTQs, which must display strict isomorphism with the parenthetical clauses to which they attach.

(101) a. Sam hit someone – he hit Abe, {didn’t he/*wasn’t it}? – today.
b. Sam hit someone – it was Abe, {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – today.

When reduction occurs to create referential attributions, only the ‘wasn’t it?’ DTQ is licit, as (102) illustrates for both the object (102a) and subject (102b) cases (cf. Barros & van Craenenbroeck 2013).

(102) a. Sam hit someone – David, {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – today.
b. Someone – David {wasn’t it/*didn’t he}? – hit Sam today.

Because the distribution of the DTQs in (102) patterns with (101b) but not (101a), the examples in (102) suggest that (101b) is the correct underlying derivation for referential attributions in English, even in those environments (such as 101a) where ‘regular’ parenthetical clauses are available as potential sources.42

42 Note that the isomorphism condition associated with DTQs is obviated when the licensing clause contains a contrastively-focussed element, as (i) shows (Sailor 2009).
While these data from English are encouraging for the cross-linguistic application of the truncated cleft analysis of referential attributions, I must concede that they only provide circumstantial support for it, as the absence of DTQs in German prevents one from applying the same diagnostic to the German utterance in (96).

If the attribution in (96) is indeed derived from a reduced truncated cleft copular clause as I maintain, then certain construction-specific factors must give rise to the unexpected presence of accusative case on the attribution. It appears that (i) the non-pronunciation of the predicate pronoun and copula verb in the parenthetical clause, and (ii) the adjunction of the parenthetical clause to its host, interact to cause this phenomenon. At the present time, the nature of this interaction is unknown to me (though see Heringa 2011:199-207 for a proposal of how to formalise this interaction, which utilises ideas propounded in Matushansky 2008). However, it should be pointed out that the unexpected case-marking observed in (96) is also observed in other inflectional languages aside from German. For instance, Heringa (2011, §6) shows that, although they are underlyingly copular clausal, both predicative and truncated cleft attributions in Russian and Czech must receive their anchor’s case. If my contention about German and Heringa’s suggestion about Russian and Czech are correct, then a complex of constraints that are operative in inflectional languages conspire to hide the fact that all attributions are derived from parenthetical copular clauses. Put another way, the distribution of morphological case seems to be an unreliable diagnostic of the underlying structure of attributions in inflectional languages. The distribution of adphrasal morphological case in agglutinative languages like Turkish appears to be a more reliable diagnostic in this respect.

(i) Bob went to Chicago, wasn’t it?
I tentatively suggest that, contrary to appearances, the isomorphism condition on DTQs is not actually obviated in (i). Rather, utterances like (i) involve *Horn amalgams* (Kluck 2011) (ii), in which *it was* is rendered unpronounced (iii). Support for this suggestion comes from the fact that DTQs may immediately follow contrastively-focussed elements that arise clause-medially, as (iv) shows. Because DTQs must otherwise linearly follow their licensing clause (as (v) shows), this pattern of interpolation ceases to be anomalous on a *Horn amalgam* account, as the DTQ does fully succeed its licensing clause, which is the reduced interpolated clause *it was Chicago.*

(ii) [Bob went to [Ø [it was Chicago, wasn’t it?]]].
(iii) [Bob went to [Ø [it was Chicago, wasn’t it?]]].
(iv) [Bob went to [Ø [it was Chicago, wasn’t it?,] on Saturday?]
(v) * Bob kissed, didn’t he, Sally?
3.5.5 Syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach: a summary

In this subsection (§3.5), I provided syntactic evidence for the reduced copular approach to attributions that I propounded in §3.2. The fact that bare nominals can be attributions (§3.5.2), and that predicative attributions display predicative case in non-Slavic languages (§3.5.4) provides direct support for the reduced copular approach, which treats attributions as postcopular elements of reduced parenthetical copular clauses. The fact that attributions cannot be c-commanded into or extracted from (§3.5.1), and that attributions can display dissimilar illocutionary force to their hosts (§3.5.3), merely show that attributions are derived from clauses that are syntactically and semantically opaque and which can be used to commit speech acts. While these properties are captured on the reduced clausal approach, which treats the parenthetical copular clauses from which attributions are derived as Force phrasal adjuncts, it does not entail that alternative analyses that can also capture these properties are inferior to the reduced copular analysis of attributions. Thus, the inferiority of these alternative theories (if indeed they are inferior) must be shown by other means. I return to this issue in chapter six, where I discuss the feasibility of alternative analyses to those that I have advanced for appositions in §2.1 and for attributions in §3.2.

3.6 Concluding remarks on attributions

In this chapter, I advanced the idea that attributions are reduced parenthetical predicational or truncated cleft copular clauses and provided evidence to support it. My analysis differs from others that pursue a similar approach (namely, that appositives are reduced copular clauses) such as Heringa (2011), Döring (2014) and Ott (2014a, b) in two ways. First, I do not claim that all appositives are derived in this manner, as only attributions (and not true appositions, see chapter two) are. Secondly, I claim that, aside from the application of left-edge ellipsis in English and presence of pro subjects and zero copulas in Turkish, attributions are identical to parenthetical copular clauses that can be introduced by a linker like and (these clauses are called and-parentheticals in Kavalova 2007). This
association is absent in Heringa (2011), though I cannot say with any confidence whether or not this absence of association is intentional or not.

In this chapter, I proposed that and-parentheticals (and hence the attributions formed from their reduction) are adjoined to their host clause. Adjunction is not the only possibility however: and-parentheticals could be coordinated with or orphaned from their hosts. I will provide evidence against these alternative hypotheses in §6.2-6.3.

At this juncture, it appears that the explication of my theory of appositives is now complete. I have endeavoured to show that a binary and superordinate division must be made between appositives that are coordinated with their anchors in a low, WYSIWYG fashion (i.e. appositions), and appositives that are Force phrases (which can be reduced to form attributions) that adjoin to their host.

There are repercussions to advancing a binary division between appositive elements, however. One repercussion concerns appositive relative clauses (ARCs) such as who is my friend in (103) below.

(103) **John, who is my friend, is coming for dinner.**

The question that arises is this: are ARCs coordinated with their hosts in a low fashion (as appositions are), or are ARCs (derived from) Force phrasal adjuncts (as attributions are)? I endeavour to answer this question in following chapter.
4

Appositive relative clauses

In this chapter, I aim to locate the place of appositive relative clauses (ARCs) within the theory of appositives that I developed in chapters two and three. Do ARCs modify null nominal appositions or null nominal attributions, or are they stand-alone Force phrasal adjuncts? In §4.1, I introduce appositional and attributional relatives – which are regular restrictive relatives observed in parenthetical environments – and outline a syntactic analysis of them that serves as formal backdrop for later subsections. To test the hypothesis that ARCs are indeed restrictive relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments, I attempt to discover in §4.2 and §4.3 whether ARCs modify null appositions (§4.2) or null attributions (§4.3). Because ARCs pattern unlike appositional or attributional relatives, I conclude that ARCs modify neither null appositions nor null attributions. This entails that ARCs are stand-alone parenthetical clauses; an entailment I support with the theory of ARCs I outline in §4.4.

4.1 Introductory remarks

According to the conclusions of chapters two and three, appositions are coordinated with their anchors, while attributions are postcopular elements of reduced parenthetical copular clauses:

(1) a. \[&P [DP \text{Lizzy Windsor}], \text{i.e.} [DP \text{the Queen}]], \text{drinks Dubonnet every day.}\n
b. \[DP [DP \text{Lizzy Windsor}], [\text{ForceP (she’s)} [DP \text{a monarch of habit}]]], \text{drinks Dubonnet every day.}\n
As the examples in (1) show, noun phrases can be both conjuncts and postcopular items (among many other things). Noun phrases can also be optionally modified by restrictive relative clauses. Bearing these simple facts in mind, the fact that utterances like those in (2) are attested is rather
unsurprising. The relative clauses in these constructions are merely restrictive relatives that modify an apposition (2a) and an attribution (2b), and hence arise in a parenthetical environment.

(2) **Appositional relative clause**
   a. \[ \text{[\&P [DP Tom], i.e. [DP the man [CP that fixed our boiler]]], has sent us a Christmas card.} \]

   **Attributional relative clause**
   b. \[ \text{[DP [DP Bob], [ForceP (he is) [DP someone [CP that always has too much to drink]]]], embarrassed himself last night.} \]

At first glance the appositive in (3a), which exemplifies the class of appositives known as *appositive relative clauses* (ARCs), looks like a restrictive relative that arises in a parenthetical environment whose external noun phrase is unpronounced, as in (3b) (De Vries 2002, 2006a, Šimík 2008, and Lassiter 2011). In this chapter, I test this ‘first blush’ hypothesis about ARCs.

(3) a. **Tom, who fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card.**
    b. **Tom, [DP (the man) [CP who fixed our boiler,]] has sent us…**

The chapter is structured as follows. In the remainder of this subsection (§4.1), I outline a syntactic and semantic analysis of the restrictive relative clauses displayed in (2). I do this in order to provide a formal backdrop for a comparison of appositional/attributional and appositive relative clauses in English. As such, the analysis of restrictive relatives that I adumbrate is not intended to be definitive, but merely sufficient for the sake of comparison.

After outlining my analysis of restrictive relatives in English, I will return to ARCs in §4.2 and §4.3 and test the abovementioned ‘first blush’ hypothesis. If the conclusions reached in chapters two and three are also correct, then ARCs must be a subclass of either appositional or attributional relative clauses, as the noun phrases to which they attach can only appear as

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43 Because it does not display relativisation of the ‘operator-gap’ ilk (Lewis 1967), Turkish is not mentioned in this chapter.
appositives if they are either directly coordinated with their anchors (as nominal appositions are), or if they are postcopular nouns phrases of predicative or truncated cleft parenthetical clauses (as attributions are). Maintaining the assumption that they modify null appositive noun phrases, my aim in §4.2 and §4.3 is to discover whether ARCs modify null nominal appositions or null nominal attributions. However, because they behave unlike appositions or attributions, I will ultimately conclude that ARCs modify neither null appositions nor null attributions. This conclusion entails that ARCs are in vacuo parenthetical clauses (i.e. stand-alone parenthetical clauses that do not modify anything); an entailment that I argue is correct in §4.4.

To begin: let us, for the sake of concreteness and comparison, take a stance about the syntax of the restrictive relative clauses observed in (2). I adopt a variant of the matching analysis (Chomsky 1965, Sauerland 2003, Koster-Möller 2012). Internally, I assume that relative pronouns are definite descriptions that display the syntax that is exemplified by the schema in (4) (cf. Šimík 2008). In (4), X0 is a functional head that bears syntactic wh-features. X0 is treated as a semantic identity function that concatenates with the predicate noun phrase thing. In (4), X0 is realised by which and D0 is occupied by a determiner that is obligatorily null in modern British English.

(4)  

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\alpha[\text{thing}(x)] \\
\downarrow \\
D^0 \\
\downarrow \\
\lambda \text{thing}(y) \\
\downarrow \\
\lambda P \alpha[P(x)] \\
\downarrow \\
X^0 \\
\downarrow \\
\lambda P \lambda y[P(y)] \\
\downarrow \\
\lambda z[\text{thing}(z)] \\
\end{array}
\]

\[44\] As far as I can tell, no aspect of the analysis that I advance in this chapter relies upon the adoption of the matching analysis of restrictive relatives. It is simply the case that a concrete comparison of restrictive and appositive relatives is more straightforward on the matching analysis than its raising (Kayne 1994, De Vries 2002) counterparts.
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It appears that $D^0$ in (4) can be morphologically realised in restrictive relatives in some varieties of English however (particularly in archaic English), as the examples procured from the internet in (5) and (6) demonstrate.

(5) A book of contemplation the which is called The cloud of Unknowing.
   (Underhill’s 1922 edition of the above-named treatise)

(6) It is in no way an accurate description of the flourishing industry which is already planning its next round of drilling in 2015, nor the commitments the which are recognized as one of the highest standards of safety regulation anywhere in the world.

What suppresses the morphological realisation of $D^0$ in restrictive relatives in standard English is unknown to me. Note that $D^0$ can be realised in restrictive relatives in other languages, such as archaic registers of Dutch. This is shown in the example in (7), which is procured from the internet, in which the determiner het ‘the’ and relative element welk ‘which’ are fused.

(7) Hij las het boek hetwelk hij van zijn vader geërfd had.
   he read the book the which he of his father inherited had
   ‘He read the book which he inherited from his father.’

Following Jackendoff (1977) and Lassiter (2011), I propose that relative pronouns other than which are polymorphemic. As such, a relative pronoun like who realises the referential noun phrase [$\emptyset$ the which person], while a relative pronoun like where realises the prepositional phrase [in $\emptyset$ the which place].

Upon extraction, relative pronouns like (4) are concatenated with TP by predicate modification (Heim & Kratzer 1998). The resulting CP, which is represented in (8), is therefore interpreted as a predicate.

(8)  $[CP_e, t_1] [DP \emptyset [\text{whP which thing}]] [\text{TP Pete likes } t_1]]$

The relative clause in (8) then concatenates by predicate modification with an external predicate nominal, which is thing in (9a). Finally, the entire
construction is topped by a determiner, which converts it into a referential noun phrase (9b).

(9) a. \[ NP \text{thing} \ [CP \ [DP \emptyset \text{the} \ [whP \text{which thing}]_1 \ [TP \text{Pete likes } t_1]]] \]
    b. \[ DP \text{the} \ [NP \text{thing} \ [CP \ [DP \emptyset \text{the} \ [whP \text{which thing}]_1 \ [TP \text{Pete likes } t_1]]] \]

In the case of which-relatives, the predicate noun within the whP is deleted, as (10a) shows. In the case of that-relatives, the entire whP is rendered unpronounced, as (10b) shows.

(10) a. \[ NP \text{thing} \ [CP \ [DP \emptyset \text{the} \ [whP \text{which thing}]_1 \ [TP \text{Pete likes } t_1]]] \]
    b. \[ DP \text{the} \ [NP \text{thing} \ [CP \ [DP \emptyset \text{the} \ [whP \text{which thing}]_1 \ [TP \text{Pete likes } t_1]]] \[that \ [TP \text{Pete likes } t_1]] \]

The operation observed in (10) is called movement deletion, which is licensed locally by c-command, which is obligatory, and which targets erasable copies in A'-chains. Movement deletion is also observed in comparative constructions such as (11), as Kennedy (2002) shows.

(11) The Milky way contains more stars than \[ CP (*\text{the amount of stars})_1 \text{the eye can see } t_1] \.

Having outlined an analysis of the restrictive relatives that are observed in the appositives in (2) (and restrictive relatives more generally) that will serve as a suitable backdrop for an investigation of appositive relative clauses, I now turn to the question of whether ARCs are indeed a subset of either appositional (such as 2a) or attributional (such as 2b) relative clauses.

4.2 Appositive relatives as modifiers of null nominal appositions?

In this section, I entertain the hypothesis that ARCs like (3a) modify null nominal appositions. In other words, I assess the plausibility of the claim that (3a) displays the coordinative syntax in (12).

(12) \[ &P \ [DP \text{Tom},] \ [DP \text{(the man)} \ [CP \text{who fixed our boiler},]] \text{has sent us} \ldots \]
The most straightforward way to tell if ARCs display the structure in (12) is to compare them to appositional relative constructions like (13), which definitely do display the structure in (12) (see chapter two).

(13) Tom, i.e. the man {who/that} fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card.

In two important respects, appositional and appositive relatives do correspond. First, if contained within the same clause as their anchors, both appositional and appositive relative clauses must be right-adjacent to them, as the examples in (14) and (15) show (however, see footnote 47 in this chapter for important caveats).

(14) Appositional relative clauses
   a. The Big Apple, i.e. the city that most people know as “New York”, is a huge place.
   b. * The Big Apple is, i.e. the city that most people know as “New York”, a huge place.

(15) Appositive relative clauses
   a. The Big Apple, which most people know as “New York”, is a huge city.
   b. * The Big Apple is, which most people know as “New York”, a huge city.

Second, both appositional and appositive relatives can occupy a position right-adjacent to the clause that immediately contains their anchor, as the examples in (16) and (17) demonstrate (De Vries 2002, contrary to the assumptions of McCawley 1998 and Potts 2005). Note that I will return to discuss the distribution of ARCs that are non-adjacent to their anchors in §4.4.2.
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(16) Appositional relative clauses
   a. John saw Jo yesterday, i.e. the woman that he often dreams about.
   b. That John visited the Big Apple yesterday, i.e. the city that most people know as “New York”, is great news.

(17) Appositive relative clauses
   a. John saw Jo yesterday, who he often dreams about.
   b. That John visited the Big Apple yesterday, which city most people know as “New York”, is great news.

This is where the similarities between appositional and appositive relatives end. Problematically, ARCs do not reformulate or identify their anchors. Considering that appositions must do this by definition (§2.1), this is troubling for the association of ARCs with appositional relative clauses. To illustrate that ARCs do not identify their anchors, consider the examples in (18). Here, the anchor is a third person pronoun whose antecedent is not sufficiently salient in the prior discourse. To ensure that the hearer knows to whom her refers, the speaker appends an apposition (18a) or appositional relative construction (18b), which provides a more informative name for discourse referent in question.

(18) a. John saw her yesterday, his ex-wife.
   b. John saw her yesterday, the woman he loves.

If ARCs are appositional relative clauses, one expects them to display the same behaviour that is observed in (18). They do not, as (19) demonstrates. Here, the ARC fails to provide a more informative name for her, and incoherence arises because her cannot be bound (in discourse terms) to a salient discourse referent.

(19) # John saw her yesterday, who he loves.

One might claim that the appositive noun phrase in ARCs must be a null pronoun (De Vries 2006a:238). If this claim is correct, then the incoherence observed in (19) is expected. ARCs like (19) do not reformulate their anchors
for the same reason that appositional relative clause constructions that display pronouns and modify unbounded pronominal anchors such as (20) do not: they fail to provide more informative names for their anchors.

(20)  # John saw her yesterday, she who he loves.

As I discussed in §2.2.6, appositions also exemplify their anchors, as the example in (21), which is repeated from (113) in chapter two, shows.

(21) All politicians, but especially Cameron, are crooks.

As one would expect, appositional relative constructions can exemplify their anchors too:

(22) All politicians, but especially the man that lives in Downing Street, are crooks.

If ARCs are derived from appositional relative constructions, then one expects them to be capable of exemplifying their anchors. This expectation is not met, as the examples in (23) show. This observation casts a shadow of doubt on the alignment of ARCs with appositional relative constructions.

(23) a. * John likes music, especially which his dad introduced him to.
    b. * John likes music, which his dad introduced him to, especially.

Moreover, one cannot appeal to notion that ARCs modify null appositive pronouns rather than full referential expressions to explain why the example in (22) is acceptable while the examples in (23) are not. This is because pronouns make for suitable external noun phrases of appositional relative constructions that exemplify their anchors:

(24) Mary hates all the villains in Harry Potter, especially he who cannot be named.

Another hint that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from data that concern extraction. Recall from §2.1 that extraction is licit in
appositional constructions only if it applies equally to both the apposition and its anchor, as per Ross’ (1967) coordinate structure constraint. This fact gives rise to the prediction that, if ARCs are akin to appositional relative clauses, extraction from within an ARC’s anchor alone should be illicit, as the anchor is the initial conjunct of a coordination phrase.

The prediction is not borne out, as the examples in (25) show. Note that (25a) is degraded because who is indefinite (while 25a comes from Citko 2008: 648, the judgement reflects my informants’).

(25)  a. ? Who₁ did John buy Picasso’s portrait of t₁, which all his friends admired?
       b. It’s England₁ that we hate the roads of t₁, which are full of potholes.

Further evidence that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from finiteness. The relative clause in appositional relative constructions can be infinitival, as (26a) shows. If relative clauses in appositions are merely regular relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments (as I claim) then this fact is unsurprising, as regular relatives may display infinitival syntax too, as (26b) illustrates.

(26)  a. A holy day, that is to say a day on which to pray, is coming up next week.
       b. A day on which to pray is coming up next week.

If they modified null appositions, and hence patterned with regular restrictive relatives, one would expect that ARCs could display infinitival syntax. This expectation is not met, as (27) demonstrates (McCawley 1998). That this dissimilarity between ARCs and appositional relative constructions pertains provides an additional hint that ARCs do not modify null appositions.

(27)  * A holy day, on which to pray, is coming up next week.
Because appositional relative constructions are subclausal constituents, they cannot bear an illocutionary force that is dissimilar to their host clauses', as (28) shows.

(28) Appositional relative clause constructions
   a. * Bob, i.e. the man from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?, is a curmudgeonly man.
   b. * When the play is over, i.e. the point at which please remember to applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area.
   c. * Pete's bid, i.e. the offer that I hereby gladly accept, was substantial.

Nor can appositional relative constructions host dependent interrogative tags, which are reserved for Force phrases that are endowed with a QUESTION predicate:

(29) * Bob, i.e. the guy that fixed our boiler, isn't he?, sent us a Christmas card.

If ARCs are appositional relative constructions whose external noun phrase is null, then one expects that ARCs cannot host independent illocutionary force either. This expectation is not met, as the examples in (30) and (31) demonstrate (Cinque 2008). In (30a), the ARC is a question inside a host assertion, in (30b) the ARC is a command inside a host assertion, while in (30c) the ARC is a performative inside a host assertion. In (31), the ARC successfully hosts a dependent interrogative tag. This discrepancy between ARCs and appositional relative constructions provides another hint that they should not be equated, as it suggests that ARCs are (derived from) Force phrases while appositional relative clauses are not.

(30) a. Bob, from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?, is a curmudgeonly man.
    b. When the play is over, at which point please remember to applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area.
    c. Pete's bid, which I hereby gladly accept, is very generous.
(31) **Marcia, who you wanted to meet, didn’t you?,** has just arrived.  
(McCawley 1998:447)

A further hint that ARCs are (derived from) Force phrases comes from the observation that they may host discourse particles such as *therefore* (see 32a, modified from Burton-Roberts 1999), which establish rhetorical relations between Force phrases across the discourse. As appositive noun phrases that cannot bear independent illocutionary force, the fact that appositional relative constructions are unable to host discourse particles like *therefore* is expected (see 32b). Again, the contrast observed in (32) provides further evidence that ARCs do not modify null appositions.

(32) a. John gets on best with **small firms, who therefore employ him frequently.**

b. * The vice president gets on best with **the Halliburton group, i.e. those firms who therefore employ him frequently.**

On the matching analysis of restrictive relatives outlined in §4.1, restrictor noun phrases that arise when the relative pronoun is *which* are obligatorily deleted, as the schema from (10a), which is repeated in a modified form in (33) below, shows.

(33)  [DP the [NP book [CP [which (*book)]]_1 [TP I loathed t as a student]]]]

Because appositional relative constructions are merely noun phrases like (33) that are observed in an appositional environment, the same obligatory deletion of restrictor noun phrases is observed:

(34) **Finnegan’s Wake, i.e. the book which (*book) I loathed as a student,**  
starts halfway through a sentence.

This obligatory deletion is not observed in ARCs, however, as the example in (35) shows (Fabb 1990, McCawley 1998).

(35) **Finnegan’s Wake, which (book) I loathed as a student,** starts halfway through a sentence.
On the assumption that ARCs and appositional relative constructions correspond, it seems that deletion of the restrictor noun phrase is obligatory if the external noun phrase is present (as with restrictive and appositional relatives) but optional if the external noun phrase is null (as with ARCs). The matching analysis of relative clauses, which assumes movement deletion (Kennedy 2002), fails to account for the observation in (35). If movement deletion were optional when its licensor were absent, one would expect that the amount of stars in the comparative construction in (36B), which is derived by movement deletion, could undergo optional deletion too. This expectation is not met, as the amount of stars in (36B) must be deleted. Resultantly, the assumption that the absence of the external noun phrase licenses the pronunciation of the restrictor noun phrase in ARCs must be viewed with suspicion. More plausible is the simple hypothesis that ARCs do not contain an external noun phrase whatsoever.

(36) A: There are so many stars in the sky!
   B: Indeed. There are more stars than (*the amount of stars) the eye can see $t_1$.

Another indication that ARCs do not modify null appositions comes from data that concerns ‘split’ anchors. Because appositions function to reformulate their anchors, referential appositions cannot corefer with items other than those with which they are coordinated. This is shown in (37), where the apposition cannot be construed as coreferent with both Tom and Katie.

(37) * Tom met with Katie, i.e. [my siblings]+k.

As expected, the same constraint that is observed in (37) is operative on appositional relative constructions, as (38) demonstrates.

(38) * Paul uses whisky to dilute brandy, i.e. [the two strong liquors]+k
     that he likes to drink.

If they are appositional relative constructions, then one expects that ARCs cannot modify ‘split’ anchors either. This expectation is not met. As the
example in (39) illustrates, ARCs can modify split anchors (McCawley 1998, De Vries 2002, Cinque 2008).

(39) Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy, which are both strong liquors.

Another concern for the hypothesis that ARCs are appositional relative constructions comes from the observation that appositional relative constructions, but not ARCs, can host apposition markers:

(40) a. Pete, (i.e.) the guy who fixed our boiler, sent us a Christmas card.
    b. Pete, (*i.e.) who fixed our boiler, sent us a Christmas card.

To account for the dissimilarity observed in (40), an advocate of the notion that ARCs modify null nominal appositions might suggest that apposition markers are only licit if external noun phrases of appositional relative constructions are pronounced. Evidence suggests that such an idea cannot be maintained however, as ‘complement of N’ appositional relatives such as those exemplified in (41) can host apposition markers regardless of whether or not the external noun phrase the rumour is pronounced. (That the constructions in 41 involve relativisation is demonstrated by Aboh 2005, Kayne 2010, Arsenjević 2009, and Haegeman 2012.)

(41) The rumour, (i.e.) (the rumour) that John was fired, is nonsense.

The last difference between ARCs and appositional relative constructions that I wish to discuss concerns massive pied-piping (Safir 1986). As the example in (42) shows, ARCs permit the massive pied-piping of phrases that contain appositive relative pronouns.

(42) Doctor Smith, due in part to the cool-headedness of the father of the wife of whom I am alive today, is incompetent.

This phenomenon is illicit in appositional relative constructions, however:
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(43)  * Doctor Smith, i.e. the man due in part to the cool-headedness of the father of the wife of whom I am alive today, is incompetent.

On the matching analysis of relative clauses outlined in §4.1, the difference in acceptability between (42) and (43) cannot be accounted for. Regardless of whether or not the external noun phrase the man is pronounced, no movement deletion occurs in either (42) or (43), as the relative pronoun is polymorphemic (i.e. it realises which man). As such, one cannot appeal to locality constraints on movement deletion to explain the unacceptability of (43).45

To summarise: in this section (§4.2), I assessed the plausibility of the claim that ARCs modify null nominal appositions by comparing their behaviour to that of appositional relative constructions. Aside from the fact that they share the same distribution (i.e. both can only appear adjacent to their anchors or the clauses that immediately contain their anchors), ARCs and appositional relative constructions share no common properties. This conclusion casts a rather large shadow of doubt on the hypothesis that ARCs modify null nominal appositions.

4.3 Appositive relatives as modifiers of null nominal attributions?

In this section, I entertain the hypothesis that ARCs like (44a) modify null nominal attributions. In other words, I assess the plausibility of the claim that (44a) displays the syntax in (44b).

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45 De Vries (2006b) notes that, in cases where the relative phrase is a prepositional phrase that contains a possessive noun phrase, massive pied-piping is licit in both restrictive and appositive relatives:

(i) I know the man to the father of whose wife you spoke yesterday.
(ii) Ben, to the father of whose wife you spoke yesterday, is coming for dinner.

These data and those in (42) and (43) highlight that there are different degrees of ‘massiveness’ to pied-piping, and that only ‘extreme’ massive pied-piping of the sort observed in (42) can occur in ARCs. About the extremely massive pied-piping exemplified in (42), Webelhuth (1992:130) says "the exceptional cases of pied piping are indeed instances of topicalisation in which what looks formally like a relative pronoun is interpreted as an indexical pronoun". I will argue in §4.4 that Webelhuth’s characterisation is indeed correct for ARCs: the relative phrase in ARCs indeed undergoes obligatory topicalisation.
(44) a. Tom, who fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card.
   b. [DP [DP Tom,] [ForceP he–is [DP (the man) [CP who fixed our boiler,]]]] has sent us…

The most straightforward way to tell if ARCs display the structure in (44b) is to compare them to attributional relative constructions such as (45), which definitely do display the structure in (44b).

(45) Tom, (he is) someone {who/that} is always late, has sent us a Christmas card.

At first glance, the theory that ARCs modify null nominal attributions fares better than the theory that they modify null nominal appositions, which I assessed in §4.2. In that section, I showed that ARCs may modify split anchors while appositional relative constructions cannot:

(46) a. Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy, which are both strong liquors.
    b. * Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy, i.e. [the two strong liquors] that he likes to drink.

Like ARCs, attributional relative constructions may modify split anchors:

(47) Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy, (they are) drinks that are both strong liquors.

As the subscripted indices in (47) indicate, attributional relative constructions can modify split anchors because they are postcopular items of parenthetical copular clauses whose null subjects can corefer with multiple precedent referents. The fact that ARCs can modify split anchors therefore provides an initial suggestion that they contain null subjects too, and hence that the schema in (44b) is correct for ARCs.

It was also mentioned in §4.2 that ARCs can host independent illocutionary force (see the examples in 30, which are repeated below).
(48) a. Bob, from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?, is a curmudgeonly man.
b. When the play is over, at which point please remember to applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area.
c. Pete’s bid, which I hereby gladly accept, is very generous.

Attributional relative constructions also display this property, but in a limited respect. More specifically, attributional relative constructions can be questions and performatives, but not commands:

(49) a. Bob (the guy that Mary likes?) is sitting over there.
b. * When the play is over, a point at which please remember to applaud!, we will be serving drinks in the reception area.
c. Pete’s bid, an offer which I hereby gladly accept, is very generous.

The limitations on the type of independent force that attributions may bear can be ascribed to their status as reduced copular clauses. Erotetic and performative attributions are permitted because the finite copular clauses from which they are derived can be interrogative and declarative (i.e. *is he the guy that Mary likes?* in the case of 49a; *it is an offer which I hereby gladly accept* in the case of 49b) but not imperative. If ARCs modified null nominal attributions, one would expect the same limitation observed in (49) to apply. That it does not (as 48 has demonstrated) hints towards the conclusion that ARCs and attributions do not obtain their status as independent speech acts by the same means. Resultantly, the data in (48) and (49) undermine the notion that ARCs modify null attributions, and imply that the similarity that pertains between ARCs and attributional relative constructions with respect to split anchors is accidental.

Further evidence that ARCs and attributional relative constructions obtain their status as speech acts by different means is provided by revisiting the data on interrogative tags from §4.2. When the clauses from which attributional relative constructions are derived are fully pronounced (as in 50a) the subject of the tag cannot corefer with subject of the relative clause (you). Rather, it must corefer with the parenthetical clause’s matrix subject (that). When such parenthetical clauses are reduced down to form
attributions, as in (50b), a similar acceptability judgement is obtained, as expected.

(50)  a.  **Stilton, that's the cheese that you like, {isn't it / *don't you}?, is on offer in the supermarket.**
    b.  **Stilton, that's the cheese that you like, {isn't it / *don't you}?, is on offer in the supermarket.**

As mentioned in §4.2, ARCs can host dependent interrogative tags. If ARCs were akin to attributional relative constructions and were therefore derived from the schema in (44b), the distribution of tags that is observed in (50) would also be observed in ARCs. As (51) demonstrates, this is not the case.

(51)  **Stilton, which you like, {don't you / *isn't it}?, is on offer in the supermarket.**

The fact that the interrogative tag *isn't it?* is unavailable in (51) shows that the ARC in (51), unlike its attributional relative counterpart in (50b), is not dominated by an unpronounced subject *that*. This conclusion therefore provides evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions.

Additional evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions comes from finiteness. The relative clause in attributional relative constructions can be infinitival, as (52a) shows. If relative clauses in attributions are merely regular relatives that are observed in parenthetical environments (as I claim) then this fact is unsurprising, as regular relatives that modify postcopular noun phrases may display infinitival syntax too (see 52b).

(52)  a.  **The Dalai Lama, a man to whom to show respect, lives in India.**
    b.  The Dalai Lama is a man to whom to show respect.

If they modified null attributions, and hence equate with regular restrictive relatives, one would expect that ARCs could display infinitival syntax. This expectation is not met, as (53) demonstrates. This discrepancy provides another hint that ARCs do not modify null attributions.
Further evidence that ARCs do not modify null attributions comes from the observation that two particular subsets of ARCs cannot be derived from copular clauses. These are ARCs whose relative pronouns are contained within complements of nouns (see 54), and ARCs whose anchors are free relatives (see 55, from Del Gobbo 2007:193).

(54)  a.  The Romans are famous for their mosaics, fine examples of which are held at the museum.

   b.  * The Romans are famous for their mosaics, {there are/it is} (some) fine examples of which are held at the museum.

(55)  a.  I go there whenever I have time, which isn’t often.

   b.  * I go there whenever I have time, it is {something/a time/the time} which isn’t often.

The fact that the ARCs in (54) and (55) cannot be derived from copular clauses demonstrates that the schema in (44b) is untenable for them. While this observation does not preclude that other ARCs modify null attributions, it undermines the worth of pursuing such a theory. If an alternative analysis can be advanced that captures the syntactic behaviour of all ARCs, this alternative analysis will be preferred to a theory that necessarily splits ARCs asunder.

Further evidence that ARCs are not attributional relative clauses comes from the types of quantified nominal anchors each may modify. I demonstrated in §3.4.2.2 that attributions can modify anchors whose quantifier is referential (i.e. a, three, some, several, many, few) or superfluous (every and all in certain contexts), but cannot modify strong quantified phrases. The relevant examples are repeated below.
(56) a. Every chess set comes with a red pawn, a spare.
   b. (Every) man, driven to it by his genetic predispositions, feels the need to dominate others.
   c. (All) biologists, slaves to their ambition, wish to publish in Nature.
   d. Mary has ([few / many]) friends, leftists no doubt.
   e. (Several / some) students, a tenacious little bunch, still go to Dr. Brown’s lectures.
   f. * (Every / no) climber, an experienced adventurer, was found sipping cocoa in the lodge.

While ARCs pattern like attributions with respect to (56a-e), as (57) shows, they pattern dissimilarly to attributions with respect to strong quantified noun phrases like every x and no x, as (58) illustrates.

(57) a. Every chess set comes with a red pawn, which is a spare.
   b. (Every) man, who is driven to it by his genetic predispositions, feels the need to dominate others.
   c. (All) biologists, who are slaves to their ambition, wish to publish in Nature.
   d. Mary has ([few / many]) friends, who are leftists no doubt.
   e. (Several / some) students, who are a tenacious little bunch, still go to Dr. Brown’s lectures.

(58) a. No properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.
   b. Every properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have got that right.

   (Arnold 2007:292)

The ARCs in (58) can modify strong quantified anchors because the irrealis tense observed within them permits modal subordination (Roberts 1987), which renders the ARCs as equivalent to conditionals. This makes the quantified noun phrase properly trained linguist accessible for binding by the ARC pronoun (see Arnold 2007 for a formal implementation). Indeed, when
irrealis tense is removed, as in the stative copular clausal ARC below, incoherence is engendered (just as in 56f).

(59) * {Every / no} climber, who was an experienced adventurer, was found sipping cocoa in the lodge.

Thus, (56f) and (59) are unacceptable because they are derived from stative copular clauses that do not trigger modal subordination. If ARCs were derived from attributions (see 60a), which are themselves derived from stative copular clauses, one would incorrectly predict that the examples in (58) are unacceptable. Moreover, one cannot pursue the idea that ARCs are derived from attributions by arguing that reduction can apply to non-stative copular clauses (as in 60b). If it could, then the example in (56f) would be coherent (as it could be derived from 61), which it is not.

(60) a. * No properly trained linguist, she is someone who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.

b. No properly trained linguist, she would be someone who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.

(61) {Every / no} climber, he would be an experienced adventurer, was found sipping cocoa in the lodge.

To summarise: in this section (§4.3), I assessed the plausibility of the hypothesis that ARCs modify null nominal attributions. While ARCs and attributions share two commonalities, namely that both can display independent illocutionary force and modify split anchors, ARCs pattern unlike attributional relative constructions with respect to their ability to modify strong quantified anchors, their ability to display infinitival syntax, and their ability to host dependant interrogative tags that are non-isomorphic to those tags that attributional relative constructions can host. Also, there exist two subclasses of ARCs that cannot be derived from copular clauses and hence cannot be attributional relative constructions. Taken together, I conclude from the data examined in this section that the
commonalities that are observed between ARCs and attributions are accidental, and that, ultimately, ARCs do not modify null nominal attributions.

4.4 Appositive relative clauses as finite clausal Force phrasal adjuncts

In §4.2 and §4.3, I assessed the plausibility of the hypotheses that ARCs modify null nominal appositions and attributions respectively. By comparing the behaviour of ARCs to the behaviour of appositional and attributional relative constructions, I demonstrated that ARCs act like neither. From this comparison, I conclude that ARCs do not modify null appositions or attributions. On the assumption that all appositive noun phrases are either appositions or attributions, this leads to the conclusion that ARCs are in vacuo parenthetical clauses: they do not modify a null external appositive noun phrase of any kind.

In this section, I advance an analysis of the syntax of ARCs that postulates precisely this – that ARCs are parenthetical clauses. Not only does this analysis straightforwardly capture the behaviour of ARCs that has been documented in §4.2 and §4.3, but it allows me to maintain the claim that appositive structures come in only two variants: either coordinated with their anchors (i.e. appositions), or Force phrasal adjuncts. ARCs are in the second group, and are therefore comparable to the Force phrasal adjuncts from which attributions are derived.

4.4.1 The internal syntax of appositive relative clauses

According to the matching analysis of relative clauses that I outlined in §4.1, fronted phrases in restrictive relative clauses display the internal syntax in (62), which is repeated from (4).
I claimed in §4.1 that phrases exemplified by (62) are extracted and then concatenated by predicate modification with the TP in which their base-position is contained. Concatenation occurs via predicate modification in order to derive predicate that can undergo an additional instance of predicate modification with an external noun phrase:

\[(63)\quad \text{man who man Lucy loves} = \lambda y[\text{man}(y) \land \text{loves}(\text{Lucy}, y)]\]

Because they do not concatenate with an external noun phrase, I suggest that ARCs’ fronted phrases need not concatenate with the TP in which their base-position is contained via predicate modification. Rather, this concatenation can proceed via regular function application (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Aside from this difference, the fronted phrases in ARCs are identical to the fronted phrases observed in restrictive clauses (i.e. both display the internal syntax in 62).

\[(64)\quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & [\epsilon, 0] [\\text{O}_{\text{the}} \text{which (thing)}][\epsilon, 0 \text{ John likes } t_1 \text{ best}] \quad \text{(restrictive rels)} \\
\text{b. } & [\text{t}, [\\text{O}_{\text{the}} \text{which (thing)}][\text{t}, 0 \text{ John likes } t_1 \text{ best}]] \quad \text{(appositive rels)}
\end{align*}\]

As with restrictive relatives that display which, D⁰ in (62) cannot be realised in ARCs in modern British English. However, the realisation of D⁰ was prevalent in earlier forms of English, as the examples in (65) show (the first two examples in 65 come from Lassiter 2011:83).
Appositive relative clauses

(65) a. The better part of valour is discretion; [in the which better part], I have saved my life $t_1$. (Shakespeare’s Henry IV, V:1)
b. But a snark, [on the which], we might lovingly gaze $t_1$, We have never beheld till now! (Carroll’s The Hunting of the Snark)
c. Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, [over the which], the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers $t_1$. (King James Bible, Acts 20:28)

D$^0$ in (62) can be pronounced in related languages however, such as archaic registers of Dutch:

(66) De mannen, met dewelke ik gisteren nog gesproken heb,…

the men with the which I yesterday just spoke have

‘The men, with which I conversed only yesterday,…’ (M. de Vries, p.c.)

Like with fronted phrases in restrictive relatives, I claim that all appositive relative pronouns aside from which are polymorphemic. In other words, who realise the noun phrase $[Ø \text{the which person}]$, while where realise the prepositional phrase $[\text{in }Ø\text{the which place}]$, etc.

The analysis I have advanced above maintains that, aside from the manner in which they remerge, the fronted phrases of restrictive and appositive relative clauses are identical. Support for this hypothesis comes from extraction data. In both restrictive (and hence appositional and attributional) and appositive relatives, fronted phrases that are extracted from noun phrase positions (I include positions where pronouns can replace clauses and verb phrases under this heading) are insensitive to selective islands, which are permeable to entities (Cresti 1995). This is demonstrated in (67) to (69) below, where the $a$- to $d$-examples display restrictive, appositional, attributional, and appositive relative clauses respectively (cf. Potts 2002).
(67) a. I’ve lost [e the book]₁ that Pete asked whether I’ve read yet ₁.
b. **Pnin, i.e. [e the book]₁ that Pete asked whether I’ve read yet ₁, is gathering dust on my bookshelf.**
c. **Kerry, [e a teacher]₁ that Pete always asks whether I like ₁, is giving today’s class.**
d. The prosecutor claimed that I dropped the murder weapon, [e which]₁ the judge then asked whether I did drop ₁.

(68) a. [e The rumour about John]₁ that I wonder whether he’ll deny ₁ is rather vicious.
b. **The rumour – i.e. [e the one about John]₁ that I wonder whether he’ll deny ₁ – is rather vicious.**
c. **The rumour about John, [e something]₁ that I wonder whether he’ll deny ₁, is rather vicious.**
d. The prosecutor claimed that I am guilty, [e which]₁ the judge then asked whether I deny ₁.

(69) a. I will do [e the same thing]₁ that Bill wonders whether Holly has done ₁ in the past.
b. **That action, i.e. [e the thing]₁ that Bill wonders whether Holly has done ₁ in the past, will have terrible consequences.**
c. **That action, [e something]₁ that Abby wonders whether Holly has done ₁ in the past, will have terrible consequences.**
d. My lawyer said that I should plead guilty, [e which]₁ the judge then asked whether I will do ₁.

Insensitivity to selective islands is not observed when relative pronouns are extracted from non-nominal positions, however:

(70) a. * Bo is in that place [(e,0) where]₁ I wonder whether I saw Al ₁.
b. * Bo is there, in the place [(e,0) where]₁ I wonder whether I saw Al ₁.
c. * Bo is there, somewhere [(e,0) where]₁ I wonder whether I saw Al ₁.
d. * The prosecutor claimed that I saw him in a movie, [(e,0) where]₁ the judge then asked whether I did see him ₁.
The examples in (67) to (69) demonstrate that in each of the relative constructions under investigation, the extracted phrase denotes a full-fledged referential noun phrase. Furthermore, the examples in (70) provide support for the notion that relative pronouns like where are polymorphemic and denote full-fledged prepositional phrases.

The claim that phrases that contain relative pronouns remain referential in ARCs receives support from the ‘split anchor’ data discussed in §4.2 and §4.3. In these sections I showed how, unlike appositional (see 71a) but like attributional (see 71b) relative constructions, ARCs can modify a multiplicity of precedent anchors (see 71c).

(71) a. * Sarah, met with Amy, i.e. [the girls] that I know from university.
    b. Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy (they are) drinks that are both strong liquors.
    c. Paul uses whisky, to dilute brandy, which are both strong liquors.

I claimed in §4.3 that attributional relative constructions can modify split anchors because they contain a null pronoun (i.e. they in 71b). On the current analysis, the relative pronoun which is equivalent to a pronoun, insofar as both are definite descriptions (Elbourne 2001) that can establish coreference with referential expressions in the preceding discourse. Thus, the observation that ARCs can modify split anchors accords with my claim that appositive relative pronouns remain referential.

While I associate appositive relative and regular pronouns, I do not wish to imply that both classes are identical. Indeed, there are marked distinctions between the two (see Del Gobbo 2007:185). First, regular pronouns are deep anaphora (Hankamer & Sag 1976), which can corefer with both salient linguistic or non-linguistic antecedents. In contrast, appositive relative pronouns are surface anaphora that can only corefer with linguistic antecedents (Lassiter 2011, LaCara 2012). This distinction is exemplified by (72A) and (72A’).

Like surface anaphors such as so and that, appositive relative pronouns permit sloppy readings (compare (i) to (ii) and (iii) below). Because such interpretations are usually associated with verb phrase ellipsis, LaCara (2012) has argued that appositive relative pronouns that denote verb phrases are actually
(72) [Context: The company boss approaches A and B. A murmurs to B:]  
A: Watch out – it’s the boss!  
A': # Watch out – who’s the boss!

Second, the ‘distance’ between a regular pronoun and its antecedent can be greater than with an appositive relative pronoun and its antecedent. Regular pronouns are governed by accessibility restrictions (see Kamp & Reyle 1993), while (in most situations) appositive relative pronouns must corefer with the linearly-closest salient potential antecedent to their left. This constraint appears to be so inviolable that it may force one to associate the closest potential antecedent with a class to which it does not conventionally belong. This is observed in (73). Here the regular pronoun he may corefer with Frank, while the appositive relative pronoun must corefer with a Porsche, the closest potential antecedent. Incoherence arises because who’s coreference with a Porsche requires one to anthropomorphise a car, and to ascribe pretention to it.

(73) A: Frank bought a Porsche yesterday.  
B: He’s so pretentious.  
B': # Who’s so pretentious.

Thirdly, pronouns like it can be cataphors. When observed in parenthetical clauses, such pronouns can be licensed either from a position linearly before or within their anchor:

(74) a. John – and everyone reckons he didn’t do it, – has been accused of [stealing a car].

b. [The senator told the public – and everyone now admits it, – many lies]. (Arnold 2007:283)

the morphological realisation of an ellipsis site. For me, sloppy readings arise due to indexical ambiguity (cf. Elbourne 2008).

(i) Mary is careful with her money, which John never was. (Del Gobbo 2007:194)
(ii) Mary is pretty [careful with her money]. And John even more so.  
    (sloppy reading: John is careful with his money, not Mary’s)
(iii) Mary [bites her nails]. Luckily, John never does that.  
    (sloppy reading: John bits his nails, not Mary’s)
Appositive relative pronouns can only be cataphors in conjuncts, where they are immediately preceded by a coordinator, as (75a) shows (Lee-Goldman 2012). In all other environments, appositive relative pronouns cannot be linearly succeeded or surrounded by their anchor, as (75b) and (75c) illustrate.  

(75)  
\begin{enumerate}[a.]
\item It may have happened once, or, which, is unlikely, twice.
\item * Which, everyone now admits, [the world is round].
\item * [The senator told the public, which, everyone now admits, many lies].
\end{enumerate}

(Arnold 2007:283)

To summarise: in this subsection (§4.4.1), I outlined by analysis of the internal syntax of ARCs. *Modulo* the variation in the type of semantic concatenation that occurs when fronted relative phrases remerge with the TP in which their base-position is contained (predicate modification in restrictive relatives versus function application in ARCs), I claimed that the relative constructions under investigation in this chapter are internally identical. While I claimed that they are referential, I listed data that illustrate that appositive relatives have a much more limited coreference domain than

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47 Interestingly, it appears that some ARCs that modify clauses *can* be surrounded by their anchors, as the examples in (i) and (ii) show (I mark these examples as degraded rather than acceptable because, for my informants, judgements vary widely).

(i) ? Ben has, which has started to annoy his wife, developed a tendency to whistle in the shower.
(ii) ? Bobby has, which is actually beginning to worry me, been absent from school for a week.

Common to such examples is the fact that, if paraphrased as non-appositive structures, these utterances involve *it*-extraposition/sentential subjects, as (iii) and (iv) show. In other words, it seems that a prerequisite for the (roughly) acceptable host-medial interpolation of such ARCs is that *which* is extracted from a position other than the object of an embedding verb (*if which* is extracted from this object position, unacceptable arises, as (75c) in the main text shows). At current, I have no idea why this should be, or whether or not these constructions involve extraposition.

(iii) It is actually beginning to worry me that Bobby has been absent from school for a week.
(iv) That Bobby has been absent from school for a week is actually beginning to worry me.

Mark de Vries (p.c.) points out that Dutch appears to allow for similar constructions:

(v) Jan heeft, wat vreemd is, een nieuwe auto gekocht.
John has which peculiar a new car bought

'John has, which is peculiar, bought a new car.'
regular pronouns. An explanation for the difference is no doubt found in differences between how the ‘formal link’ between appositive relatives and their anchors and pronouns and their antecedents is established; a factor that I have not discussed and therefore leave for future investigation (see Del Gobbo 2007 for pertinent remarks).

4.4.2 The external syntax of appositive relative clauses

With respect to their external syntax, I propose that ARCs are Force phrases that adjoin to a maximal projection within their host clause (Arnold 2007, Koev 2013). From this claim arises the prediction that ARCs do not participate in the narrow syntactic or semantic composition of their host (no scope, no c-command relations). The examples in (76) to (79) show that this prediction is borne out. The examples in (76) to (78) illustrate that c-command relations cannot be established across the host/ARC boundary, while the examples in (79) show that extraction from within the ARC is illicit (cf. McCawley 1998, De Vries 2007).

(76) NPI licensing
   a. It’s not the case that Grant is all that smart.
   b. * It’s not the case that Grant, who is all that smart, won the pub quiz.

(77) Modal auxiliaries
   Bob might call Jenny, who is a plumber, for help with his broken boiler.
   Interpretation: Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny is a plumber.
   * Bob might call Jenny, and Jenny might be a plumber.

(78) Sentential negation
   Pete won’t visit Sally, who is an old friend, at the weekend.
   Interpretation: Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally is an old friend.
   * Pete won’t visit Sally, and Sally isn’t an old friend.
(79) a. * Where is Elizabeth, who is the queen of $t_1$, the country’s longest reigning monarch?

b. * It is England that Elizabeth, who is the queen of $t_1$, is the country’s longest reigning monarch.

c. * England, Elizabeth, who is the queen of $t_1$, is the country’s longest reigning monarch.

d. * Elizabeth, who is the queen of $t_1$, has just been crowned [of England].

Thus, the analysis I adopt for ARCs is identical to the one I provided for parenthetical copular clauses in §3.2, as a comparison of the schemata in (80b) and (18b) from chapter three (repeated in 81b below) demonstrates.48

48 In V2 languages like Dutch, ARCs such as *die mijn vriend is in (i) below display the verb-finality typically associated with subordinate clauses (ii), rather than the V2 word order associated with root clauses (iii).

(i) Joop, die mijn vriend is, is ook mijn baas.
    Joop, who my friend is is also my boss
    ’Joop, who is my friend, is my also boss.’

(ii) Ik denk dat [Joop mijn vriend is].
    I think that Joop my friend is
    ’I think that Joop is my friend.’

(iii) Op zaterdag kocht ik een nieuw pak.
    On Saturday bought I a new suit
    ’On Saturday I bought a new suit.’

If my claim that ARCs are Force phrasal adjuncts is correct, then the ARC in (i) is more closely related to the root clause in (iii) than the subordinate clause in (ii), even though the position of the verb in the sentences above suggests otherwise. To account for this discrepancy, I tentatively propose that the presence or absence of $wh$-features in the topicalised phrases *die in (i) and *op zaterdag in (iii) is responsible for the verb’s position. If the topicalised phrase is [*$wh$, -Q], then verb-finality arises, while if the topicalised phrase is [-$wh$, -Q], then verb-second arises. Consequently, I maintain that verb-finality and subordination are not causally related.
(80) a. **Pete, who is my friend, has kissed Miranda.**

b. 

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(81) a. **Ben has (and he’s a nice guy) baked us a cake.**

b. 

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The claim that ARCs are finite clausal Force phrasal adjuncts provides a straightforward explanation for why ARCs and (some) attributional relative
constructions can display independent illocutionary force: ARCs constitute a distinct Force phrase to their host clause, while attributional relative constructions are noun phrases contained within a Force phrase that is distinct from their host clause:

(82)  a. Bob, [ForceP from whom will we EVER receive a compliment?], is a curmudgeonly man.  
     b. Bob ([ForceP [TP (is he) [DP the guy that Mary likes?]]]) is sitting over there.

As Force phrases, ARCs can host main clause phenomena, just like regular root clauses can. Thus, ARCs can display massive pied-piping (see 83, which is repeated from 42) because regular root clauses can, as the example in (84), which is modified from Ross (1967), shows.

(83) Doctor Smith, [ForceP [due in part to the cool-headedness of the father of the wife of whom]1 I am alive today t1], is incompetent.

(84) [ForceP Apparently, [the height of the lettering on covers of these reports]1 the GOVERNMENT, rather the local authority, prescribes t1]. With this in mind, we must be extra careful when preparing our dossiers.

The claim that ARCs are Force phrasal adjuncts also provides an explanation for why ARCs can exhibit restrictor noun phrases but restrictive (and hence appositional and attributional) relatives cannot (see 85). According to the matching analysis of restrictive relatives that I outlined in §4.1, an ellipsis operation called movement deletion mandatorily deletes isomorphic lexemes in A’-chains under identity with the external noun phrase (see 86). This ellipsis operation is licensed by c-command.
(85) a. The man which (*man) fixed our boiler is standing over there.
   b. Pete, i.e. the man which (*man) fixed our boiler, has sent us a Christmas card.
   c. Pete, someone which (*person) always has too much to drink, embarrassed himself last night.
   d. Nietzsche said that God is dead, with which (proposition) I am inclined to agree.

(86) \[ DP \text{the} [NP \text{man} [\text{CP} [\text{which man}]_1 [\text{TP} \text{John recommended} t]]]] \]

As Force phrasal adjuncts, ARCs are opaque to c-commanding elements in their host clauses. Consequently, movement deletion is not operative. This explains why pronunciation of the restrictor noun phrase is possible in ARCs but not restrictive relatives.

The fact that ARCs cannot display infinitival syntax (see 87a, repeated from 52a) is also straightforwardly explained on the Force phrase analysis: undominated clausal syntactic units must be finite.

(87) a. * The Dalai Lama, to whom to show respect, lives in India.
   b. * To show respect to him.

As mentioned in §4.2-4.3, the subject of dependent interrogative tags must corefer with the matrix subject of a Force phrase, as the example in (88) illustrates.

(88) John denies that Mary will kiss him, {doesn’t he / *won’t she}?

The current analysis, which maintains that ARCs are Force phrases that display WYSIWYG syntax, thus provides a straightforward explanation for why ARCs can host interrogative tags (as they are Force phrases) and for why the tag and the ARC’s subjects must corefer (as the ARC’s subject is the matrix subject):

(89) Stilton, which you like, {don’t you / *isn’t it}?, is on offer in the supermarket.
Note that the adjunction that connects the ARC to the host clause is unconstrained from both a syntactic and compositional semantic perspective (see §3.2 for details). For the parenthetical copula clauses discussed in chapter three this was a benefit, as such interpolations can appear in any niche within their host:

(90)  a. **Someone** (*and I think it was Pete*) has eaten all of the éclairs.
    b. ** Someone** has (*and I think it was Pete*) eaten all of the éclairs.
    c. **Someone** has eaten all of the éclairs (*and I think it was Pete*).

Conversely, if an ARC is contained within the intonation phrase (ι) of the clause that immediately contains its anchor α, it must immediately succeed α (contra McCawley 1998) (the examples below are modified from an utterance Strunk 2007 procured from the internet).

(91)  a.  * [Bill Wyman, *who I'd known in the 1970s*, was phoning me].
    b. * [Bill Wyman was, *who I'd known in the 1970s*, phoning me].
    c.  [Bill Wyman was phoning me], *who I'd known in the 1970s*.

That the same freedom of interpolation observed with parenthetical copular clauses is not observed with ARCs requires the following restrictions to be posited:

(92)  If α is the element with which the appositive relative pronoun co-refers (i.e. the anchor), and β is the intonation phrase that immediately contains α, then an ARC must either:
    a. immediately follow α, or;
    b. immediately follow β.

The generalisation in (92b) permits examples like (93a) and prohibits examples like (93b-c).

(93)  a.  [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday], *who’s a dissident*, is scandalous.
    b. * [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday] is scandalous, *who’s a dissident*.
    c. * [β That Jo met [α Ad] yesterday] is, *who’s a dissident*, scandalous.
The generalisations in (92) still hold in cases in which the complement of the head noun of the anchor undergoes extraposition (the examples below are from Arnold 2007:287 and Potts 2002:85 respectively):

(94)  a. Sam claims to have found \[ \alpha \text{ a proof } t_1 \], which many believed could not exist, \[ \text{ of one of the most famous conjectures in the history of mathematics } \].
       b. “I’d have a better chance of winning the MegaBuck lottery,” Miles said, sliding the platter onto the counter and \[ \text{ noticing } t_1 \], which he hadn’t for a long time, \[ \text{ the purple cyst that grew out of Horace’s forehead } \].

Note that pragmatic considerations constrain the application of (92b). Non-adjacent ARCs that provide information about their anchor that is tangential to topic under discussion (elaborative ARCs) are difficult to license, while non-adjacent ARCs that extend the topic under discussion (continuative ARCs) are not (see Holler 2005, Loock 2007, and references therein):

(95)  Continuative ARCs
       a. Russell was both a philosopher and an activist, who readily suffered imprisonment for his beliefs.
       b. Che Guevara was the real hero of the Cuban uprising, who showed admirable bravery in front of his troops.
       c. John tripped over a stone in the park yesterday, which he picked up and took home with him.

(96)  Elaborative ARCs
       a. * Kristian’s bicycle has a flat tyre, which is a racer.
       b. * Ben reads the book to Lucy every night, which is a hardback.
       c. ? John stole a rose from Ben’s garden, which is the universal symbol for romance.

49  As an aside, note the example in (95c) demonstrates that ARCs need not modify definite anchors. Rather, they must modify specific ones (as (i) below shows).

(i)  * Everyone saw a lady yesterday, who was upset. (on the distributive interpretation of a lady)
If the referent of an ARC’s anchor becomes the topic under discussion, elaborative ARCs cease to provide tangential information. In such environments (particularly, where contrastive focus is observed), non-adjacent elaborative ARCs are easier to license, as a comparison of (97a) and (97b) illustrates.

(97)  

|   | a. ?? **John** saw Mary yesterday, *who she’s known since childhood.*  
|   |   | (all-new context)  
|   | b. A: I heard that Bill saw Mary yesterday.  
|   |   | B: No, **JOHN** saw Mary yesterday, *who she’s known since childhood.*  

For some of my informants, a distinction pertains within the class of non-adjacent elaborative ARCs. This distinction concerns pitch accents. For them, non-adjacent elaborative ARCs cannot be licensed unless no pitch accent intervenes between the anchor and the ARC. Thus, in all-new environments, verb phrase adjuncts may intervene between object anchors and ARCs if such adjuncts are prosodically ‘light’ enough to be parasitic on the pitch accent of the anchor. If such adjuncts bear their own pitch accent, they cannot intervene between object anchors and ARCs (where acute accents represent pitch accents in the examples below).

(98)  

|   | a. Jóhn saw **Máry** yesterday, *who’s my sister.*  
|   | b. ?? Jóhn saw **Máry** yésterday, *who’s my sister.*  

I believe that both the pragmatic and the prosodic constraints discussed above are facets of a broader set of rules that govern how discourse is managed and how coreference is established across it. Precisely how these rules should be formulated, and what creates them, must be left for future investigation.

Note also that the Force phrase analysis of parenthetical copular clauses in §3.2 provided a syntactic locus for the act-initial coordinator, which I claimed is the specifier position of the Force phrase. However, such coordinators are illicit in ARCs, contrary to the predictions of my analysis.

(99) **John**, (*and) *who is my friend*, baked me a cake.
Thus, an extraneous explanation must be obtained for why and is licit in parenthetical copular clauses but not ARCs. Aside from suggesting that left-edge ellipsis (LE, see §3.2) is obligatory in ARCs, which would help to account for the restrictions on their interpolation freedom, I concede that this explanation escapes me.

To summarise: in this subsection (§4.4.2), I advanced my analysis of ARCs as finite clausal Force phrases that adjoin within their host clause. Because Force phrases are syntactically and semantically opaque, this analysis captures the fact that ARCs display opacity with respect to c-command and extraction. It also explains why restrictor noun phrases are licit in ARCs: the movement deletion that mandatorily deletes restrictor noun phrases in restrictive relatives (see §4.1) is not licensed in ARCs because it requires c-command to pertain between the deleted restrictor noun phrase and the external noun phrase, which it does not in ARCs. The claim that ARCs are clausal Force phrases aligns them with regular root clauses, and therefore explains why both permit massive pied-piping and can bear independent illocutionary force.

Although my ‘Force phrase’ analysis captures the unique properties of ARCs described above, it does not explain the interpolational restrictions that ARCs (but not parenthetical copular clauses) display. This is because my analysis predicts that ARCs can adjoin anywhere within their hosts. While I failed to provide explanations for the interpolational restrictions ARCs exhibit, I demonstrated that, to a large extent, pragmatic and prosodic constraints dictate the linear position of ARCs. If this is true, then my ‘adjoin anywhere and let extra-syntactic factors decide whether it’s okay’ approach to the external syntax of ARCs is plausible after all.

I have now outlined my analysis of ARCs, which treats them as finite clause Force phrasal adjuncts. If this analysis is correct, it supports my overarching claim that, from a syntactic perspective, there exist two types of appositive constructions in English and Turkish: those that are coordinated with their anchor in a ‘low’, WYSIWYG manner (i.e. appositions), and those that adjoin to their host (i.e. ARCs and copular clauses from which attributions are derived). Adjunct appositives are always Force phrases, while conjunct appositives are not categorically restricted.

In the next chapter, I examine the pragmatic behaviour of appositives. The aim of this investigation is to provide additional support from the
pragmatic domain for the conclusions reached so far, that a bipartite division pertains between conjunct and adjunct appositives.

However, before I move into the area of pragmatics, I wish to conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of whether or not attributions can be derived from ARCs.

4.5 Are attributions derived from copular clausal appositive relative clauses?

In chapter three, I proposed that attributions are derived from parenthetical predicative and truncated cleft copular clauses:

(100) a. Lucy, (she is) a secretive woman, works for MI5.
    b. Someone, (it was) Bill no doubt, left the front door open.

A number of previous scholars have claimed that attributions are derived from ARCs (Smith 1964, Burton-Roberts 1975, McCawley 1998, Potts 2005:109, O’Connor 2008, Cardoso & De Vries 2010, among others). Is this claim plausible?

This hypothesis comes in ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants. The strong hypothesis excludes the possibility that attributions can be derived from sources other than ARCs. The weak hypothesis allows for the possibility that attributions can be derived from alternative sources, but maintains that ARCs are plausible sources for attributions nonetheless.

The strong hypothesis can be ruled out immediately. As I discussed in §4.4, appositive relative pronouns display the same underlying syntax as regular pronouns such as he, she, they, etc. Like regular pronouns, appositive relative pronouns make for unsuitable subjects of truncated clefts, as the example in (101B) shows.

(101) A: Someone has stolen my laptop.
    B: {It/*He/*Who} was probably Bill.

Because appositive relative pronouns make for unsuitable subjects of truncated clefts, ARCs cannot modify those anchors that parenthetical truncated clefts can:
Appositive relative clauses

(102) **Someone, {it/*who} was probably Bill,** has stolen my laptop.

Consequently, ARCs cannot be sources for attributions like *probably Bill* in (103) below (cf. McCawley 1998). The only acceptable sources for attributions like these are truncated clefts.

(103) **Someone, {{it/*who} was} probably Bill,** has stolen my laptop.

The weak hypothesis fares better. Because regular pronouns and appositive relative pronouns are identical in all relevant respects, parenthetical predicational copular clauses and predicative ARCs are effectively the same. As such, both appear to provide suitable sources for non-referential attributions:

(104) **John, {he/who} is my friend,** is coming for dinner.

One may wonder whether there are any reasons to favour a predicational copular clausal analysis over an ARC analysis of such attributions. For English, these analyses appear equivalent: LE applies to *he is* or *who is* in (104) to derive the correct result.

However, in V2 languages like Dutch, the predicational copular clauses analysis seems more suitable. ARCs display verb-finality in this language, as (105) shows.

(105) Joop, die mijn vriend is, is ook mijn baas.

Joop, who my friend is is also my boss

‘Joop, who is my friend, is my also boss.’

One cannot use LE to cause reduction here, as LE targets a contiguous string and would therefore leave the string-final copula overt in the parenthetical in (105). Nor is sister ellipsis a feasible alternative (contrary to what Potts 2005:109 claims), as the prerequisite topically-isation operation is unavailable inside Dutch ARCs:

(106) * Joop, [mijn vriend], die t, is, is ook mijn baas.
Consequently, the copular clausal source for attributions like *mijn vriend* in (107) seems more plausible (as per Heringa 2011), as LE can apply.

(107) **Joop, hij is mijn vriend, is ook mijn baas.**

Turkish cannot create the ARCs from which its attributions could be derived. This is because Turkish does not display relativisation in the Germanic ‘operator-gap’ sense: the Turkish equivalents of English restrictive relatives are participial attributive adjectives (Lewis 1967). One might conclude from this that Turkish does not display attributions at all, and those constructions that I have been calling ‘attributions’ in Turkish are fundamentally different from their English counterparts. While such a conclusion is logically viable, it is not supported by the evidence. Aside from how reduction is caused (LE in English versus *pro* subjects and zero copulas in Turkish), the parentheticals that I have been calling ‘attributions’ share the same properties in both languages, and thus it seems sensible to me to maintain that they arise from the same source, which is parenthetical predicational or truncated cleft copular clauses.
5

The pragmatics of appositives

In this chapter, I extend the analysis developed in chapters two to four into the domain of pragmatics. In §5.1, I outline a bespoke model of conversation that serves as platform for investigating the pragmatic import of appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts. In §5.2, I show that utterances that display attributions and appositive relative clauses display an almost identical pragmatic distribution to monologues. In §5.3, I demonstrate that the pragmatic import of appositions is correctly predicted by the syntactic analysis of appositions that I introduced in chapter two. In §5.4, I discuss two alternative accounts of the pragmatic import of appositives, and argue that the analysis developed in §5.1 and §5.2 confers greater parsimony than these.

Potts (2005) proposes that, by virtue of being adorned with the semantic feature [COMMA], appositives are imbued with a conventionally implied meaning that is distinct from their host clauses’ purported at-issue meaning. The notion that appositives and their hosts convey distinct types of meaning arises from Potts’ syntactic and semantic analysis of appositives, which treats them as syntactically adjoined to their hosts but utilises separate at-issue and conventionally implied semantic types to account for the semantic opacity that he claims that all appositives display (for detailed discussion of Potts 2005, see §5.4.1 and §6.1). While Potts’ syntactic analysis of appositions is eschewed in recent research (see De Vries 2006a, O’Conner 2008, Heringa 2011, Döring 2014, and Ott 2014a, 2014b) his idea that appositives are imbued with an inherent type of meaning has proven influential, and is observed in more recent approaches to the pragmatic import of appositives such as AnderBois et al. (2013), who treat appositives as displaying inherent ‘apposity’.

The syntactic analysis of appositives that I developed in chapters two to four hints towards a conception of the pragmatic import of appositives that differs substantially to Potts’. Firstly, my analysis of appositions in chapter
two is suggestive of the notion that, as regular subconstituents of the host clause in which they are contained, non-Force phrasal appositions cannot display a different type of meaning to their host (as they constitute part of their host’s meaning). Secondly, I argued in chapters three and four that the opacity displayed by attributions and ARCs is caused by the fact that they comprise distinct assertions (or questions, or demands, etc.) to their assertoric (or erotetic, or directive) hosts. Thus, my position is weaker than Potts’ and AnderBois et al.’s, as I do not claim that Force phrasal appositives display an inherently dissimilar type of meaning to their hosts. Rather, my syntactic analysis gives rise to the expectation that assertoric appositives that are contained in assertoric hosts (see 1a) are, in terms of their impact on the discourse, roughly equivalent to two independent assertions sequentially uttered by a single speaker (i.e. a monologue, see 1b).

(1) a. **John, who is my friend**, is coming over for dinner.
    b. John is my friend. He is coming over for dinner.

Potts’ bidimensional semantic approach is not motivated solely to account for the opacity displayed by certain appositives, however. It also aims to account for the peculiar pragmatic properties that appositives display. On my approach to appositives, which treats appositive constructions like (1a) as composed of two assertions that display the same meaning-type, the peculiar pragmatic properties displayed by Force phrasal appositives must be explained by recourse to how the discourse is structured.

Thus, I simultaneously undertake two tasks in this chapter. I show that, once a suitable model of the discourse is in place (I will use an informal model of discourse structure of my own creation), the peculiar properties that appositives display can be accounted for without introducing a distinction between types of meaning. While doing this, I also demonstrate that non-Force phrasal appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts exhibit the dissimilar pragmatic behaviour that one would expect if the syntactic analysis that I advocated in chapters two to four is correct.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first outline my model of discourse (§5.1), and then discuss the distribution of attributions and ARCs within it (§5.2). In §5.3, I will investigate the pragmatic import of appositions, and show that they pattern as one would expect if the conclusions of chapter two
are correct. In §5.4, I discuss in more depth the two alternative analyses of the pragmatics of appositives mentioned above; namely, Potts (2005) and AnderBois et al. (2013). I aim to show in §5.4 that these analyses not only introduce a distinction in meaning-types that is unnecessary, but also that they make some incorrect empirical predictions.

Before I begin, let me first provide two disclaimers. First, the model of conversation advanced in §5.1 is not intended to supplant other compatible ones, regardless of whether such models are historical, contemporaneous, or nascent. Rather, its dissemination is intended merely to provide a stable foundation on which an investigation of the pragmatic import of attributions and ARCs (and indeed any other Force phrase parentheticals) can be conducted. Second, the model advanced in §5.1 was conceived, committed to paper, and presented at a conference in February 2014 without prior knowledge of Koev (2013), whose approach is similar in certain respects, although he does not take presuppositions into account. 50

5.1  Context sets, requests, and a structured discourse

5.1.1  An introduction to the structured discourse

In a work of fiction, the world in which the story is set becomes more detailed and precise as the plot unfolds. A consumer of fiction does not demand that the world in which the story is set is identical to the actual world. Provided that the law of cause and effect is obeyed, and provided that the story does not contain errors in continuity, a consumer of fiction is willing to suspend her disbelief. Conversation is similar in this respect, as the world in which a conversation is set is created by conversation itself. This world becomes more detailed and precise as the conversation progresses, and, like a work of fiction, it need not be identical to the world in which its creators reside. But whatever its topography, the law of cause and effect must be obeyed in this world, and continuity errors must be avoided.

The construction of a conversational world, which I will call the context hereafter, can be either a collaborative or competitive enterprise. If
collaborative, its creators will cooperate to build a context that each finds agreeable. If competitive, its creators will compete to build the context that each individually favours.

My focus here is collaborative context construction, in which the building blocks of the context are requests, which I represent in (chevrons) hereafter, to alter (or update) the context from one state to another. The context itself can be envisaged as a set of possible worlds in which the law of cause and effect is obeyed (Stalnaker 1978). Requests to alter the context are therefore requests to reduce the context from a set of possible worlds \( w_1 \) to a strict subset of these worlds \( w_2 \). \( w_2 \) is the set in which the propositional content contained in (or triggered from) the request in question is treated as true in all the possible worlds that comprise the context. Because the alteration of the context is effectively a process of world-reduction, a request \( \alpha \) is considered as felicitous only if:

\( \text{(2) The context that } \alpha \text{ aims to alter does not comprise solely of possible worlds in which } \alpha \text{’s truth already holds.} \)

The structured discourse (SD) is the name I apply to the public record of requests to alter the context. With respect to the SD, requests are divided into two classes, the latter of which is itself split asunder:

\( \text{(3) At conversational time } t, \)
\n\( \text{a. the current request is the propositional explicature of the most recent utterance that invokes one;}^{51} \)
\n\( \text{b. a past request is a non-current request.} \)

\( \text{(4) a. a successful past request has not been rejected;} \)
\n\( \text{b. an unsuccessful past request has been rejected.} \)

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\( ^{51} \text{To maintain simplicity in my model, I must gloss over the (very important) distinctions pragmatists make between sentence meaning, what is said (see Recanati 2001), explicatures (in Sperber & Wilson’s 1986 sense), and implicitures (Bach 1994) such as (i).} \)

(i) John and Tom are in love. \((\text{Impliciture: John and Tom are in love with each other})\)

For me, the term explicature roughly equates with what Recanati (2001) calls the literal meaning of a sentence. This is the output of narrow semantics plus sufficient context for deictic expressions and resolving ellipsis.
The SD comprises of two sets. The first contains successful past requests, and is ordered according to the sequence in which the requests in question alter the context (the sequence runs from left to right). This first set also contains the current request, which bears the potential to alter the context. The second set contains unsuccessful past requests. This second set, which I call the bin, is unordered. Unsuccessful requests can be reused, but their reuse creates a violation of Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle. One might venture that contained within the Cooperative Principle is the axiom ‘file request α only once during the flow of conversation’. Consequently, reused rejected requests are usually employed in competitive conversational environments, such as quarrels or debates.

My representation of the SD is exemplified in (5), where I use ⟨double chevrons⟩ to delimit the SD from individual requests filed by one speaker or another. The current request is underlined, while past requests are not. Note that I will use the phrase ‘SD’ to refer to the ordered set exemplified in (5) alone hereafter, unless stated otherwise. Also, if the bin is empty, I do not represent it.

(5)  ⟨John loves his job, John kissed Mary⟩
BIN: {John kissed Sue, John baked a cake}

In what follows, I will outline my model of conversation by examining simple discursive environments that involve only two interlocutors, speaker A (Amy) and speaker B (Bob). This is done for ease of exposition. The model could be scaled-up to include more interlocutors, but to do so and maintain the informal style of exposition that I wish to adopt quickly leads to unwieldy representations, as the reader will soon come to appreciate.

5.1.2 Direct approval and opposition

Let us begin by examining the simple dialogue in (6), which is uttered in an all-new context.

(6)  A: [a David baked a cake.]
B: [b Okay.]
Amy utters $\alpha$, which expresses her request for the context to contain only those possible worlds in which *David baked a cake* is true. This engenders the SD in (7a), where the explicature of $\alpha$ is the current request. With $\beta$, Bob approves of Amy’s request in a *direct* manner. As an instance of direct approval, $\beta$ itself does not extend the SD, as it does not constitute a request. However, Bob’s expression of $\beta$ does alter the SD: it converts $\alpha$ from the current request into a past request, as (7b) illustrates. Thus, after $\beta$ is uttered, the context is composed of only those possible worlds in which *David baked a cake* is true.

(7) a. $\langle \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle \rangle$
b. $\langle \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle \rangle$

In (8), Bob directly opposes Amy’s request. After Amy utters $\alpha$ in (8), the SD is as represented in (9a), where the explicature of $\alpha$ is the current request. Bob then utters $\beta$. As an instance of direct opposition, $\beta$ does not extend the SD, as $\beta$ does not constitute a request. Rather, $\beta$ reduces the SD to an empty set, as Amy’s $\alpha$, although now a past request, is not a successful one. As such, this request is deposited into the bin, as (9b) shows.

(8) A: [ $\alpha$ David baked a cake. ]
B: [ $\beta$ No. ]

(9) a. $\langle \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle \rangle$
b. $\langle \langle \text{} \rangle \rangle$

BIN: {David baked a cake}

5.1.3 *Monologues*

The dialogues in §5.1.2 exemplify how structured discourses are built by *turn-taking* (i.e. Amy says $\alpha$, Bob says $\beta$, Amy says $\gamma$, Bob says $\delta$, and so on). In this subsection (§5.1.3), I wish to highlight the fact that the atoms of an SD are not simply the totality of what Amy or Bob says when it is her or his turn to speak. A speaker’s ‘turn’ can be composed of more than one unit of the structured discourse. Such a turn can be described as a *monologue*. 
To see how monologues shape the SD, let us now consider the example monologue in (10).

(10) A: [α David baked a cake.] [β It’s a Battenberg.]

First, Amy utters α, which creates a request to update the context with ⟨David baked a cake⟩. Unlike in the turn-taking cases described in §5.1.2, Bob does not respond to Amy’s request in (10). He remains silent. At this juncture, Amy can respond to Bob’s reticence in one of two ways. Her first option is to ask Bob explicitly about whether he approves or rejects her request, which gives rise to a tangential dialogue like (11). If Bob responds with (11a), the situation equates to (6). However, if Bob responds with (11b), the situation equates to (8).

(11) A: What’s wrong Bob? Don’t you believe that David baked a cake?
   a. B: Yes! Please continue…
   b. B: No.

Amy’s second option is this: file another request. If she files another request, her original request is converted into an unattended past request, as per the algorithm that builds SDs described in (3). Evidently, Amy chooses this second option in (10). By uttering β, she changes the SD from (12a) to (12b).

(12) a. ⟨David baked a cake⟩
   b. ⟨David baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg⟩

5.1.4 Presuppositions

Let us consider (13), which is uttered in an all-new context.

(13) A: [α David hates his job.]

The request directly corresponding to (13) aims to reduce the context to only those worlds in which David has a job and David hates his job are true. Because reduction of the context is incremental, this request – if successful –
triggers reduction of the context twice. According to the rule in (2), the only available order of reduction is this:

(14) STEP 1: reduction to those worlds in which *David has a job* is true.
    STEP 2: reduction to those worlds in which *David hates his job* is true.

By virtue of expressing (13) then, Amy files two independent requests to update the context. The first, *(David has a job)*, is not explicitly uttered, while the second, *(David hates his job)*, is the explicature of (13). I will refer to the former type of requests as *presuppositions*. Like all requests, both the explicature and the presupposition corresponding to (13) are catalogued in the SD. Thus, (13) creates two requests simultaneously. These enter the SD as an ordered tuple that reflects the order in which reduction of the context must proceed:

(15) *(David has a job, David hates his job)*

In an all-new context, the complex request in (15) therefore creates the following SD:52

(16) «(David has a job, David hates his job)»

In (16), the presuppositional request *(David has a job)* enters the SD as an unattended past request. This is because, according to (3), the SD can contain only one current request at any one point in conversational time.

It appears then that monologues like (10) and presupposition-triggering utterances like (13) share a commonality. In both, a complex SD that contains a past request as well as the current request is formed during one

52 To maintain simplicity, I prohibit nesting in the SD. Resultantly, the addition of a complex request like (15) to a non-empty SD forms a monostatal ordered set. As such, the dialogue in (i) creates the SD in (ii), rather than (iii).

(i) A: Larry deserves some happiness.
    B: He hates his job, though.
    A: He's lucky to have one!

(ii) «(L deserves some happiness, L has a job, L hates his job, L is lucky to have his job)»

(iii) «(L deserves some happiness, (L has a job, L hates his job), L is lucky to have his job)»
speaker’s ‘turn’, as (12b) and (16) show. However, (10) and (13) also display an important difference. The creation of the SD in (12b) spanned two distinct points in conversational time: Amy first uttered α, to which Bob could have responded but chose not to, and then she uttered β. Thus, both α and β were, at different points in time, the SD’s current request. The creation of the SD in (16) occurs at a single point in conversational time, however. That is to say, there is no juncture at which the presuppositional request ‘David has a job’ is a current request. This presupposition is thus imposed upon the SD. It updates the context simply by being triggered (AnderBois et al. 2013).

As the discussion above makes clear, my conception of presupposition includes accommodation phenomena (Lewis 1979). It makes no recourse to speakers’ private beliefs, which are extraneous to the composition of the SD. Presuppositions in my terms are necessarily inferred requests that a speaker has publicly filed, while private beliefs are not. Thus, in my model, the utterance ‘David hates a job’ in (13) triggers the presuppositional request ‘David has a job’ in an all-new context regardless of whether Amy and/or Bob privately believe that the content of this request is true already. Of course, if ‘David has a job’ is already contained within the SD when Amy utters (10), then only the surface proposition of (10) is invoked as a new request.

5.1.5 Types of response to a request

In §5.1.2, I discussed how the SD is altered when Bob offers direct approval or opposition to a request that Amy files (i.e. yes and no responses). Evidently, yes and no (and variations thereupon) are not the only responses to requests. Thus, in this penultimate subsection of §5.1, I wish to provide an

53 As the reader is no doubt aware, I treat the length of time that it takes a speaker to fully articulate a speech act as the indivisible unit of conversational time. This done for brevity’s sake. In reality, a speaker seldom waits for her interlocutor to finish articulating a speech act before she begins to express a speech act of her own.

54 At first glance it appears that self-verifying requests such as performatives (e.g. ‘I admit that I hate chocolate’) are also imposed upon the SD, as their veracity cannot be questioned. However, their ‘imposition’ on the SD differs to that which is observed with presuppositions. When uttered, performatives are current requests: it is merely the fact that any request that follows them in conversational time will convert performatives into successful past requests that makes them seem ‘imposed’.
exhaustive list of the relevant types of response that Bob may voice to Amy’s requests, and when each type is applicable.

5.1.5.1 *Indifference*

When Bob offers an *indifferent* response, he does not address Amy’s request. The result of Bob’s expression of an indifferent response is that Amy’s request is converted from a current to an unattended (and therefore, *successful*) past request. *Direct* indifferent responses neither provide approval or rejection of Amy’s request nor invoke a request of their own. *Whatever* in (17) is an example of this type of request.

(17)  

a. A: [α Bob, your bedroom is untidy.]  
B: [β Whatever.]

b. 〈Bob’s bedroom is untidy〉

*Indirect* indifferent responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples containing indirect indifferent responses include topic-shifting responses such as (18a), which engenders the SD in (18b).

(18)  

a. A: [α David baked cake.]  
B: [β I baked a cake once.]

b. 〈David baked a cake, *Bob baked a cake〉

5.1.5.2 *Approval*

The result of Bob’s expression of *approval* is that Amy’s request is converted from a current to a successful past request. *Direct* approval responses provide approval of Amy’s request without evoking a request of their own. *Okay* in (6) (repeated below in 19 with the SD that it engenders) has already provided an exemplary case. Other direct approval responses include *fine, yes, sure, And?, so?,* and *right.*
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(19) a. A: [α David baked a cake.]
    B: [β Okay.]

b. ⟨David baked a cake⟩

Indirect approval responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples containing indirect approval responses include Bob’s response in (20a), which engenders the SD in (20b).

(20) a. A: [α David baked a cake.]
    B: [β Good for him!]

b. ⟨David baked a cake, it is good for David that he baked a cake⟩

Responses like good for him in (20a) are considered as instances of ‘indirect’ approval because they do not directly approve Amy’s request. Rather, because they are deictic (see §5.1.5.4 below) as (20b) shows, they would invoke the complex request in (21) if uttered in an all-new context, which contains the request in (20aA) that Amy has offered for evaluation. Resultantly, Amy’s request is approved because Bob’s response in (20aB) assumes the content of her request to be true.

(21) a. It’s good for David that he baked a cake.
    b. ⟨David baked a cake, it is good for David that he baked a cake⟩

5.1.5.3 Opposition

The result of Bob’s expression of opposition is that Amy’s request α, and any other request that is contingent upon α (see §5.2.2.2 for a discussion of contingency), is removed from the SD. Direct opposition responses provide opposition to Amy’s request without invoking a request of their own. No in (22) (repeated below from 8 with the SD that it engenders) provides an exemplary case. Other examples of direct opposition are difficult to find. This is perhaps because direct opposition is a likely conversation-killer, and the implementation of such devices of termination is hence to be avoided in the collaborative creation of conversation.
Indirect opposition responses are, in themselves, requests. Examples containing include Bob’s response in (23).

(23) a. A: [α David baked a cake.]
   B: [β That’s impossible!]

   b. {It’s impossible that David baked a cake}
   BIN: {David baked a cake}

Recall that certain requests cannot be sensibly opposed. As mentioned in footnote 54, this class includes (at least) performatives. Requests that report its speaker’s mental disposition (e.g. ‘I think that God exists’) are difficult to oppose, but can be. Social factors, such as knowledge of one’s interlocutor, appear to dictate when requests of this type can be opposed. For example, I cannot respond to a chiliast that stands on my doorstep and says to me ‘I believe the New World is upon us!’ with ‘no you don’t’, but his psychiatrist perhaps can.

5.1.5.4 Generic and specific responses

Responses can be divided across another dimension: whether they are specific or generic. Specific responses target particular requests, while generic responses, as deictic expressions (Krifka 2013), can be expressed in response to any request. Direct responses are inherently deictic, while indirect generic responses are deictic because they contain the deictic expressions it, that or so, which can be coreferent with antecedent requests (Asher 1993), or repetitions of such antecedents.

The inherent deixis of direct responses demand that they can only be licensed ‘locally’. In other words, they are licit only as responses to current requests, as the example in (24) demonstrates. A direct response γ that
appears to apply to a direct response \( \beta \) that immediately precedes it is either emphatic or corrective, as shown in (25).

\[
(24) \quad \text{A:} \quad [\alpha \text{ David baked a cake.}] \quad [\beta \text{ it's a Battenberg}]
\]
\[
\text{B:} \quad (\text{referring to } \beta): \quad [\gamma \text{ Okay.}]
\]
\[
\text{B'}: \quad (\text{referring to a but not } \beta): \quad \# \quad [\gamma \text{ Okay.}]
\]

\[
(25) \quad \text{a. A:} \quad [\alpha \text{ David baked a cake.}]
\]
\[
\text{b. B:} \quad [\beta \text{ Okay.}] \quad [\gamma \text{ Fine.}] \quad \text{(emphatic)}
\]
\[
\text{B':} \quad [\beta \text{ Whatever.}] \quad [\gamma \text{ Fine.}] \quad \text{(corrective)}
\]

The licensing constraints on indirect generic responses are much more complex than those that govern direct generic responses. This complexity arises from the fact that deictic elements such as \textit{it}, \textit{that} and \textit{so} have complex licensing conditions, which, to be accurately described, require one to appeal the pragmatic salience of their licensor.

This complexity is particularly apparent in the case of indirect generic indifferent responses, as Asher (1993) demonstrates. As such, I will not discuss their licensing conditions further here, except to note that they are not only able to refer to past requests that have been approved by direct generic approval (as 26 shows), but also past requests that have been rejected by direct opposition (as 27 shows).

\[
(26) \quad \text{a. A:} \quad [\alpha \text{ David baked a cake.}]
\]
\[
\text{B:} \quad [\beta \text{ Okay.}] \quad [\gamma \text{ That seems plausible enough to me.}]
\]

\[
\text{b.} \quad \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle
\]
\[
\text{c.} \quad \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle
\]
\[
\text{d.} \quad \langle \text{David baked a cake, that David baked a cake seems plausible enough to Bob} \rangle
\]
The pragmatics of appositives

(27)  
\[ a. ~ A: \alpha \text{ David baked a cake.} \]  
\[ B: \beta \text{ No.} \gamma \text{ That’s preposterous.} \]  

b.  
\( \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle \)  
c.  
\( \langle \text{David baked a cake} \rangle \)  
\text{BIN: \{David baked a cake\}}  
d.  
\( \langle \text{that David baked a cake is preposterous} \rangle \)  
\text{BIN: \{David baked a cake\}}

Indirect generic approval and opposition exhibit dissimilar (but equally complex) licensing conditions to indirect generic indifference. An attempt to provide an accurate generalisation of the licensing conditions that govern such responses is tangential to my purposes, and as such I refer the interested reader to Asher’s (1993) work. Relevant here is the observation that, while indirect generic approval or opposition can target either the current request alone or an array of requests that includes the current request, such responses cannot target a past request alone or an array of requests that excludes the current request. This observation is encapsulated in (28) below, where (28b) should be understood as a necessary but insufficient condition for licensing.

(28) An instance of indirect generic approval or opposition \( \alpha \) is licensable only if:
\[ a. \quad \alpha \text{ targets the current request} \]  
\[ b. \quad \alpha \text{ targets an array of subsequent requests up to and including the current request.} \]

That the terms in (28) constrain the licensing of indirect generic approval or opposition is evidenced by the dialogue in (29), where Bob’s response can target either \( \beta \) or \( \langle \alpha, \beta \rangle \), but not \( \alpha \) alone. As the examples show, this constraint holds regardless of whether or not \( \beta \) is contingent upon \( \alpha \).
One sees from the example discussed above that indirect generic approval and opposition may create ambiguity. That is to say, there are cases when responses of these types may licitly refer to the current request or an array of requests. On the current model of conversation, which prohibits any appeal to a speaker's intentions as a disambiguator (i.e. 'Bob intended that’s wonderful to refer to α’), I deal with cases of ambiguity by positing the guideline in (30).

(30)  *Maximisation:*
Create as detailed a context as possible.

In the case of ambiguous indirect generic approval, the guideline in (30) suggests that Bob’s response in (31) creates the SD in (32a), and not the SD in (32b).

(31)  A:  [α David baked a cake.] [β It’s a Battenberg.]
B:  [γ That’s fab!]

(32)  a.  «D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg, it’s fab that D baked a cake and that it’s a Battenberg»
    b.  «D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg, it’s fab that it’s a Battenberg»

In the case of ambiguous indirect generic opposition, the guideline in (30) suggests that Bob’s response in (33) creates the SD in (34a), and not the SD in (34b).

(33)  A:  [α David baked a cake.] [β It’s a Battenberg.]
B:  [γ That’s impossible!]
The pragmatics of appositives

(34) a. 《D baked a cake, it's impossible that it’s a Battenberg》
   BIN: {D baked a Battenberg}
   b. 《it's impossible that D baked a cake and that it’s a Battenberg》
   BIN: {D baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg}

5.1.6 The structured discourse: a summary

In §5.1, I provided the foundations for a theory of how the context in which a conversation is 'set' is built. According to this approach, the atoms of conversation are past and current requests. The totality of successful past requests at any juncture in conversational time equates with the context. Presuppositions are past requests, and can be treated as equivalent to assertions that entered the context at a previous point in conversational time. Unlike assertions, however, presuppositions are imposed upon the context. They are, at no point in conversational time, current requests.

5.2 Force phrasal parentheticals and the structured discourse

5.2.1 Linear position and the structured discourse

All of the explicatures discussed in §5.1 were invoked by root clauses, i.e. Force phrases. If certain parentheticals, including appositives like attributions and ARCs, are Force phrases (as I claimed in chapters three and four), then one predicts that these parentheticals invoke propositional explicatures too. If this is true, Force phrase parentheticals and their host clauses invoke distinct requests.

In the discussion of monologues in §5.1.3, I showed that a single speaker may convert one of her own requests into an unattended (and therefore successful) past request simply by filing an additional successive request. This was observed in (10) (repeated below in 35a), which results in the SD in (35b).

(35) a. A: 《α David baked a cake.][β It’s a Battenberg.》
   b. 《David baked a cake, it’s a Battenberg》
With respect to (35a), the request engendered by α precedes the request engendered by β in the SD for the simple reason that α is fully articulated before β is. From this fact one arrives at the generalisation that, in the SD, the order of the requests that are generated from explicatures is determined by the order in which the explicatures that generated them are fully articulated.

Following this logic, one arrives at the notion that utterances that contain Force phrasal parentheticals generate structured discourses that can match two possible schemata, which are represented in (37).

(37) a. \([\text{request}_{\text{par}}, \text{request}_{\text{host}}]\)
    b. \([\text{request}_{\text{host}}, \text{request}_{\text{par}}]\)

Utterances that contain parentheticals that linearly precede or are surrounded by their host clause (I call these *interpolated* parentheticals in the remainder of this chapter) generate SDs that fit the schema in (37a). The reason for this follows straightforwardly from the mechanics of the current model and the generalisation about explicatures that I have just introduced. In an utterance like (38a), the parenthetical is fully articulated (by this I mean that all the lexical items that comprise it are expressed) before the host clause is. Thus, the request generated from the explicature of the parenthetical (call it ‘α’) enters the SD first, as a current request. After this point, the host clause is fully articulated, and a request β is generated from its explicature. β then supplants α as the current request, and converts α into an unattended, and therefore *successful*, past request. The resulting SD is (38b), which fits the schema in (37a). Note that the process of supersession that creates (38b) is identical to that which creates the monologue SD in (35b).

(38) a. **John, who is my neighbour**, lost his job.
    b. \([\text{John is my neighbour, John lost his job}]\)

Utterances that contain parentheticals that linearly succeed their host clause (I call these *final* parentheticals henceforth) generate SDs that fit the schema in (37b). Again, the reason for this follows straightforwardly from the
mechanics of the current model (this rationale is a repetition of explanation given for 38). In an utterance like (39a), the host clause is fully articulated before the parenthetical is. Thus, the request generated from the explication of the host (call it ‘α’) enters the SD first, as a current request. After this point, the parenthetical is fully articulated, and a request β is generated from its explication. β then supplants α as the current request, and converts α into an unattended, and therefore successful, past request. The resulting SD is (39b), which fits the schema in (37b).

(39)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \textbf{John got a promotion, which is great.} \\
\text{b. } & \langle \text{John got a promotion, that John got a promotion is great} \rangle
\end{align*}

Abstracting away from the reality of conversation, in which speakers interrupt each other frequently, I mentioned in footnote 53 that I treat the time that it takes to fully articulate a speech act as the indivisible unit of conversational time. Thus, when extending the discourse model from §5.1 to parenthetical utterances like (38a) and (39a), one must make a decision: does an instance of conversational time elapse each time one of the speech acts in (38a) and (39a) is fully articulated (see 40), or is the entire utterance contained within one measure of conversational time (see 41)?

(40)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \textbf{John, who is my neighbour, found a new job.} \\
\text{b. } & \textbf{Man U got relegated today, which is superb.}
\end{align*}

(41)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \textbf{John, who is my neighbour, found a new job.} \\
\text{b. } & \textbf{Man U got relegated today, which is superb.}
\end{align*}
The decision about how to carve up conversational time has non-trivial consequences for one’s approach to the pragmatics of parenthesis. If one maintains that (40) exemplifies the correct way to understand conversational time, then utterances like those in (38a) and (39a) are identical to two-utterance monologues in all respects. Like with monologues, there is a point in conversational time (i.e. after \( t_1 \) in 40) where the requests generated by the speech acts that are fully articulated first are current, and therefore can be (but in this scenario are not) approved or opposed in the same way that regular current requests can be. This conception of such utterances entails that, if Bob responds after \( t_1 \) (as in 42, where I have included Bob’s response in brackets within the linear string of Amy’s utterance in order to best convey how conversational time passes), a regular turn-taking dialogue is observed: Amy says \( \alpha \), Bob says \( \beta \), Amy says \( \gamma \), and so on.

(42)  a. A: **John, who is a fool,** (B: \{And? /That’s not true!\}) hates me.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow t_0 \\
\downarrow t_1 \\
\uparrow t_2 \\
\uparrow t_3
\end{array}
\]

b. A: **John got fired,** (B: \{No! /That’s unexpected!\}) *which is sad.*

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow t_0 \\
\downarrow t_1 \\
\uparrow t_2 \\
\uparrow t_3
\end{array}
\]

However, if one maintains that (41) exemplifies the correct way to understand conversational time, then one abstracts away from – and therefore excludes – the possibility that Bob can respond to the ARC in (42) immediately after it is uttered. On this conception of conversational time, the requests engendered by the speech acts that are fully articulated first in utterances that contain parentheticals share a commonality with the presuppositional requests discussed in §5.1.4: they are both necessarily imposed upon the structured discourse. This is because there is no juncture in conversational time at which the requests engendered by the speech acts that are fully articulated first are current.
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The observation that Bob can indeed interrupt the articulation of the host clause to respond to the request generated by the interpolated parenthetical in (42a) demonstrates that (40) exemplifies the correct way to carve up conversational time. However, previous research on the pragmatic import of appositives has been concerned only with what kind of responses Bob can voice after both the parenthetical and host clause have been fully articulated. In other words, the past literature makes the implicit assumption that (41) exemplifies the correct way to carve up conversational time. This leads directly to the false conclusion that interpolated parentheticals are necessarily imposed on the discourse, and that this desire to impose arises from an inherent 'secondary meaning' that parentheticals display. According to the current model however, it is merely the case that, in a scenario where Bob voices his response after both the interpolated parenthetical and host clause have been fully articulated, the request generated from the explication of the interpolated parenthetical has already been converted into an unattended and therefore successful past request.55

I have now described the place of utterances that contain Force phrasal adjuncts (i.e. attributions, ARCs, other clausal parentheticals) within the discourse model created in §5.1. In the next section, I provide empirical support for this pragmatic theory of parenthesis by reviewing the data discussed in previous literature on the pragmatics of appositives.56

5.2.2 Parentheticals, presuppositions, and monologues

5.2.2.1 Responses

With respect to responses (see §5.1.7), the conclusions reached in the introductory paragraph of §5.2.1 give rise to the correct prediction that, as

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55 While I contend that (40) exemplifies the best way to carve up conversational from a theoretical perspective, it seems clear from the presence of prosodic continuation tones at \( t_1 \) in (42) that (41) best exemplifies how speakers intend conversational time to be carved up.

56 Except for the data on contingency in §5.2.2.2, the data discussed in §5.2.2 are not novel. They are discussed in Potts (2005), Nouwen (2007), and AnderBois et al. (2013), among others.
past requests, presuppositions (43a), interpolated parentheticals (43b-c), the hosts of final parentheticals (43d-e), and initial assertions in two-utterance monologues (43f) cannot be targeted in a generic fashion in the scenario in (43), either by direct or indirect approval or opposition, as none of these generic responses can target past requests alone (see §5.1.5).

(43) a. A: David hates his job.
   b. A: David, [who’s a psychologist], hates his job.
   c. A: Sally, [a blatant sadist], hit David.
   d. A: [David hit Sally], who then hit him back.
   e. A: [Sally hit David], a guy that deserves a good punch.
   f. A: [David has a job], He hates it.

   B: # {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!}

To run through an example: the utterance in (43c) creates the SD in (44) below. In the scenario depicted in (43), the generic responses in (43B), which can target current requests alone, cannot target the request (Sally is a blatant sadist), which is a successful past request.

(44) (Sally is a blatant sadist, she hit David)

The opposite prediction is also borne out in this scenario. As current requests, final parentheticals (45a-b) and final assertions of monologues (45c) can be targeted by generic responses, which are suitable as responses to current requests.

(45) a. A: David hit Sally, [who then hit him back].
   b. A: Sally hit David, [a guy that deserves a good punch].
   c. A: David has a job. [He hates it].

   B: {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!}

To run through an example: the utterance in (45a) creates the SD in (46) below. In the scenario depicted in (45), the generic responses in (45B), which

---

57 The generic response in (43B) intends to target the presuppositional request in (43a), which is (David has a job).
The pragmatics of appositives can target current requests alone, may target the request (she hit him back), which is a current request.

(46) 〈David hit Sally, she hit him back〉

5.2.2.2  Contingency and opposing oneself

Let us consider again the utterance from (13), which is repeated in (47) below.

(47) A:  [α David hates his job.]

If the SD prior to α’s expression contains the successful past request (David has a job), then α in (47) invokes the request in (48a). If the SD prior to α’s expression does not contain the successful past request (David has a job), then α in (47) invokes the complex request in (48b) (see §5.1.4).

(48) a. 〈David hates his job〉
   b. 〈David has a job, David hates his job〉

Thus, regardless of which of the two scenarios that I described above pertains, the request 〈David has a job〉 must be filed before the request 〈David hates his job〉. We can therefore say that 〈David hates his job〉 is contingent upon 〈David has a job〉 (below, ‘α 礌 β’ is used to mean ‘α is contingent upon β’).

My model correctly predicts that, while contingency can pertain between interpolated parentheticals and their hosts (see 49) and the initial and final assertions of a two-utterance monologue (see 50), it need not. These facts hence support the notion that parentheticals are not presuppositions, as presuppositions and their triggers always display a relationship of contingency (as 47 and 48 have shown).

---

58 That the host in (49a-b) is contingent upon its parenthetical dictates that, if the parenthetical were absent, the host would trigger a presupposition that files the same request as the absent parenthetical.
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(49) a. David, who baked a cake, then iced it. (host ↔ ARC)  
b. David, a judge, sentenced someone. (host ↔ attribution)  
c. David, who’s a nice guy, baked a cake. (~[host ↔ ARC])  
d. David, a policeman, baked a cake. (~[host ↔ attribution])

(50) a. David baked a cake. He then iced it. (final ass ↔ initial ass)  
b. David baked a cake. He’s a nice guy. (~[final ass ↔ initial ass])

In the dialogue in (51), Amy requests that the context be reduced from its current state \( w_1 \) to only those worlds in which \( David \) is a bachelor is true \( w_2 \). Because Bob’s response is a request that cannot apply to \( w_2 \) (as those worlds in which \( David \) is married do not comprise a strict subset of \( w_2 \)), Amy is informed that her request to move from \( w_1 \) to \( w_2 \) has been indirectly opposed.

(51) A: [α David is a bachelor.]  
    B: [β David is a married man.]

The dialogue in (51) seems perfectly natural because speakers often disagree about how the conversational world should look. However, unless \( β \) is construed as supplanting \( α \) as a correction, the monologue in (52) seems highly unnatural. This is because speakers (of sound mind) do not indirectly oppose their own requests to update the context.

(52) A: # [α David is a bachelor.][β He is a married man.]

The same incoherence arises in utterances that contain ARCs and attributions, and for same the reason:

(53) a. # David, who’s a bachelor, is a married man.  
b. # David, a bachelor, is a married man.  
c. # Joel is married to Jack, who’s a bachelor.  
d. # Joel is married to Jack, a bachelor.

Because conversation is collaborative, interlocutors are typically charitable to one another. As such, monologues that involve self-opposition are often
‘repaired’ so that a non-contradictory interpretation is obtained (Kehler 2002). This is observed in those situations exemplified by (54), in which incoherence arises if the default stance that events described in α occur before events described in β is retained. To avoid interpreting (54) as an occurrence of self-opposition (as β cannot apply to a context in which α is true if the default temporal order is retained), the hearer interprets β as a reason clause or as containing a silent instance of previously (or some similar temporal adjunct).

(54) A: [α David iced a cake.] [β He baked it.]

The same repair affect is observed in utterances that contain ARCs and attributions, and for the same reason:

(55) David, who iced a cake, baked it.

Thus, the fact that parentheticals and assertions in two-utterance monologues pattern identically with respect to contingency and self-opposition provides additional evidence for the pragmatic approach to Force phrasal appositives advocated here, which establishes a link between the two.

5.2.2.3 Antibackgrounding

The rule in (2) in §5.1.1 says that a request α is infelicitous if it attempts to apply to a context that is comprised solely of possible worlds in which α’s truth already holds (in other words, one cannot file superfluous requests). Potts (2005:34) calls this the antibackgrounding condition. This condition makes the correct prediction that, in all-new contexts, presuppositions, Force phrase parentheticals, and assertions whose veracity is guaranteed result in incoherent discourses, as they violate the rule in (2).
The pragmatics of appositives

(56)  a. # David hates his job. He has one.
   b. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. He’s my neighbour.
   c. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. John, who’s my neighbour, drinks beer.
   d. # John’s my neighbour. We go fishing together. John, my neighbour, drinks beer.

These data therefore demonstrate that Force phrase parentheticals, like both presuppositions and assertions, are atoms of the discourse structure, and as such must obey felicity conditions imposed thereupon.

5.2.2.4 Unpluggability

Because requests are necessarily engendered from their explicatures, initial assertions are never interpreted as contained within intensional environments such as mental or hypothetical worlds. In the terminology of Karttunen & Peters (1979), assertions are never plugged. This is illustrated below, where the interpretation of (57) must be (58a) and not (58b).

(57) A: [a David has a job.][b Fred thinks that David baked a cake.]
       SD:  (David has a job, Fred thinks that David baked a cake)

(58) Interpretation of (57A):
       a. David has a job and Fred thinks that David baked a cake.
       b. # Fred thinks that David has a job and that David baked a cake.

The same situation pertains in the mirror of (57) in (59):

(59) A: [a Fred thinks that David baked a cake.][b David has a job.]
       SD:  (Fred thinks that David baked a cake, David has a job)

(60) Interpretation of (59A):
       a. Fred thinks that David baked a cake. David has a job.
       b. # Fred thinks that David baked a cake and that David has a job.
Because requests are also necessarily engendered from their surface meaning, interpolated and final Force phrasal parentheticals are expected to be unpluggable too. This expectation is met, as the examples in (61) to (64) demonstrate (Potts 2005).

(61)  A: [a Fred thinks that David, who has a job, baked a cake.]
     SD: ⟨David has a job, Fred thinks that David baked a cake⟩

(62)  Interpretation of (61A):
     a. David has a job and Fred thinks that David baked a cake.
     b. # Fred thinks that David has a job and that David baked a cake.

(63)  A: [a Fred thinks that David kissed Sally, who has a job.]
     SD: ⟨Fred thinks that David kissed Sally, Sally has a job⟩

(64)  Interpretation of (63A):
     a. Fred thinks that David kissed Sally. Sally has a job.
     b. # Fred thinks that David kissed Sally and that Sally has a job.

5.2.2.5 Modal subordination

Recall from §4.3 that appositive relative pronouns can refer to quantified noun phrase anchors if the ARC displays irrealis tense:

(65)  a. No properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.
     b. Every properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have got that right.

The same observation holds of appositive relative pronouns that appear to corefer with the hypothetical aspect of their anchors. This is demonstrated in (66a) (from Arnold 2007:299), which can be paraphrased as in (66b), where a car is understood as contained within a protasis.
(66) a. Sam doesn’t own a car, which she wouldn’t be able to drive anyway.
    b. Sam doesn’t own a car. Even if she did own [a car], she wouldn’t be able to drive it.

Note that the same observation also holds of regular pronouns that are contained within clauses that display irrealis tense:

(67) Sam doesn’t own [a car]. She wouldn’t be able to drive it, anyway.

A related phenomenon is observed in cases like (68a). Here, a regular pronoun within the ARC corefers with the entire protasis. The same situation is observed in (68b) with a finite clausal parenthetical.

(68) a. If [Pete, who would be richer as a consequence of it, were to sell his car], then he would have more disposable income.
    b. If [Pete (and he would be richer as a consequence of it,) were to sell his car], then he would have more disposable income.

In a simple model of discourse like the one advanced in §4.1, the phenomenon exemplified in (65) to (68), which is called modal subordination, must be handled in the following manner: the requests engendered by these modally subordinated structures must belie each’s surface simplicity. Thus the ARC in (66a) and the second assertion in (67) must engender the request in (69a), while the ARC in (68a) and the finite parenthetical in (68b) must engender the request in (69b).

(69) a. (if Sam did own a car then she wouldn’t be able to drive it)
    b. (Pete would be richer as consequence of selling his car, if Pete were to sell his car then he would have more disposable income)

While more elaborate accounts of model subordination have of course been advanced, this explanation provided above must suffice for my purposes. What is important is that modally subordinated Force phrase parentheticals and assertions are treated the same. However such data are explained, the explanation will apply equally to assertions and Force phrase parentheticals.
5.2.3 Force phrase parentheticals and the structured discourse: a summary

In this subsection (§4.2), I demonstrated that assertions that contain assertoric Force phrase parentheticals (in particular attributions and ARCs) display identical pragmatic behaviour to monologues composed of two assertions, just as my approach predicts.

5.3 Appositions and the structured discourse

Let us now revisit some of the conclusions reached in chapter two with respect to appositions, which I claimed are coordinated with their anchors. With respect their possible pragmatic import, the following constructions are relevant.

(70) a. Pete, *my boss* that is to say, has asked me to work overtime.
    b. Pete, *i.e. the guy that we met last night*, is coming over for dinner.

(71) a. The Big Apple is a nice city; *that is New York is a nice city*.
    b. John saw Mary yesterday; *he saw his ex-wife yesterday*, that is.

(72) a. We’ve won the lottery, *that is to say we needn’t worry about money anymore*.
    b. Sam is a procrastinator, *that is to say he evidently spends far too much time running pointless errands when he should be working*.

The appositions in (70) exemplify those that are subclausal. Because this class are not Force phrases, one expects that these appositions cannot be used to commit speech acts and thus do not engender requests to update the context.

The appositions in (71) exemplify those that are clausal but semantically *vacuous* insofar as they do not bear illocutionary force (see §2.2.1). As such, one expects that these appositions cannot be used to commit speech acts and thus do not engender independent requests to update the context.

The appositions in (72) exemplify those that are *assertoric* (see §2.2.1). As such, one expects that they can be used to commit speech acts and hence do
engender requests to update the context. That assertoric conjuncts can engender requests is evidenced by constructions like (73).

(73) \[ &P \{ a. \text{Jo entered the pub} \} \text{and} \{ b. \text{Bob served her a drink} \}. \quad (\text{where} \ b \leftrightarrow a) \]

I will now test these predictions by employing the first two diagnostics that were used for attributions and ARCs in §5.2.2 (pluggability has already been discussed in §2.1.5).

5.3.1 Responses

As (74) shows, neither interpolated nor final subclausal appositions can be targeted by a generic response, where the response is intended to be interpreted as \textit{that’s (not) true that the apposition is another name for the referent denoted the anchor}.59

(74) a. A: \textbf{The Big Apple}, \textit{i.e. New York}, is a great place to live.
    b. A: \textbf{Pete}, \textit{i.e. the guy that we met in the pub}, invited us to lunch.
    c. A: John’s been to \textbf{the Big Apple}, \textit{i.e. New York}.
    d. A: I just saw \textbf{Pete}, \textit{i.e. the guy that we met in the supermarket}.

    B: \# \{That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!\}

The same pattern is observed with semantically vacuous appositions, as (75) shows, where the response is again intended to be interpreted as \textit{that’s (not) true that the correlate is another name for the referent denoted by the subapposition}.

59 Mark de Vries (p.c.) notes that the synonymy relationship that is established between anchors and subclausal appositions can be targeted by a specific response, as (iB) demonstrates.

(i) A: \textbf{The Big Apple}, Chicago, is a great place to live.
    B: It’s a mistake to associate the Big Apple with Chicago.

That the synonymy relationship in question can be commented upon (iB) is expected, as other subsentential grammatical relationships can be commented upon too:

(ii) A: The novelist Robert Burns is a hero in Scotland.
    B: He’s more of a poet than a novelist.

Resultantly, that fact that (iB) comments upon the synonymy relationship between the anchor and the apposition in (iA) does not entail that an SD-style request to establish the synonymy relationship in question is invoked from (iA).
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(75) a. A: **The Big Apple is a nice city**; that is **New York is a nice city**.

b. A: **John saw Mary yesterday**; **he saw his ex-wife yesterday**.

B: # {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!}

With assertoric appositions, a different pattern is observed. Here, generic responses can be coherently employed. In each case, generic opposition (for instance) can be expressed towards the apposition alone. In other words, *that’s not true* can mean *it’s not true that we needn’t worry about money anymore* in (76a). However, my informants were divided with respect to whether or not generic opposition can target the synonymy relation that the speaker intends to establish. In other words, it is unclear whether for (76a) *that’s not true* can mean *it’s not true that winning the lottery equates with not needing to worry about money*. This complication aside, it is clear that these appositions may engender requests to update the context.

(76) a. A: **We’ve won the lottery**, in other words **we needn’t worry about money anymore**.

b. A: **Sam is a procrastinator**, that is to say **he evidently spends far too much time running pointless errands when he should be working**.

B: {That’s not true! / That’s true! / Indeed! / No!}

5.3.2 Contingency

The diagnostic of *contingency* employed in §5.2.2.2 does not apply in any relevant sense to subclausal appositions. While the example in (77a) shows that hosts need not be contingent upon subclausal appositions contained within them, this does not entail that such appositions engender requests to update the context. Rather, it merely shows that additional information provided about a referent need not be relevant to the evaluation of the proposition in which this referent is contained. This is made clear by (77b). Because Plato could have written many dialogues without being a philosopher, the host is not contingent on the philosopher. However, *the philosopher* is a functional element of type (e, t) (Potts 2005:113), and as such is not a plausible candidate for request-engenderment. I maintain that the same is true of subclausal appositions.
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(77) a. **Obama**, *i.e. the president of the United States*, is a Democrat.
    b. The philosopher Plato wrote many dialogues.

The same argument works in reverse. At first glance the host clause in (78a) appears to be contingent upon the subclausal apposition, as only US presidents can order the deployment of that country’s nuclear arsenal. This apparent contingency is illusory however, as the absence of the apposition leads to the same interpretation. In other words, the truth of (78b) is contingent upon Obama being the US president (if the conversation world aims to reflect the real world). Thus the apposition in (78a) merely spells out a relationship of contingency that is already established.

(78) a. **Obama**, *i.e. the president of the United States*, ordered the deployment of US nuclear weapons.
    b. **Obama** ordered the deployment of US nuclear weapons.

Contingency is irrelevant to semantically vacuous appositions too, for a similar reason. Again, the fact that Obama must be the US president in order to approve the deployment of nuclear weapons remains even when the apposition in (79) is removed.

(79) **Obama ordered the release of US nuclear weapons**; in other words **the president of the United States ordered the deployment of US nuclear weapons**.

Because a causal (as well as synonymy) relationship may pertain between assertoric appositions and their hosts, contingency is observed. This is observed in (80), where the abdication of the queen entails the coronation of a king (assuming again that the conversational world reflects the actual world).

(80) **The UK’s queen has abdicated**, in other words **the UK now has a king**.
5.3.3 **Appositions and the structured discourse: a summary**

In this subsection (§5.3), I demonstrated that subclausal and semantically vacuous appositions do not engender requests to update the context, while assertoric appositions do. This provides further evidence for the analysis in §2, which predicts this result.

5.4 **Alternative analyses of the pragmatic import of attributions and appositive relative clauses**

The approach advanced in §5.1 confers the benefit of treating attributions and ARCs with declarative syntax as regular assertions. This circumvents the need to venture that these parentheticals display an inherent semantic property that instructs the semantic module to treat them as different to regular at-issue content.

In this subsection (§5.4), I review two semantic approaches to attributions and ARCs that do precisely this. By reviewing these two analyses, I aim to show that the assignment of inherent 'non-at-issueness' to parentheticals is both conceptually and empirically disfavoured.

5.4.1 **Attributions and appositive relative clauses as implicatures**

As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to this chapter, Potts (2005) invokes a bidimensional semantic account of parentheticals, which distinguishes between at-issue and conventionally implied (CI) material. For him, attributions and ARCs are generated as at-issue terms, but are type-shifted to CI terms by the feature COMMA. When the time comes for utterances that contain attributions or ARCs to be interpreted, they constitute 2-tuples of propositions \( \langle t^a, \{c_1, \ldots, c_n\} \rangle \), where the superscripted \( a \) and \( c \) denote at-issue and CI terms respectively. The \( t^a \) term denotes the host clause, while \( t^c \) terms denote attributions and ARCs interpolated within it.

One of the main motivations for Potts’ bidimensional approach comes from the independence of truth-values that utterances that contain attributions and ARCs appear to display. For instance, Potts (2005:32) notes about (81) that "I know that Armstrong is a Texan; the [attribution] is false."
But I can still recover from [(81)] the information that Lance won the 2002 Tour”. For him, this requires that (81) be assigned the truth value \((1, 0)\).

(81) **Lance Armstrong**, *an Arkansan*, has won the 2002 Tour de France!

Potts’ maintenance of independent truth values makes incorrect predictions, however. It incorrectly predicts that examples like those in (82), wherein the host and attribution/ARC engender contradictory propositions, should not create incoherence, as one should be able to assign truth values such as \((1, 0)\) or \((0, 1)\) to them.

(82) a. # **David**, *who’s a bachelor*, is a married man.
b. # **David**, a bachelor, is a married man.
c. # Joel is married to **Jack**, *who’s a bachelor*.
d. # Joel is married to **Jack**, a bachelor

The approach outlined in §5.1 accounted straightforwardly for these facts. As discussed in §5.2.2.2, incoherence arises in such cases because the speaker opposes her own requests to update the context. In (82a) for instance, the request (David is a bachelor) is imposed upon the discourse by the same speaker that files the contradictory request (David is married man). Incoherence arises because there is no reason why interlocutors of sound mind would do this.\(^60\)

AnderBois et al. (2013) point out that Potts’ bidimensional approach also predicts that dependencies between anaphors (83a) and other elements that are connected via a linear dependence (83b-c) across the host/parenthetical boundary should be impossible to establish, contrary to observation.

(83) a. [**Every speaker**], *all of them, PhD students*, gave a great talk.
b. John kissed **Mary**, *who kissed him too*.
c. Mel lost three games of tennis to **Betty**, *who lost six \(\Delta\) to Jane.*

\(^60\) As the current approach correctly predicts, the same incoherence observed in (82) arises with utterances that engender explicatures that contradict with existential presuppositions (see (i) and (ii) below).

(i) # The bachelor is a married man.
(ii) \((x, \text{is a bachelor}, x, \text{is a married man})\)
The simple model advanced in §5.1 evidently ignores how such anaphoric relations are established across the discourse. A more complex model, such as a variant of discourse representation theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993), is required for this. However, my approach does not preclude these interactions. Because it treats attributions/ARCs and their hosts as occupying the same dimension of meaning, such interactions are indeed expected.

5.4.2  Attributions and appositive relative clauses as impositions

Like Potts (2005), AnderBois et al. (2013) maintain a fundamental distinction between at-issue and what they call appositive content (this is similar to Potts’ conventional implicature content). For them, at-issue material engenders requests to update the context, while appositive content updates the context without a request being engendered. Thus, appositive content is always imposed upon the context.

While their approach is closer to mine than Potts’, important dissimilarities pertain. For them apppositivity is inherent, and therefore imposition is unrelated to conversational time or to a parenthetical’s linear position respective to its host in the string that they share. Thus, advocates of this approach cannot straightforwardly account for the fact that final parentheticals are not imposed on the context (see §5.2.2). To remedy this, one might suggest that final parentheticals are exceptional in that they do not bear appositive content (perhaps the proposition they engender is conjoined to the host clause proposition, and together they generate a single request). While this solution is plausible, it requires one to posit a dichotomy in interpretation between parentheticals based upon their linear position; a dichotomy that my approach does not require.

Regardless of whether or not they engender requests, questions never update the context. Thus, parenthetical questions (see 84 below) cannot be appositive for AnderBois et al., as they cannot update the context directly, which is the sole function of appositives. However it is unclear to me whether their account’s distinction between appositives (i.e. declarative Force phrase parentheticals) and non-appositives (i.e. non-declarative Force phrase parentheticals) has any advantages or disadvantages from a semantic perspective.
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(84) A masked man (*but who exactly?*) kissed Miranda at the party.

On my account, Force phrase parentheticals and independent sentences are identical, in that those that display declarative syntax can be used as assertions (which engender requests), while those that display non-declarative syntax cannot be used as assertions (and therefore cannot engender requests). Thus, my account maintains the same distinction that AnderBois et al.’s does, except that for me this distinction is not particular to parentheticals (i.e. appositive vs. non-appositive), but is more universal (i.e. assertions vs. non-assertions).

As a final note, a diagnostic that AnderBois et al. (2013:21) introduce to support their claim that attributions and ARCs display inherent appositivity concerns their (in)ability to answer questions. They claim that B’s response in (85) below is infelicitous because only at-issue (i.e. non-appositive) material can answer questions.

(85) A: Who had prostate cancer?
    B: ?? Tammy’s husband, who had prostate cancer, was being treated at the Dominican Hospital.

This diagnostic has gone unmentioned in the discussion about the pragmatics of appositives thus far, as it is difficult to ascertain exactly why (85B) is infelicitous. The utterance in (85B) cannot be infelicitous because of the ARC’s inherent ‘appositivity’ (contrary to what AnderBois et al. claim), as an increase in the salience of both interpolated and final Force phrasal appositives makes them capable of answering questions, as (86) shows.

(86) A: Does David have a job?
    a. B: David, who indeed DOES have a job, now works for Google.
    b. B: David seems able to pay the rent, which suggests to me that he indeed DOES have a job.

I tentatively suppose that there exists a preference, which can be overridden, for speaker A’s question to be answered by whichever speech act speaker B starts uttering immediately after A’s question is asked. Such an explanation,
if feasible, would not only account for the data in (85) and (86), but also for the monologue data in (87) below, which patterns identically to (85) and (86).

(87) A: Does David have a job?
   a. B: He does. I’m proud of him
   b. B: # I’m proud of David. He has a job.
   c. B Well, he’s paying his rent. So yes, David indeed does have a job.

5.5. Concluding remarks on the pragmatics of appositives

In this chapter, I investigated the pragmatic import of the appositives whose syntax I examined in chapters two, three, and four. To accomplish this task, I created an informal model of discourse that captures how assertions and presuppositions (as defined in §5.1.4) behave within a structured discourse (SD). I demonstrated that attributions and ARCs behave like assertions in monologues. This conclusion therefore supports my syntactic analyses of attributions and ARCs as (derived from) finite clausal Force phrasal adjuncts, which, when declarative, may bear assertoric force and hence may engender requests to update the conversational context.

In §5.3, I analysed the pragmatic import of appositions. I showed that, unlike attributions and ARCs, subclausal and vacuous clausal appositions do not engender requests to update the conversational context. Assertoric clausal appositions do engender requests, however. These results therefore support my syntactic analysis of appositions from chapter two, which treats appositions as coordinated with their anchors in a low WYSIWYG fashion.
6

Alternative analyses

In this chapter, I provide critique of three alternative analyses of appositives. These are the bidimensional semantic approach (§6.1), the orphanage approach (§6.2), and the par-MERGE approach (§6.3).

In this penultimate chapter, I outline and discuss the three alternative analyses of appositives that I believe are my analysis’ most plausible competitors. I aim to show that, in each case, the syntactic analysis advanced in chapters two to four confers greater empirical coverage and explanatory power than these.

6.1 The bidimensional semantic approach

In this section, I return to Potts (2005) bidimensional account of attributions and ARCs, which was briefly discussed in §5.4.1. In that subsection, I argued that semantic bidimensionality is unsuitable for a plausible analysis of the pragmatic import of attributions and ARCs. Below, I critique the syntactic mechanisms that Potts (2005) employs to make his bidimensional semantics work.

Let us first recall the relevant aspects of Potts’ account. Potts distinguishes between at-issue and conventionally implied (CI) material. When the time comes for utterances that contain attributions or ARCs to be interpreted, they constitute 2-tuples of propositions \( \langle t', \{t'^i, \ldots, t'^n\} \rangle \), where the superscripted \( a \) and \( c \) denote at-issue and CI terms respectively.

Among the compositional rules that Potts introduces is (1), which states that the application of a function of the type \( \langle \sigma^a, \tau^c \rangle \) to an at-issue entity \( \beta \) returns a secondary proposition and the at-issue entity \( \beta \) unaltered.
(1) \[ \beta : \sigma^a \]

\[ \bullet \]

\[ \alpha(\beta) : \tau^c \]

\[ \beta : \sigma^a \quad \alpha : (\sigma^a, \tau^c) \]

Syntactic constituents are converted from type \( (\sigma^a, \tau^c) \) (their usual type) to type \( (\sigma^a, \tau^c) \) by the syntactic feature COMMA, whose type for our purposes is \( (\sigma^a, \tau^c), (\sigma^a, \tau^c) \). COMMA is applied to non-terminal syntactic nodes. An example of how Potts’ account works is provided in (2b) below. Here, the predicate nominal *an actor* is converted from an at-issue to a conventionally implied predicate by COMMA. The compositional rule in (1) then applies to George and *an actor* and returns the conventionally implied proposition *George is an actor* and the at-issue entity *George*. Regular function application then occurs, thus creating the at-issue proposition *George loves Amal*.

(2) a. **George, an actor, loves Amal.**

b. 

\[ \text{TP: } t^a \]

\[ \text{loves}(\text{George, Amal}) \]

\[ \text{DP: } e^a \quad \text{VP: } (e^t, t^c) \]

\[ \text{George} \quad \lambda y[\text{loves}(y, \text{Amal})] \]

\[ \text{DP: } t^c \quad \text{loves Amal} \]

\[ \text{actor}(\text{George}) \]

\[ \text{DP: } e^a \quad \text{DP[+COMMA]: } (e^t, t^c) \]

\[ \text{George} \quad \text{DP: } (e^t, t^c) \]

\[ \lambda x[\text{actor}(x)] \]

\[ \text{an actor} \]
6.1.1 Appositions

Potts himself only applies his system to nominal attributions, and in the process neglects the distinction between ‘true’ appositions (chapter two) and attributions (chapter three). Thus, I wish to make clear that this subsection (§6.1.1) does not provide a rebuttal of Potts’ own application of his system to appositions, but rather provides good reasons for why Potts’ system should not be extended to ‘true’ appositions.

First, I should say something about why the distinction between true appositions and attributions is often ignored. The most salient reason is that, in certain cases that were discussed throughout chapters two and three, ‘appositions’ are ambiguous between true appositions and attributions.

Second, the desire to distinguish regular (or loose) appositions from close appositions such as those in (3a) can easily lead to the erroneous conclusion that true appositions and attributions form a natural class. After all, all loose appositions seem prosodically isolated from their host, unlike close appositions.

(3) a. [The poet Rab Burns] is renowned throughout Scotland.  
   b. [Rab Burns, the poet,] is renowned throughout Scotland.

Indeed, Potts (2005:113) uses examples like (4) to argue that loose and close appositions form distinct natural classes. His argument runs as follows. The sentences in (4a) form an incoherent discourse because the Texan and the Ohioan are understood as properties, and, as properties, they are mutually exclusive (i.e. the individual Armstrong cannot be Texan and Ohioan simultaneously). This incoherence does not arise in (4b) because the parts that form close appositions are not referential themselves, rather they form a referential noun phrase when they concatenate. Thus, the two instances of Armstrong in (4b) are necessarily interpreted as distinct individuals. Therefore, he concludes, all loose appositions are non-referential noun phrases of type (e, t).
Alternative analyses

(4) a. Armstrong, the Texan, is a cyclist. Armstrong, the Ohioan, is an astronaut.

b. Armstrong the Texan is a cyclist. Armstrong the Ohioan is astronaut.

This argument is fallacious because Potts’ example sets up an environment in which the non-referential attributional interpretation of the parenthetical is forced. If amended to force a referential reading, the incoherence of (4a) disappears, and one is left with the ‘true’ apposition interpretation (though the oddness of talking about two distinct people called Armstrong remains).

(5) Armstrong, (that is) the Texan standing over by the window, is a cyclist. And Armstrong, (that is) the Ohioan sitting at the table, is an astronaut.

Thus, while one can indeed maintain a distinction between loose and close appositions, one should also distinguish between ‘true’ appositions and attributions.

Having provided some comments about why one might incorrectly lump appositions and attributions together, I now show how Potts’ bidimensional semantics is unsuitable for ‘true’ appositions.

Firstly, the inputs for the feature COMMA must be functions. However, as already discussed, appositions can be entities. Thus, type-shifting must occur to provide COMMA the correct input. While not impossible, I envisage that independent justification for such type-shifting is difficult to ascertain.

Secondly, ceteris paribus, conventionally implied propositions are always speaker-oriented: they cannot be ‘plugged’ by attitudinal verbs, conditional operators, etc. (Potts ibid.). As I demonstrated in §2.1.5, appositions can be plugged, contrary to Potts’ (2005) expectation.

In sum, the application of Potts’ multidimensional approach to appositions fails to provide the required degree of explanatory or descriptive adequacy.
6.1.2 Attributions and appositive relative clauses

When attempting to apply Potts’ approach to attributions, four issues arise. The first concerns the realisation of morphological case. Potts claims that attributions arise with either (A) the same case as their anchor, (B) the same case that is realised on postcopular items, or (C) an idiosyncratic case. With respect to B, Potts postulates that such attributions are realised with predicative case because they are derived from reduced ARCs (ibid.:109); a claim that is unlikely to be true when one considers the cross-linguistic evidence against it that I advanced in §4.5.

The second issue arises from the first. Once the notion that attributions are derived from reduced ARCs is discarded, Potts’ approach has no means by which to account for the existence of referential noun phrase attributions like (6). This is because only functions are suitable inputs for COMMA, while referential noun phrases are atomic elements of type $e$. Thus, the account undergenerates.

(6) A masked man, probably Pete, kissed Miranda at the party.

The third issue concerns the opposite problem: overgeneralisation. As discussed in §3.2, current syntactic theory in the Chomskyan vein assumes that syntax is blind: it merely takes any two syntactic objects and MERGES them (Chomsky 2008). The eventual output of MERGE (call it ‘α’) is constrained only by the interfaces, which assess α’s well-formedness. A consequence of this view is that phrases of any syntactic type can be adjuncts, and that if (say) a verb phrase adjoins to a determiner phrase, it will create unacceptability in the semantic module by virtue of the fact that it does not create a legitimate semantic object.

---

61 To resolve the problem, one could suggest that Pete in (6) is type-shifted to a predicate, as I mentioned in §6.1.1. An issue arises from this resolution, however: the proposition that results from the application of the type-shifted predicate to the anchor a masked man is unacceptable in non-appositional environments, as (i) shows, in contravention to what Potts’ account predicts.

(i) * A masked man is probably Pete.
   (on an individual, rather than generic, reading of a masked man)
On Potts' approach, any unary predicate of type \((e^a, t^v)\) can be type-shifted by \textsc{comma} to \((e^a, t^c)\). Thus, provided that \textsc{comma} is present, verb phrase adjuncts should be permitted: no syntactic or semantic constraints prevent it. This leads to overgeneralisation, as it predicts that derivations like (8a) give rise to licit attribution constructions. As (8b) shows, this prediction is incorrect.

\[(8) \quad \text{a. } \quad \text{TP: } t^v \]
\[
\text{hates(B, F)}
\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP: } e^a \\
\text{Bob}
\end{array}
\]
\[
\text{VP: } \langle e^a, t^v \rangle
\]
\[
\lambda y[\text{loves}(y, F)]
\]
\[
\text{VP: } \langle e^a, t^c \rangle
\]
\[
\lambda x[\text{hates}(x, J)]
\]
\[
\text{hates John}
\]

\[
\text{b. } \quad \text{Bob, hates John, loves Fred.}
\]

The fourth issue concerns extensibility. Potts' account cannot be straightforwardly extended to cover attributions that have non-nominal anchors. One might suppose such anchors are nominalised and then
verbalised by type-shifters (as in 9b below, which is modelled on Potts 2002:84, and which employs a world variable but uses simple extensional notation for types). While this approach is tenable, my analysis, which permits coreference across the discourse with enlightened as a concept, is theoretically simpler.62

(9) a. Siddhartha is enlightened, a state of bliss that few experience.

b. 

```
TP: tₐ
\lambda w[enlightenedₙ(x)]
  DP: eₐ
  VP: (eₐ, tₐ)
Siddhartha
  \lambda w \lambda x[enlightenedₙ(x)]
    \cup f
      VP: eₐ
      [ENLIGHTENED]
        •
          VP: tₐ
            \lambda w[SoBₙ([ENLIGHTENED])]
              VP: eₐ
                [ENLIGHTENED]
                  \cup f
                    VP: (eₐ, tₐ)
                      \lambda w \lambda y[SoBₙ(y)]
                        a state of bliss that
                          few experience
```

62 Note that attributions can sometimes modify inferred anchors. This occurs in (i) below, where the apposition is interpreted as modifying Poland, which is inferred from the anchor Polish.

(i) Mary is Polish, a country I hope to visit one day.

On the ’reduced copula’ analysis of attributions that I advocated in chapter four, (i) displays the syntax in (ii). As such, (i)’s acceptability is expected, as pronouns like it in (ii) may sometimes corefer with inferred antecedents, as shown by (iii). As far as I can tell, the type-shifting approach exemplified by (9) is entirely unable to account for (i)’s acceptability.

(ii) Mary is Polish, (it is) a country I hope to visit one day.

(iii) Polish people are really friendly. It’s a country I’d to visit one day.
As Potts (2005:104) makes clear, his approach demands that \( (e^i, t^i) \) terms adjoin adjacent to their anchors. While adjacency must be maintained with attributions in English (§3.4.1), non-adjacency is permitted with Turkish attributions and English ARCs (§4.4.2). This latter fact is also unaccounted for by Potts’ approach.

To summarise: it appears that Potts’ bidimensional semantic analysis of appositives (or supplements in his terminology) does not provide the required degree of descriptive and explanatory adequacy. Syntactically, it over- and undergenerates with respect to attributions and ARCs, and cannot be extended to ‘true’ appositions. Pragmatically, it incorrectly predicts that no interaction is permitted across the parenthetical/host boundary (see §5.4.1), and it fails to account for the similarities between attributions/ARCs and assertions that comprise monologues.

### 6.2 The orphanage approach

#### 6.2.1 The orphanage approach to attributions and appositive relative clauses

In this section I discuss the orphanage approach to parenthesis, particularly its application to attributions and ARCs. It should be noted that I do not consider the application of the orphanage approach to appositions in this subsection, as I have already demonstrated in §2.2.3 that an orphanage analysis of appositions is infeasible.

Let me begin by outlining the structure of this subsection (§6.2.1). Many scholars have proposed that parenthetical clauses are orphans (Haegeman 1991, Burton-Roberts, 1999, 2006, Peterson 1999, Döring 2014, Ott 2014a, b, among others). Because orphanage is a rather fractured notion within syntactic theory (for instance, compare Espinal 1991 with Burton-Roberts 1999), I must first reserve some space to outline what I believe to be the most charitable Minimalist formulation of it. At first sight, this formulation of orphanage appears to confer greater theoretical elegance than the Force phrase approach to attributions and ARCs that I advocated in chapters three and four, insofar as orphanage appears able to account for the semantic opacity that attributions/ARCs display without recourse to sui generis mechanisms like Force predicates. In arguing against orphanage, I will first
show that this theoretical advantage is illusory, and that, if one wishes to retain an orthodox conception of the architecture of grammar, orphanage requires a *sui generis* secondary linearisation mechanism to account for opacity. By exposing this illusion, I level the playing-field: I show that both the orphanage and the Force phrase approach utilise *sui generis* means to guarantee that attributions and ARCs are interpreted as semantically opaque. Once the playing-field is levelled, I show that the use of Force phrases, rather than the use of a secondary linearisation procedure, confers greater theoretical parsimony, and that the Force phrase approach is therefore favoured over the orphanage approach.

I start by outlining my conception of orphanage. To begin, consider the example in (10), where each lexeme precedes and/or follows another lexeme. These planar relations are called *precedence* relations. All the syntactic theories that I know of, whether derivational or monostral, maintain that these precedence relations should be understood as (derived from) syntactic relations.

(10) Tom is my brother.

Syntactic theories are built to model a finite amount of linguistic information at any one time. For the sake of clarity, I will call these finite ‘chunks’ of information *syntactic units* (SUs). SUs usually correspond to the pretheoretical notion of a sentence, which, in terms of orthography, is the grammatical unit that starts with a capital letter and ends with a full-stop in English.63

On this simplistic notion that SUs equate with sentences, one is assured that at least one precedence relation exists in language that should not be understood as a syntactic relation. This is the precedence relation that pertains between the final lexeme of one SU (*brother* in 11) and initial lexeme of the next SU (*he’s* in 11).

---

63 One might suggest that the *phase theory* initiated within the Minimalism program by Chomsky (2001a) treats subentential phenomenon as SUs (i.e. ‘phases’). I disagree: phases are merely (partially) opaque domains within SUs. To my knowledge, phase theorists do not treat the two sentences in (11) in the main text as phases that are contained within a larger phase (as in (i) below). Thus, the largest phase that can be created is the root clausal phase, and this is therefore phase theory’s ‘SU’.

(i) [**PHASE-1** [**PHASE-2** Tom is my brother.] [**PHASE-3** He’s a social worker.]]
The precedence relation between brother and he’s in (11) can instead be attributed to articulatory time. In other words, brother precedes he’s in the linear string in (11) because the speaker articulates the SU Tom is my brother before she articulates the SU he’s a social worker.

Non-syntactic precedence relations like the one that persists between brother and he’s in (11) are an inevitable consequence of two factors: maintenance of the assumption that syntax operates on SUs, and the fact that spoken, signed, and written language is (and must be) articulated along one dimension, which is time. The assumption that syntax deals in SUs could of course be discarded, and one could instead maintain that syntactic connexions persist across sentential and even speaker boundaries (see Neijt 1979). Such an approach requires that syntactic representations are never fully encapsulated, and that a syntactic node is always available to which incoming syntactic information can attach. While not pursued in theories like Minimalism, this idea is not impossible to implement, though for Minimalism it would require a different conception of phases and a rejection of the numeration, which is necessarily finite.

The demand for sequentiality that I mentioned above constrains the articulation of language, but not the mental representation of it. In Minimalist terms, one can maintain that syntax operates on SUs (i.e. it builds finite trees from finite numerations) while also maintaining that the syntax can deal with many SUs simultaneously (i.e. it builds more than one finite tree from more than one finite numeration at the same time). These views are not incompatible. For instance, the notion of multiple derivational ‘workspaces’ is often used as an explanatory tool in the Minimalist framework, as Nunes (2004) exemplifies.

If the mental representation of language is not subjected to the sequentiality constraint that articulation is, then it is feasible that convergent SUs (i.e. those SUs that obey the ‘interface’ constraints imposed by the sound and meaning components of the mind) can stack up in an articulatory cache, ready to be articulated. Provided that the linear order of lexemes internal to

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64 Note that the verb ‘articulation’ is not limited to vocal expression or written inscription here. Any SU that is available to the conscious mind is ‘articulated’.
a particular SU is maintained (as each SU has been independently linearised), these stacked-up SUs can be articulated in a manner that replicates synchronous articulation as best as the articulatory system allows, where SUs completely linearly precede/follow one another (12a), or where certain SUs are fully linearly contained within others (12b), or where SUs are linearly interlaced (12c).^{65}

(12) a. \[[SU_1 A B C D] [SU_2 E F G H]\]

b. \[[SU_1 A B [SU_2 E F G H] C D]\]

c. \[
\begin{array}{c}
SU_1 \\
A B \\
SU_2 \\
E F \\
C D \\
G H
\end{array}
\]

In the situation represented in (12b), for example, the precedence relation between B and E is not a syntactic relation, but rather a relation established by articulatory time. Thus, if one permits the notion of an articulatory cache, more non-syntactic precedence relations can be present in language than those observed at the boundaries of sequentially-ordered sentences.

An orphanage approach to attributions and ARCs that is grounded in Minimalism requires that the situation described above pertains. According to this approach to orphanage, those SUs that appear as interpolated into other SUs are orphans. Because they are syntactically derived and assessed for their interpretative and phonological well-formedness in complete isolation to the SUs into which they interpolate, orphans show syntactic and semantic opacity with respect to their 'hosts'.

From the description above it appears that the orphanage approach is compatible with the Minimalist conception of grammar, provided that one permits the existence of an articulatory cache. Because the ascription of the status of 'orphan' to parenthetical clauses accounts for their semantic and syntactic opacity straightforwardly (and without the need to posit additional syntactic or semantic machinery such as the 'Force phrases' I invoked to

^{65} Note that the possibility represented in (12c) is not attested in natural language; a fact to which I return later in this subsection.
account for the opacity of attributions and ARCs in chapters three and four),
the orphanage approach seems like an elegant and therefore conceptually
attractive theory.

It is important to realise however that the theoretical parsimony
conferred by the orphanage approach rests upon the notion that any
grammatical mechanism that operates upon two intertwined SUs (i.e. the
representations in 12b-c) applies in synchrony with articulatory time. If on
the other hand such mechanisms must 'see' the intertwined SUs before
articulation occurs then one cannot appeal to articulatory time to explain the
alleged non-syntactic relations of precedence that are exhibited between
intertwined SUs. Instead, an advocate of orphanage must concede that her
system involves two distinct linearisation operations; one that establishes
precedence relations within SUs (this is the regular linearisation mechanism
with which practitioners of Minimalism are familiar), and another that
establishes precedence relations across intertwined SUs. Once this
concession is made the orphanage approach loses its elegance and hence
conceptual attractiveness. Like the 'Force phrase' approach outlined in
chapter three, the orphanage approach requires a unique mechanism (in its
case, a secondary linearisation operation) to explain how orphans are
pronounced in the linear position that they are.

To provide a concrete example, let us consider prosody. Most
prosodicians assume that syntactic trees are prosodically parsed at the PF
interface of grammar (Embick & Noyer 2001), where 'parsing' refers to the
action of adding prosodic instructions for the articulatory system such as
"intonate the left edge of this phrase with a high tone" onto syntactic heads
and maximal projections. In English, the default right edge intonation phrase
tone for declarative sentences is \( L! \), which is a low tone. If two SUs are
computed independently, and if both are clausal, both should receive an \( L! \)
tone by default. Thus, in the articulatory cache, both should look like this:

(13) \( ([SU_1 \text{ Tom is a social worker}])_{L!} \)
(\( [SU_2 \text{ He’s my brother}] \))_{L!}

However, when the two SUs in (13) are intertwined during articulation, the
actual right edge intonation phrase tone displayed on SU2 in (14) is \( H! \),
which is a \textit{continuation} tone:
The intonation pattern depicted in (14) is not expected on the orphanage approach as currently formulated. Rather, SU2 is expected to be intonated with L!, as (13) shows. That SU2 exhibits a continuative H! tone informs us that the prosodic parser knows that SU2 is interpolated into SU1.

To account for the pattern of intonation observed in (14), an advocate of orphanage must propose that the prosodic parser knows that SU1 is interpolated into SU2 because prosodic parsing happens at the same time that articulation does: SUs are not prosodically parsed before they are articulated. Such a claim must be made because if the prosodic parser applied before articulation then all of the precedence relations observed in (14) must be established before articulation, which undermines the appeal to articulatory time as the means of establishing the non-syntactic precedence relation that purportedly holds between Tom and he’s in (14).

Taking all of the above into account, it appears that the conceptual feasibility of the orphanage approach is best assessed by first adumbrating the grammatical operations that take as their input intertwined SUs like (14), and then evaluating whether it is justified to claim that these operations are applied in synchrony with articulation.

With respect to morphophonological operations, it appears that an advocate of the orphanage approach must maintain that not just prosody but also vocabulary insertion and cliticisation must occur in synchrony with articulation. That such a claim must be maintained is demonstrated by examining the relationship between attributions/ARCs and contracted auxiliaries and the Saxon genitive in English.

Cliticisation of the Saxon genitive takes as its input intertwined SUs. In the case of attributions and ARCs, the Saxon genitive is cliticised to the most rightward attribution/ARC that modifies a possessor noun phrase anchor (cf. Arnold 2007). This is illustrated in (15a), where the Saxon genitive is cliticised to mine and pronounced as /z/, as per the allophony rule that demands that such sibilants are pronounced as voiced if they immediately follow a voiced segment. As (15b) shows, the Saxon genitive cannot be
cliticised to the possessor phrase *Mark in these environments, and thus cannot be pronounced as the unvoiced /s/.

(15)  a.  *Mark, a friend of mine,’s new car was expensive.
     b.  Mark’s, a friend of mine, new car was expensive.

Since Halle & Marantz (1993), there has been general accordance in the literature that syntactic lexical heads are composed of bundles of syntactic features. After 'spell out' of an SU to the phonological component of the grammar, a process called *vocabulary insertion* superimposes vocabulary items onto these lexical heads. Because clitics like the Saxon genitive show allophonic variation that is determined by their phonetic environment, cliticisation must occur after (or concurrent with) vocabulary insertion, otherwise allophony rules could not be applied.

On the orphanage approach, the cliticisation of the Saxon genitive to the attribution in (15a) must occur in synchrony with articulation. Because cliticisation is sensitive to its phonological surroundings, vocabulary insertion must occur in synchrony with articulation too. To claim that vocabulary insertion and cliticisation apply before articulation requires that the precedence relations that are observed in (15a) are established *before* articulation – a claim that undermines any appeal to articulatory time as the creator of the precedence relations between mine and the genitive clitic in (15a).

The same argument applies with contracted auxiliaries. For me and my British English informants, the prosodic intonation phrase boundaries that typically separate attributions and ARCs from their hosts can be absent if speech is rapid enough. In such cases, attributions/ARCs and their anchors share a phonological phrase, where the phrase accent (represented by small caps below) falls within the parenthetical:

(16)  a.  (John a NEIGHBOUR of mine)$_p$
     b.  (John who I WORK with)$_p$

---

66 Other instances of the Saxon genitive cliticising to appositives have already provided in this thesis: see examples (35c) and (83b) in chapter two.
When attributions/ARCs and their anchors display the prosodic configuration exemplified in (16), contracted auxiliaries may cliticise to the final word in the parenthetical, as the examples in (17) demonstrate, where the commas that usually surround attributions and ARCs are absent so that the intended prosodic integration is conveyed. Note that, in each case, unacceptability arises if the contracted auxiliary is cliticised onto the anchor John instead.67

(17) A. We need an extra player for the football match on Saturday.
   a. B: John who I work with’ll fill in, I bet.
   b. B: John who I work with’d fill in, I bet.
   c. B: John who I work with’s been asking about it. He’ll fill in.

Like with the Saxon genitive, the cliticisation of the contracted auxiliaries to the ARCs in (17) must occur in synchrony with articulation on the orphanage approach.

As a syntactician, I cannot say with any confidence whether or not the deferral of the application of the three morphophonological operations mentioned above (i.e. prosodic parsing, vocabulary insertion, and cliticisation) until the point of articulation is justifiable. I simply note here that advocates of the orphanage approach must adopt an explicit stance towards morphophonological operations that treats them as applied in synchrony with articulation. Note however that this stance clashes with the basic tenets of morphophonological theories like Distributed Morphology (DM), which maintains that prosodic parsing, vocabulary insertion and cliticisation each occur before SUs are assessed for their phonological well-formedness (Embick & Noyer 2001:566). If the tenets of DM are correct,

67 McCawley (1998:486, en.36) notes that "combinations of non-restrictive clause and a contracted auxiliary ‘s … are syntactically acceptable, though they have no acceptable written form." He provides (i) below as an example, where I assume that commas represent prosodic breaks. I agree with McCawley that this example is acceptable. Resultantly, it appears that, although an absence of pauses is required to contract auxiliaries onto appositives in most cases, the prosodic integration of appositives is not a prerequisite for auxiliary contraction.

(i) John, who I can’t stand,‘s been given a promotion.

Interesting, McCawley (ibid.:471) judges examples like (15a) in the main text to be rather degraded. Arnold (2007), my informants, and I disagree. Further research is required to discover why judgements about such examples diverge.
then the morphological dependencies observed in (15) and (17) cannot be
established in synchrony with articulatory time across SUs after all. Rather,
they must be established within one SU. This suggests that
attributions/ARCs and their host clauses share an SU, just as the ‘Force
phrase’ approach to attributions and ARCs that was outlined in chapters
three and four suggests.

An advocate of orphanage could suggest that SUs are intertwined at some
point before articulation, and that the sequential application of
morphophonological operations that Distributed Morphologists call the ‘PF-
branch’ targets the occupants of the articulatory cache. This suggestion
amounts to a concession that a secondary linearisation operation – which
targets SUs rather than the lexemes that comprise them – applies at some
juncture between the construction of SUs and their articulation. As
mentioned previously, the postulation of a secondary linearisation operation
eliminates the conceptual advantage that the orphanage approach appears to
possess over its rivals; as the orphanage approach, just like the Force phrase
and bidimensional semantic approaches, requires a sui generis means of
capturing the syntactic and semantic opacity that attributions and ARCs
display.

Whether justifiable or not, the claim that morphophonological operations
apply in synchrony with articulation is conceptually viable in Minimalism,
which in its core form (i.e. Chomsky’s work since his 1995 The Minimalist
Program) is ambivalent towards the timing of post-syntactic grammatical
operations. However, the claim that syntactic operations apply in synchrony
with articulation is conceptually unviable for Minimalism, which maintains a
strict separation between the creation of SUs and their articulation (this
division can be traced back to Chomsky’s 1965 distinction between
competence and performance). As such, evidence that syntactic operations
take as their input intertwined SUs provides robust opposition to the
implication (inherent in the orphanage analysis) that SUs are intertwined at
the point of articulation. Because one cannot justifiably claim that syntactic
operations occur in synchrony with articulation, one must concede that SUs
are intertwined before articulation, and hence undermine the main reason to
adopt orphanage.
To see that certain syntactic operations take as their input apparent intertwined SUs, consider the example in (18) below, which is repeated from example (94) in chapter four.

(18) Sam claims to have found \([a \text{ proof } t_1], \text{ which many believed could not exist}, \text{ of one of the most famous conjectures in the history of mathematics}\),

I have represented the construction in (18) as involving **extraposition**, which is an extraction operation that moves constituents rightward. However, it is possible that (18) involves no extraction at all. Rather, the ARC could be interpolated *within* the anchor.

Evidence that (18) does involve extraposition comes from the behaviour of appositive relative pronouns. I demonstrated in §4.4.2 that such relative pronouns, except in certain exceptional circumstances, cannot corefer with an anchor that *surrounds* them.

(19) * [The senator told the public, which, everyone now admits, many lies].

One could claim here that ARCs can be surrounded by noun phrase anchors but not clausal ones. This claim cannot be maintained however, as it incorrectly predicts that the example below, where extraposition cannot have occurred, is acceptable. Thus, extraposition must indeed occur in (18).

(20) * [John, which, is a Jaguar’s car], is brand new.

On the assumption that extraposition is a syntactic operation (Ross 1967, Guéron 1980, Koster 2000, among others), the example in (18) hints towards the conclusion that the proposal that SUs are intertwined at the point of articulation is wrong. Because the syntax must know that the ARC is present in order to extrapose a phrase around it, it seems implausible that the linear precedence relations that pertain between the ARC and its host in (18) can be established post-syntactically, and especially not as articulation takes place.
It is worth mentioning here that Truckenbrodt (1995) and Göbbel (2007) have claimed that extraposition is an extraction operation that occurs postsyntactically, as part of the sequence of operations that occur along the PF-branch of grammar. Even if this is true, the argument against intertwining at the point of articulation still stands. (More specifically, the argument becomes a repetition of what I said with respect to cliticisation, prosody and vocabulary insertion in the preceding paragraphs.)

Furthermore, it appears that, in certain environments, syntactic selection (MERGE) traverses purportedly interwined SUs. This is observed with right node raising (RNR) constructions. As mentioned in chapter two, RNR is not a unitary phenomenon. For instance, Barros & Vicente (2011) claim that certain RNR constructions are derived from backwards deletion, while others involve multidominance. An RNR construction like (21a), which displays a ‘cumulative’ shared constituent, must involve multidominance, as (21a) is semantically incoherent on the backwards deletion analysis provided in (21b).

(21)  
   a. Sam killed and Laura wounded a collective total of 200 badgers.
   b. # Sam killed a collective total of 200 badgers and Laura wounded a collective total of 200 badgers.

As (22a) demonstrates, cumulative shared constituents are also observed in constructions that contain appositives (cf. Arnold 2007).

(22)  
   a. I know Sam, who killed, and you know a girl that wounded a collective total of 200 badgers.
   b. # I know Sam, who killed a collective total of 200 badgers, and you know a girl that wounded a collective total of 200 badgers.

As the incoherence of (22b) demonstrates, the utterance in (22a) cannot be derived by backwards deletion. As such, I will assume that the shared constituent in (22a) is multidominated, following Barros & Vicente (2011). If this assumption is correct then a syntactic connexion must pertain between the host clause and the ARC, as both killed in the ARC and wounded in the host clause select for the same noun phrase. This entails that, at the very least, the utterance (22a) is derived from one multi-rooted SU (see 23)
Alternative analyses

(though see De Vries 2009:358 for arguments that multi-rooted SUs are conceptually infeasible). How these roots are ordered with respect to precedence cannot be decided by articulatory time, which only acts across (and not within) SUs. As such, utterances like those in (22) not only suggest that SUs are interwined between before articulation, but also suggest that orphanage’s claim that all appositives constitute independent SUs to their hosts is incorrect.68

\[ (23) \]

\[
\text{CPARC} \quad \text{CP HOST}
\]

\[
\text{who}_1 \quad \text{TP} \quad \ldots
\]

\[
\text{t}_1 \quad \text{VP} \quad \text{VP}
\]

\[
\text{killed} \quad \text{wounded} \quad \text{DP}
\]

a collective total of 200 badgers

To summarise so far: I outlined what I perceive to be a plausible Minimalist conception of the orphanage approach to parenthesis. I emphasised that, in order to retain a conceptual advantage over competing theories, the orphanage approach must maintain that the precedence relations that persist between elements contained within parentheticals and their hosts must be established at the point of articulation. Using morphological, prosodic, and syntactic data from English, I demonstrated that the notion that parentheticals and their hosts are only related at the point of articulation is infeasible, as a number of grammatical operations, which apply before

68 In chapter three, I claimed that non-local dependency relationships can only be established between binders and bindees that are relativised to the same Force. As such, dependency relationships like anaphoric binding, compositional semantic scope, and extraction (which I claim does not involve a transformational operation such as COPY or INTERNAL MERGE, despite its name; cf. Gazdar 1981, Koster 2003, 2007, contra Chomsky 1995, 2001b) cannot be established across ForceP boundaries, as was illustrated in chapters three and four. On the multidomiance analysis adopted in §2.1.1, RNR is not a dependency relationship that involves a binder (the shared constituent) and a bindee (the purported ‘gap’). Rather, RNR constructions merely involve shared structure. As such, the fact that the shared constituent in (22a) is relativised to two Force’s on the current approach (namely, the ARC and the host clause) is unproblematic, and does not result in unacceptability because the shared constituent does not enter into a non-local dependency relationship.
articulation, take intertwined appositives and hosts as their input. At best, orphanage can account for these observations by claiming that appositives and their hosts are intertwined before the point of articulation but after the narrow syntactic compositional procedure is complete. However, such a claim amounts to a concession that a secondary linearisation procedure occurs that establishes the precedence relations that persist between parentheticals and their hosts. Because this secondary linearisation procedure is effectively a *sui generis* means by which to capture the syntactic and semantic opacity of parentheticals, it reduces the potential conceptual elegance of the orphanage approach, and renders it equivalent to the Force phrase approach to attributions and ARCs that was discussed in chapter three, which posits the existence of force predicates to ensure that attributions’ and ARCs’ opacity is captured.

Now that I have levelled the playing-field by showing that both the orphanage and the Force phrase approach make recourse to a *sui generis* mechanism to ensure that opacity is captured, the following question can be addressed: which method of ensuring that opacity is captured is more parsimonious, secondary linearisation or force predicates?

In order to answer this question, recall from my description of orphanage earlier in this subsection that there are three potential ways in which cached SUs could be articulated: successively, nested, or interlaced. These options were respectively represented in (12), which is repeated in (24) below.

(24) a. \([SU_1 A B C D][SU_2 E F G H]\)

b. \([SU_1 A B [SU_2 E F G H] C D]\)

c. \(SU1 \quad SU2\)

\[A B \quad E F \quad C D \quad G H\]

In the discussion on orphanage so far, I have ignored the possibility that SUs could be interlaced. I ignored this possibility because it seems infeasible: attributions/ARCs (and indeed, all parentheticals) are unable to interlace with their hosts:
On the orphanage assumption that the host clause and the parenthetical
*that’s* *my boss* are indeed separate SUs, the unacceptability displayed in (25)
can only be explained by banning the secondary linearisation that is required
on the orphanage approach from creating sequences that match the schema
in (24c). As far as I can see, this ban must be enforced by stipulation: one
must simply state that the secondary linearisation mechanism may nest SUs
but may not interlace them.

No such stipulations are required to account for why attributions/ARCs
and their hosts cannot be interlaced on the Force phrase approach, however.
For interlacing to arise, elements contained within the appositive Force
phrase must extract to a position with the host Force phrase, as the
representation in (26) shows. As I demonstrated in (§3.5.1), such extraction
is illicit, as Force phrases are inherently opaque domains for extraction.
Thus, the ban on interlacing falls out naturally.

Resultantly, the Force phrase approach can take advantage of the hierarchy
that is created from syntactic concatenation to account for why succession
and nesting, but not interlacing, is observed in utterances that contain
attributions and ARCs (and parenthetics more generally). The orphanage
approach cannot rely on the syntax in the same way, and consequently must
stipulate that secondary linearisation cannot result in interlaced structures.
That such a stipulation is required therefore makes the orphanage approach

(25) * Frankie – *that’s* – is a megalomaniac – *my boss.*
(intended: Frankie, *that’s my boss*, is a megalomaniac.)
conceptually inferior to the Force phrase approach that I outlined in chapter three.

6.2.2 Invalid arguments for and against the orphanage approach

In the last section, I raised what are to my knowledge the totality of valid extant arguments against the orphanage analysis of attributions and ARCs. However, a number of invalid empirical arguments for and against orphanage have been advanced in the past. In this somewhat tangential subsection, I will address and discard five invalid arguments in a stepwise manner, in the hope that this prevents them from being programmatically repeated in future research.

**One:** The *right-adjacent rule*, which assumes orphanage and which Arnold (2007) attributes to Espinal (1991), demands that ARCs immediately follow their anchor. That extraneous material may intervene between an ARC and its anchor (interveners can be host clause material (see §4.4.2), or parentheticals such as additional ARCs (see 27)) demonstrates that this rule is spurious. Note that showing that the right-adjacent rule is incorrect does not weaken those orphanage analyses that do not assume it (such as Ott 2014a, b), however.

(27) **The King, who is our leader, for whom I would gladly give my life, is**
    due to abdicate soon.

**Two:** Arnold (2007) notes that verb phrase ellipsis can be licensed within the host clause by an antecedent within an ARC, or *vice versa*:

(28) a. *Someone that [supports the war], insulted Kim, who doesn’t Δ.*
    b. *Kim, who [supports the war], insulted someone that doesn’t Δ.*

Arnold (ibid.:290) says “assuming that VP-ellipsis to be an operation on grammatical structures (i.e. LFs), data like [those provided in (28) above] are entirely unexpected, because no grammatical process should be able to access [ARCs] and [restrictive relatives contained within host clauses] at the same time.”
While Arnold is correct that ellipsis targets LFs, he is incorrect to assume that grammatical processes are incapable of targeting separate LFs simultaneously. Because ellipsis is licensable across sentences and speakers, as in (29), one must assume that ellipsis can be licensed by items of discourse. If this is true then the ellipsis data in (28) do not provide evidence against orphanage approaches that maintain that sentences that contain attributions and ARCs are equivalent to two independent sentences modulo the non-syntactic interpolation of one sentence into the other.

(29) A: Kim [supports the war].
    B: I know! I just saw him insult someone that doesn’t Δ!

**Four:** Another invalid argument concerns anaphora. Consider the data below from Arnold (2007:290).

(30) a. The people who saw [the film] were deeply affected by it.
    b. The people who saw it were deeply affected by [the film].
    c. * It, deeply affected the people that saw [the film].

(31) a. My parents, who saw [the film], were deeply affected by it.
    b. My parents, who saw it, were deeply affected by [the film].
    c. * It, deeply affected my parents, who saw [the film].

In (30a-b) the referential noun phrase *the film* is not bound by the pronoun *it*, while in (30c) it is. Unacceptability arises in (30c) because Principle C of the Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) is violated. Arnold claims that, because the same judgements hold of the ARC constructions in (31), ARCs must share a syntactic connexion with their hosts.

This is a false analogy, as the same distribution of acceptability observed in (30) is observed across sentences, as shown in (32) below. If utterances that contain ARCs are the intertwined variants of the examples below, as advocates of orphanage maintain, then the judgements observed in (31) are expected.
Alternative analyses

(32) a. My parents saw [the film]. They were deeply affected by it.
    b. My parents saw it. They were deeply affected by [the film].
    c. * It, deeply affected my parents. They saw [the film].

Five: The final argument provides false evidence for orphanage. Burton-Roberts (1999) and Lassiter (2011) discuss relatifs de liaison, which are ARCs that are uttered by speaker B to ‘supplement’ speaker A’s utterance (to use Arnold’s 2007 term). Burton-Roberts claims that the existence of relatifs de liaison is evidence that ARCs are orphans.

(33) A: Frank bought a Porsche yesterday.
    B: Which is an expensive car.

Unless reasons are advanced for why phrases that can be uttered in isolation are not syntactically integrated when observed in environments in which they are not uttered in isolation, this argument is baseless. Note that if the argument is somehow substantiated, it must apply to other phrases that act like relatifs de liaison, such as restrictive relatives and verb phrase adjuncts:

(34) a. A: There are no problems with my car.
    B: That you know of!

    b. [context: speaker A & B are relaying an anecdote to speaker C]
    A: John was on the roof.
    B: With a hammer!
    B’: Waving a hammer around!

To summarise: by demonstrating that the majority of arguments against the orphanage approach are invalid, I have in this subsection (§6.2.2) emphasised that the decision to adopt the Force phrase or orphanage analysis of attributions and ARCs is based largely upon theory-internal considerations. Adherents to the organisation of grammar as currently conceived by Minimalism and Distributed Morphology will find the Force phrase approach to attributions and ARCs more plausible, while those that support the notion that morphophonological rules apply to SUs that await articulation (i.e. E-language tokens of I-language SUs) will find the
orphanage approach more plausible. As discussed in §6.2.1, however, a
decisive reason to favour the Force phrase approach is that it readily
accounts for why attributions/ARCs and their hosts cannot be interlaced,
while this observation must be attributed to a stipulative ban on secondary
linearisation on the orphanage approach.

6.3 The par-MERGE approach

The par-MERGE approach to parenthesis captures the syntactic and semantic
opacity exhibited by parentheticals by adding a unique syntactic
concatenation operation to the grammar, which is called par-MERGE in De Vries (2012).69

On the par-MERGE approach, all parentheticals are complements of a
functional head called Par⁰. The concatenation of parentheticals and Par⁰ is
not performed by regular MERGE (Chomsky 1995), but by par-MERGE. Par-
MERGE is permitted only when one of its inputs is Par⁰. Unlike with regular
MERGE, the output of par-MERGE does not dominate its input. Resultantly,
the syntactic – and hence compositional semantic – opacity of parentheticals
is obtained because neither the output of par-MERGE, nor any node that
dominate it, dominates the parenthetical.

De Vries (2007) suggests that Par⁰ comes in two variants, bivalent and
monovalent. Bivalent Par⁰ is treated as a coordinator. As such, the maximal
projection of bivalent Par⁰ is a coordination phrase whose second conjunct is
undominated (35a), assuming that coordination is best represented by an X’-
schema (Johannessen 1998). The output of par-merger of monovalent Par⁰
and its parenthetical complement is ParP, which freely adjoins to its host
(35b).

69 The par-MERGE approach to parenthesis was initiated by De Vries (2002) and adopted and
Alternative analyses

(35) a. …

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{WP}_{\text{HOST}} \\
\text{ParP} \\
\text{XP}_{\text{ANCHOR}} \\
\text{Par}^0 \\
\text{ZP}_{\text{PARENTHETICAL}}
\end{array}
\]

b. …

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{WP}_{\text{HOST}} \\
\text{ParP} \\
\text{YP}_{\text{HOST}} \\
\text{XP}_{\text{ANCHOR}} \\
\text{Par}^0 \\
\text{ZP}_{\text{PARENTHETICAL}}
\end{array}
\]

(where \( \cdots \) represents \textit{par}-Merge)

Because they do not display syntactic and semantic opacity (as I illustrated in detail in chapter two), neither of the schemata in (35) are suitable for appositions. The bivalent schema in (35a) is also unsuitable for attributions and ARCs. Under the assumption that both attributions and ARCs are (derived from) parenthetical clauses, adoption of the schema in (35a) demands that coordination with \( \text{Par}^0 \) can be semantically imbalanced (as (36) shows), something that certain adopters of the schema in (35a) permit (Heringa 2011, Kluck 2011) but others do not (De Vries 2002: 240).

(36) a. \([\text{ParP} [e \text{ John.}], \text{Par}^0 [\text{, (he’s) my boss,}]]) \ldots

b. \([\text{ParP} [e \text{ John.}], \text{Par}^0 [\text{, who’s my boss,}]]) \ldots

As a coordination structure, the adoption of the ‘bivalent \( \text{Par}^0 \)’ schema in (35a) for attributions and ARCs also gives rise to the prediction that attributions must maintain linearly adjacency with their anchors. This prediction is not borne out, as the Turkish data from chapter three (repeated below) demonstrates.

(37) \textbf{Ali Bey} Mine-yi, ki evli bir adam, taciz et-ti.

\textit{Ali Mr. Mine-ACC LINK married a man harassment make-PST}

‘\textbf{Mr. Ali, a married man, harassed Mine.’}

Lastly, adoption of the schema in (35a) for attributions and ARCs gives rise to the prediction that extraction from ParP, like extraction from other coordination phrases, must occur ‘across the board’. This prediction is not borne out either, as the examples in (38), which are repeated from §3.5.1. and §4.2 respectively, demonstrate. In these examples, licit extraction from
the anchor but not the attribution/ARC takes place. This suggests that
attributions and ARCs are not coordinated with their anchors. If they were,
the coordinate structure constraint (Ross 1967), which enforces ‘across the
board’ extraction in coordination phrases, would render the examples in (38)
unacceptable.

(38) a. It’s [the Labour party] that Miliband is leader of t, a difficult
job by anyone’s standards.

b. It’s England that we hate the roads of t, which are full of
potholes.

Let us now turn to the monovalent variant of par-merge that is represented
in (35b). Aside from the mechanism used to capture their syntactic and
semantic isolation, the Force phrase and the ‘monovalent Par°’ (i.e. 35b)
approach to attributions and ARCs make identical empirical predictions.
This is because both theories treat attributions and ARCs as clausal adjuncts
that display opacity and can adjoin anywhere within their host clause.

This being the case, any comparison made between the Force phrase and
monovalent Par° approaches to attributions and ARCs must focus upon their
conceptual differences. Which confers more parsimony – the use of Force
predicates like assert to ensure opacity, or the use of the concatenation
mechanism par-merge?

The use of neither is ad hoc, as both Force phrases and par-merge are
invoked to capture the behaviour of phenomena unrelated to parenthesis.
Thus, neither account can be favoured on the grounds of extensibility. That
par-merge has, to my knowledge, one additional use (in regular
coordination environments, see De Vries 2003) while Force phrases have
many (see Krifka 2014 for an overview) is irrelevant.

The reason why I think that the use of Force predicates confers greater
theoretical elegance than the use of par-merge concerns the theoretical
viability of par-merge. Recall that, when par-merge applies, the output of
par-merge does not dominate its input. This differs from regular merge,
where the output of merge also dominates its input. Thus, the possibility
that par-merge can exist as a concatenation operation rests upon the
assumption that output and domination are two distinct notions. To my
mind, this distinction seems redundant. In terms of derivational syntax, the
most parsimonious view to uphold is that ‘dominates’ is merely a synonym for ‘is the output of’ (this view can be traced back as least as far as Epstein 1998). In other words, “Z dominates X and Y” means “Z is the output of X and Y’s merger”. If domination is dissociated from output, then it becomes difficult to ascertain what hierarchical relationship domination intends to describe, and how domination is established in the first place. Furthermore, this dissociation of domination and output requires one to provide an extraneous reason for why dominance is established when regular MERGE applies. If domination is equated with output however, then par-MERGE cannot exist, as it is nonsensical to claim that a syntactic concatenation operation can have an output that does not dominate its input.

The theoretical viability of force predicates like ASSERT and DEMAND cannot be brought into question in the same manner, as the relativisation of variables to particular operators is a routine occurrence (e.g. Relativised Minimality, Rizzi 1990).

To summarise: in this section (§6.3), I outlined and critiqued the par-MERGE approach to parenthesis, which maintains that a sui generis syntactic concatenation operation creates the syntactic and semantic opacity displayed by parentheticals. I showed that the ‘bivalent Par^0’ approach to attributions and ARCs, which treats them as coordinated with their anchors, fails to capture a number of properties that these appositives display. The ‘monovalent Par^0’ approach, on the other hand, provides equal empirical coverage as the Force phrase approach advocated in chapters three and four. Consequently, whether to use Force predicates or par-MERGE to explain parentheticals’ opacity becomes a conceptual choice. I suggested that the use of Force predicates confers greater theoretical parsimony, as the existence of par-MERGE rests upon questionable assumptions about notion of syntactic dominance.

6.4 Concluding remarks on alternative analyses

In this chapter, I compared the analyses of appositives outlined in chapters two, three, and four to its most serious competitors; the bidimensional semantic approach of Potts (2005), the orphanage approach, and the par-MERGE approach of De Vries (2002 et seq.). Because the ‘true’ appositions from chapter two are not ‘parenthetical’ in any relevant sense (as I conclude
in that chapter), none of these alternative analyses can account for their
distribution, as each incorrectly assumes that they display the syntactic and
semantic opacity that is observed in ‘proper’ parentheticals, such as
attributions and ARCs. Except for the bidimensional semantic approach,
whose account of attributions and ARCs is flawed in a number of respects,
the alternative analyses I have discussed provide equal empirical coverage of
attributions and ARCs as the ‘Force phrase’ analysis I advanced in chapters
three and four. This is because all of these analyses treat attributions and
ARCs as (derived from) parenthetical clauses. The difference between the
Force phrase, orphanage, and par-merge analyses concerns how they
capture the syntactic and semantic opacity that is displayed by attributions
and ARCs, and these differences cannot be easily tested from an empirical
standpoint. Consequently, I examined theory-internal reasons for favouring
one analysis over another. I concluded that the orphanage approach is
disfavoured because it requires a drastic reorganisation of the order of
grammatical operations, while the par-merge approach is disfavoured
because the feasibility of the concatenation operation ‘par-merge’ rests upon
questionable assumptions about what syntactic domination is. Resultantly,
the Force phrase analysis, which does not require the grammar to be
reorganised and is not founded upon questionable assumptions, comes out
as the favoured analyses of attributions and ARCs.
Conclusion

This study of appositives in English and Turkish has revolved around two syntactic schemata, (low) coordination and Force phrasal adjunction. I employed these schemata as definientia that bifurcate appositives. I claimed that appositives that match the coordination schema are appositions, while those that match the Force phrase adjunction schema are ‘elsewhere’ cases.

From a historical perspective, my syntactic definition of appositions incorporates a number of definientia proffered in the literature. Hockett (1955) demands that appositions be endocentric (in a Structuralist sense), while Quirk et al. (1972) say that “two units in apposition are constituents of the same [syntactic – J.G.] level”. Burton-Roberts (1975) adds that appositions must display the same semantic function as their anchors. Because coordination is endocentric (insofar as the coordination phrase fulfils the same function as its conjuncts), semantically balanced, and flat (in terms of feature percolation), these three definientia are straightforwardly captured by my claim that appositions are defined by the coordinative relationship that they share with their anchors.

Regular coordination is distinguished from appositional coordination by synonymy (and exemplification, which I set aside hereafter). Conjuncts denote distinct signifié in regular coordination but the same signifié in appositional coordination. Synonymy is another defining characteristic of apposition for Hockett (1955) and Burton-Roberts (1975). However, for Burton-Roberts (1975:392), the fact that synonymy pertains in appositional constructions indicates that appositions and their anchors are not conjoined, as the conjunction of synonymous elements is “logically incompatible” with coordination. This remark is heeded by Cardoso & De Vries (2010) and Heringa (2011), who invoke a bespoke specificational (Koster 2000) form of coordination for appositional constructions to ensure that regular and appositional coordination are treated as distinct. In this thesis, I rejected
Burton-Robert’s remark and I denied that the discrepancy in patterns of synonymy – namely, appositions and their anchors are synonymous while regular conjuncts are not – provides a priori justification for dismissing a coordination analysis of appositions. Because regular conjuncts and anchor/apposition combinations pattern identically in almost all respects except for those that pertain to their (non-)synonymy, I concluded in chapter two that apposition is a syntactic exaptation of coordination. The dissimilarly in interpretation that pertains between regular and appositional coordination is therefore created by pragmatic repair mechanisms.

As I discussed in chapter three, Force phrases are the syntactic representation of constructions that are used to commit illocutionary acts. Such constituents are semantically and syntactically opaque (Koev 2013). If they arise as optional modifiers (i.e. adjuncts), their position of attachment within their host clause is syntactically and semantically unconstrained. The two exemplars of Force phrasal adjuncts that I discussed in chapter three and chapter four were and-parentheticals (Kavalova 2007) and appositive relative clauses (ARCs). I claimed that copulative and-parentheticals (and perhaps, for English, some ARCs too) can be reduced down to their postcopular element to form attributions.

A number of complicating factors conspired to conceal the fact that my straightforward structural dichotomy between appositions (i.e. second conjuncts) and Force phrasal adjuncts sufficiently captures the data within its remit.

One such complicating factor was structural ambiguity. Many occasions arise on which appositive constructions are syntactically ambiguous. The sentence in (1) is an exemplar, which is ambiguous between an appositional and attributional derivation (compare the schemata in 2) when the context does not provide sufficient disambiguation.

(1) London, the capital of England, is a nice city.

(2) a. [&P [DP London,] [DP the capital of England,]] is a nice city.
   b. [DP [DP London,] [ForceP it is the capital of England,]] is a nice city.

Another complicating factor was the inexact correlation between function and syntactic form. As discussed in chapter one, my point of departure for
this thesis was the functional distinction between reformulative and attributive appositions, which I used to motivate my structural division between appositions and attributions. Simply put, the function distinction delimits appositive noun phrases that provide alternative descriptions of referents denoted by their anchors (these are reformulative, see 3a) from appositive noun phrases that predicate properties of their anchors (these are attributive, see 3b).

(3) a. The Big Apple, New York, is huge city. (reformulative)
b. The Big Apple, a magical place, is a huge city. (attributive)

This functional distinction correlates with my structural division between appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts on almost all occasions. For instance, the functional notion of attributive appositions correlates with my structural definition of attributions exactly, as the attributive function of these appositive noun phrases is caused by their structural position as postcopular items of predicational copulative Force phrasal adjuncts (see 2b). An exact correlation does not pertain between reformulative appositions and my structural definition of appositions, however. This is because an appositive noun phrase’s identificational function is not indicative of its structural role as the second conjunct in an appositional coordination phrase, as postcopular items of truncated cleft Force phrasal adjuncts can perform the same identificational function. More concretely, an example like (4), which performs a reformulative function, is structurally ambiguous between an apposition (see 5a) and an attribution (see 5b) for me.

(4) Someone, Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

(5) a. [\&P [DP Someone,] [DP Pete,]] keeps leaving the door open.
b. [DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it is Pete,]] keeps leaving the door open.

These complicating factors and others were surmounted with the aid of syntactic disambiguators. For instance, I used apposition markers like or and i.e. to uncover appositions (Burton-Roberts 1975) (see 6 and 7), and temporal adverbs like now and often to uncover attributions (Quirk et al. 1985) (see 8 and 9) in chapter two and chapter three.
(6) a. **London**, or the capital of England, is a nice city.
   b. **Someone**, i.e. Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

(7) For (6a) and (6b) respectively:
   a. \[ &P [DP London,] or [DP the capital of England,] \] is a nice city.
   b. \[ &P [DP Someone,] i.e. [DP Pete,] \] keeps leaving the door open.

(8) a. **London**, now the capital of England, is a nice city.
   b. **Someone**, often Pete, keeps leaving the door open.

(9) For (8a) and (8b) respectively:
   a. \[ DP [DP London,] [ForceP it is now the capital of England,] \] is a nice city.
   b. \[ DP [DP Someone,] [ForceP it is often Pete,] \] keeps leaving the door open.

Once these complicating factors (and others) were adequately controlled for, the fact that my dichotomy between appositions and Force phrasal adjuncts could capture the data within its remit was straightforwardly demonstrated with syntactic, semantic, (see chapter two, three, and four) and pragmatic (see chapter five) diagnostics.

With respect to pragmatics, I introduced in chapter five an informal model of the discourse and discussed the place of appositions, attributions, and appositive relative clauses within it. I showed that the structural division between appositional conjuncts and Force phrasal adjuncts is echoed in the discourse: Force phrasal adjuncts act identically to regular speech acts with respect to the discourse (as expected on the current approach), while subclausal appositional conjuncts act like regular subclausal constituents.

In this thesis I have only discussed in depth what Acuña-Fariña (1999, 2000) considers to the paradigmatic cases of appositives: appositions (to use this term informally) and appositive relative clauses. As such, the extent to which my syntactic bifurcation of appositives is suitable for the outlier cases of appositives remains to be investigated. Such outlier cases include corrections (10), which look similar to appositions (Blakemore 2007), exclamative epithets (11), which look similar to Force phrasal adjuncts.
(Güneş 2015), and ‘reduced’ prepositional phrases (12) and floating infinitival clauses (13), which look like regular adjuncts and hence should be excluded from the class of ‘appositive’ constructions proper (if my bifurcation is adopted, of course).

(10) John listed the sound effects, or rather the gadgets for making sound effects, that we had in stock. (modified from Meyer 1987:104)

(11) Frank, has, the lucky bastard, won the lottery.

(12) a. (As) a tall guy, Harry always has an unobstructed view at gigs.
    b. (With) lunch finished, the delegates resumed their talks.

(13) a. Being an Englishman, Brendan is good at cricket.
    b. The monarch having finally arrived, the feast began.

These outlier cases aside, the main message I have endeavoured to communicate in this thesis is that, provided extraneous factors are controlled for, analyses that employ conservative syntactic structures such as coordination and adjunction can capture the vast majority of peculiar properties that appositives exhibit.


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Samenvatting in het Nederlands

In traditionele grammatica’s wordt de term appositie (of bijstelling) gebruikt om een concept van familiegelijkenis weer te geven, waarbij er een prototype is, zoals geïllustreerd in (1) (Matthews 1981:236). In (1) is Brugge een uitbreidende appositie bij Bruges.

(1) **Bruges, Brugge**, is een prachtige stad.

Voor generatief-taalkundigen ligt er een taak in het geven van een formele definitie voor de term appositie, die, hoewel hij niet exact kan overeenkomen met het informele concept van de familiegelijkenis, toch intuitief en ook empirisch en theoretisch gerechtvaardigd moet zijn. Ik streef ernaar om hier een dergelijke definitie te geven. De focus van dit proefschrift ligt dus bij apposities en verwante constructies, die ik samen appositieven (Eng. appositives) noem.

In pogingen om de term appositie te definiëren is het functionele onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities invloedrijk geweest. Herformulerende apposities bieden extra en vaak meer informatieve namen voor hun ankers, zoals in (1), terwijl attributieve apposities eigenschappen toewijzen; zie (2):

(2) **Brugge, een populaire vakantiebestemming**, is een prachtige stad.

Recente analyses hebben gesteld dat het functionele onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities ook een indicatie is voor syntactische verschillen tussen deze twee apposities. McCawley (1998) en Cardoso & De Vries (2010) stellen dat herformulerende apposities een transparante syntaxis hebben waarin geen structuur aanwezig is behalve de zichtbare appositie, maar dat attributieve apposities zijn afgeleid uit appositieve relatiefzinnen. Met andere woorden, ze beargumenteren dat Brugge in (1) slechts een referentieel naamwoord is, maar dat een populaire
vakantiebestemming in (2) een predicaatnomen is dat onderdeel is van een appositieve relatiefzinn. In deze analyses blijven het koppelwerkwoord en het relative voornaamwoord van de appositieve relatiefzinn onuitgesproken (zie 3, waar het onuitgesproken materiaal tussen haakjes staat).

(3) **Brugge, <dat> een populaire vakantiebestemming <is>, is een prachtige stad.**

Andere analyses geven deze vermeende syntactische verschillen op andere manieren weer. Heringa (2011) stelt bijvoorbeeld dat herformulerende apposities onderdeel zijn van beknopte zinnen waarvan het onderwerp verplicht onuitgesproken blijft (4a), terwijl attributieve apposities van onderliggende parenthetische finiete zinnen met een koppelwerkwoord worden afgeleid (4b).

(4) a. **Bruges, <het> Brugge, is een prachtige stad.**  
   b. **Brugge, <het is> een populaire vakantiebestemming, is een prachtige stad.**

Hiertegenover stellen Döring (2014) en Ott (2014a, b) dat zowel herformulerende als attributieve apposities afgeleid zijn van onderliggende parenthetische finiete zinnen en dat de verschillen tussen deze twee groepen apposities kunnen worden toegeschreven aan hun positie binnen de onderliggende zin: herformulerende apposities en hun ankers hebben beide dezelfde basispositie in hun respectievelijke zinnen (zie 5), terwijl attributieve apposities hun basispositie hebben na het koppelwerkwoord in een finiete parenthetische copula-zin (zie 4b).

(5) **Bruges, Brugge <is een prachtige stad>, is een prachtige stad.**

hebben beide soorten apposities een speciaal soort ‘parenthetische coördinatie’-relatie met hun ankers. (Om het eenvoudig te houden, heb ik deze relatie in de voorbeelden 6 en 7 als &P gepresenteerd en is de parenthetische coördinator weggelaten.) Voor Döring (2014) en Ott (2014a, b) zijn de onderliggende parenthetische zinnen waarin herformulerende en attributieve apposities staan syntactisch gezien niet verbonden met hun gastzin. In plaats daarvan zijn deze zinnen zogenaamde weeszinnen, die door middel van niet-syntactische middelen verbonden zijn met de gastzin.

(6)   Cardoso & De Vries (2010)
   a. &P [Bruges,][Brugge,] is een prachtige stad.
   b. &P [Brugge,][<dat> een populaire vakantiebestemming <is>,] is een prachtige stad.

(7)   Heringa (2011)
   a. &P [Bruges,][<het> Brugge,] is een prachtige stad.
   b. &P [Brugge,][<het is> een populaire vakantiebestemming,] is een prachtige stad.

Ik zal in mijn zoektocht naar een geschikte definitie voor het begrip appositie ook aannemen dat het functionele onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities een indicatie is van syntactische variatie. Echter, in tegenstelling tot de hierboven besproken analyses, zal ik aantonen dat er verschillen zijn in de interne en de externe syntaxis van herformulerende en attributieve apposities. Met andere woorden, ik laat zien dat deze twee soorten apposities noch hun interne, noch hun externe syntaxis gemeen hebben.

In het geval van de herformulerende apposities zal ik syntactische en semantische diagnostiek gebruiken om te laten zien dat ze op syntactische wijze aan hun ankers gecoördineerd zijn. De coördinatie (of nevenschikking) die ik voorstel is niet de speciale soort parenthetische coördinatie van Cardoso & De Vries (2010) en Heringa (2011), maar het is reguliere coördinatie van het type dat gebruikt wordt om naamwoorden in een zin, zoals Jaap en Joop sliepen, te coördineren. Hoewel eerdere analyses terughoudend waren om het idee te accepteren dat herformulerende apposities gebruik maken van reguliere coördinatie (voor relevante
opmerkingen over dit onderwerp, zie Burton-Roberts 1975), zal ik aantonen dat herformulerende apposities alle syntactische kenmerken van reguliere coördinatie vertonen. Ik stel dus voor dat herformulerende appositie een syntactische *exaptatie* van coördinatie is, en dat het pragmatische factoren zijn die zorgen voor de prosodische en betekenis-gerelateerde verschillen tussen reguliere en appositionele coördinatie.

In het geval van attributieve apposities gebruik ik syntactische en semantische diagnostiek om aan te tonen dat Heringa (2011) en anderen gelijk hebben met hun stelling dat attributieve apposities elementen zijn die na het koppelwerkwoord staan in parenthetische finiete zinnen waarin al het andere materiaal onuitgesproken is (zie 4b). In het bijzonder stel ik dat deze zinnen met koppelwerkwoord zogenaamde *Force phrases* zijn (Rizzi 1997). Dit zijn syntactische eenheden die gebruikt worden om taaldaden uit te drukken. Met betrekking tot hun externe syntaxis, beargumenteer ik dat deze parenthetische zinnen aanhechten aan een maximale syntactische projectie binnen hun gastzin (zie 8).

\[ 8 \quad [\text{DP } \text{Brugge},] \quad [\text{ForceP } <\text{het is}> \quad \text{een populaire vakantiebestemming},\text{]} \text{ is een prachtige stad}. \]

Ik beweer dat de status van onafhankelijke Force phrases ervoor zorgt dat deze parenthetische zinnen opaak zijn: syntactische of compositioneel-semantische relaties kunnen niet worden gelegd over de grens heen tussen een parenthetische zin en zijn gastzin (hoe het kenmerk Force zorgt voor opaciteit wordt in meer detail uitgelegd in §3.2). Door dit kenmerk is adjunctie van een parenthese binnen de gastzin vrij van syntactische of compositioneel-semantische beperkingen. Alle restricties die van toepassing zijn op de keuze aan welke maximale syntactische projectie ze kunnen aanhechten, zijn afkomstig van externe factoren, die of prosodisch of pragmatisch van aard zijn, of betrekking hebben op restricties op ten aanzien van onuitgesproken taalkundig materiaal.

Echter, dit is nog niet het hele verhaal. Ik beargumenteer dat, hoewel het functionele verschil tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities informatief is, het niet één op één overeenkomt met het eerder genoemde syntactische verschil tussen appositionele coördinatie en Force phrase-
adjunctie. Er is namelijk één geval waar een conflict tussen functie en syntactische structuur ontstaat.

De bron van dit conflict ligt bij zinnen zoals die in (9). Vanuit een functioneel perspectief, is de relatie tussen het appositieve naamwoord en het anker er een van herformulering (althans in de meest voor de hand liggende lezing), aangezien Pieter een meer informatieve naam is voor de persoon aangeduid door de specifieke onbepaalde naamwoordgroep een gemaskerde man.

(9) *Een gemaskerde man, Pieter, danste met Marjolijn.*

Ik laat zien dat in bepaalde situaties referentiële appositieve naamwoorden zoals Pieter in (9) elementen zijn die na het koppelwerkwoord staan in Force phrase-adjuncten die onderliggende ‘beknopte cleft-constructies’ zijn (Mikkelsen 2005), zoals in (10). Het conflict ligt hierin: hoewel ze hun ankers herformuleren, laten deze referentiële appositieve naamwoorden soms de syntactische kenmerken van de Force phrase-analyse zien die met attributieve appositie wordt geassocieerd.

(10) *[DP [DP *Een gemaskerde man,*] [ForceP <het was> Pieter,]] danste met Marjolijn.*

Om dit conflict op te lossen, neem ik afstand van het idee dat het functionele onderscheid tussen herformulerende en attributieve apposities van ontologische betekenis is voor de formele karakterisering van *apposities* (hoewel ik niet ontken dat dit functionele onderscheid gebruikt kan worden als geschikte leidraad). In plaats daarvan beweer ik dat *apposities* gedefinieerd moet worden enkel aan de hand van syntactische schemata.

Zo zijn we teruggedrongen bij het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift, namelijk het definiëren van de term *apposities*. Ik beweer dat apposition best gedefinieerd kan worden met betrekking tot *appositionele coördinatie*. Dat wil zeggen, ik stel dat ‘echte’ appositionen verbonden zijn met hun ankers en dat reguliere en appositionele coördinatie alleen verschillen in zoverre dat reguliere conjuncties verschillende referenten of concepten aanduiden (zie 11a), terwijl appositionele conjuncties dezelfde referenten of concepten aanduiden (zie 11b).
Deze definitie van appositie wordt gegeven in (12).

(12) *Definitie van appositie*

Wanneer a het eerste lid van een coördinatie is en b het niet-eerste lid geldt:

Als b dezelfde referent of hetzelfde concept als a aanduidt, of een sub- of superset daarvan, dan is b een appositie.

De definitie van *appositie* in (12) houdt in dat de ‘attributieve apposities’ die hierboven besproken zijn uiteindelijk geen ware apposities blijken te zijn. In plaats daarvan vormen ze een subgroep van een klasse van Force phrase-adjuncten waarvan ik beweer dat die diverse parenthetische structuren omvat, zoals *and-parentheticals* (Kavalova 2007, zie 13a), *exclamative epitheta* (13b), *vocatieven* (13c), en andere. (Ik beweer in hoofdstuk drie dan ook dat ‘attributieve apposities’ eigenlijk zijn afgeleid van *copular clausal and-parentheticals*.)

Het gebruik van een bepaald syntactisch schema om *appositie* te definiëren heeft directe terminologische en taxonomische gevolgen. Met betrekking tot de terminologie is het verwarring bijstellingen zoals geïllustreerd in (2) als ‘attributieve apposities’ te blijven aanduiden, omdat mijn definitie in (12) ontkent dat deze een appositionele status hebben. Nieuwe terminologie is dus vereist. Vanaf nu zal ik *herformulerende apposities* gewoon *apposities* noemen, zoals Burton-Roberts (1975) en McCawley (1998) deze term ook gebruiken. Om een verbinding met voorgaande literatuur te houden, zal ik vanaf nu *attributieve apposities* gewoon *attributies* noemen. Om deze eigenschap-toeschrijvende functie te benoemen, zal ik vanaf nu de term
attributieve functie gebruiken. Verder gebruik ik de (Engelse) notie appositive als een overkoepelende term voor apposities en attributies.

Met betrekking tot de taxonomische gevolgen zien we dat het definiëren van apposities met behulp van een coördinatieschema identiek aan dat van reguliere coördinatie leidt tot nieuwe argumenten tegen het opnemen van apposities in classificerend onderzoek naar parenthetische constructies zoals dat van Dehé & Kavalova (2007). Deze tegenargumenten ontstaan omdat met mijn analyse apposities op geen enkele theoretisch relevante manier parenthetisch zijn, tenzij men het tweede lid van een reguliere coördinatie constructie ook wil classificeren als parenthetisch.

Na de introductie van apposities in hoofdstuk één, ziet het proefschrift er als volgt uit.

**Hoofdstuk 2:** In §2.1 verdedig ik de stelling dat subclausale apposities met hun ankers worden gecoördineerd. Ik breid deze analyse uit naar clausale apposities in §2.2.1 en bespreek hoe ellipsis daarop kan inwerken in §2.2.2. In §2.2.3 bespreek ik het idee om de ‘biclausale’ analyse uit de literatuur toe te passen op subclausale apposities en concludeer dat dit niet haalbaar is. §2.2.5 en §2.2.6 zijn gewijd aan miscellanea die betrekking hebben op apposities: §2.2.5 gaat verder met de discussie uit §2.1 over het onderscheiden van apposities en attributies, terwijl §2.2.6 over de pragmatiek van apposities en soortgelijke constructies gaat.

**Hoofdstuk 3:** De focus van dit hoofdstuk ligt bij finiete parenthetische copular-zinnen (een subset van and-parentheticals) waarin alleen de woordgroep na het koppelwerkwoord wordt uitgesproken. Ik noem deze gereduceerde parenthetische zinnen attributies. In §3.1 introduceer ik deze attributies en ik benadruk het feit dat ze wel of niet referentieel kunnen zijn omdat ze twee mogelijke bronnen hebben, namelijk predicatieve zinnen zoals ‘(Joop is) een goede vader’ en beknopte cleft-zinnen zoals ‘(Het was) Pieter’. In §3.2 schets ik mijn syntactische analyse van attributies, die inhoudt dat ze hun bronzinnen als Force phrases behandelen die vrijelijk aan een gastzin kunnen hechten, en die uitlegt op welke manier de functionele elementen (d.w.z. onderwerp, hulpwerkwoorden, koppelwerkwoorden) in deze woordgroepen de status van onuitgesproken element krijgen. In §3.3 bespreek ik manieren waarop attributies kunnen worden onderscheiden van andere appositives die er op het eerste gezicht hetzelfde uitzien. In §3.4-3.5 geef ik verder bewijs voor de analyse van attributies zoals geschetst in §3.2.
**Hoofdstuk 4:** In dit hoofdstuk streef ik ernaar appositieve relatiefzinnen (in het Engels *appositive relative clauses*, ARCs) een plaats te geven binnen de theorie van appositives die ik in de hoofdstukken twee en drie heb ontwikkeld. Modificeren ARC’s lege nominale apposities of lege nominale attributies, of zijn het onafhankelijk parenthetische Force phrase adjuncten? In §4.1 introduceer ik appositionele en attributionele relatiefzinnen – reguliere beperkende relatiefzinnen die voorkomen in parenthetische omgevingen – en geef ik een syntactische analyse voor deze zinnen die fungeert als formele achtergrond voor latere paragrafen. Om te testen of ARC’s inderdaad beperkende relatiefzinnen zijn die voorkomen in parenthetische omgevingen, probeer ik in §4.2 en §4.3 te ontdekken of ARC’s lege apposities (§4.2) of lege attributies (§4.3) modificeren. Omdat ARC’s een andere distributie hebben dan zowel appositionele als attributionele relatiefzinnen, concludeer ik dat ARC’s noch lege apposities noch lege attributies modificeren. Dit betekent dat ARC’s onafhankelijke parenthetische zinnen zijn. Deze theorie werk ik verder uit in §4.4.

**Hoofdstuk 5:** In dit hoofdstuk breid ik de analyse die in de hoofdstukken 2 tot 4 werd ontwikkeld uit naar het domein van de pragmatiek. In §5.1 schets ik een op maat gemaakt model van conversatie dat als platform fungeert voor het onderzoeken van de pragmatische betekenis van apposities en Force phrase-adjuncten. In §5.2 laat ik zien dat de distributie van uitingen die attributies en ARC’s bevatten nagenoeg identiek is aan de pragmatische distributie van *monologen*. In §5.3 toon ik aan dat de syntactische analyse van apposities die in hoofdstuk twee werd geïntroduceerd de pragmatische betekenis van apposities correct voorspelt. In §5.4 bespreek ik twee alternatieve analyses van de pragmatische betekenis van apposities en ik toon aan dat de analyse die in §5.1 en §5.2 werd ontwikkeld eenvoudig en beter is dan deze alternatieven.

**Hoofdstuk 6:** In dit hoofdstuk geef ik kritiek op drie alternatieve analyses van appositives. Dit zijn de zogenaamde *tweedimensionale semantische* analyse (§6.1), de *weeszinnen*-analyse (§6.2) en de *par-MERGE*-analyse (§6.3).

**Hoofdstuk 7** bevat de conclusie van dit proefschrift.
Biography

James Griffiths received his BA (Hons) in Linguistics and Philosophy from the University of Sheffield in 2008. He received his MA (cum laude) in Linguistics from Universiteit Leiden in 2010. He became a PhD researcher in Linguistics at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in 2011. From January 2013 to June 2013 James was a Junior Specialist in Linguistics at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
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