Qualifying Standpoints

Stance adverbs as a presentational device for managing the burden of proof

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To the enduring memory of my grandmother Eleni (1896-1981)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... **xi**

LIST OF TABLES ..... **xiii**

INTRODUCTION **1**

Qualified utterances and qualified standpoints 1
Theoretical perspective 4
Aim of the study 9
Research questions 11
Methodological considerations 11
Outline of the study 13

PART I QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT **17**

CHAPTER 1 DESIGNING A STANDPOINT BY QUALIFYING **19**

1.1 Introduction 19
1.2 Designing a standpoint 20
1.3 Qualification defined 25
1.3.1 Qualifying as adding an extra element 25
1.3.2 Qualifying as adding extra meaning 27
1.3.3 Qualification as a presentational device for designing a standpoint 28
1.4 Ways of qualifying a standpoint 31
1.4.1 Adding a comment about the content 34
1.4.1.1 Comment conveying commitment to the propositional content 34
1.4.1.2 Comment conveying evaluation of the propositional content 37
1.4.2 Adding a comment about the act 39
1.5 Concluding remarks 41

CHAPTER 2 STANCE ADVERBS QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT **43**

2.1 Introduction 43
2.2 Sentence adverbs and stance adverbs 44
2.3 Stance adverbs and the three ways of qualifying a standpoint 49
2.3.1 Stance adverbs commenting on the commitment to the propositional content 51
2.3.1.1 Modal, evidential and domain adverbs 51
2.3.1.2 Emphasising the quality of the evidence 54
2.3.2 Stance adverbs commenting on the evaluation of the propositional content 60
2.3.2.1 Evaluative adverbs 61
2.3.2.2 Emphasising shared evaluation 63
2.3.3 Stance adverbs commenting on the performance of the act 68

2.3.3.1 Illocutionary adverbs and expectation markers 68
2.3.3.2 Emphasising cooperativeness 72
2.4 Concluding remarks 76

PART II MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 79

CHAPTER 3 A PROCEDURAL VIEW OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF 81
3.1 Introduction 81
3.2 A liaison between advancing a standpoint and forwarding argumentation 81
3.3 The procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof 84
3.3.1 Acquiring the burden of proof 88
3.3.2 Assuming the burden of proof 92
3.3.3 Meeting the burden of proof 94
3.3.4 Acquitting oneself of the burden of proof 99
3.4 The interactional dimension in the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof 102
3.5 Concluding remarks 104

CHAPTER 4 BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE STRATEGIC GOAL OF DESIGNING A STANDPOINT 105
4.1 Introduction 105
4.2 Seeking a successful discharge of the burden of proof 106
4.3 Conditions for a successful discharge of the burden of proof 108
4.3.1 Conclusive argumentation 109
4.3.2 Expedient starting points 112
4.4 The management of the burden of proof 114
4.5 Three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof 117
4.6 Concluding remarks 121

PART III QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT AND MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 123

CHAPTER 5 USING QUALIFICATION TO MANAGE THE BURDEN OF PROOF 125
5.1 Introduction 125
5.2 Qualification of a standpoint and the progress of an argumentative discussion 126
5.2.1 Confronting the antagonist with a choice 127
5.2.2 The strategic function of qualification 130
5.3 Constructive use of the strategic function of qualification 134
5.3.1 Signalling agreement regarding the quality of the evidence 134
5.3.2 Signalling agreement regarding evaluation 139
5.3.3 Signalling agreement regarding cooperativeness 143
5.4 Concluding remarks 146

CHAPTER 6 ABUSING QUALIFICATION WHEN MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 149
6.1 Introduction 149
6.2 Derailment of the management of the burden of proof 150
6.2.1 What derails? 150
6.2.2 Which rule is violated? 151
6.2.3 What is the role of qualification? 154
6.3 Abuse of the strategic function of qualification 155
6.4 Discussion of examples 159
6.4.1 Abusing endorsement regarding the quality of the evidence 159
6.4.2 Abusing endorsement regarding shared evaluation 163
6.4.3 Abusing endorsement regarding cooperativeness 166
6.5 Concluding remarks 169

CONCLUSION 171

Main findings 171
Theoretical and practical implications 178
Further research 181

APPENDIX 185

LIST OF REFERENCES 189

INDEX OF ADVERBS, NAMES & TERMS 199

SUMMARY 205

SAMENVATTING 211

CURRICULUM VITAE 217

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1
STANCE ADVERBIALS (Biber et al., 1999) 48

TABLE 2
STANCE ADVERBS FOR QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT 50

TABLE 3
THE PROCEDURE OF INCURRING AND DISCHARGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 87

TABLE 4
THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF 120

TABLE 5
CONSTRUCTIVE USE AND ABUSE OF THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION OF THE THREE WAYS OF QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT 158

INTRODUCTION

Qualified utterances and qualified standpoints

Language users may provide information in addition to the factual information that an utterance gives, by using words such as the ones italicised in the examples below, taken from the BNC corpus[1]:

(1) *Clearly*, a great variety of difficulty could be introduced into the tests.

(2) *Evidently*, there are many aspects to the question of integration.

(3) *Fortunately*, these sorts of incidents are not common.

(4) It was bloody exhausting, *frankly*.

(5) You ought to read about him, *honestly*.

(6) *Obviously*, some situations are much more serious and therefore more difficult to resolve than a dispute over an untidy room.

(7) *Perhaps*, it is not so much that police behaviour has deteriorated as that public expectations have risen.

(8) *Surely*, tearing up the Pope's picture was meant as a symbolic gesture, not a personal affront.

(9) *Technically speaking*, as long as nobody was hurt, no injuries, no damage to the other vehicle, this is not an accident.

(10) *Unfortunately*, the real world of cable commerce is far from perfect.

The highlighted words in the above examples are called stance adverbs (Biber et al., 1999).[2] Their presence adds information that is not crucial for the understanding of the core meaning of the utterance. They can be omitted without rendering the sentence ungrammatical or the utterance incomprehensible. They have been studied exclusively or in connection with other linguistic expressions from varying theoretical perspectives within the fields of semantics (Bartsch, 1979; Bellert, 1977), syntax (Ernst, 2002; Espinal, 1991), pragmatics (Schreiber, 1972; Wilson & Sperber, 1993), and discourse

[1] The British National Corpus (BNC) is a 100 million-word collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide cross-section of current British English. I have made use of the free access to it at: http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/, a website maintained by Mark Davies.

[2] Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989), Fraser (1996), and Greenbaum (1969), among others, have specifically focused on stance adverbs. Extensive treatment of this class of adverbs can be found in grammars by Biber et al. (1999), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Quirk et al. (1985). The classifications proposed in all these studies, however, do not overlap and the adverbs are studied under various labels such as 'disjuncts', 'adjuncts', and 'markers'.

analysis (Hoye, 1997; Stubbs, 1986). Their use in discourse has been related to such phenomena as 'hedging' (Hyland, 1998), 'mitigation' (Caffi, 1999; Fraser, 1980; Holmes, 1984; Sbisà, 2001), 'evidentiality' (Chafe, 1986; Rooryck 2001a, 2001b), 'evaluation' (Hunston & Thompson, 2000), and 'appraisal' (Martin & White, 2005). Within the framework of Relevance Theory, for example, Ifantidou (2001) has studied the semantic status of adverbs such as *certainly*, *evidently*, *frankly*, *unfortunately* and their contribution to the interpretation of utterance meaning within the framework of Relevance Theory. Brown and Levinson (1987) have studied some of these adverbs together with modal verbs and other hedging expressions as devices used for face saving strategies within their proposed theory of politeness. Scholars like Myers (1989) and Hyland (1998) have studied the use of such expressions as a strategy to negotiate the exchange of information between authors and readers in academic discourse.

Stance adverbs can be used to qualify an utterance that expresses a point of view supported by arguments, as the following examples, taken from the COBUILD corpus,[3] illustrate:

(11) *Clearly*, the figures in the text are incorrect, since they do not add up to 113, and the number of lunar months in the Saros cycle is in any case almost double that given by Ssu Ma Ch'ien.

(12) *Quite frankly*, council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department.

(13) *Obviously*, the Ryder Cup win is my personal highlight, especially since it was my final attempt at it as captain.

(14) *Technically*, valves are the worst way to do it [to amplify a guitar], because they are in essence microphonic.

(15) *Unfortunately*, because the Earth's climate mechanisms are so extremely complex, predictions of what could happen are very uncertain.

In the above cases, the argument in the subordinate clause (introduced by *since* or *because*) does not support the choice of the adverb that qualifies the main clause but the propositional content that is asserted in it. The adverb can be omitted without rendering the sentence ungrammatical or the argument incoherent. These cases can be contrasted with the fragments below, where the language user justifies the choice of the specific stance adverb:

[3] The Collins Wordbanks*Online* English corpus, originally known as COBUILD corpus, is composed of 56 million words of contemporary written and spoken text. I have made use of a sample of it that can be accessed freely online at:
http://www.collins.co.uk/Corpus/CorpusSearch.aspx.

(16) Saw the Black Dahlia a couple of days ago and I *honestly* liked it (*I say honestly* because for some reason critics seem not to like it much). I hadn't read the book (and now I have to) and at first I didn't really understand what was going on but once I stopped trying to figure out everything from the beginning and just went with the flow, it was great. [GOOGLE]

(17) I couldn't actually see the Stage Door as such, but *obviously* there was *someone* there. *I say obviously* because people were calling out 'hello' and so on, but I didn't make the analytical leap that if other people are saying 'hello' there was a chance I might want to. [COBUILD]

(18) But the real key to SGML's success -- both *politically* and *technically* -- is the fact that SGML is a bona fide International Standard, not the creation of a dominant vendor or a consortium. *I say 'politically'* because large users feel they can safely invest millions to convert to SGML because the SGML specification is stable and is maintained by a neutral organization. *I say 'technically'* because the concept of conformance to a standard is what makes SGML work. [GOOGLE]

(19) Prep courses: are they worth it? *Unfortunately*, for some students, the answer may be -yes. *We say 'unfortunately'*, because they're very costly. [GOOGLE]

In those cases where the stance adverb qualifies the utterance that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion (see examples 11-15, in the previous page), its presence can be said to have a *discourse effect*, even though it does not play a constitutive role in the core meaning of that sentence. Discourse scholars study such effects at the interpersonal or the textual level of discourse, without, however, specifying further the different functions that the discourse may have, for example to convince, explain, describe, and so forth. When the focus is on argumentative discourse in particular, the discourse effect of a stance adverb can be specified as playing a role in the progress of an argumentative discussion.

Within argumentation studies, so far, the study of such qualifiers as stance adverbs has largely been restricted to the concept of probability and epistemic modality. Argumentation scholars have focused on words such as *perhaps*, *probably* and *clearly*, known as epistemic modal adverbs, and have studied them in connection with other expressions of modality such as modal verbs (Benjamin, 1986; Ennis, 2006; Jason, 1988; Pinto, 2007; Rocci, 2007; Toulmin, 1958/2003). Nevertheless, equating the phenomenon of qualification of assertions with degrees of commitment to the truth restricts the account that can be provided for the impact that qualification has on argumentation in two ways. First, this perspective leaves out items such as *actually*, *fortunately*, and *frankly* that can also be said to qualify the utterance in which they appear,

without however affecting its truth conditions. Second, such an approach suggests that commitment to the truth is essential in an argumentative discussion; namely, that it is commitment to the truth that helps identify the argumentative function of a speech act that is used to put forward a standpoint, and that it is the commitment to truth that is being tested in the course of an argumentative discussion by means of adducing argumentation.

In this study, I adopt a view of argumentation as an activity, in which ordinary language users engage not primarily with the aim of discovering truth, but rather with the aim of resolving differences of opinion. The object of this study are utterances qualified by a stance adverb, by means of which language users express a point of view, henceforth referred to as *qualified standpoints*. The aim of studying qualified standpoints and the use of stance adverbs, in particular, is to provide an argumentatively focused account that can contribute to the assessment of the function that qualification has in the development of an argumentative discussion. Such an account will be of use to the analyst when analysing and evaluating argumentative discourse in which a qualified standpoint is put forward.

Theoretical perspective

To develop a systematic account of the phenomenon of qualification within argumentation studies a clear theoretical approach is needed. The theoretical framework within which I seek to study qualified standpoints is the pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis of argumentative discourse developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007b, 2007c). Pragma-dialectics proposes studying argumentation as it occurs in ordinary language, in everyday encounters or in institutional settings, in spoken or in written discourse. It acknowledges that argumentation has both a communicative and a rational aspect and therefore proposes an integration of descriptive and normative insights in the study of it. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) define argumentation thus:

> A verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint. (p.1)

The proposed approach is *pragmatic* because it studies argumentation by paying attention to the way language is used for argumentative purposes. The approach is *dialectical* because it studies the argumentative function of language use in terms of a procedural model that postulates the conditions that need to be fulfilled if the goal of dispute resolution is to be reached.

In order to be able to evaluate argumentation as it occurs in ordinary language, Pragma-dialectics assumes a dialectical perspective, which allows for

standards of reasonableness to be spelled out and to be used in assessing the quality of the procedure of testing the tenability of a standpoint. Pragma-dialectics assumes a critical rationalist stance when analysing argumentative discourse and proceeds to reconstruct the discourse according to the criteria and requirements of a dialectical model of discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007a). According to this view, "a systematic critical scrutiny of all fields of human thought and activity is the principle that serves as the starting point for the resolution of problems" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 131). For this purpose, an ideal model of a critical discussion is devised along the lines of dialectical models, notably Barth and Krabbe's (1982) formal dialectics, in order to provide a frame of reference for discussing the quality of argumentation, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004) explain. In van Eemeren and Houtlosser's words, the ideal model of a critical discussion represents

> what argumentative discourse would be like if it were optimally and solely aimed at methodically resolving a difference of opinion about the tenability of a standpoint. (2002a, p. 132)

The ideal model of a critical discussion is a theoretical construct developed within Pragma-dialectics, which serves as the lens through which argumentative reality is interpreted, analysed and eventually evaluated. This model is conceived of as a dialogue between two parties, a protagonist and an antagonist, which is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by means of critically testing the tenability of the standpoint advanced. The antagonist casts doubt on the standpoint and potentially on the arguments in support of it, while the protagonist forwards arguments in response to the antagonist's doubt. The various moves that the two parties make in order to arrive at a resolution of the dispute are analysed as speech acts. The model postulates the stages and the moves allowed in each stage. It is through these stages that an argumentative discussion should proceed if it is to be considered as a felicitous procedure for testing the tenability of a standpoint. The stages as well as the moves allowed per stage are determined and ordered by the ultimate goal that the two parties are assumed to pursue when engaging in an argumentative discussion, namely the resolution of the dispute that gave rise to the discussion in the first place.

In the *confrontation stage*, the difference of opinion is externalised and the positions that the two parties assume with respect to the disputed issue are identified. In the *opening stage*, the dialectical roles of protagonist and antagonist are allocated with respect to the position (or positions) advanced and starting points are agreed, on the basis of which the protagonist and the antagonist will perform their dialectical roles of supporting and attacking the standpoint respectively. In the *argumentation stage*, arguments in support of the standpoint and doubt against it are advanced by the protagonist and the antagonist respectively, drawing from the common starting points agreed upon in the

opening stage. In the *concluding stage*, it is assessed whether a resolution has been reached or not.[4]

In each stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion, rules apply which govern the achievement of the objectives of that stage. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) have proposed a list of rules for critical discussion, which constitute the necessary conditions for the resolution of a difference of opinion. Parties engaging in an argumentative discussion that have an interest in resolving their dispute by means of critically testing the standpoint(s) advanced are expected to observe these rules. The rules are formulated in such a way as to promote an optimal externalisation of the positions and criticisms advanced in the course of an argumentative discussion, thus providing optimal conditions to undergo the critical testing procedure. These rules are taken to be instrumental in the achievement of the goal of dispute resolution (problem validity) and to correspond to the norms of reasonableness of ordinary discussants (conventional validity).[5] It is with reference to these rules that the quality of argumentation is evaluated. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) remark:

> The evaluation process entails establishing whether the discussion has actually progressed along a route that may lead to the resolution of the difference of opinion. All discussion moves that are an obstacle to this goal must be recognized as such and unmasked as fallacious. (p. 95)

By conceiving of fallacies as the obstructive (infelicitous) result of the realisation of moves that are analytically relevant in the ideal model of a critical discussion, Pragma-dialectics proposes a comprehensive theoretical frame for the study of fallacies, within which both the moves that are constructive and the ones that are obstructive to the goal of dispute resolution are examined. The allocation of the rules to the various stages of the critical discussion creates a grid that helps to study the implications a fallacy may have for the progress of the discussion in the particular stage where it occurs and for the discussion as a whole. Moreover, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) note that the identification of fallacies is always conditional: "Only given a certain interpretation of the discourse, is it justified to maintain the allegation that a fallacy has occurred" (p. 105). That is why a well-established and thoroughly

---

[4] One should keep in mind at this point that the stages and their ordering do not describe what goes on in argumentative reality. It is often the case that in written argumentative discourse the other party is only implicitly present, if at all, and not all stages are explicit either. Similarly, in spoken argumentative discourse, the discussants may not go through all the stages named above and almost never in the order that the ideal model prescribes (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Moreover, it should be clear that the model represents a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the resolution of a difference of opinion.

[5] See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988, p. 280). See also van Eemeren (1987, p. 214, footnote 20).

justified analysis of the discourse is a prerequisite for the evaluation of that discourse.

Prior to the evaluation of argumentative discourse, an interpretation and analysis is required in order to reshape the text produced in the discourse "in a way that reveals the extent to which this specimen of argumentative reality, on closer inspection, corresponds with the ideal model" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 23). Reconstruction is needed because it helps extract only the information that is argumentatively relevant from the discourse: it externalises the commitments of the discussants, on the basis of which the evaluation of the discourse may proceed (van Eemeren et al., 1993). As van Rees (2001) puts it:

> Reconstruction is a theoretically motivated interpretation of argumentative discourse that seeks to identify and make explicit all those elements that are relevant to the theoretical perspective and for the theoretical purposes of the analyst. (pp. 165-166)

In order to reconstruct argumentative discourse (spoken or written) in terms of the ideal model of a critical discussion, Pragma-dialectics treats it as a dialogue (irrespective of whether it was originally a monologue or a dialogue) and attributes to the parties involved in it the joint goal of coordinating their moves in order to critically test the tenability of a standpoint.

In a series of articles, van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007c) argue that an integration of rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectical framework can benefit the analysis by providing a better understanding of argumentative reality. In the light of what is termed *strategic manoeuvring*,[6] Pragma-dialectics acknowledges that the parties, when fulfilling their respective roles and contributing their moves to the dispute resolution process, do not only observe the dialectical standards set by the procedural rules of the discussion but also try to make the best of what is allowed for each of them in the various stages of the discussion. In this view, parties do not only have a dialectical but also a rhetorical goal. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002a) remark:

> People engaged in argumentative discourse are characteristically oriented towards resolving a difference of opinion and may be regarded as committed to norms instrumental in achieving this purpose. … This does not mean, however, that these people are not interested in resolving the difference in their own favo[u]r. (p. 134)

[6] For the record, it is worth noting that the phrase 'strategic manoeuvring' appears for the first time in van Eemeren et al. (1993, p. 173) where it is used to describe in communication terms the balance that arguers seek to keep between their argumentative obligations and other objectives when entering into an argumentative discussion.

A consequence of this integrated view is that there is both a dialectical and a rhetorical goal that is attributed to the dialectical roles of the antagonist and the protagonist. Namely, the protagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by forwarding arguments in support of it, but also in having the other party retract his doubt as a result of the testing procedure. Correspondingly, the antagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by casting doubt on the arguments in support of it, but also in having the other party retract his standpoint as a result of the testing procedure.

Another consequence of the strategic manoeuvring approach is that the moves that each party makes in the course of an argumentative discussion are considered to originate in their respective attempts to strike a balance between the goals of having the standpoint tested and having it tested in his own favour. In this way, the concept of strategic manoeuvring provides a view of how moves in an argumentative discussion are produced. While the ideal model of a critical discussion specifies which moves are required and in which order for the progress of the dispute resolution procedure, the strategic manoeuvring approach provides a theoretical account of the way these moves are realised in actual discourse. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a) propose that the *design* of the moves can be described with reference to the three aspects of topical potential, adaptation to audience and presentation; that is by studying the choices that an arguer made from the material available in a specific context, the way in which he accommodated the preferences and expectations of his audience, and the choices he made in order to present his moves. By the 'design of a move' I refer to the strategic manoeuvring that was used in a specific situational context to realise a move that is analytically relevant in the ideal model of a critical discussion.

The analysis of argumentative discourse in the light of the strategic manoeuvring approach invites the analyst to pay closer attention to the pragmatics of communication in order to present a better-justified reconstruction of argumentative reality and a more refined evaluation of it. Therefore, the concept of strategic manoeuvring opens up the possibility within Pragma-dialectics of a more systematic exploration of the strategic function of choices made in the use of language (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007b). It constitutes the pragma-dialectical tool for interpreting real argumentative discourse and for relating the surface of the discourse with the moves that are required in the various stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion. One choice made on the surface of argumentative discourse is the choice of a stance adverb in order to qualify the utterance that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion.

Up until now, within Pragma-dialectics, the choice of a language user to qualify an utterance like the one in examples (1) to (10) and (11) to (15) above, and to qualify it by using *certainly* instead of *frankly* or *unfortunately* instead of

clearly would go unnoticed. Scholars like Snoeck Henkemans (1992) and Houtlosser (1995), who have focused on some of these words drawing from discourse and semantic studies on modality and illocutionary qualification, have studied them with an interest in their indicative potential. Snoeck Henkemans studied the effect of modal adverbs such as *probably* that appear in the standpoint as one of the pragmatic clues for reconstructing the structure of the argumentation in support of such a qualified standpoint. Houtlosser examined adverbs such as *apparently*, *certainly*, *clearly*, *probably*, *surely*, *undoubtedly*, together with other expressions that have a parenthetical position, as indicators of the argumentative function of an utterance as a standpoint. However, the focus of these studies is not on the strategic function that choosing one adverb instead of another has but on the indicative potential that particular adverbs have for the purposes of reconstruction. In a recent monograph, van Eemeren, Snoeck Henkemans and Houtlosser (2007) refer to some of these words, among other linguistic expressions, in a comprehensive study of indicators that can help the analyst identify moves of the ideal model of a critical discussion from the way such moves have been presented in the actual discourse.

In this study, I seek to provide an account of the strategic function that the use of words such as stance adverbs has in argumentative discourse. I am interested in spelling out the argumentative relevance that qualification may have for the analysis and evaluation of discourse, thus complementing previous studies that have explored the indicative potential of certain qualifiers. I start from where Houtlosser (1995) left off, in the sense that I take a standpoint as already identified in a given piece of discourse and ask what was strategic about the way it was designed, focusing on the arguer's choice to use a stance adverb in order to qualify the utterance by means of which that standpoint was put forward in the discourse.

Aim of the study

In order to assess the quality of the argumentation produced against standards of reasonableness, assuming the pragma-dialectical perspective, one needs to exclude from consideration the psychological or cognitive processes that could have led to its production as well as the social and cognitive effects that its production could be shown to have. Likewise, in order to assess the contribution that the choice of a specific linguistic means of qualifying makes in the course of an argumentative discussion, one needs to study that choice with respect to such standards of reasonableness that govern argumentative discussions, irrespective of the social and cognitive goals that the parties may pursue. For that to be possible it is necessary to spell out the argumentative relevance of qualification. In other words, it is important to specify the strategic function that qualification has for the development of an argumentative discussion.

Studying the phenomenon of qualification in connection with the specific move of advancing a standpoint makes it possible to relate the strategic function of such a choice to the specific commitments that arise from the performance of this move. In this way, the strategic function of the choices made regarding the presentation of this particular move can be distinguished from the function that the same choices would have had if made in the presentation of a different move (for example, the move of advancing argumentation). Compare the following examples, where the adverbial phrase *quite frankly* qualifies an utterance that has a different argumentative function each time, namely as an explanatory statement in (20), as an argument in support of a standpoint in (21), and only in the last case as a standpoint in support of which argumentation is forwarded.

(20) We gave up the written report *quite frankly* because we found it a waste of time. [BNC]

(21) I really support the idea of trying to come up with a plan of action because *quite frankly* I find that London and England is just so full of talk shops. Just millions of conferences that just tire you out and exhaust you, and nothing change[s] as you come out of the conference. [BNC]

(22) *Quite frankly*, council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department. [COBUILD]

In this study, I focus on those uses of qualification as exemplified in (22), where a stance adverb qualifies the utterance that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion. The aim is to account for the strategic function that a choice of a particular adverb has for the progress of the argumentative discussion, excluding from consideration what the intentions of the language user may have been as well as what the requirements of the social situation are, in which such a choice is made. The *strategic function* in this study is defined not just in terms of what is effective with respect to the language user's goals but also in terms of what is effective for the resolution of the dispute. The strategic function of qualification that I seek to spell out is thus both rhetorical and dialectical, in the sense that qualifying the standpoint is favourable for one party while at the same time observes the standards of the critical discussion. In this theoretical account of the qualification of standpoints within the pragma-dialectical framework, I seek to explain how qualification serves the rhetorical goals of the protagonist of the standpoint given the dialectical constraints of the ideal model of a critical discussion. Such a theoretical account will be of use in the analysis of instances of qualified utterances that function as standpoints, and in the critical assessment of the contribution that such a choice of the arguer made in the progress of an argumentative discussion.

Research questions

The main research question of this study is the following:

> How does qualification of a standpoint function strategically in an argumentative discussion?

In order to specify the strategic function of qualification of a standpoint, a theoretical account is needed of what standpoint qualification is, and how it relates to the development of an argumentative discussion. The following two questions call for an answer:

1) What is a qualified standpoint?

2) Why would the protagonist qualify the standpoint?

The answer to the first question seeks to provide a definition of qualification that takes into account the argumentative function of the move of advancing a standpoint. In order to provide such a theoretical account, I exploit the idea proposed within the strategic manoeuvring approach that moves are designed, and I take into consideration the analysis of the move of advancing a standpoint as an assertive speech act. With this theoretical account it becomes possible to relate the linguistic phenomenon of qualification to the specific move of advancing a standpoint in an argumentative discussion and to identify the ways available for qualifying standpoints.

Given that qualification is studied here in connection with the move of advancing a standpoint, as a choice regarding the design of this move, the second question seeks an argumentatively focused explanation for this choice of the protagonist. In answer to this question, I make use of the concept of *burden of proof*, which is intrinsic to the move of advancing a standpoint, in order to specify the strategic goal that the protagonist is aiming for when qualifying the standpoint. The burden of proof is the obligation for the one who has advanced a standpoint to assume responsibility for it and thereby to provide argumentation in support of it, answering the questions of the other party. By assuming that the protagonist seeks a favourable result as far as his burden of proof is concerned, the strategic function of qualification can be specified with respect to the argumentative concept of the burden of proof.

The main question of this study can thus be answered by relating the ways of qualifying standpoints to the possible ways in which the protagonist's strategic goal with respect to the burden of proof can be attained.

Methodological considerations

In this study, I set out to account for the strategic function that qualification of a standpoint has in an argumentative discussion. The interest in accounting for the strategic function of such a choice in the use of language is theoretical, not

empirical. Therefore, I seek to provide a tool for the analysis of argumentative discourse rather than to provide an explanation of the social or cognitive reasons behind why language users qualify their utterances or an answer to the question of whether qualified utterances are more or less convincing than unqualified ones.

I thus study qualification in relation to one specific move of an argumentative discussion. This makes it possible to consider the function that such a choice has in connection to the role that this particular move plays in the discussion: in this case, the move of advancing a standpoint, by which an argumentative discussion starts, and the one which incurs a burden of proof. The ideal model of a critical discussion developed within Pragma-dialectics helps place the move of advancing a standpoint in a concrete stage of the discussion and thereby helps determine the consequences that choices regarding the design of that move have for the other stages of the discussion.

Moreover, the focus on this move makes it possible to specify ways of qualifying on the basis of the illocutionary analysis of this particular move as an assertive speech act. In this view, the ways of qualifying are specified in conceptual terms, not in linguistic terms, since they apply to a functional concept, such as a *standpoint*, and not to a linguistic one, such as an *utterance*. The standpoint that gives rise to the argumentative discussion and over which an argumentative discussion evolves is analysed neither in semantic, structural terms nor in social, cognitive terms. Analysing a standpoint is a matter of the argumentative function that a certain illocutionary act has in the context in which it is performed, something which depends on the relation of that act to others preceding and following it in the discourse, performed by the same language user or by his interlocutor.

In this study, I make use of the concept of the burden of proof as the basis for proposing a theoretical explanation for the way qualifying a standpoint can be strategic in the course of an argumentative discussion. In this sense, the burden of proof helps 'translate' the discourse effect that qualification is observed to have in communication into the strategic effect which I postulate that it has in the context of an argumentative discussion, without having recourse to any cognitive or social concepts. Using the burden of proof as the argumentative concept, with respect to which the strategic function of qualification is to be understood, makes it also possible to identify conditions under which the use of qualification can be considered constructive and conditions under which it ends up being obstructive for the dispute resolution process.

Throughout, I make use of real and of constructed examples. Regarding examples from real discourse, I have collected fragments in which a qualified utterance functions as a standpoint from the BNC and COBUILD corpora[7] as

[7] For these two corpora see footnotes 1 and 3 earlier.

well as from the Internet. In order to facilitate my search for such examples, I have considered mainly those cases in which the standpoint is reconstructed from the main clause and the argument from the subordinate, *because*-clause, in the text. These were fragments of written discourse rather than spoken ones. Where necessary, I have also constructed examples of sentences or short dialogues. This was done especially in those cases where the focus was on the structure of the argumentation and the procedure in which an argumentative dialogue develops, rather than on the use of a particular stance adverb in context. The aim of discussing examples from real discourse, especially in the last two chapters of this study, is to illustrate how an argumentation analyst should interpret the choice of an arguer to qualify the standpoint in a certain way, in the light of the theoretical account about the strategic function of qualification that I propose.

Finally, I have restricted my search for the linguistic representation of the ways of qualifying to the class of single word stance adverbs. There were two main reasons for this choice. First, the fact that single word adverbs constitute the most frequent linguistic realisation of stance (see Biber et al., 1999). Second, the fact that single word stance adverbs are the most varied and diversified group in English compared to other languages (see Ramat & Ricca, 1998). Nevertheless, the theoretical account of qualification that I seek to provide in this study is not meant to be restricted to the group of single word stance adverbs but to cover all instances of language use that may count as qualification of an utterance. Despite the fact that I make use of real language fragments collected from corpora of English, my study is not a corpus-based empirical study of qualification or of stance adverbs. The theoretical account of the strategic function of qualification is not meant to be restricted to the use of stance adverbs in English or to the use of qualification in a specific register or in a specific genre of communication, either.

Outline of the study

The thesis is divided in three parts. Part I and Part II provide answers to research questions 1 and 2, respectively, which are prerequisites for answering the main question of the study about the strategic function of qualification. This latter question is answered in Part III.

In *Part I*, I define standpoint qualification and identify the ways in which standpoints can be qualified.

In Chapter 1, I propose studying qualification as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. Following the illocutionary analysis of the move of advancing a standpoint as an assertive speech act, I define standpoint qualification as the addition of a comment that is peripheral both structurally and semantically, and is not part of the propositional content of the standpoint. Such a comment may thus only be *about* the propositional content (in which case it conveys information about the

commitment to it *or* about the evaluation of it), or *about* the act as a whole. In either of these three cases the comment does not become the bone of contention in the argumentative discussion that follows.

In Chapter 2, I study the group of single word stance adverbs in English as one possible linguistic realisation of qualification in argumentative discourse. After discussing the relevant literature, I identify the stance adverbs that can be used to qualify the standpoint in each of the three ways of qualifying distinguished in the previous chapter. In addition, I describe what the discourse effect of using the listed adverbs is, when considered against the background of a context of doubt and of a critical discussion, in which a standpoint is advanced.

In *Part II*, I introduce the concept of the management of the burden of proof in order to provide a theoretical explanation of the choices an arguer can make when designing the move of advancing a standpoint.

In Chapter 3, I elaborate on the concept of the burden of proof as the obligation that comes with the act of advancing a standpoint, according to which the party who assumes the role of the protagonist is required to defend it by carrying out the corresponding tasks throughout the discussion. I argue that by virtue of its omnipresence throughout the stages of an argumentative discussion, the concept of the burden of proof can be used in order to specify the strategic goal that the protagonist has when designing the standpoint.

In Chapter 4, I postulate the *management of the burden of proof* as the rationale for the choices that the protagonist can be shown to have made regarding the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. In this view, the protagonist designs the standpoint in a way that can allow an optimal development of the dispute resolution procedure towards a favourable end for him. For the protagonist, such a favourable end of the discussion comes when the doubt with respect to the standpoint is retracted and its tenability accepted. In this case, it can be said that he has successfully discharged the burden of proof. By considering the requirements for the testing of the tenability of a standpoint, three possible optimal paths towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof are specified. These paths constitute the theoretically possible scenarios through which the protagonist seeks to manage the burden of proof.

In *Part III*, I relate the three ways of qualifying identified in the first part to the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof specified in the second part of the study. In this way, I describe the strategic function of qualification of a standpoint in the course of an argumentative discussion by illustrating how each of the ways of qualifying can help the protagonist pave the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. In Chapter 5, I present the strategic function of each of the ways of qualifying a standpoint, which counts as a description of the conditions under which qualification can be used constructively. In Chapter 6, I specify what counts as abuse of the strategic function of qualification and the conditions under which qualification

can be said to have obstructed the critical testing of the standpoint. In both chapters, I discuss examples of argumentative discourse in which a qualified standpoint is advanced, in order to illustrate how an analyst can use the presence of a stance adverb as a clue to the protagonist's management of the burden of proof.

PART I
QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT

In order to understand the strategic function of qualification it is first necessary to relate this phenomenon of language use to a specific move in the ideal model of a critical discussion. In this part, I seek to answer the question: "What is a qualified standpoint?". Defining qualification in relation to the move of advancing a standpoint makes it possible, in the following parts of this study, to account for its strategic function by considering the implications that qualification has for the way an argumentative discussion develops after a standpoint is advanced.

In this part, in the light of the strategic manoeuvring approach, I treat qualification as a choice that the protagonist of a standpoint makes when designing it. I provide a definition of standpoint qualification that takes into account the illocutionary analysis of this particular move as an assertive speech act. Qualifying is understood neither in purely semantic nor in purely syntactic terms but in the integration of these two levels. To qualify is to add an extra element to the core meaning of the utterance, by means of which an assertive speech act is performed, that conveys a certain comment. Such a comment may be about either the commitment to or the evaluation of the propositional content of the assertive speech act, or about the performance of this act.

In Chapter 1, I identify the ways of qualifying standpoints. These ways can be conceptually distinguished on the basis of the definition of qualification as a presentational device for designing a standpoint.

In Chapter 2, by way of illustration of one linguistic realisation of standpoint qualification, I look at the stance adverbs that can be used to qualify an utterance in English. After reviewing the relevant literature, I group them under the various ways of qualifying standpoints that I have distinguished earlier, and I describe their discourse effect.

CHAPTER 1
DESIGNING A STANDPOINT BY QUALIFYING

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that, in the light of the strategic manoeuvring approach, qualification can be analysed as one of the presentational devices at the protagonist's disposal when designing the move of advancing a standpoint. The strategic manoeuvring approach allows one to pay attention to the choices that a language user has made when realising the move of advancing a standpoint. These choices do not determine the argumentative function of this move but constitute the way in which it is realised in actual discourse. A choice that a language user can make when designing the standpoint is to qualify the utterance by means of which a standpoint is advanced in discourse. When qualifying, a language user adds a comment that conveys information about commitment, evaluation or style.

Following the illocutionary analysis of the move of advancing a standpoint as an assertive speech act, I argue that the comment that qualification adds to the standpoint does not constitute the propositional content of the assertive speech act and does not affect its illocutionary force either. When qualifying, the protagonist adds a comment that is *about* the propositional content of the assertive or *about* the fact that an assertive is being performed. Considering that the comment added about propositional content may convey commitment to it or an evaluation of it, I distinguish three ways of qualifying standpoints: a) qualifying by adding a comment conveying commitment to the propositional content, b) qualifying by adding a comment conveying an evaluation of the propositional content, and c) qualifying by adding a comment conveying information about the act.

In the following section, I start by introducing the idea that standpoints are designed in the sense that the language user who advances one in actual discourse is assumed to have made choices that help him balance his rhetorical goals with the dialectical exigencies of an argumentative discussion. In order to relate qualification to the move of advancing a standpoint, in section 1.3, I propose a definition of it that pays attention to the illocutionary analysis of this move and integrates a qualitative and a quantitative understanding of qualification. Considering the three kinds of comment that qualification adds and the aspects of the assertive illocutionary act to which that comment may pertain, I present, in section 1.4, the three ways of qualifying standpoints that can be conceptually distinguished.

1.2 Designing a standpoint

In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the concept of standpoint refers to the product of an argumentative analysis of discourse and not to the product of the interpretation that language users give when engaging in an argumentative discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2004).[8] In Pragma-dialectics, a standpoint is defined as "an externalized attitude of a language user in respect of an expressed opinion" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 5), and it is analysed as an assertive speech act. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) stress the significance of analysing the move of advancing a standpoint (and the move of forwarding argumentation) as performing an assertive speech act when they write:

> If these expressed opinions and argumentations could not be construed as assertives, a resolution of the dispute would be impossible, since it is only possible to resolve disputes thanks to the specific committedness associated with the performance of assertives. (p. 97)

While the act of promising places the one who promised under the obligation to do the promised thing, the act of asserting places the one who asserted under the obligation to honour his claim, in other words, entitles the addressee to demand reasons in support of the belief expressed that the assertion made is true (Green, 2000; Grewendorf, 1984; Pagin, 2005).

It is the committedness to being ready to answer the questions of the addressee regarding the truth or correctness of what is asserted that is essential to the assertive illocutionary act. It is this committedness that Pragma-dialectics focuses on and one that it seeks to externalise by analysing both the move of advancing a standpoint and the move of advancing argumentation in terms of an assertive illocutionary act. This kind of committedness originates in the belief the speaker expresses in the truth or correctness of the asserted proposition and in the fact that he has evidence to support it, something which he implies by asserting that proposition in the first place. That is why after an assertive illocutionary act is performed, the addressee is entitled to ask the speaker for the reasons of his belief *that p*, and the speaker is thereby expected to answer accordingly.[9]

A: John is not coming with us tonight.

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[8] Houtlosser (2001) provides an overview of the various terms and accounts proposed for the concept of standpoint in other approaches.

[9] Nonetheless, one should not identify the requirement to justify an assertion by responding to the interlocutor's question with the requirement to forward arguments in support of the standpoint advanced in the context of an argumentative discussion. As Kauffeld (1995, 1998) also points out, the one is merely a discourse obligation while the other is the probative obligation to which the concept of the burden of proof refers. On the concept of the burden of proof, see Chapter 3.

B: How do you know that?
A: He called me to ask me not to wait for him.
OR
A': The trains are not running.

According to Brandom, (as cited in Pagin, 2005, p. 30):

> The nature of assertion consists in the fact that in asserting the speaker achieves two different normative/institutional results at the same time: on the one hand she authorizes the hearer to claim anything that follows from what is asserted and on the other she undertakes the responsibility of justifying it. (1994, pp. 173-175)

These two 'institutional results' of asserting, as Brandom calls them, are the features that assertives have, which make van Eemeren and Grootendorst analyse the move of forwarding argumentation and the move of advancing a standpoint as assertives. The two moves, however, differ in the role they play in the course of an argumentative discussion; while the move of forwarding argumentation is performed with the aim of providing support to the standpoint in order to remove doubt, the move of advancing a standpoint is performed in a context of doubt and thereby requires support.

The fact that the move of advancing a standpoint is analysed as an assertive illocutionary act does not mean, however, that all assertive speech acts performed in actual discourse function as standpoints under all circumstances. Houtlosser (1995, 2001, 2002) has specified the felicity conditions that pertain to the performance of the act of advancing a standpoint.[10] These conditions, based on the formulation of the felicity conditions for assertive speech acts, can be of use in identifying the argumentative function of an act performed in actual discourse as being the standpoint in the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from that discourse. For an illocutionary act to be identified as a standpoint, a context of doubt need obtain or should be assumed to obtain, in which the felicitousness of the performance of the specific act is put into question (see also van Eemeren, 1987).

In the following constructed dialogue between Peter and Mary, who are waiting for John who has not shown up after the dinner that all three had the night before at Jane's place, the assertive 'John is sick' is performed in a context of doubt and functions as a standpoint:

Peter: John is sick.
Mary: What makes you think that?

[10] These felicity conditions are presented in 3.3.1, where the obligation to defend that constitutes the essential condition for the act of advancing a standpoint is discussed in detail. In the current section, I focus on the assertive illocutionary nature of the move of advancing a standpoint, without making any specific reference to the conditions for its felicitous performance.

> Peter: It is 45 minutes we have been waiting for him; he is never so late.

If there is no context of doubt regarding the assertive 'John is sick', as in the constructed dialogue below, the specific assertive cannot be said to function as a standpoint:

> Mary: We should call Jane.
> Peter: Why should we do that?
> Mary: John is sick and Jane should know about it.

In the above dialogue, Mary is performing the assertive 'John is sick' in a context in which she knows or expects Peter to share the information about John's condition. In this case, the assertive functions as an argument in support of Mary's point of view that Mary and Peter should call Jane, not as the standpoint.

It may well be the case that an assertive such as 'John is sick' is performed in a non-argumentative context, as in the constructed dialogue below:

> (Mary is calling Jane)
> Mary: Hi Jane.
> Jane: What's up?
> Mary: John is sick.
> Jane: Oh my God! Don't tell me it is because of the mushroom sauce I prepared last night.

In this case, the assertive 'John is sick' is performed in a context of providing information and there is nothing in the previous or following utterances of the interlocutors that suggests a context in which the particular assertive is put in doubt or is used in order to remove doubt.

Moreover, it may be the case that a speech act functions as a standpoint even if it is not an assertive. This is possible when the felicitousness of the act performed is questioned and justification is provided to repair the doubt. Consider the constructed dialogue below:

> Mary: Call John's mother right away.
> Jane: Why me?
> Mary: It seems there was something in the mushroom soup you prepared that made John sick.

In the above dialogue, Mary performs a directive by uttering 'Call John's mother right away', which is challenged by Jane and which receives support in the third turn. While the speech act performed at the sentence level belongs to the type of directives, the argumentative function it has in the context in which it is performed is that of expressing Mary's point of view that it is a good idea that Jane call John's mother.

As the last example shows, a standpoint may have been put forward in discourse even when no assertive speech act was actually performed (see also van Eemeren, 1987).[11] While the move of advancing a standpoint is analysed as an assertive speech act in the ideal model of a critical discussion, van Eemeren and Grootendorst acknowledge that in argumentative discourse standpoints can be realised in a variety of ways ranging from implicit (no standpoint), indirect (standpoint advanced by means of an act other than an assertive) to explicit /direct (standpoint advanced by means of an assertive accompanied by a standpoint indicator). This functional view of what a standpoint is and the discrepancy between the move of advancing a standpoint in the ideal model, on the one hand, and what counts as such in the actual discourse, on the other, opens up the space for studying the choices available regarding the way this move is realised in actual discourse.

Within Pragma-dialectics so far, the emphasis has been on the indicative potential that linguistic choices have or, in other words, on the clues that linguistic choices could provide to the analyst for identifying a specific instance of discourse as a particular move in an argumentative discussion (see van Eemeren et al., 2007). Houtlosser (1995, 2002) has argued that expressions such as *I believe that..*, *I think that..*, *in my view*, *of course*, *it is clear that..*, among others, can be used as clues for identifying a standpoint in actual discourse.[12] The question that is of interest to this study, however, is how a language user may exploit the potential of the various choices available for the realisation of a move that plays a role in the development of a critical discussion.

In the strategic manoeuvring approach (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007c), it becomes possible to study the relation between the way in which a specific move of the ideal model of a critical discussion has been realised in actual discourse and the role that this move plays in the ideal model. In the light of the assumption about strategic manoeuvring, the moves that the parties make in the course of an argumentative discussion (which can be reconstructed into the analytically relevant moves performed in the various stages) are analysed as designed both to uphold a reasonable discussion attitude and to further a party's case. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a) suggest that a way to understand the design of the moves is by referring to the three aspects of *topical potential*, *adaptation to audience* and *presentation*.

The topical potential refers to the material in an arguer's disposal in a given context, from which he can make a choice in order to compose his moves. The adaptation to audience refers to the ways in which the arguer may choose to accommodate to the preferences, expectations and perspective of the

[11] In some cases, it is possible that a standpoint is reconstructed even when no concrete act was performed in the actual discourse. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2004) remark, in the discourse of advertising, argumentation is advanced in support of a standpoint that invites consumers to buy the product advertised. Such an inciting standpoint usually remains implicit.

[12] On standpoint indicators see also van Eemeren et al. (2007, pp. 28-45).

audience that he is addressing in a given context. The presentation refers to the choices that the arguer can make in order to verbalise his contributions in the most appropriate way in the context concerned. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser propose making use of these three aspects in order to explain why a specific move in argumentative discourse is realised in a specific way. In ideal terms, none of these aspects overrides the other two in the definition of a move, which should be both dialectically sound and rhetorically effective. Analytically speaking, all three coordinate in defining a particular move at a given moment of the discussion. There cannot be an a priori description of the choices that can be made with respect to each of these aspects in designing a move. The way each of these aspects is realised in discourse depends on the type of move as well as on contextual factors.[13]

A language user who puts forward a standpoint would have designed this move (to be reconstructed in the confrontation stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion) not only in a way that observes the dialectical requirement that it be made clear what the difference of opinion is about but also in a way that promotes his own interest in the given discussion. The cluster of choices that this language user has made with respect to the topical potential, the adaptation to audience and the presentational means in a given instance would constitute the strategic manoeuvring for the move of advancing the standpoint in that particular case. It may be that a particular cluster of choices is indeed effective in one context but not in another or that different choices are available in different contexts (when addressing different audiences about different issues).

While there cannot be an exhaustive and finite list of the ways in which a language user may manoeuvre strategically when advancing a standpoint, or when performing any other move in an argumentative discussion, it should be possible to provide a general explanation for the various ways that can be chosen. Such an explanation relies on the connection between the type of move and the dialectical and rhetorical goals that the party that performs that move has in the stage in which the move is performed and/or in the discussion as a whole.

In the first constructed dialogue between Peter and Mary, presented earlier, Peter could have chosen to qualify the utterance by means of which the assertive 'John is sick' was performed in either of the following ways:

Clearly, John is sick.

Perhaps, John is sick.

Frankly, John is sick.

Unfortunately, John is sick.

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[13] Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2007b) is a first attempt to propose a systematic way for studying the strategic manoeuvring that takes place in argumentative discourse.

In either case, as long as Mary would have doubted the assertive and Peter would have replied by supporting it, Peter would be committed to the point of view that John is sick. His choice of the one or the other formulation would be a matter of *designing* the standpoint, that is, the result of the strategic manoeuvring when advancing the standpoint. Before discussing what the language user would be targeting by designing the move of advancing the standpoint (in Part II of the thesis) it is important to have a better understanding of what the choice of qualifying amounts to and to which of the three aspects of the strategic manoeuvring it relates. In section 1.3, I provide a working definition of qualification while in section 1.4 I present the ways of qualifying standpoints that can be distinguished theoretically.

1.3 Qualification defined

Qualification can be understood in at least two senses which are complementary to each other; quantitatively, as adding an extra element that is structurally detached and peripheral to the main constituents of a sentence, and qualitatively as adding some extra meaning to the core meaning conveyed by parts of the sentence or by the sentence as a whole. In this section, I present the two senses and argue that a combination of both is required for an understanding of qualification at the illocutionary level where standpoints are analysed.

1.3.1 Qualifying as adding an extra element

A structural way to understand qualification is in terms of adding an element to an item that does not play a constitutive role for identifying that item; that is, the added element is not an indispensable constituent of the sentence. In English, for example, this can be illustrated with reference to various grammatical ways of expanding the nominal or adverbial phrase, where supplementary information is given for a headword (noun, adjective or adverb). The examples below, taken from Downing and Locke (2002), and Biber et al. (1999), illustrate this point:

	HEADWORD	
Mild	depression	
	Einstein,	*the famous physicist*
Growing	population	
	the place	*where I was born*
	Doctors	*at John Hopkins Medical School*
	Chance	*to do the right thing*
3.5 $ million	yacht	
Inner	life	
	Discovery	*of new worlds*
Too	cold	*for me*

Desperately	poor	
	Guilty	*of a serious crime*
A little	late	
	Early	*in the morning*
	Fortunately	*enough*

The information supplied by the italicised elements in the left and right columns concerns extrinsic features of the headword in the middle column, which enable the hearer/reader to identify the entity in question even though the information is not essential for understanding what the entity in question is, or adds supplementary information about that entity after it has already been identified in a specific context.

In a similar way, words or a group of words can be used to add information to a clause or to the whole utterance, as the examples below illustrate, taken from Biber et al. (1999):

	Chris didn't want to know,	*frankly.*
Clearly,	there is integration between private and public sectors.	
Nevertheless,	she spoke wonderfully about her childhood.	
As to all the rest,	I am well pleased and no further talk is needed.	
Well,	that's true.	
	There is no money to be made out of recycling,	*you know.*

There are different terms used for these peripheral elements, depending on the grammatical class to which they belong and to the syntactic level at which they are added (the word, the phrase or the clause): pre-modifiers, post-modifiers, adjuncts, disjuncts, among others. In all these cases, these peripheral elements supply extra information that is not directly essential to the understanding of the core meaning of what is being said. Such information, however, is required in order to facilitate the understanding of what is said and/or to relate what is said to the context in which it is said. The information provided by the elements in the left and right columns could be omitted without causing trouble to understand what is being talked about. Omitting the information provided by the word, phrase or clause in the middle column, however, would create confusion as to what is being talked about, and as to where is the comment attached to.

In a structural view of qualification, any item that is peripheral in a sentence and can be omitted without rendering the sentence ungrammatical (that is, lacking its main constituents) could be considered a qualifier. This view, however, does not take into account the meaning that the qualifying element adds to the sentence. The use of linguistic elements like *nevertheless*, *as to all the rest*, and *well* in an utterance that functions as a standpoint conveys information about the way the language user conceives of the textual relation of a particular utterance to others preceding and following it. On the other hand, the use of

linguistic elements like *frankly*, *clearly*, and *perhaps* conveys information about the way the language user positions himself with respect to his own utterance.

1.3.2 Qualifying as adding extra meaning

So far, I have presented a syntactic, structural view of qualification as adding elements that can be omitted without obstructing the identification of the entity that is being described or of the core information that is provided in a sentence. Qualification can also be understood relative to a semantic view, according to which there is extra meaning added to the core meaning of a message that does not necessarily expand the structure of that message. In that view, qualification is to be related to the aspect of meaning that Lyons (1977, 1995) calls the 'subjective meaning' or what is elsewhere referred to as 'affect', 'evaluation', 'appraisal' or 'stance'.[14]

In communication, more often than not, language users produce utterances that do not merely contain what can be described as content information, that is, meaning that is factual and that can be proven true or false in some way or another. They also provide information as regards personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments or assessments. Lyons (1977) uses the term 'modulation' to describe

> the superimposing upon the utterance of a particular attitudinal colouring, indicative of the speaker's involvement in what he is saying and his desire to impress or convince the hearer. (p. 65)

Consider the following examples:

(1)
It *rained* all night.
It *poured* all night.

A: Are you *angry*?
B: I am *livid*!

(2)
Fortunately, it rained all night.
Unfortunately, it rained all night.

(A, B and C are waiting for John)
A: I am afraid that the trains are not running tonight.
B: *Perhaps*, John is not coming.
C: *Clearly*, John is not coming!

Information about value judgements or assessments can be encoded in the lexical meaning of words as the use of a verb like *pour* instead of *rain*, or the use

[14] See Hunston and Thompson (2000), for an overview.

of the adjective *livid* instead of *angry* shows in (1). Such information can also be grammatically encoded in words such as the adverbs *fortunately* and *unfortunately*, or the adverbs *perhaps* and *clearly*, as the examples in (2) illustrate.

In the literature, as Hunston and Thompson (2000) discuss, there is a tendency to study the extra meaning that can be added to the factual meaning of utterances by distinguishing between modal meaning (concerning probability or usuality) and attitudinal meaning (concerning feelings or values), and by focusing on the one or on the other. Biber and Finegan (1989, p. 93) have used the term *stance* to describe "the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message". In this way, they propose a superordinate term for the meaning that language users can communicate in addition to the propositional content. Thus stance is used to refer both to the attitudinal and the modal meanings that can be conveyed in addition to the factual meaning of an utterance. In the Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, Biber et al. (1999, pp. 972ff) distinguish three main kinds of stance: *epistemic*, *attitudinal*, and *style of speaking*. Epistemic stance presents the speaker's comment about "the status of information in a proposition" (1999, p. 972). It marks certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, limitation or the source of knowledge or the perspective from which the information is given. Attitudinal stance "reports personal attitudes or feelings" (1999, p. 974). Style of speaking stance "comments on the communication itself" (1999, p. 975). In what follows, I refer to Biber et al.'s (1999) three-part distinction of stance meaning.

The semantic view of qualification allows one to relate qualification to the expression of stance meaning that complements the factual meaning expressed in utterances. A purely semantic understanding of qualification, however, would make it difficult to distinguish between the core (factual) meaning and the additional (stance) meaning. In those cases, for example, where the core meaning of an utterance would be expressed by value laden words, such as *happy*, *jerk*, or *good*, the stance meaning would be lexically encoded making it impossible to distinguish the element conveying the stance meaning from the core meaning. In the following subsection, I present a working definition that integrates the quantitative and the qualitative view of qualification, and I describe it as a presentational device for designing standpoints.

1.3.3 Qualification as a presentational device for designing a standpoint

In this section, I argue that a combined view of qualification is required, since standpoints are defined neither in purely structural nor in purely semantic terms. Standpoint qualification should thus not be understood as merely taking a stance but more accurately as adding a comment, which conveys a particular stance with respect to the proposition expressed in the standpoint. In this way, I do not consider lexical stance marking to count as standpoint qualification,

and I do not take qualification to coincide with the principal information provided in discourse either. At the same time, standpoint qualification should not be understood as simply the addition of an extra element, but as the addition of an extra element that conveys a comment about commitment, evaluation or style.

Following Biber et al.'s (1999) presentation of the grammatical realization of stance, I propose the following working definition of qualification:

> *Qualification*
> The addition of a comment that conveys the commitment, evaluation or style of the speaker, which can be detached semantically from the core propositional meaning that the utterance has and which is also syntactically detached from the main constituents of the sentence.

The combination of a structural (quantitative) and a semantic (qualitative) criterion for defining qualification helps discard cases such as the following, when studying standpoint qualification:

> *To cut a long story short*, John ended up in the hospital.
>
> John ended up in the hospital.

In the first utterance, the non-finite clause *to cut a long story short* adds a parenthetical comment, which can be omitted without disrupting the meaning of that utterance, as the second utterance illustrates. Nevertheless, the particular comment does not convey information about the commitment, evaluation or style of the speaker. Instead, it conveys information concerning the relation this clause has with others in the discourse.[15] The addition of such a comment, however, to an utterance that functions as a standpoint in argumentative discourse could not count as qualifying it.

The combination of the two criteria also helps discard cases such as the following:

> Are you *angry*? – I am *livid*.

In this case, the choice of the particular adjective *livid* conveys the feelings of the speaker but is a main constituent of the clause and therefore cannot be omitted. The addition of an evaluative comment in this case makes it hard to distinguish the two components: the core meaning and the comment to the core meaning. If the utterance were to function as a standpoint in an argumentative discussion, the content of the standpoint that would need defence would have been the choice of the word *livid*.

Nevertheless, for a comment to count as qualifying a standpoint, it is not enough to be structurally separate from the rest of the constituents of the sentence and to concern the commitment, feelings or style of the language user.

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[15] Such words or phrases are studied under the label of 'discourse markers'; see Fraser (1999).

For such a comment to count as qualifying the standpoint, it is important that it does not receive support in the argumentative discourse in which the standpoint in question is being defended. Compare the following fragments taken from the BNC corpus:

(1) *Unfortunately*, previous surveys of people's animal preferences – conducted mainly in the United States – are difficult to compare because, generally, different methods were employed.

(2) *Unfortunately*, only two teams will now be able to take part in the Inter Counties match, because everyone seemed to enjoy taking part.

While in both cases the adverb *unfortunately* qualifies the main clause, adding a comment regarding the speaker's feelings, it is only in the first case that the standpoint reconstructed from the discourse can be said to be qualified by the addition of such a comment. On the contrary, the evaluative comment that is added to the main clause in the second case is to be reconstructed as part of the standpoint that is being defended by the argument that follows. Here are the reconstructed standpoints under (1') and (2') respectively:

(1') It is my point of view that previous surveys of people's animal preferences –conducted mainly in the United States – are difficult to compare.

(2') It is my point of view that it is unfortunate that only two teams will now be able to take part in the Inter Counties match.

The comment that the adverb *unfortunately* adds is not part of the reconstructed standpoint in the first case. It is only in such cases that one can talk about a qualified standpoint. In the light of the above, I propose the following more elaborate definition of standpoint qualification:

> *Standpoint qualification*
> The addition of an extra element to the sentence that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion, which is not an indispensable constituent of that sentence, and which adds a comment that conveys information regarding the commitment, the evaluation or the style, which is not questioned or defended in the ensuing argumentative discussion.

The question regarding standpoint qualification now is whether it is to be analysed as a choice regarding the topical potential, the adaptation to audience or the presentational devices when designing a standpoint (see 1.2). From the discussion so far, it becomes clear that qualification cannot be treated as a choice regarding the topical potential, since it, by definition, does not change the content of the standpoint; the argumentation in defence of the standpoint remains the same whether the qualifier is there or not. Qualification cannot be

treated as a choice regarding the adaptation to audience when designing a standpoint either. The choice to qualify the standpoint does not relate to addressing a specific audience. While qualification may be used in connection with choices made regarding the adaptation to audience (for example, creating communion or emphasising the clash with a certain audience), it is not a choice regarding the aspect 'to whom' of the design of a standpoint.[16]

Qualification is one choice from the presentational devices at the protagonist's disposal when designing the move of advancing a standpoint. This is so because qualification does not affect the argumentative interpretation of the utterance in which it appears as a standpoint and does not receive support in the ensuing argumentative discussion either. In the next section, I propose a theoretical distinction of the ways of qualifying standpoints, based on the illocutionary analysis of this move as an assertive speech act.

1.4 Ways of qualifying a standpoint

So far, I have proposed a working definition of standpoint qualification and I have argued that qualification should be studied as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. This means that the comment that qualification adds to the standpoint is not part of its propositional content and does not affect the interpretation of the argumentative function of an utterance as a standpoint. As I have pointed out in section 1.2, a standpoint is not conceived of in terms of lexical meaning but in terms of illocutionary meaning, analysed as an assertive illocutionary act. As a result, the comment about commitment, evaluation or style that is added when qualifying a standpoint should be understood as pertaining to those aspects of the assertive illocutionary act that do not affect the interpretation of the argumentative function of that act as a standpoint in an argumentative discussion. In order to theoretically distinguish the ways in which a standpoint can be qualified, one needs to identify the aspects of the assertive illocutionary act to which such a comment can be added. In this section, I argue that the comment that qualification adds to the standpoint can be analysed as being either about the propositional content of the assertive speech act or about the assertive speech act as a whole. I further discuss the different kinds of

[16] At first sight, almost any choice made with respect to the design of a standpoint can be accounted for in terms of adaptation to audience. This view would wrongly equalise rhetorical effectiveness to the idea of giving in to audience demand, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser remark (2002a, p.141, footnote 34). Studying qualification as adaptation to audience would take the audience to be the determining factor for the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint and to qualify it in a certain way. Whether qualification can be used as a presentational device when adapting to the audience in a certain way and how, as well as whether it can be combined with certain choices regarding the topical potential and how are issues that deserve further investigation.

comment and the aspect of the assertive speech act to which they pertain, presenting thus three ways of qualifying standpoints.

An assertive, like any other illocutionary act, according to the standard speech act analysis, consists of two elements, namely the illocutionary force and the propositional content (Searle, 1969, p. 30). The illocutionary force shows how the proposition is to be taken: as a statement in the case of assertives, as a request in the case of directives, and so forth, indicating thus what illocutionary act the speaker is performing. The propositional content is the reference and predication over which a particular force is expressed, when a specific illocutionary act is performed. A propositional content cannot occur alone. Searle writes: "When a proposition is expressed it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act" (1969, p. 29). In principle, the same propositional content can be common to different kinds of illocutionary acts, that is the same propositional content can be embedded to different types of illocutionary force. As Green (2000) notes, the content does not determine a specific force and neither can the force select a specific content. Nevertheless, it is a specific kind of force that determines the specific kind of act that is being performed and not the content that does that.

As the discussion of the constructed dialogues in 1.2 illustrates, when an assertive speech act functions as a standpoint in a context of doubt, it is not its propositional content that determines this argumentative function. This means that, if a comment is added to the propositional content, it cannot change the type of the illocutionary act performed, and cannot affect the interpretation of that act as a standpoint either. However, if a comment is added to the force of the act, it would result in changing that force into some other force and would thereby change the type of the act altogether. As Vanderveken (1985) shows, a comment that suggests a different degree of strength of the illocutionary force ends up defining a different illocutionary act. The acts of requesting and insisting, for example, differ with respect to the degree of strength of their illocutionary force. Following from the definition of standpoint qualification, the comment that qualification adds to the standpoint can therefore be analysed as being about the propositional content of the assertive but not about its force.[17]

Of the three kinds of stance comment,[18] the epistemic and the evaluative comment can indeed appear before the propositional content element of the assertive 'I assert John is sick', as the following examples illustrate:

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[17] This goes counter to the view that authors like Holmes (1984), Lakoff (1980) and Sbisá (2001) seem to hold, when talking about illocutionary force modification. These authors seem to suggest that the linguistic choices that language users make with the aim of mitigating the effect of the illocutionary acts they perform in communication affect the illocutionary force of the act without changing the force of the illocutionary act.

[18] For illustrative purposes, in the constructed examples discussed here, I take the adverbs *perhaps*, *unfortunately*, and *frankly* to represent an epistemic, evaluative and style stance comment,

I assert that *perhaps* John is sick.

I assert that *unfortunately* John is sick.

The comment about style, however, cannot appear before the propositional content element of the assertive:

*I assert that *frankly* John is sick.

Unlike the other two kinds of comment, the comment about style can appear before the illocutionary force element of assertives as well as of other types of illocutionary acts, as the following examples illustrate:

Frankly, I assert that John is sick.
**Perhaps*, I assert that John is sick.
**Unfortunately*, I assert that John is sick.

Frankly, I promise that Mary comes back.
**Perhaps*, I promise that Mary comes back.
**Unfortunately*, I promise that Mary comes back.

Frankly, I request that you stay.
**Perhaps*, I request that you stay.
**Unfortunately*, I request that you stay.

From the above, it becomes clear that an epistemic or evaluative stance comment can be added before the propositional content element only in those utterances that are used to perform an assertive illocutionary act, while a stance comment regarding style can appear in all types of illocutionary act, before the illocutionary force element. This is because style pertains to the performance of an illocutionary act as a whole and does not play any role in the identification of a particular illocutionary force. Therefore, a comment that concerns the act as a whole is also a comment that can be added without changing the illocutionary force of that act; that is a meta-comment about the fact that one is performing an illocutionary act.[19]

The discussion so far makes it clear that standpoint qualification amounts to adding a comment that is either about the act as a whole or about its propositional content without changing the force of the act that is being

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respectively, following Biber et al. (1999). For an elaborate presentation of the groups of stance adverbs that constitute the linguistic realisation of each of the ways of qualifying see Chapter 2.

[19] The evaluative comment added by the adverb *unfortunately* seems to be ambiguous as to whether it is a comment about the act of asserting, in which case it can be paraphrased as 'I find it unfortunate to assert that..', or a comment about the propositional content that is expressed with an assertoric force, in which case it can be paraphrased as 'I assert that …, which is unfortunate'. The unacceptability of the other illocutionary acts prefaced with *unfortunately* shows that the comment it adds cannot be about the fact that an illocutionary act is performed, contrary to what is the case with *frankly*.

performed. With respect to the propositional content, a language user may either a) convey the degree of commitment to the truth of that content, or b) convey an evaluation of that content. Over the act as a whole, a language user may convey a comment regarding the conditions obtaining for the performance of the act. The following three ways of qualifying standpoints can thus be distinguished theoretically:

a) Adding a comment conveying commitment to the propositional content

b) Adding a comment conveying evaluation of the propositional content

c) Adding a comment conveying information about the performance of the act as a whole

In the following subsections, I argue why a comment about the content or a comment about the act counts as qualifying the standpoint and how the different kinds of comment should be understood in the context of an argumentative discussion. The information that qualification signals to the other party, as far as the move of advancing a standpoint is concerned, is to be understood against the background of the context of doubt and of the stage of the critical discussion in which this move is advanced. In that context, it is assumed that there is a difference of opinion, over which the move of advancing a standpoint makes clear the position (positive or negative) of the party who advances it in that discussion.[20] By advancing this move, the party assumes publicly a responsibility, not only to engage in a critical discussion where the tenability of the position assumed should be tested, but more specifically to be ready to answer the other party's questions and to defend the position he has assumed.

1.4.1 Adding a comment about the content

1.4.1.1 Comment conveying commitment to the propositional content

One of the requirements for identifying the move of advancing a standpoint is that the one who advances it believes that the expressed opinion, which he asserts in the standpoint, is the case (see sincerity felicity condition, Houtlosser, 2001, p. 32). In order to believe that the expressed opinion is (not) the case and to have reached the point of asserting this positive (or negative) position in public, the speaker must, according to the preparatory conditions for advancing a standpoint, have some evidence. Such evidence may come from various sources: the speaker has read something, has seen something or has thought of

[20] Of course, in real discourse it may be the case that it is not yet clear to the one or the other party that there is a difference of opinion in the first place, but that is something that becomes clear when the utterance which can be reconstructed as a standpoint is actually produced (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003a).

something on the basis of which he has formed the belief that the expressed opinion is the case (or is not the case) and has come to assume a positive (or a negative) position with respect to it. As Houtlosser (2001, p. 46) notes, following van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), such a belief does not amount to a psychological or cognitive state but to a responsibility that the language user takes in public:

> Someone who has advanced a standpoint does not really have to believe that the opinion to which the standpoint pertains is the case; the point is that he is publicly committed to believing that it is the case.

Suppose that speaker A has uttered 'John is not coming with us tonight', addressing a group of people who were expecting John to join them. Assuming that the conditions for advancing a standpoint are observed, the speaker can be plausibly assumed to have advanced the following positive standpoint:[21]

> My point of view with respect to the issue of John's not coming with us tonight is that it is the case that John is not coming with us tonight

In such a case, the speaker does not assert that 'John is not coming with us tonight' but asserts his own positive position on the question. In fact, the speaker does not have to believe in the truth of the proposition 'John is not coming with us tonight' or to know or suppose it to be true, in order to assert a positive or negative position on the matter. Such a belief, knowledge or assumption is not a requirement for him to engage in a discussion over that expressed opinion with another language user. It constitutes no cheating or uncooperativeness on his part if he does not actually believe that John is not coming, as long as he is ready to defend this position in an argumentative discussion.

After all, the point of an argumentative discussion initiated by such a standpoint is not to test whether the proposition 'John is not coming with us tonight' is true or whether the speaker has sufficient knowledge of it, but to test whether the positive attitude expressed towards it is tenable or not, given the evidence forwarded in reply to the other party's questions. All that is required from the speaker is to have evidence (of some kind), to believe that the evidence he has at his disposal can help him justify this particular position, and to be ready to bring that evidence forward when asked by the other party. To advance a standpoint therefore does not commit one primarily to the proposition asserted in the expressed opinion but to a positive (or negative) position in respect of the proposition in the expressed opinion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 107) remark:

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[21] Certain conditions need to be fulfilled for an utterance to be identified and reconstructed as a standpoint and a number of textual and contextual clues can be used to support such a reconstruction (see van Eemeren, 1987; Houtlosser, 1995, 2002).

> The point at issue in a discussion is not the strength of the belief expressed by language user 1 in an assertive, but the fact that by performing an assertive he has expressed a (cautious or firm) view with regard to an expressed opinion and that this is a view to which he can be held or which can be called into question by language user 2.

The speaker who uttered 'John is not coming with us tonight' may have chosen to be explicit about the degree of the strength to which he is committed to the proposition (for example, by using a modal verb or modal adverb), or not. When choosing to be explicit, he could have indicated low or high degree. The indication of low degree does not suggest lack of commitment to the position assumed in the standpoint advanced by means of uttering this sentence. Similarly, the indication of strong degree of commitment to the proposition cannot suggest that one is more committed to the standpoint that is put forward than one would have been if one had not indicated any degree at all.

When a comment about commitment to the propositional content of the assertive is interpreted against the background of a critical discussion in the confrontation stage, it does not convey degree of commitment to the standpoint; that is, it does not grade the responsibility for having expressed a positive/negative position with respect to an expressed opinion. It conveys degree of commitment to the expressed opinion. The responsibility that is assumed for advancing a standpoint does not change on the basis of the linguistic realisation of that move. In the pragma-dialectical conception of a standpoint, there are no degrees of standpoints, only positive and negative standpoints. The opposite standpoint to the one that a language user advanced by uttering 'Perhaps John is sick' would not be expressed by uttering 'Clearly John is sick' but by using an utterance like 'John is not sick' or 'Perhaps John is not sick' or 'Clearly John is not sick'. The argumentation that is forwarded in support of a standpoint qualified with an adverb such as *clearly* or *perhaps* would not come, in principle, as a support for the degree of probability with which the expressed opinion is presented but as support for the positive or negative position assumed with respect to such an expressed opinion.

The protagonist who qualified the standpoint with a comment conveying strong degree of commitment to its propositional content would appear signalling to the antagonist the following:

> John is sick. I am sure.

The protagonist who qualified the standpoint with a comment conveying a weak degree of commitment to its propositional content would appear signalling to the antagonist the following:

> John is sick. I am not so sure.

In both cases, the protagonist should argue in support of the proposition 'John is sick' and not in support of the comment concerning the degree of

commitment. Given that advancing a standpoint presupposes that the protagonist has evidence, which he takes to be correct and sufficient for supporting the standpoint, to add a comment conveying the degree of commitment to the propositional content would count as emphasising the quality of evidence that he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.[22]

1.4.1.2 Comment conveying evaluation of the propositional content

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) argue that the expressed opinion with respect to which a positive or negative position is assumed need not always be a factual, descriptive proposition that can be true or false. Normative statements inciting action as well as evaluative statements regarding ethical or aesthetic assessments can also be an issue over which a dispute may arise, and thereby may constitute the expressed opinion with respect to which a positive or a negative position is assumed when one advances a standpoint. They distinguish three kinds of propositional content that the act of advancing a standpoint may have: descriptive, inciting and evaluative (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992).

Note here that it is the content of a standpoint and not the standpoint as a whole that can be termed descriptive, inciting or evaluative. This means that asserting a proposition in which a value is attributed to a referent (for example, 'Paris is a beautiful city') may be one of the three kinds of content that a standpoint has but is not what advancing a standpoint amounts to. As Houtlosser (2001) makes clear in discussing the literature on points of view, there is a difference between an attitude and a standpoint. The former is the expression of a positive or negative evaluation of an object, person, institution, idea, and so forth, while the latter (in the way it is conceived of within Pragma-dialectics) is the expression of a positive (or negative) position with respect to an expressed opinion. Thus the act of advancing a standpoint is not identical to the expression of an evaluative judgement over an issue.

An utterance does not function as a standpoint just because a certain evaluation is expressed in it. The expression of a positive or negative evaluation may become the bone of contention in the ensuing discussion or may not, depending on what the reaction of the interlocutor to it is and what the follow up of the first speaker is. The utterances 'The arguments in his book are really weak' or 'You are such a liar' do not function as a standpoint because of the evaluation that their content expresses. There need be a context of doubt (explicit or anticipated) in which it can be said that the utterance is used in order to express the position of a language user with respect to the evaluative proposition 'The arguments in his book are weak' or 'You are a liar', for it to function as a standpoint. In that case the difference of opinion would be said to be over an evaluative proposition.

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[22] On the stance adverbs that can be used for the linguistic realisation of this way of qualifying and the discourse effect of emphasising the quality of the evidence see 2.3.1.

It is possible, however, that one asserts a proposition and at the same time expresses an evaluative comment about it. One way this can be done is with the use of so-called evaluative adverbs, such as *fortunately*, *ironically*, and *surprisingly*. As Bellert (1977), among others, has observed, sentences with evaluative adverbs "express two asserted propositions and each of them can be negated independently" (p. 342). This means that the speaker is committed to two propositions and that the hearer could potentially challenge one or the other:

> Unfortunately, John is not coming tonight
> a. John is not coming tonight
> b. That John is not coming tonight is unfortunate

Interestingly, there is no one way in which the hearer's reaction could be taken to challenge both of these propositions at the same time. Consider the following constructed dialogue:

> A: Unfortunately, John is not coming tonight.
> B: Why do you say that?

In response to B's question, A could reply in either of the following ways, thus making the argumentative discussion to concern either the testing of the main proposition or the testing of the evaluative comment:

> A: Because the trains are not running and he does not have a car
> OR
> A: Because he always brings me chocolates when he comes

In those cases where the argumentative discussion concerns the testing of the main proposition, not the evaluative comment, the evaluative adverb can be regarded as the presentational means that the protagonist has chosen in order to qualify the standpoint. This comment is about the evaluation of the proposition to which one is committed and with regard to which one assumes a position, but it is not identical to the position one assumes. In this case, the standpoint would be paraphrased as:

> My point of view with respect to the issue John's not coming with us tonight is that it is the case that John is not coming with us tonight

Complementing the standpoint, the comment 'I find this unfortunate' is provided, which does not receive support in the argumentation that is forwarded.

When this comment is interpreted against the background of a context of doubt in which a standpoint is advanced, it becomes clear that it does not play a role in the identification of the standpoint. The comment that is added suggests something like:

> John is not coming tonight. I am unhappy about that.

The protagonist of the standpoint comes out as being committed to two propositions, one regarding the tenability of the expressed opinion, and another regarding the evaluative comment added to the expressed opinion. The standpoint is considered qualified by the evaluative comment when the proposition, to which the evaluative comment is added, is targeted, but not when the evaluative comment is targeted. In this case, the evaluative comment can be considered as accepted by the other party.[23] Qualifying the standpoint by adding a comment about the evaluation of the propositional content would thus count as emphasising the evaluation that the two parties share over the expressed opinion.[24]

1.4.2 Adding a comment about the act

In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, standpoints are always placed in an interactional context, in which a party addresses another party, and the two of them engage in an argumentative discussion with the aim of resolving a difference of opinion engage in a collaborative way. For an utterance to function as a standpoint, it is not enough that the speaker believes something to be the case and expresses it, and that the hearer has doubt with respect to it and expresses it. It is important that there be such an interactional context that makes the speaker expect the hearer not to accept at face value the position he assumes, and the hearer expect the speaker to be ready to give reasons for what he claims to be the case.

In this view, the antagonist expects the protagonist to have reasons for what he claims to be the case, and to be ready to provide those reasons when requested to do so. Such an expectation rests on the fact that the protagonist has made a claim in public and has accepted to engage in a discussion over it. Similarly, the protagonist expects the antagonist not to believe that what he asserts is the case, otherwise he would not go through the trouble of providing arguments in support of it.

A comment that can be added to the move of advancing a standpoint, concerning the interactional context in which this particular move is made, would be about the protagonist's sincerity or about the unexpectedness of the standpoint. The protagonist's cooperativeness and the standpoint's unexpectedness are the two main features of the interactional context in which an utterance functions as a standpoint. The utterance would not function as a standpoint unless there is doubt expressed over it and the one who produced it is ready to take the responsibility for it and engage in a discussion. Nevertheless, while these two conditions are integral part of the interactional context in which a standpoint arises they do not have to be made explicit by

[23] Of course it is possible that the evaluative comment is also targeted but this would not be a case of a qualified standpoint.

[24] On the stance adverbs that can be used for the linguistic realisation of this way of qualifying and the discourse effect of emphasising shared evaluation see 2.3.2.

means of language use. In the following text (adapted from a fragment found in the COBUILD corpus) the main clause functions as a standpoint even though the speaker is not being explicit about his readiness to engage in a discussion or about the unexpectedness of the claim he makes:

> Council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation, because they are council officers who are involved in the department.

Conversely, the presence of an explicit comment about sincerity or unexpectedness does not instantly make the utterance function as a standpoint. In the following two fragments, the main clause is qualified by adverbs like *frankly* and *in fact* but does not function as a standpoint:

> *Frankly*, we don't give a damn if we ruin your meal because what we're doing is natural, so if you so much as raise an eyebrow, we'll show you up for the weirdo you are. [COBUILD]

> Most of the software developers are, *in fact*, developing multimedia properties because they know that that's where the future is. [COBUILD]

In both cases above, the discourse is explanatory and not argumentative. The clause with the adverb is the explained statement followed by an explaining statement.

The comment that can be added with respect to the performance of the illocutionary act as a whole may concern the way the act is performed or the conditions under which it is performed. Such a comment may thus be about the speaker's sincerity when performing the act he does by means of uttering a particular sentence (in which case, a comment like *to be frank*, or *to tell you the truth* would be added), or it may be about the way in which the speaker performs a particular illocutionary act (in which case, a comment like *to be brief*, or *to talk hypothetically* would be added). The comment may also be about the way the speaker expects the act he performs to be received by the hearer (in which case, a comment like *as a matter of fact*, or *as you know* would be added). As shown in section 1.4, the presence of a comment about style does not indicate what the illocutionary force of the act is but complements the act by placing it in the interactional context in which it is performed. In other words, the comment functions as a meta-comment about the conditions for the performance of the specific act.

To add such an explicit comment to the utterance that has the function of advancing a standpoint, however, is redundant in the sense that one would expect the arguer to be sincere and cooperative when expressing his point of view, anyway. When this comment is interpreted against the background of the context of doubt, in which a standpoint is advanced in the confrontation stage of an argumentative discussion, it becomes superfluous since it acknowledges either that the other party will not accept the standpoint at face value or that

the protagonist is cooperative and sincere in performing this move. The consequence of adding this comment is that it emphasises the protagonist's sincerity or the unexpectedness of the standpoint. In this way, the protagonist ends up implicating that he has good reasons for advancing the standpoint he does. In this sense, adding a comment about the act as a whole emphasises the quality of the evidence.[25] When compared to qualification by means of adding a comment conveying commitment to the propositional content (see 1.4.1.1 above), this way of qualifying achieves the same effect but only in an indirect way, since it alludes to the quality of the evidence by referring to the protagonist's cooperativeness.

1.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I provided the theoretical basis for defining qualified standpoints and for identifying the ways in which standpoints can be qualified. I have made use of the strategic manoeuvring approach in order to argue that standpoint qualification can be analysed as a choice at the arguer's disposal when designing the move of advancing a standpoint. In this view, a language user who puts forward a standpoint is assumed to have made choices that help him not only to observe the dialectical requirement that he makes clear what the difference of opinion is about, but also to promote his own interests in the given discourse. The cluster of choices made with respect to the topical potential, the adaptation to audience and the presentational means in a given instance constitutes the protagonist's strategic manoeuvring for the move of advancing the standpoint in that particular case, or, in other words, the *design* of the standpoint.

After presenting a quantitative and a qualitative definition of qualification, as adding an extra element and as adding extra meaning, I argued that qualification of standpoints is best understood as the addition of a comment conveying commitment, evaluation or style, which is not necessary for the identification of the standpoint and which does not receive support in the ensuing argumentation. Starting from the illocutionary analysis of the move of advancing a standpoint as an assertive speech act, I argued that the comment that can be added to an assertive without altering its force may be either *about* the propositional content of the assertive or *about* the illocutionary act as a whole. Given that a language user may express commitment to the truth of the propositional content or an evaluation presupposing its truth, I have identified three ways of qualifying standpoints, namely: a) adding a comment conveying commitment to the propositional content, b) adding a comment conveying evaluation of the propositional content, and c) adding a comment conveying information about the act.

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[25] On the stance adverbs that can be used for the linguistic realisation of this way of qualifying and the discourse effect of emphasising cooperativeness see 2.3.3.

When considering the context of a critical discussion in which a standpoint is advanced, the comment that each of the three ways of qualifying adds to the standpoint can be interpreted in a specific way. Given that in such a context it is assumed that the protagonist is committed to the standpoint, that he evaluates it in some way and that he is ready to cooperate for the testing of it, qualifying the standpoint in any of the above three ways (a-c) counts as emphasising directly or indirectly the quality of the evidence in support of it. In the next chapter, I focus on the linguistic realisation of each of these three ways of qualifying and, in particular, on the single word stance adverbs that can be used to qualify utterances reconstructed as a standpoint in an argumentative discussion.

CHAPTER 2
STANCE ADVERBS QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present English stance adverbs as one of the possible linguistic means by which qualification of a standpoint can be realised in discourse. From the definition of qualification of a standpoint that I proposed in the previous chapter (as the addition of a comment about the propositional content or about the illocutionary act as a whole), it follows that the linguistic elements that may be used for this purpose in discourse are the ones that can be both syntactically and semantically detached from the rest of the elements of the utterance in which they appear.

A linguistic element is syntactically detached when it occurs in various positions within the same sentence, without rendering that sentence ungrammatical:

> *I suppose*, your house is very old.
> Your house is, *I suppose*, very old.
> Your house is very old, *I suppose*.

In the above example, the parenthetical verb *I suppose* can appear in all three positions without affecting the grammaticality of the sentence or changing its meaning.

A linguistic element is semantically detached when its presence or absence does not alter the core meaning of the sentence:

> *To cut a long story short*, she left.
> She left.
>
> *Wisely*, Jane did not answer my letter.
> Jane did not answer my letter.

In the above examples, the presence or absence of the non-finite clause *to cut a long story short* or of the adverb *wisely* does not change the information that the speaker conveys. On the contrary, in the following utterances the presence or absence of the non-finite clause or of the adverb conveys a different message:

> She asked him *to cut a long story short*.
> She asked him.
>
> Jane did not answer my letter *wisely*.
> Jane did not answer my letter.

As the constructed examples above show, the syntactic and semantic detachability is not necessarily a property of certain linguistic elements but

rather a feature of the specific use that can be made of these linguistic elements. This means that it is not a semantic or syntactic property of finite and non-finite clauses or of adverbs, for example, to be detached, rather that a finite clause or adverb can be used in a detached way in certain cases, and not in others.

Nevertheless, in language there are certain linguistic elements that are more frequently or typically used in a parenthetical / detached way than other elements. In English, this is the case with the words that belong to the grammatical class of adverbs. Adverbs, in general, appear to have a rather loose connection with the rest of the elements in a sentence. As Ramat and Ricca (1998) observe, the functional property of the linguistic category of adverbs is that they "add information to other linguistic elements which can stand on their own, semantically as well as syntactically" (p. 187), a property which they share with the linguistic category of adjectives. The difference between adjectives and adverbs is that adverbs, unlike adjectives, modify non-nominal constructions.

Of the various linguistic realizations of qualification as defined it in the previous chapter (1.3.3), I focus here on the use of single word stance adverbs as one of the linguistic means by which an utterance (that can be reconstructed as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion) may be qualified in English. The reason for this is that this class of adverbs is the most diverse in English and that it has received a lot of attention from a variety of approaches in linguistics and discourse analysis so far.

In section 2.2, I briefly present the class of stance adverbs and their relation to other classes of adverbs in English. In the three subsections of section 2.3, I relate the various groups of stance adverbs identified in the literature to the three ways of qualifying that I have distinguished in the previous chapter. Under each subsection, I first discuss briefly the classification of the relevant stance adverbs in the literature. I then describe the discourse effect that is achieved when the comment of the stance adverbs that are used for the particular way of qualifying is interpreted in the context of doubt, in which a standpoint is advanced.

2.2 Sentence adverbs and stance adverbs

Before presenting the stance adverbs that fall under the three ways of qualifying standpoints, I provide in this section a short overview of the group of stance adverbs and discuss their relation to the rest of the groups in the grammatical class of adverbs.

Biber et al. (1999) distinguish three main groups of adverbs, namely a) circumstance adverbs (*eagerly, here, now, slowly*, *then, weekly*), b) stance adverbs (*apparently, clearly, frankly*, *perhaps, technically, unfortunately*), and c) linking adverbs (*additionally*, *besides, moreover, nevertheless*). As they note (p. 765), of the three groups, circumstance adverbs are by far the most common class in all four registers of the English corpus that they have studied (conversation, fiction,

news, and academic discourse). Circumstance adverbs, however, are those that are the most dependent and least flexible regarding their position in the sentence. They pertain to what Ramat and Ricca (1998) call the representational level of meaning, concerning the description of an event. They are used as a complement of a verb or a noun and therefore cannot be omitted without disrupting the meaning of the sentence. Circumstance adverbs are part of the core propositional content of a sentence.

Conversely, stance and linking adverbs are detached, both syntactically and semantically, from the core propositional content. Stance adverbs provide a comment about the propositional content while linking adverbs signal the way in which the propositional content of the one utterance relates to that of utterances elsewhere in the text. Stance adverbs convey information about the propositional content of the sentence or about the speech act that is associated with the sentence, occupying what Ramat and Ricca (1998) refer to as the interpersonal level of meaning, which concerns speaker/hearer attitudes.

The adverbs that fall within the group of stance adverbs are often treated in the literature in connection with adverbs from the group of linking adverbs, under a number of labels and within a variety of frameworks.[26] Depending on the interests of scholars, when the syntactic criterion prevails, stance adverbs are treated next to linking adverbs, under the label of 'sentence adverbs' or 'sentence adverbials' or 'sentence modifiers'. When a pragmatic criterion is used, namely in discourse studies, there is a clear separation between stance adverbs, called 'comment pragmatic markers' and linking adverbs called 'discourse markers' (Fraser 1999). Regardless of whether a syntactic or a semantic criterion is used or a combination of both, there are still some discrepancies in the ways these adverbs are labelled and grouped in the literature (Biber et al., 1999; Halliday, 1994; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002; Quirk et al., 1985; Sinclair et al., 1990). Greenbaum (1969, p. 2) remarks:

> Grammarians are not in general agreement on what to include among sentence modifiers or sentence adverbs. Moreover, they either fail to be precise about the criteria to be employed in assigning adverbs to this class or fail to provide any criteria.

In Quirk et al.'s grammar, (1985) the adverbs listed in the Appendix are labelled 'disjuncts' or 'conjuncts', while in Sinclair's (1990) as well as in Halliday's (1994) grammar they appear under 'adjuncts'. Huddleston and Pullum (2002) classify

[26] The list in the Appendix presents in alphabetical order all the single word adverbs (some prepositional phrases are also included), which belong to the group of linking or stance adverbs and are treated in the following literature: Bartsch (1976), Biber et al. (1999), Fraser (1996), Greenbaum (1969), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), Koktova (1986), Quirk et al. (1985), Sinclair (1990). I have tried to collect all adverbs that appear in lists provided in the above literature or in the examples discussed therein. The list also includes the adverbs labelled as 'sentence adverb' that appear as an independent entry in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (2003).

them under 'adjuncts', too, more specifically under 'clause-oriented adjuncts'. In various studies from the fields of pragmatics and semantics these words also appear as 'pragmatic markers' (Fraser 1996), and 'sentence adverbials' (Bartsch, 1976; Koktova, 1986). Other labels include 'sentence markers', 'sentence modifiers' and 'sentential adverbs'. The common denominator that brings all these adverbs together is that in syntactic terms they occupy the most peripheral position in the clause and that in semantic terms they "characterize how the propositional content of the clause relates to the world or the context", as Huddleston and Pullum (2002, p. 576) put it.

As Biber et al. (1999) remark, the use of stance adverbs is much less common than the use of circumstance and linking adverbs: "In fact, most sentences in English do not contain stance adverbs. Rather they are statements made without overt stance markers" (p. 853). Of the four registers that Biber et al. have studied and from which they have drawn their examples (conversation, fiction, news, and academic discourse), stance adverbs appear more frequently in conversation. Here is how the authors explain this:

> Speakers use stance adverbs to convey their judgments and attitudes, to claim the factual nature of what they are saying, and to mark exactly how they mean their utterances to be understood. (1999, pp. 766-767)

Stance adverbs are relatively common in academic prose, while they have the lowest frequency in news.

Single word adverbs constitute the most frequent and diversified realization of stance adverbials – at least as far as the English language is concerned.[27] According to Biber et al. (1999), "prepositional phrases and finite clauses each account for about 15-20% of stance adverbials" (p. 768). Finite clauses are the second most common structural form of stance adverbials in conversation and fiction. Prepositional phrases are the second most common form in news and academic prose. Other constructions used to convey stance include: nouns, modal auxiliaries and main verbs, as well as paralinguistic features such as prosody and loudness.

Biber et al. (1999) distinguish three main types of stance adverbs, based on semantic and pragmatic criteria, namely: epistemic adverbs, attitude adverbs and style adverbs. The first group is subdivided in sub-groups as Table 1 shows.[28] Epistemic stance adverbs focus on the truth-value of the proposition commenting on factors such as certainty, reality, sources, limitations, and

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[27] A distinction is made in the literature between the terms 'adverb' and 'adverbial'. 'Adverb' refers to the part of speech that modifies a verb, adjective or another adverb. 'Adverbial' refers to words, phrases or clauses that function as adverbs. In this study, I focus on single word stance adverbs and use the term 'stance adverbs' throughout.

[28] Table 1 includes a selection of the stance adverbials that appear in Biber et al's (1999) relevant chapter as well as in the examples and in the indicative lists of stance adverbials provided in other sections of the grammar.

precision of the proposition (p. 764). Attitude stance adverbs express the speaker's attitude towards or evaluation of the content (p. 764). Style stance adverbs convey a speaker's comment about the style or form of the utterance, often clarifying how the speaker is speaking or how the utterance should be understood (p. 764).

Of stance adverbs, epistemic adverbs are much more common than the other two types in all four registers. *Perhaps* and *probably* are the most common adverbs in all registers. According to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (2003), *certainly*, *clearly*, *maybe*, and *possibly* are also among the most common. Style adverbs are more common in conversation than in other registers and attitude adverbs are slightly more common in news and academic prose than in conversation and fiction.

In the remainder of this study, I focus on single word stance adverbials, hereafter referred to as 'stance adverbs'. In the following sections, I present the adverbs of the various subgroups of stance adverbs identified in the literature that constitute the linguistic realisation of each of the three ways of qualifying standpoints.

TABLE 1 STANCE ADVERBIALS (Biber et al., 1999)

	EPISTEMIC STANCE						ATTITUDE STANCE	STYLE STANCE
	Doubt & certainty	**Actuality & reality**	**Source/ evidence**	**Limitation**	**Viewpoint or perspective**	**Imprecision**	**Evaluation; judgement; assessment of expectations**	
SINGLE WORD ADVERB	certainly, definitely, maybe, obviously, of course, perhaps, probably, undeniably, undoubtedly	actually, really	apparently, evidently, reportedly	generally, mainly, typically		about, approximately kind of, like, roughly, sort of	amazingly, astonishingly, conveniently, curiously, disturbingly, fortunately, hopefully, inevitably, interestingly, ironically, predictably, quite rightly, regrettably, sadly, sensibly, surprisingly, unbelievably, unfortunately, wisely	confidentially, figuratively, frankly, honestly, literally, seriously, truthfully
ADV. P.	most likely, quite likely						even more importantly, even worse, oddly enough, rather surprisingly	quite frankly, quite honestly, quite simply
PREP. PHRASE	for all I know, without doubt	for a fact, in actual fact, in fact	according to..	in general, in most cases, in most instances, on the whole	from our perspective, in my opinion, in my view, in our view, in some cases, in the author's view		to my surprise	in a word, in brief, with all due respect
N. P.	no doubt							
FINITE CLAUSE	I think, I guess, I bet, I would say, it seems, it appears		as X notes			if you can call it that	as might be expected, as you might guess, as you would expect	if I may say so, if you don't mind my asking
NON-FINITE CLAUSE		as a matter of fact				so to speak	most surprising of all, rather surprisingly	more simply put, putting it bluntly, strictly speaking, technically speaking, to tell you the truth

2.3 Stance adverbs and the three ways of qualifying a standpoint

Even though I take Biber et al.'s (1999) presentation of stance adverbs as a starting point for exploring the linguistic realisation of qualification, I depart from it in some respects:

First, I look at single word adverbs alone and do not consider any other grammatical realisation of stance, such as prepositional phrases, finite clauses, and so forth. That is why I refer to the group of adverbs that I study as 'stance adverbs' and not as 'stance adverbials'. Single word adverbs constitute the most varied grammatical realisation of stance in English and are more frequent than other grammatical realisations of stance.

Secondly, I do not consider these adverbs when they are used to add a comment about an element of a clause but only when they are used to comment on the whole clause. Cases where the stance adverb is used to qualify an element of the clause are illustrated in the following examples:

(1) The entrepreneurial definition is *clearly* inappropriate here. [BNC]

(2) It is *surprisingly* difficult to define aggression because it can take so many forms and be directed either inwards or outwards. [COBUILD]

(3) A *truly* wonderful piece not only because of strength, but because the steel protects the normally brittle ceramic. [COBUILD]

The standpoint that can be reconstructed from the above utterances, in which the qualifier scopes over an element of the main clause, could not be considered a qualified standpoint. This is because the comment that the adverb adds is part of the propositional content of the standpoint, not a comment about that propositional content or about the act as a whole.

Thirdly, I do not follow the sub-classifications that Biber et al. propose neither do I always agree with the items that they list under these sub-groups.

Table 2 on the next page lists the adverbs that I have selected from the list presented in the Appendix, under the three ways of qualifying a standpoint introduced in the preceding chapter. In the following subsections, I discuss each of these three groups, first by providing a brief overview of the literature concerning the linguistic status of the adverbs listed under each. I then present the discourse effect that I take these adverbs to have when they appear qualifying a standpoint.

TABLE 2
STANCE ADVERBS FOR QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT

COMMENT ABOUT THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT		**COMMENT ABOUT THE ACT**
EPISTEMIC WAY OF QUALIFYING	***EVALUATIVE WAY OF QUALIFYING***	***ILLOCUTIONARY WAY OF QUALIFYING***
ADVERBS COMMENTING ON THE COMMITMENT	**ADVERBS COMMENTING ON THE EVALUATION**	**ADVERBS COMMENTING ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WHOLE ACT**
MODAL ADVERBS arguably, assuredly, certainly*, clearly*, conceivably, definitely, doubtless, evidently, for certain, improbably, incontestably, incontrovertibly, maybe, no doubt, perhaps, possibly, presumably, probably, surely*, undoubtedly EVIDENTIAL ADVERBS allegedly, apparently, manifestly, obviously*, ostensibly, patently, purportedly, reportedly, reputedly, seemingly, supposedly, visibly DOMAIN ADVERBS aesthetically, architecturally, biologically, chemically, commercially, culturally, ecologically, economically, emotionally, environmental, ethically, financially, formally, ideally, ideologically, intellectually, linguistically, logically, materially, mechanically, mentally, morally, officially, physically, politically, practically, privately, psychologically, racially, realistically, scientifically, sexually, socially, spiritually, statistically, superficially, technically, technologically, theoretically, unofficially	(EVENT-ORIENTED/ CLAUSE ORIENTED) EVALUATIVE ADVERBS bizarrely, commendably, conveniently, curiously, disappointingly, fortunately, funnily, happily, hopefully, illogically, interestingly, ironically, justifiably, justly, luckily, oddly, paradoxically, preferably, regretfully, regrettably, sadly, significantly, strangely, surprisingly, tragically, unaccountably, unfortunately, unhappily unreasonably	ILLOCUTIONARY ADVERBS a) MANNER-OF-SPEAKING bluntly, candidly, confidentially, frankly, honestly, really, seriously, truly, truthfully b) METALINGUISTIC basically, briefly, broadly, figuratively, generally, hypothetically, literally, metaphorically, objectively, personally, roughly, simply, strictly EXPECTATION MARKERS actually, admittedly, avowedly, factually, in effect, in fact, in reality, indeed, naturally, of course, really certainly*, clearly*, obviously*, surely*

2.3.1 Stance adverbs commenting on the commitment to the propositional content

The adverbs that may be used as the linguistic realisation of the *epistemic way of qualifying standpoints* belong to what are traditionally identified as modal or epistemic adverbs (*certainly, clearly, perhaps, possibly, probably, surely*) and evidential or hearsay adverbs (*allegedly, apparently, obviously, reportedly, seemingly*), as well as domain adverbs (*emotionally, ideally, logically, officially, technically, theoretically*).[29] As the discussion of the literature in 2.3.1.1 shows, there is disagreement about the labels used and the adverbs that fall under each. When it comes to argumentative discourse and to the analysis of these adverbs as qualifiers of the standpoint, the degree of commitment or the source of evidence do not play a role in understanding the discourse effect that their use may have. As I argue in section 2.3.1.2, the use of any of these adverbs has the discourse effect of emphasising the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.

2.3.1.1 Modal, evidential and domain adverbs

The adverbs that appear in the first column of Table 2 (as the linguistic realisation of the way of qualifying standpoints by commenting on the commitment to the propositional content) are treated in the literature under a variety of names such as 'modal', 'epistemic', 'evidential', 'hearsay', and 'domain' adverbs. The discussion of the relevant literature in this section illustrates that there is disagreement not only about the names but also about the items that fall under each label, something which allows space for considering these adverbs under one broad group of epistemic stance adverbs.

Both Greenbaum (1969) and Quirk et al. (1985) identify a group of adverbs that express a 'comment about the truth-value of what is said' and divide it further into three sub-groups. However, each of these authors applies a different criterion for the proposed subdivision. Two of the sub-groups that Greenbaum distinguishes are adverbs that 'merely express shades of doubt or certainty', and adverbs that 'in addition refer to the observation or perception of a state of affairs'. On the other hand, Quirk et al. distinguish between adverbs that 'express conviction', and adverbs that 'express some degree of doubt'.[30] Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989) follow Quirk et al.'s distinction and identify 'surely-adverbials' on the one hand and 'maybe-adverbials' on the other. Biber et al. (1999), however, treat all these adverbs under one group of epistemic stance adverbs conveying doubt or certainty. Similarly, Fraser (1996) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) place the adverbs in question under one group called 'evidential markers' (Fraser) or 'modal clause-adjuncts'

[29] For a detailed list, see the first column in Table 2.

[30] For the third sub-group, which includes adverbs that convey 'the sense in which the speaker judges what he says to be true', see the paragraph about domain adverbs on page 53.

(Huddleston & Pullum), instead of identifying two different groups on the basis of the criterion of degree of probability. In line with Greenbaum's original distinction, Fraser and Biber et al. distinguish between adverbs that merely indicate a degree and adverbs that indicate the type of source (the latter are labelled 'hearsay markers' in Fraser).

When looking into the individual items that fall under the above labels, there is no agreement either. Take for example the following group of adverbs:

> allegedly, certainly, clearly, evidently, obviously, reportedly, seemingly, supposedly, surely

According to Greenbaum, *certainly*, *surely*, and *allegedly*, *reportedly* and *supposedly* belong to the group of adverbs that expresses shades of doubt or certainty. The first two adverbs convey conviction and the other three convey some degree of doubt. *Clearly*, *evidently*, and *obviously* belong to another group that expresses, in addition, the observation of a state of affairs. *Seemingly* falls in that same group, indicating some degree of doubt. According to Fraser, however, *certainly*, *clearly*, *evidently*, *obviously*, *seemingly*, *supposedly*, and *surely* belong to the group of evidential markers, while *allegedly* and *reportedly* belong to the group of hearsay markers. Biber et al. seem to agree with Fraser's groupings with the exception of *evidently*, which they consider to indicate source of knowledge instead of doubt/certainty.

For the same group of adverbs, Quirk et al. and Biber and Finegan agree that *certainly*, *clearly*, *obviously*, *surely*, and *evidently* indicate strong conviction, while *allegedly*, *reportedly*, *seemingly*, and *supposedly* together with *apparently* and *presumably* indicate some degree of doubt. Huddleston and Pullum go even further, distinguishing four degrees of strength, with *certainly*, *obviously* and *surely* indicating strong degree, while *apparently*, *evidently*, *presumably*, *seemingly* indicating a 'quasi-strong' degree.[31] Note, moreover, that according to Greenbaum, Quirk et al., and Biber and Finegan, *apparently* indicates conviction and *evidently* indicates some degree of doubt, but that according to Huddleston and Pullum, both indicate 'quasi-strong degree'. Sinclair (1990), who offers the most diversified classification of adverbs, places the above adverbs under three different groups. The adverbs of the first group indicate 'justification for a statement' (*apparently*, *clearly*, *evidently*, *obviously*). The adverbs of the second group indicate reality or possibility (*allegedly*, *certainly*, *presumably*, *seemingly*, *supposedly*). The adverbs of the third group, 'assuming hearer's agreement', include once more the adverb *apparently* of the first group and the adverbs *clearly*, *obviously* of second group, next to *naturally*, *of course*, and *plainly*.[32]

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[31] According to Huddleston and Pullum, *arguably* and *probably* indicate 'medium' degree, while *maybe*, *perhaps*, and *possibly* indicate 'weak' degree.

[32] I take these last three adverbs to belong to the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying standpoints, see 2.3.3.

Both Greenbaum and Quirk et al. distinguish a third sub-group within the group of adverbs that indicate a 'comment on the truth-value of what is said', which includes adverbs that 'state the sense in which the speaker judges what he says to be true'. Here is a list of the adverbs that both authors place under it:

> basically, essentially, formally, fundamentally, ideally, nominally, ostensibly, outwardly, superficially, technically, theoretically

Quirk et al. additionally include *actually*, *factually*, and *really*.[33] Biber and Finegan, however treat the above adverbs in two different groups: *basically*, *essentially*, *fundamentally*, and *nominally* fall under 'generally-adverbials', together with *broadly*, *generally*, *roughly*, and *simply*, while *ideally*, *officially*, *technically*, and *theoretically* fall under 'maybe-adverbials'. Sinclair too, distinguishes between *technically* indicating 'specification' and *basically*, *broadly*, *essentially*, *fundamentally*, and *generally* indicating 'generalisation', within the broad category of 'field of reference'. In Sinclair, *nominally*, *officially*, and *theoretically* appear under the group of adverbs indicating 'reality or possibility'. Fraser excludes from the lists of his commentary pragmatic markers such adverbs as *ideally*, *literally*, *officially*, *technically* and *theoretically*, which he labels 'hedges' and takes them to be "preposed adverbials that are part of the propositional content" (1996, p. 180, note 17). Huddleston and Pullum follow Bellert (1977), who calls the adverbs *aesthetically*, *linguistically*, *logically*, and *morally* 'domain adjuncts'.

There is quite a discrepancy in the labels used for the group of adverbs presented in the previous paragraph, which I refer to as 'domain adverbs'. The disagreement is also about deciding which items fall under this group and what their function is. The adverbs that fall under this group can take a paraphrase like 'X speaking', where X stands for the relevant adverb, a feature that they seem to share with adverbs like *frankly*. Nevertheless, domain adverbs may also be paraphrased as 'from an X point of view', where X stands for the adjective from which the relevant adverb derives, something which is not the case for *frankly* adverbs. Moreover, domain adverbs can be focused, something which makes them different from adverbs like *apparently*, *clearly*, and *evidently* or *perhaps* presented earlier in this section. Nevertheless, domain adverbs, like the so-called modal and evidential adverbs, affect the truth conditions of the sentence in which they appear, something which is not the case with *frankly* adverbs. Ramat and Ricca (1998), who present a typological overview of sentence adverbs in the languages spoken in Europe, discuss briefly the problems that arise with domain adverbs and choose to place them in between the speech-act oriented adverbs (illocutionary adverbs), such as *frankly*, and what they call 'propositional adverbs' (that is, modal and evaluative adverbs). Quirk et al. (1985, p. 569) also note that 'viewpoint subjuncts', such as *architecturally*, *linguistically*, *morally*, and *politically*, are not the same as the speech-related

[33] For these three adverbs, see the last group in 2.3.3.1.

disjuncts even though they may resemble them, despite the paraphrase with *speaking* that both groups can take.

As I argue in the following section, domain adverbs[34] can be considered together with the so-called modal and evidential adverbs as belonging to the same group of adverbs that may realise linguistically the epistemic way of qualifying standpoints. This is possible because the semantic criterion of degree of commitment to the truth/falsity of the proposition is not a decisive criterion when it comes to the qualification of a standpoint.

2.3.1.2 Emphasising the quality of the evidence

In general, it is acknowledged that modal adverbs like *perhaps* and *clearly*, and evidential adverbs like *apparently* and *allegedly* indicate strong or weak degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition that is asserted in a sentence and can thereby be used in order to boost or downplay the effect that the asserted sentence has or the expectations that it creates for the audience (Holmes, 1984; Sbisà, 2001). In this section, I argue that there is no difference in the discourse effect that using a modal or an evidential adverb has when qualifying a standpoint in an argumentative discourse. I also argue that domain adverbs follow the same pattern and that all three groups of adverbs can be considered as the linguistic realisation of the epistemic way of qualifying standpoints. This way of qualifying standpoints seeks to emphasise the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.

In the pragma-linguistic literature, the equation between the lexical meaning of such adverbs as *certainly*, *clearly*, *obviously*, *perhaps*, *possibly*, *probably*, *surely*, and the effect of emphasising or acknowledging a limitation in the speaker's knowledge or commitment is not a straightforward one. Aijmer (2002b), reviewing some studies concerning adverbs such as *certainly*, *no doubt*, and *surely*, remarks that scholars have different views on whether these adverbs mark certainty or uncertainty. Part of the disagreement arises from the confusion between meaning as lexical meaning of these words and meaning as the use that can be made of these words in context. The question for my study, however, concerns the effect of the language user's choice to mark a high or low degree of probability/certainty in argumentative discourse. Whether marking a high or low degree of probability (or of certainty or commitment) can be achieved in a particular context by using *certainly* and in another by using *no doubt* or *probably* is of no direct importance here. Having said that, it should

[34] In the list of domain adverbs that I present in Table 2, I do not include the adverbs *essentially*, *fundamentally*, *nominally*, and *outwardly*. This is because they do not function in the same way as adverbs like *technically* and *theoretically*, which indicate a field or perspective from which the language user asserts the truth of the proposition. The adverbs *basically* and *generally* are also missing from this list because they are not used in order to specify some field but rather to indicate the style of speaking. They appear together with adverbs like *briefly*, *figuratively*, and *roughly* under 'illocutionary adverbs' in the third column. See 2.3.3.1.

be clear that there is no established agreement concerning the adverbs that fall under the rubric of the 'modal' or 'epistemic' group and that there is still a lot to be said concerning the multifunctionality of most of these adverbs.[35]

Merlini Barbaresi (1987) distinguishes adverbs like *arguably*, *certainly*, *perhaps*, *possibly*, *presumably*, and *probably*, from adverbs like *apparently*, *clearly*, *obviously*, *oddly*, *seemingly*, and *surprisingly*.[36] The former are labelled 'epistemic modifiers'. They are locutor-oriented in the sense that they express degrees of the speaker's personal commitment to the correctness of what he asserts. The latter are labelled 'inferability indicators'. They are receiver-oriented in the sense that they indicate how acceptable the speaker judges his utterance to be for his interlocutor. While epistemic modifiers directly contribute to the epistemic evaluation and thereby make the speaker's commitment shift on the epistemic scale, inferability indicators do not, in principle, mark a high or low degree of commitment. Merlini Barbaresi further observes that "the epistemic evaluation of the thesis belongs naturally to the argumentative-line dimension, the inferability assessment to the metatextual dimension" (1987, p. 20). This author's distinction echoes the distinction between adverbs that signal (subjective) epistemic modality and adverbs that signal evidentiality.[37] Epistemic modality is an indication of the speaker's evaluation of the probability of the state of affairs expressed in the clause, while evidentiality is an indication of the speaker's evaluation of the nature or quality of the sources of the evidence for accepting the existence of a state of affairs (Nuyts, 1993, 2005). While the definition of the two concepts appears clear, the boundaries between the various elements that constitute the linguistic realisation of the one or the other are not. As Nuyts observes, evidential categories often suggest or imply a certain degree of probability of the state of affairs.

With respect to *obviously*, for example, Aijmer (2006) observes that while its lexical meaning suggests that the speaker draws the conclusion on the basis of some evidence, when used in context it signals that something is not obvious or that the speaker has strong evidence for what he asserts. Aijmer identifies the various functions that the use of *obviously* has in the various contexts in which it appears as follows: a) a strongly evidential function, where the speaker emphasises the strength of the evidence he has; b) a distancing/ hedging function, where the source of the evidence that the speaker has is externalised or attributed to some source other than the speaker (what people say); c) an impositive function, where the speaker suggests that the proposition should be

[35] Adverbs like *certainly*, *clearly*, *obviously*, and *surely* are used not only to indicate strong degree of commitment but also, by extension, to emphasise the unexpectedness or expectedness of the speaker's utterance. In Table 2, these adverbs appear both under the first and the third column, marked with an asterisk.

[36] All of these adverbs, with the exception of *oddly* and *surprisingly* appear under the first column of Table 2. The latter appear under the second column of Table 2, and are discussed in 2.3.2.

[37] On the concept of evidentiality and the lexical or grammatical realisation of it in language, see Chafe (1986) and Rooryck (2001a, 2001b).

known by the audience, regardless of whether it is actually known or not; and d) a solidarity-establishing function, where the speaker presents the information as already shared knowledge.

With respect to the adverbs *certainly* and *surely*, Aijmer (2002b) distinguishes between their use as adverbs and as discourse particles. As adverbs, *certainly* and *surely* can be used to indicate certainty but also uncertainty. Echoing an observation originally made by Lyons (1977), Aijmer writes:

> When the speaker uses the marked alternative with surely, the hearer infers, correctly or not, that the speaker is not certain, since it would have been more economical to use a bare assertion. (2002b, p. 100)

Certainly expresses stronger certainty than *surely*. As discourse marker, *surely* is used in contexts where the speaker seeks confirmation, while *certainly* is used for emphasis.

Nuyts (2005) argues against lumping epistemic modality and evidentiality together, despite the fuzziness of the boundary between the two concepts. While this makes sense at a theoretical level, when it comes to dealing with the linguistic realisations of either of these categories, and in particular when studying stance adverbs as qualifiers in argumentative discourse, this is not so easy. The language user who qualifies his utterance with *perhaps* indicates a weak commitment to the truth of the proposition he asserts. Such a commitment is warranted on evidence the source or quality of which is not strong enough to justify a stronger degree of commitment. Conversely, the language user who qualifies his utterance with *clearly* indicates strong commitment to the truth of the proposition he asserts, which is warranted on evidence the source or quality of which is strong enough to justify such a degree. The degree of commitment expressed by the choice of one or another adverb can thus be related to a certain kind of source of evidence that one has at one's disposal when making a relatively 'strong' or a relatively 'weak' claim.

Compare the two constructed examples (adjusted from the COBUILD corpus) regarding an evaluation of the correctness of the numbers of an astronomical table found in an old text:

(1) *Perhaps* the numbers are incorrect because the author of the text is not Arab [and Arabs were prototypically the most knowledgeable mathematicians and astronomers at that time].

(2) *Clearly* the numbers are incorrect because they do not add up to 112 [and 112 is what the numbers of all other astrological maps of the time add up to].

The choice of the adverb *perhaps* in the first text reflects the author's belief that the fact that Arabs were the best mathematicians is not a strong basis for concluding that the numbers in a text written by a non-Arab author are incorrect. On the other hand, the choice of the adverb *clearly* in the second text

reflects the author's belief that deciding whether the numbers add up to 112 or not is a matter that can be easily verified. Of course, this by no means suggests that there is no way to challenge the argument in text (2) as insufficient, if number 112 in all astrological maps of the time can be shown to be incorrect anyway. Conversely, one could accept the argument in text (1) as sufficient if everyone agrees that all astrological maps written by non-Arabs contain mistakes. An author addressing an audience that is knowledgeable about the one or the other fact could have chosen to qualify the standpoint in (1) using *clearly* and the standpoint in (2) using *perhaps*, instead. Moreover, the author could have used *obviously* in both cases. The interpretation of this adverb would differ depending on the context each time. To an audience that agrees about the mathematical supremacy of all Arab authors, *obviously* would be interpreted as *clearly*. To an audience that is sceptical about the correctness of the number 112 found in all astrological maps of the time, *obviously* would be interpreted as *perhaps*, in the sense that its use would imply the speaker's uncertainty about which view is the correct one.

In the light of the above, I do not make a distinction between evidential and modal adverbs but treat them all under the rubric of epistemic standpoint qualifiers. Moreover, I take the distinction between strong and weak degrees of commitment to be purely about the semantic aspect of meaning and not to play a role in understanding what the pragmatic effect of the use of epistemic standpoint qualifiers is when used in argumentative discourse.[38] In a dialogic analysis of argumentative discourse, the use of adverbs such as *clearly*, *obviously*, *perhaps*, and *probably* is to be functionally contrasted to the use of other adverbs, such as *actually*, *fortunately*, *frankly*, *honestly*, *in fact*, and *surprisingly*, as part of a system comprising various elements from where the language user can choose in order to qualify the utterance by means of which he advances a standpoint. In this light, the question to ask is: what discursive effect does signalling that the speaker is (un)certain and that he is (not) fully committed to the truth value of the proposition have for the development of the argumentative discussion?

As the constructed dialogues[39] below show, the choice of an adverb like *clearly* or *perhaps* cannot be challenged by the question of the other party:

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[38] In a schematic way, however, in other parts of the text, I refer to adverbs *perhaps*, *possibly*, and *probably* as 'weak epistemic adverbs' and to adverbs *certainly*, *clearly*, and *obviously* as 'strong epistemic adverbs', abstracting from their context-dependent interpretation.

[39] Jayez and Rossari (2004), Nuyts (1993), and Papafragou (2006) make use of similar constructed dialogues in order to illustrate the so-called 'assent/dissent test or diagnostic'. The aim of this test is to show whether the modal meaning that an adverb (or verb) adds is part or not of the propositional content and whether it affects the truth conditions of the sentence or not. According to this test, if the content of a modal adverb or verb can be challenged or endorsed by the hearer then the modal adverb or verb can be said to contribute to the truth conditions of the sentence in which it appears. Among these authors, however, there seems to be disagreement as to how to interpret the results of this test. Nuyts and Papafragou are of the opinion that the

A: *Clearly*, Paul lost the election.
B: ?You are not right / That is not true, I think this is not so clear.

A: *Perhaps*, Paul lost the election.
B: ?You are not right / That is not true, I think this is not so probable.

In the above constructed dialogues, B's expression of disagreement cannot be taken to concern the epistemic adverb alone. In the case of *clearly*, B's reaction is understood as concerning the proposition 'John lost the election'. It could stand as a reaction expressing disagreement even if *clearly* were missing from A's utterance. The same observations apply in the case of *perhaps*. Furthermore, in utterances with an epistemic/modal adverb the hearer cannot concede to the truth of the embedded proposition and at the same time disagree with the choice of the adverb, as the following examples show:

A: *Clearly*, John lost the elections.
B: *That is true [= that John lost the elections] but it is not clear.

A: *Probably*, John lost the elections.
B: *That is true [= that John lost the elections] but it is not probable.

It is this latter feature that presumably makes scholars like Jayez and Rossari (2004) argue that the hearer's assenting or dissenting reaction includes the modal adverb. But even with this interpretation, the examples above would still be unacceptable since language user B would appear contradicting himself as the following examples illustrate:

A: *Clearly*, John lost the elections.
B: *That is true [= that it is clear that John lost the elections] but it is not clear.

A: *Probably*, John lost the elections.
B: *That is true [= that is it probable that John lost the elections] but it is not probable.

The above utterances may be used, as Jayez and Rossari make use of them, in order to illustrate in semantic terms that modal adverbs are part of the truth-evaluable propositional content of the utterance and to contrast them to evaluative adverbs.[40] However, in pragmatic terms the implications of the

assent or dissent of the hearer cannot be interpreted as endorsing /challenging the modal, contrary to Jayez and Rossari's interpretation.

[40] Contrary to Jayez and Rossari (2004), Papafragou (2006, p. 1697) concludes that the assent/dissent test "does not constitute evidence for the truth-conditional nature of (subjective) epistemic modality". A similar observation is made by Nuyts (1993). Interestingly, Papafragou,

unacceptability of the above utterances and their comparison to those containing evaluative adverbs and illocutionary adverbs (see the discussion in 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.3.2, respectively) concern the way a dialogue may proceed, the options that are available for the other party and the way the speaker may anticipate them.

Domain adverbs such as *architecturally*, *linguistically*, *politically*, *technically*, and *theoretically* can also be treated as a way to qualify an utterance by adding a comment conveying commitment to the propositional content. By specifying a field within which the proposition expressed in the sentence holds as true according to the speaker, these adverbs signal that the degree of probability that the embedded proposition is true is the highest, upon condition that the field remains the same, while they indicate that the degree is low or unknown in case the field shifts. Nevertheless, domain adverbs have some interesting pragmatic and semantic properties that relate them to modal adverbs and others that differentiate them from the latter.

Like modal adverbs, domain adverbs affect the truth conditions of the utterance. Similarly, the hearer cannot react to an utterance qualified by a domain adverb making a distinction between agreement regarding the embedded proposition and disagreement regarding the choice of that adverb.

A: *Technically*, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: *That is true [= that technically Clark Kent is Superman], but it is not technically that he is.

However, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002, p. 766) observe, domain adverbs unlike modal ones can be the informational focus in alternative questions, contrastive negation or in *it*-clefts as the following constructed examples illustrate:

Are valves the best way to amplify a guitar *technically* or *practically*?

Valves are the best way to amplify a guitar *technically* but not *practically*.

It is *technically* that valves are the best way to amplify a guitar.

*Are valves the best way to amplify a guitar *clearly* or *perhaps*?

*Valves are the best way to amplify a guitar *perhaps* but not *clearly*.

*It is *clearly* that valves are the best way to amplify a guitar.

The hearer can thus concede to an utterance qualified by a domain adverb and then indicate another domain, in which the embedded proposition does not hold, without being inconsistent, something which is not possible with modal adverbs:

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contrary to Nuyts, argues in favour of the truth-conditional nature of modals but does not take the so-called assent/dissent test to be a proof for her claim, and rightly so.

A: *Technically*, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: That is true, but in practice he is not.

A: *Perhaps* Clark Kent is Superman.
B: *That is true, but clearly he is not.

A: *Clearly* Clark Kent is Superman.
B: *That is true, but perhaps he is not.

When the utterance is qualified by a domain adverb, any agreement or disagreement expressed as a reaction to it counts as such within the domain specified by that adverb in the first place. The hearer can only concede that the embedded proposition holds as correct or challenge it as incorrect within the domain specified by the adverb.

When interpreted against the background of an argumentative discussion, the modal, evidential, and domain adverbs that constitute the linguistic realisation of the epistemic way of qualifying standpoints do not hedge the claim that the language user puts forward or modify the commitment that one undertakes when making that claim. Their presence is not necessary for the utterance to function as a standpoint in an argumentative discussion. The utterance in which such adverbs may occur functions as a standpoint when doubt is cast over the (positive or negative) position that the speaker is taken to assume in the speech act that he is performing by uttering that sentence. The doubt does not pertain to the choice of the particular adverb. The discourse effect of the protagonist's choice to qualify the utterance that functions as a standpoint with a modal, evidential or domain adverb, in the context of an argumentative discussion, is that it signals the protagonist's belief that the argumentation he is ready to forward in support of his claim is of good quality.

2.3.2 Stance adverbs commenting on the evaluation of the propositional content

The adverbs that can be used as the linguistic realisation of the *evaluative way of qualifying standpoints* belong to the group of adverbs that are generically labelled as 'evaluative adverbs' or 'attitudinal adverbs' (*fortunately, happily, interestingly, oddly, strangely, unfortunately*).[41] As I argue in section 2.3.2.1, of this large group of adverbs, only a sub-group can be considered as the linguistic realisation of the evaluative way of qualifying standpoints. This is the group of evaluative adverbs that convey evaluation regarding the representation of the event as a whole and not an evaluation of the participants/agents involved in the event described in the sentence. In section 2.3.2.2, I argue that the comment these adverbs add to

[41] For a detailed list, see the second column in Table 2.

the propositional content of the standpoint puts emphasis on the evaluation that the speaker and the interlocutor share.

2.3.2.1 Evaluative adverbs

Of the literature that I have reviewed, Greenbaum is the only one who provides a very detailed subdivision of adverbs like the following:

> conveniently, curiously, fortunately, happily, interestingly, ironically, luckily, oddly, paradoxically, regrettably, sadly, surprisingly, unfortunately

All these adverbs appear under a group that conveys 'a judgment about what is being said', subdivided in six sub-sets.[42] Other authors list all these adverbs under one group without any subdivisions. Biber and Finegan list the above adverbs under 'amazingly-adverbials', Biber et al. under 'attitude adverbials', Fraser under 'assessment markers', and Sinclair under adverbs expressing 'opinion'. Quirk et al., however, distinguish two sub-groups under the general group of adverbs conveying 'value judgment'. The adverbs of the first sub-group 'express a judgment on what is being said as a whole and they normally apply the same judgment simultaneously to the subject of the clause'. The adverbs of the second sub-group express a 'judgment [that] carries no implication that it applies to the subject of the clause'. Adverbs such as *foolishly* and *rightly* fall in the first sub-group while the adverbs listed above belong to the second sub-group.

As far as the same list of adverbs is concerned, Huddleston and Pullum identify a group of 'evaluative clause-oriented adjuncts', under which the adverbs *curiously*, *disappointingly*, *fortunately*, *funnily*, *happily*, *luckily*, *oddly*, *regrettably*, *sadly*, *strangely*, *surprisingly*, and *unfortunately* fall. The authors do not consider, however, adverbs such as *foolishly*, *rightly*, and *stupidly* to be part of that group. Instead, they classify these adverbs under another group that they call 'act-related adjuncts', which is oriented to the verb phrase and not to the whole clause.[43] Adverbs like *accidentally*, *knowingly,* and *reluctantly* belong to this latter group. In addition, Huddleston and Pullum distinguish two sub-types within the group of 'act-related adjuncts' along the same lines of Quirk et al.'s distinction. The first sub-type includes adverbs like *cleverly*, *foolishly*, *rudely*, and *wisely*, while the second sub-type includes adverbs like *accidentally*, *deliberately*, *intentionally*, *knowingly*, and *willingly*.

The adverbs that fall under the fist sub-type of the 'act-related adjuncts' in Huddleston and Pullum's classification involve not only an evaluation of the act

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[42] The other general group that Greenbaum distinguishes includes adverbs 'conveying an opinion on the truth of what is being said', and is the one that I have already discussed in the previous sub-section.

[43] Ramat and Ricca (1998) label the adverbs that fall under these two groups as 'event-oriented evaluatives' and 'participant-oriented evaluatives', respectively.

by the speaker but also an evaluation of the actor too. While such adverbs may occupy initial position in a sentence and may be relatively flexible in occupying other positions, they cannot be considered as qualifying the whole utterance. Consider the following examples (taken from Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, pp. 675-6):

(1) He answered the question *foolishly*

(2) He *foolishly* answered the question

(3) *Foolishly*, he answered the question

The same form of the adverb *foolishly* complements the verb in (1), while it qualifies the verb in both (2) and (3). Note that only (1) can be given as an answer to the question 'How did he answer the question?'. In none of the above cases, however, can the adverb be considered as qualifying the whole utterance, not even in (3) where the adverb appears in front position. Consider the following text taken from the COBUILD corpus:

(4) Many East German factories were chronically overmanned under the old system and, according to Joachim Nawrocki, the loss of many jobs is inevitable: Many people are worried about their jobs. Quite *rightly*, because the East German economy is a complete shambles and has the wrong structure.

In the above text, the adverb *rightly* expresses the author's comment about the event described in the proposition 'Many people are worried about their jobs'. At the same time, the use of the adverb *rightly* expresses the author's evaluation of the people who are worried. The author can be considered committed to a standpoint paraphrased as: 'My point of view is that the people in East Germany are right being worried about their jobs' or to a standpoint paraphrased as: 'My point of view is that it is right that people are worried about their jobs in East Germany'. In either case, the adverb *rightly* cannot be said to qualify the standpoint that the author has advanced, since it is precisely that which receives support by the subordinate clause that follows: 'Because the East German economy is a complete shambles and has the wrong structure'.

The other sub-group that Huddleston and Pullum distinguish within the group of 'act-related adjuncts' includes adverbs such as *accidentally*, *deliberately*, and *willingly*, which "do not reflect a subjective evaluation of the act but relate to the intentions or willingness of the agent" (2002, p. 676). These adverbs cannot be paraphrased in the way adverbs like *foolishly* can: '*It was deliberate of him to answer two questions'. Moreover, they are less flexible in the positions they can occupy in the sentence. Nevertheless, none of the sub-groups of 'act-related adjuncts' can be said to qualify the standpoint that can be reconstructed from the utterance in which they appear. This is because the comment that they

add pertains to the agent involved in the event that is described and not to the event as a whole.[44]

The adverbs that I take as qualifying the standpoint evaluatively are those that are labelled in the literature as 'evaluative clause-oriented adjuncts' (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002) or as 'event-oriented evaluatives' (Ramat & Ricca, 1998).

2.3.2.2 Emphasising shared evaluation

In this section, I argue that the comment evaluative adverbs add to the standpoint when qualifying it can be understood only as signalling a shared evaluation between the arguer and his interlocutor. If the interlocutor targets the evaluative comment that these adverbs add to the standpoint, the evaluative comment becomes the bone of contention in the argumentative discussion. In such a case, the evaluative comment becomes the standpoint and does not count as qualifying the standpoint.

In the discourse analysis literature, the use of evaluative terms has received considerable attention and has been studied under the labels 'evaluation', 'appraisal' and 'affect' as well as 'stance'. Hunston and Thompson (2000, p. 5), who provide an overview of related studies in this field, offer the following broad definition of evaluation:

> The expression of the speaker or writer's attitudes or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values.

In its broad conception, evaluation is linguistically manifest in discourse by a number of elements such as adverbs, particles, phrases, nouns, gestures and so forth. Martin and White (2005), elaborating on Stubbs's (1986) view, consider appraisal and the linguistic means by which it is realised in language to be a more encompassing category than modality. Here, I take a restricted view of evaluation and I am only concerned with adverbs such as *fortunately*, *interestingly*, *ironically*, *luckily*, *strangely*, and *unfortunately*, which convey the speaker's evaluation of the event, situation or state of affairs that is asserted in the clause in which they appear.

In the pragmatics and semantics literature there has been an interest in this specific group of evaluative adverbs and their contribution to the meaning of the utterance in which they appear (Bach, 1999; Bellert, 1977; Bonami & Godard, 2007; Ifantidou, 2001; Jayez & Rossari, 2004). It is suggested that the utterance in which an evaluative adverb appears counts as the assertion of two

[44] Thus, the following adverbs are filtered out from the list of the stance adverbs that can be used to qualify a standpoint evaluatively: *accidentally*, *amiably*, *aptly*, *carelessly*, *cautiously*, *cleverly*, *consciously*, *cunningly*, *deliberately*, *effectively*, *foolishly*, *harmfully*, *inappropriately*, *incorrectly*, *kindly*, *mildly*, *mistakenly*, *prudently*, *rightly*, *selfishly*, *shamingly*, *startlingly*, *suitably*, *suspiciously*, *unjustly*, *unwisely*, *wisely*.

propositions at the same time, one asserting the embedded proposition and another asserting a proposition that contains the adjective from which the evaluative adverb derives:

Unfortunately, Clark Kent is Superman
a. Clark Kent is Superman
b. That Clark Kent is Superman is unfortunate

Evaluatives unlike the so-called illocutionary adverbs do not add a comment to the speech act that is performed by means of asserting the proposition in the sentence but rather add a comment to the event or state of affairs that is described in the utterance. Nevertheless, the comment that evaluatives add to the content of the utterance does not contribute directly to the truth-conditional status of the utterance, unlike the case with modal adverbs (see 2.3.1.2 above). A number of accounts have been proposed in order to explore how evaluative adverbs contribute to the meaning of the utterance.

Bach (1999) agrees with Bellert (1977) that utterances containing an evaluative adverb express two propositions, "the proposition expressed by the matrix sentence and the proposition that the fact stated by that proposition has the property expressed by the assessive [=evaluative]" (p. 359). He contrasts utterances containing such adverbs with those containing modal adverbs like *certainly* saying that the latter express only one proposition. Somehow confusingly, though, he includes in his list of adverbs, which he labels 'assessives', and which he considers to be content-modifiers not utterance-modifiers, adverbs like *obviously*, *of course*, and *undoubtedly* next to adverbs like *amazingly*, *coincidentally*, *disappointingly*, *(un)expectedly*, *(un)fortunately*, *incredibly*, *inevitably*, *ironically*, *luckily*, *naturally*, *oddly*, *predictably*, *regrettably*, *sadly*, *surprisingly*. He maintains that these adverbs can occur within the subordinate *that*-clause of an indirect quotation and thereby contribute to the specification of what is said, unlike utterance-modifiers, which cannot.[45]

Jayez and Rossari (2004) remark that evaluative adverbs are puzzling as far as their contribution to the meaning of an utterance is concerned, because they seem to "interact with the assertive force of the sentence in which they occur", while at the same time they are not part of what is said. They conclude that evaluative adverbs trigger conventional implicatures since they are not part of what is said and they fail the tests that detect presuppositions. The authors suggest that the same status of conventional implicatures is shared by other parentheticals as well, namely connectives and the so-called illocutionary adverbs (see also Bonami et al., 2004).

Ifantidou (2001), who works within the framework of Relevance Theory, observes that evaluatives contribute to the level of higher-explicatures in the

[45] Bach's list of 'utterance modifiers' includes adverbs like *confidentially*, *metaphorically*, and *truthfully*, which I discuss in the next section under 'illocutionary adverbs'. Interestingly, the prototypical illocutionary adverb *frankly* is missing from his list.

interpretation of the utterance, like illocutionary adverbs, and unlike modal and evidential adverbs, which contribute to the basic explicatures of the utterance.[46] Regardless of the different terminology and theoretical motivations of the two accounts, it is interesting to observe that both Jayez & Rossari and Ifantidou propose a common account for the way in which evaluative and illocutionary adverbs contribute to the interpretation of an utterance, contrary to Bach, who distinguishes between the pragmatics of evaluative adverbs (assessives) and those of illocutionary adverbs. The latter, belonging to the group of 'utterance modifiers' that Bach discusses, do not contribute to what is said but do not generate conventional implicatures either; "they are the vehicles for the performance of second-order speech acts", as Bach (1999, p. 365) maintains.

Whether a pragmatic account in terms of explicatures or in terms of conventional implicatures is the right one to capture the way in which evaluative adverbs contribute to the meaning of an utterance is beyond the interests of this study. The discussion shows that evaluatives, unlike epistemic (evidential and domain) adverbs, introduce a piece of information, that is, an evaluative comment, which cannot be accepted or rejected by the other party without first accepting the core message, that is, the embedded proposition. As the following constructed dialogic exchange illustrates, no adverb with the whole clause as its scope can be directly challenged by the dissenting or assenting reaction of the hearer.

A: Frankly/Probably/Fortunately, Clark Kent is Superman
B: *That is (not) true / I (do not) agree, you are (not) frank
*That is (not) true / I (do not) agree, this is (not) probable
*That is (not) true / I (do not) agree, this is (not) fortunate

A short affirmation or rejection by the other party can by default concern the embedded proposition. However, as I discuss in the following paragraph, if the other party provides further specification, when countering the preceding utterance, his reaction can be understood as targeting either the evaluative comment or the embedded proposition.

Bonami and Godard (2007), who maintain that evaluative adverbs constitute conventional implicatures, agreeing with Jayez and Rossari (2004), seem to suggest that a hearer cannot directly disagree with the choice of an evaluative without first conceding to the truth of the embedded proposition. Using constructed examples in French, they compare the following two

[46] Ifantidou does not follow Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implied. She follows Sperber and Wilson (1995, p. 182) who define the explicatures of an utterance as "the explicitly communicated assumptions", and the implicatures as "any assumptions communicated, but not explicitly so". The concept of higher-order explicatures refers to information that is linguistically communicated given the context and the cognitive environment of the speaker and the hearer, which cannot be captured by the proper propositional meaning of the utterance.

reactions of B to A's utterance. They consider the first one of the two to be unacceptable:

A: Paul a malheureusement perdu l'élection.
'Paul unfortunately lost the election'

B: *C'est faux, je trouve que c'est une très bonne nouvelle.
'That's not true, I think it is very good news'

B': C'est vrai, mais moi, je trouve que c'est une très bonne nouvelle.
'It's true, but I personally think it is great news'

It is not clear, however, whether the authors wish to claim on the basis of the above examples that there is no way to challenge the evaluative comment that language user A has made without first conceding the embedded proposition or that the particular way of doing so, namely by saying 'That is not true' may under no circumstances count as a challenge pertaining to the evaluative comment of A's utterance. I am of the opinion that merely reacting by saying 'That is not true' would by default target the embedded proposition rather than the evaluative comment, as the first dialogic exchange on this page suggests. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is possible for the hearer to specify what he (dis)agrees with by continuing in one or the other way. Therefore, I would not consider B's first reaction (above) to be unacceptable, rather one that may be less frequent. Consider:

A: Unfortunately, Paul lost the election.
B: You are not right/ It is not true, I think this is very good news.
B': You are not right/ It is not true, he got quite a few seats in the Senate.

A: Unfortunately, Paul lost the election.
B: You are right/ It is true, I think this is very bad news.
B': You are right/ It is true, he only got few seats in the Senate.

It can be safely concluded that evaluatives *can* be targeted, provided that an appropriate specification follows the initial assenting or dissenting reaction of the hearer. On the contrary, in utterances with *frankly* and *actually* adverbs (as well as in utterances with *clearly* and *perhaps* adverbs), the hearer has no means of expressing agreement or disagreement with the comment that the adverb adds. Compare:

A: Frankly/Actually, John is not coming with us tonight.
B: *That is not true/I disagree, you are not talking sincerely.
B: *That is not true/I disagree, that is what I have said already.

In the light of the above discussion about the behaviour of evaluative adverbs, an utterance qualified by an evaluative counts as a qualified standpoint only when the argumentation forwarded comes in support of the embedded proposition, not when it comes in support of the adverb. Compare the following two examples found in the BNC corpus (presented already in 1.3.3):

(1) *Unfortunately*, previous surveys of people's animal preferences – conducted mainly in the United States – are difficult to compare because, generally, different methods were employed.

(2) *Unfortunately*, only two teams will now be able to take part in the Inter Counties match because everyone seemed to enjoy taking part.

The standpoint reconstructed from (1) could be paraphrased as: 'My point of view is that previous surveys of people's animal preferences are difficult to compare'. The standpoint reconstructed from (2) could be paraphrased as: 'My point of view is that it is unfortunate that only two teams will now be able to take part in the Inter Counties match'. It is only in (1) that the reconstructed standpoint can be considered qualified by the evaluative adverb. This is because the adverb is not challenged and does not receive support in the ensuing argumentation.

When an evaluative adverb qualifies a standpoint, the evaluative comment that it adds to it does not become the bone of contention. In this case, it can be assumed that the protagonist who made the choice to qualify the standpoint in this way suggests to the antagonist that there is a shared evaluation regarding the expressed opinion with respect to which a (positive or negative) position is assumed in the standpoint. Adverbs like *curiously*, *fortunately*, *sadly*, *surprisingly*, and *unfortunately*, "signal either denial of expectations set up by the preceding text (usually positive) or fulfilment of positive or negative expectations", as Thompson and Zhou (2000, p. 133) remark.[47] In the context of an argumentative discussion in which a standpoint is advanced, the discourse effect of this way of qualifying is that it emphasises the dissatisfaction or the satisfaction that the protagonist shares with the antagonist regarding the position that he assumes with respect to the expressed opinion. By choosing to qualify the standpoint using an evaluative adverb like *curiously*, *oddly*, *strangely*, and *unfortunately*, the protagonist acknowledges that the standpoint he is advancing goes counter to the expectations of the antagonist and signals that he shares this evaluation with him. By choosing to qualify the standpoint using an evaluative adverb like *fortunately*, *happily*, *luckily*, and *rightly*, the protagonist

[47] Thompson and Zhou go one step further to argue that evaluative adverbs such as *curiously*, *happily*, *sadly*, *unfortunately* do not only comment on the content of the clause but also in many cases suggest a specific kind of connection between two clauses, establishing a cohesive link, and thereby functioning as a linking adverb. This use of evaluative adverbs, however, is not of interest to this study since it concerns the organization of discourse and text structure. See also Biber et al. (1999, p.858) about the connective function that certain stance adverbs may have.

suggests that the standpoint he is advancing is in line with the antagonist's expectations and signals that he shares this evaluation with him.

2.3.3 Stance adverbs commenting on the performance of the act

The adverbs that can be used as the linguistic realisation of the *'illocutionary' way of qualifying standpoints*[48] add a comment that concerns the act that is being performed, not the content of the act. Such a comment indicates the language user's awareness of the conditions that pertain to the performance of an assertive speech act. As a result, the protagonist who uses this way of qualifying comments on his sincerity and cooperativeness when performing a particular act or on the expectations that his interlocutor has about the performance of that act. In section 2.3.3.1, I argue that the adverbs that constitute the linguistic realisation of this way of qualifying come both from the group of the so-called 'illocutionary adverbs' (*frankly, honestly, seriously*), and from a group of adverbs that are usually included among the epistemic adverbs or treated in the literature under the label of 'expectation markers' (*actually, admittedly, in fact, of course*).[49] In section 2.3.3.2, I argue that the discourse effect of this way of qualifying the standpoint is to emphasise the protagonist's cooperativeness.

2.3.3.1 Illocutionary adverbs and expectation markers

The adverbs that can be used to qualify a standpoint in the 'illocutionary' way belong to the group of adverbs that are known in the literature as 'illocutionary adverbs' (Bach & Harnish, 1979), 'pragmatic adverbs' (Bellert, 1977) or 'speech-act related adverbials' (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002). In this section, besides presenting these adverbs, I argue that adverbs like *actually*, *in fact*, *in reality*, and *of course*, which tend to be grouped together with modal adverbs or which appear labelled as 'expectation markers' (Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer, 2002), may also count as qualifying the standpoint by commenting on the act as a whole, rather than as commenting on the commitment to the proposition.

Next to the groups of adverbs that Quirk et al. identify as 'content disjuncts', under which the adverbs presented in the previous two subsections fall, the authors distinguish two more groups, under the label of 'style disjuncts'. The one group indicates 'modality and manner' and includes adverbs such as:

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[48] I am aware of the confusion that the use of 'illocutionary' as a label for this way of qualifying standpoints may cause, since all three ways of qualifying pertain to the illocutionary level at which standpoints are analysed, as I have argued in 1.4. For lack of any other term, I have chosen to call this way after the most recurrent term with which the adverbs that constitute the linguistic realisation of it are labelled in the literature (see 'illocutionary adverbs').

[49] For a detailed list, see the third column in Table 2.

> broadly, confidentially, frankly, generally, honestly, roughly, seriously, simply, truly

The other group that Quirk et al. identify indicates 'respect' and includes adverbs such as:

> figuratively, generally (speaking), literally, metaphorically, personally, strictly (speaking)

Greenbaum who is only concerned with attitudinal disjuncts, that is, what Quirk et al. call 'content disjuncts', does not discuss these adverbs extensively. In passing, he observes that 'style disjuncts' refer to what Poldauf (1964) has called "the form of communication" (as cited in Greenbaum, 1969, p. 81). He distinguishes between those 'expressing that the speaker is making a rough generalisation' and those 'expressing that the speaker is being frank'. Fraser groups *frankly*, *honestly*, and *seriously* together with *generally*, *metaphorically*, *personally*, and *strictly* under what he calls 'manner-of-speaking markers'. Biber and Finegan, however, keep the two groups apart, namely under 'honestly-adverbials', on the one hand, and 'generally-adverbials' on the other. Similarly, Biber et al. list the former under 'style stance adverbials' and the latter under a sub-group of 'epistemic stance adverbials' conveying 'limitation'. Sinclair, too, groups adverbs like *frankly*, *honestly*, and *seriously* separate from *broadly* but together with *personally*. Nevertheless, in Huddleston and Pullum these adverbs appear all under the group of 'speech-act related adjuncts'. Within that group, the authors distinguish 'manner of speaking adjuncts' such as *briefly*, *confidentially* and *frankly*, from what they call 'meta-linguistic adjuncts' such as *literally* and *metaphorically speaking*.

The so-called 'illocutionary adverbs' (see third column in Table 2), unlike modal, evidential, domain, and evaluative adverbs, add a comment to the act that the speaker performs by means of uttering the sentence in which they appear. The sentences in which they appear can be paraphrased with an explicit illocutionary verb like *tell*, *admit*, *order*, *inform*, *ask*. The adverb in this paraphrase functions as a manner adverb modifying the illocutionary verb and thus describes the way in which the act is being performed:

> *Frankly*, it was a waste of time > *I tell you frankly* it was a waste of time

> *Literally*, it was a waste of time > *I tell you literally* it was a waste of time

This property of illocutionary adverbs explains why they can occur with performative verbs other than just those indicating an assertive illocutionary point, as the following examples (cited in Bellert, 1977, p. 349) illustrate:

> *Sincerely*, I apologise for being so rude.
> *Briefly*, I promise you to finish my work.
> *Precisely*, I order you to get out of here.

In this respect, illocutionary adverbs differ from adverbs like *perhaps* and *fortunately*, which cannot occur with performatives, as the unacceptability of the following examples illustrates:[50]

> *Perhaps / *Fortunately, I apologise for being so rude.
> *Perhaps / *Fortunately, I promise you to finish my work.
> *Perhaps / *Fortunately, I order you to get out of here.

Of the group of illocutionary adverbs, those that comment on the speaker's own sincerity, such as *frankly*, *honestly* and *seriously*, can also be used to emphasise the truth of what the speaker says, as the example below illustrates:

> I'm so happy for you! *Honestly*, I'm really happy for you! [BNC]

However, this is not possible with the rest of the adverbs that are usually listed in the group, such as *briefly*, *literally*, *metaphorically*, and *strictly*. As Quirk et al. remark, adverbs like *actually*, *indeed*, *of course*, and *really* together with *honestly*, *frankly* and *certainly*, *clearly*, *obviously*, and *surely* may also function as 'emphasizers', reinforcing the truth value of the clause.

The adverbs *certainly*, *clearly*, *obviously*, and *surely* have been dealt with as modal adverbs indicating strong degree of commitment to the truth of the propositional content (see first column in Table 2). The adverbs *actually*, *indeed*, *of course* and *really* appear, in the literature, either in the same group as epistemic adverbs or in related groups. Greenbaum discusses the adverb *actually* together with *surely* and *certainly* as expressing the speaker's conviction of the truth or reality of what he is saying. He observes:

> The disjunct 'actually' conveys explicitly the speaker's view that what he is saying is factually true. At the same time, it suggests that what he is saying may be surprising to the person addressed. (Greenbaum, 1969, p. 141)

Surely invites agreement from the person or persons addressed. *Certainly* expresses conviction and at the same time often suggests that the speaker is restricting what he is saying (concessive force). Quirk et al. also treat *actually*, *indeed*, *of course*, and *really* together with *certainly*, *clearly*, and *obviously* as expressing a comment 'that what is being said is true'. On the contrary, Biber and Finegan distinguish a group called 'actually-adverbials' from the group of 'surely-adverbials'. Similarly, Biber et al. distinguish a sub-group within epistemic stance adverbs that conveys 'actuality and reality' that is different from the one that conveys 'doubt or certainty'.

The function of emphasising the truth-value of what one is asserting that both *actually* adverbs and *clearly* adverbs have develops from the apparent redundancy of indicating strong degree of commitment to the truth of a

[50] See also the discussion in the first part of 1.4.

proposition. Simply asserting a proposition without any qualification already indicates some commitment. In truth-conditional terms, there can be no difference in degree of commitment to the propositional truth between the two sentences below:

> He is dead.
> *Clearly*, he is dead [= I am absolutely convinced that he is dead].

In both cases, the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition 'He is dead'. Were the two utterances different in degree, it would mean that by uttering the second sentence the speaker would be *more* committed to the truth of the proposition 'He is dead' than by uttering the unqualified one. As Capone (2001) argues, following Lyons (1977), the use of a 'strong' modal adverb does not suggest a stronger degree of commitment to the truth of what is asserted. It merely suggests an interactional context in which the language user expects more doubt than in the interactional context that the unqualified version would suggest. Hübler (1983) also refers to cases of assertions with a modal expression of certainty and observes that they are indeed more emphatic than unqualified / non-explicitly modalized categorical assertions but that it is difficult to assess exactly what the emphasis is aimed at. He concludes:

> The emphasis turns out to be a meta-communicative device aimed at forestalling any possible argument about the validity of the propositional content … .The speaker is calling upon the addressee not to question the propositional content but simply to accept it as being true. (Hübler, 1983, p. 148)

Nevertheless, there is a difference between *actually* and *clearly* adverbs as far as what is being emphasised is concerned. While *clearly* adverbs emphasise the certainty that the speaker has about the truth of the proposition that he is asserting, *actually* adverbs emphasise the clash (or the agreement) with the expectations that the act of asserting a proposition may raise in the audience. Consider the following utterance taken from the corpus:

> *Clearly*, a great variety of difficulty could be introduced into the tests. [BNC]

The use of the adverb *clearly* indicates merely the expression of a strong degree of certainty about the prediction / suggestion that the speaker makes regarding the introduction of a great variety of difficulty into the tests. If the adverb *actually* had been used, a different interpretation would have been at hand:

> *Actually*, a great variety of difficulty could be introduced into the tests.

The presence of the adverb *actually* indicates a dialogic context in which the speaker offers his remark regarding the lack of variety of difficulty into the tests. The use of *actually* in the above example suggests, more strongly than if

clearly had been used, a context in which the speaker knows or expects that the audience is of the opinion that there cannot be many degrees of difficulty introduced into the tests under discussion. Compare the following two utterances:

> *Actually*, I don't think it's the word Gary just the letters G.A.R.Y. [BNC]
>
> *Clearly*, I don't think it's the word Gary just the letters G.A.R.Y.

Assuming that the choice of the adverb *actually* signals a context in which the speaker expresses an opinion, with which he knows or expects his interlocutor to disagree, the substitution with the adverb *clearly* in the same context would have made the interlocutor believe that the speaker's opinion is imposed on him.

Moreover, the fact that *actually* adverbs pertain to a different aspect of the utterance than its truth-conditional content can be illustrated by the following utterances where an *actually* adverb co-occurs with a modal adverb:

> *In fact*, you'll *probably* surprise yourself too. [COBUILD]
>
> And I think, if you look at that video, it will *actually perhaps* encourage you. [BNC]

Being a meta-linguistic comment that the speaker makes regarding the status of the utterance as a whole and its relation to the context in which it is uttered, *actually* adverbs behave, on closer inspection, in a way similar to *frankly* adverbs. The following sentences seem to be perfectly acceptable with *actually* adverbs as well as with *frankly* adverbs:[51]

> Actually / In fact / Of course, I apologise for being so rude.
> Actually / In fact / Of course, I promise you to finish my work.
> Actually / In fact / Of course, I order you to get out of here.

What is common to *actually*, *frankly* and *literally* adverbs is the meta-linguistic comment, the self-referential comment that the speaker makes, not with respect to the content of what he says but with respect to the fact that he is saying something. That is why I suggest treating all these adverbs as the linguistic realisation of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying standpoints.

2.3.3.2 Emphasising cooperativeness

In this section, I argue that in the context of an argumentative discussion a comment regarding the language user's sincerity or the unexpectedness of the information provided has the discourse effect of emphasising the protagonist's cooperativeness. Since the protagonist is expected to be cooperative and to put

[51] The sentences are based on those that appear in Bellert (1977) illustrating that illocutionary adverbs unlike modal adverbs can occur with performatives (see pp. 69-70 above).

forward a standpoint that is not accepted at face value, the emphasis on his cooperativeness in such an argumentative context becomes redundant. Such a redundancy ends up implicating that the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint is good enough for the standpoint to be accepted on the basis of the arguments provided.

Adverbs such as *actually*, *admittedly*, *indeed*, *in effect*, *in fact*, *in reality*, and *of course* have been analysed under the generic label of 'expectation markers' (Aijmer, 2002a; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer, 2002-2003). While *admittedly*, *indeed*, and *of course* signal that something is in line with expectations, *actually*, *in fact*, and *in reality* signal that what is asserted is surprising or unexpected. Aijmer (2002a) distinguishes two main functions for *actually*, namely a contrastive and an emphatic one. In its contrastive function, *actually* expresses an opposition between different points of view:

> It could be used to deny an implicit belief, signal a counter-claim or objection, facilitate for the speaker to take up a new position, to switch to another aspect of the topic or to reformulate an utterance. (Aijmer, 2002a, p. 266)

In its emphatic function, *actually* introduces an utterance that gives an explanation or justification, one that endorses or elaborates on a point of view expressed earlier in discourse and which may be unexpected at the given moment.

In a similar way, two main functions can be identified for *in fact*. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) say that *in fact* may signal a contrast with a previous claim (adversative) or strengthen what has been said (additive). Smith and Jucker (2000, p. 222) suggest that *in fact* reinforces the opposition to the preceding proposition by implying that a stronger claim needs to be made, while *actually* seems to signal that some slight reinterpretation or adjustment of perspective needs to take place, which may be seen as a shift in common ground. Oh (2000, p. 266), who sets out to compare the two adverbs, also observes:

> 'Actually' is frequently found in the context of contradiction and disagreement, whereas 'in fact' tends to mark an increase in the strength of a previous assertion.

Abstracting from the nuances and detailed accounts of the various adverbs in the group of expectation markers, the core meaning that can be attributed to them is that they indicate a discrepancy between reality and what appears to be the case or between what is expected and what is actually stated at a given moment in discourse. Oh (2000), who conducts a corpus study with the aim of describing the differences and similarities of the adverbs *actually* and *in fact*, concludes that the common core meaning of both is 'unexpectedness'.

Frankly belongs to a group that includes such adverbs as *honestly*, *in all honesty*, *seriously*, *to be honest*, and *truly*. In the pragmatics and discourse analysis literature, *frankly* adverbs have received less attention in comparison to adverbs signalling unexpectedness. While there are a number of studies on adverbs such as *actually*, *in fact*, *of course*, and *really* (see references cited above), there are not many studies devoted to adverbs such as *frankly*, *honestly*, and *seriously*, except for passing references made in the literature. In a recent article, Edwards and Fasulo (2006) study these adverbs from a conversational analytic perspective.

Interestingly, the authors remark that such adverbs as *actually*, *certainly*, *in fact*, and *really* have a related function (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006, p. 344). They report that a feature of the use of honesty-phrases that is common to both question-answer sequential environments and assessments is that "they convey a kind of reluctance on the speaker's part to be saying what they are saying". Their attested use in prefacing non-answers to expectably answerable questions and in generally negative assessments of persons or situations indicates that the speaker is aware that his utterance goes against the interlocutor's expectations but chooses to foreground his preference for sincerity.

In Gricean terms, the speaker's sincerity is a prerequisite for achieving communication (Grice, 1975). However, being explicit about adherence to the quality maxim counts as saying more than is required and thus creates an implicature about the speaker appearing defensive or even untrustworthy. A language user would feel the need to emphasise his cooperativeness and sincerity in a context where he expects or knows that there is doubt about him cooperating and/or in a context where he expects or knows that what he says will not be well received. In either case, the language user would be acknowledging that there is a discrepancy between what he says and what would be expected of him to say.

As the discussion in the previous paragraphs shows, both *frankly* and *in fact* adverbs can be considered as signalling 'unexpectedness'. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen note that words such as *actually*, *in fact*, and *of course* "explicitly indicate the speakers' awareness of the communication process as taking place in a context and thereby help to shape that process in a particular way" (2004, p. 1783). This is what distinguishes adverbs in this group (to which adverbs such as *frankly*, *honestly*, and *truly* can be added) from adverbs such as *clearly*, *obviously*, *perhaps*, and *probably* as well as from adverbs such as *fortunately*, *ironically*, and *strangely*. The comment that the speaker makes when using adverbs of these last two groups does not concern his own act of asserting a proposition but is a comment about the proposition itself. In the case of epistemic adverbs, the comment concerns the speaker's knowledge behind his asserting the proposition he asserts, while in the case of evaluative adverbs, it concerns his evaluation of that proposition. *Actually* like *frankly* adverbs can be said to convey a comment about the act that is performed rather than about the propositional content asserted in that act. *Frankly* and *actually* adverbs can be

understood as acknowledging that the propositional content of the act performed by means of asserting that content comes as unexpected for the interlocutor.

In the context of an argumentative discussion, however, the choice of the language user to signal unexpectedness by using one of the adverbs discussed in this section when advancing the standpoint strikes one as redundant. The presence or absence of the illocutionary adverb is not what makes the utterance function as a standpoint in an argumentative discussion. The discourse effect of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying a standpoint is that it emphasises the protagonist's cooperativeness. Consider the following fragment from the corpus with or without the adverb *frankly*:

> Said Mr Idun: '(Quite *frankly*), council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department. Any investigation needs to be fair and seen to be fair and the only way that can happen is to take it out of the hands of the council'. [COBUILD]

The speaker is an independent councillor investigating a case of fraud in the housing department of the South London council. The council officers he is referring to in the above statement are the two officers of the council's housing department who are leading an internal investigation regarding the missing money. In the above statement, Mr. Idun advances the standpoint that council officers should not be involved in the ongoing investigation. The use of the adverb phrase *quite frankly* plays no role in identifying the function of the first sentence of his statement as the advancement of a standpoint. It could have been omitted without changing the argumentative function that this sentence has in the above context. If *frankly* was lacking, the speaker would have come out as being blatant and could have risked being offensive to the two council officers by advancing the standpoint he did. The speaker could have also minimized such a risk if he had used the adverb *actually*. The use of a qualifier that indicates awareness of the context in which the standpoint is being advanced does not change the fact that one is committed to the particular standpoint and thereby required to defend it (as Mr. Idun does in the above statement). The use of a stance adverb like *frankly* to qualify the standpoint has helped minimize chances that secondary issues arise, which might distract from the discussion of the point at issue.

In a similar way as with modal, evidential and domain adverbs, the use of an illocutionary adverb does not hedge the commitment that one undertakes when advancing a standpoint. It suggests a background against which the argumentation that the language user is ready to forward is to be deemed conclusive support for that standpoint. While the epistemic way of qualifying a standpoint directly suggests that the argumentation constitutes strong support for the standpoint, as far as the protagonist is concerned, the 'illocutionary' way

of qualifying standpoints does so, as well, but only indirectly. This is because in the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying the protagonist appears making a comment about the way the act is performed, but not directly about the commitment to the propositional content asserted in that act.

2.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have presented the adverbs that may constitute the linguistic realisation of each of the three ways of qualifying standpoints distinguished in Chapter 1. I have chosen to look into the grammatical class of adverbs in order to search for the ones that may be used as the linguistic realisation of the three ways of qualifying standpoints. The reason for this choice is that adverbs unlike other grammatical classes are the most detached both semantically and syntactically from the core sentence. Of the three main classes of adverbs that can be generally distinguished (circumstance adverbs, stance adverbs, linking adverbs), I have narrowed down my search in the group of what Biber et al. (1999) describe as 'stance adverbs'. The reason for this is that stance adverbs are syntactically the most detached (compared to circumstance adverbs), and that they add a comment that concerns the content of the utterance in which they appear rather than suggesting a link between this content and that of other utterances in the discourse (unlike linking adverbs). While the three-part classification of stance adverbs that Biber et al. propose is a good starting point, the specifics of it require certain adjustments, given the interest in argumentative discourse and more specifically in the function that I take these adverbs to serve as qualifiers of standpoints. By discussing relevant literature on sentence adverbs and stance adverbs, I provided a motivation for the choices I have made in listing certain groups of adverbs as the linguistic realisation of one way of qualifying instead of another as well as for leaving out other groups of adverbs. In brief:

The stance adverbs that may constitute the linguistic realisation of the *epistemic way of qualifying standpoints* come from the groups of adverbs traditionally known as 'modal', 'evidential' and 'domain' adverbs. The reason for grouping them all together instead of further distinguishing among them is that criteria such as degree of commitment, source of evidence or field of reference, on the basis of which these adverbs are usually distinguished, do not play a role when it comes to the discourse effect their use has in the context of an argumentative discussion. In all three cases, I specified the discourse effect of this way of qualifying as emphasising the quality of the arguments that the protagonist of the standpoint is ready to forward.

The stance adverbs that may constitute the linguistic realisation of the *evaluative way of qualifying standpoints* come from a sub-group of the broad group of 'evaluative' adverbs, namely what are called 'event-oriented' or 'clause-oriented' evaluatives. It is only adverbs of this group that can be detached both semantically and syntactically from the utterance in which they appear. I have

specified their discourse effect when qualifying a standpoint in the context of an argumentative discussion as emphasising the evaluation that is shared concerning the issue over which the difference of opinion develops.

The stance adverbs that may constitute the linguistic realisation of the *'illocutionary' way of qualifying standpoints* come from the group that is traditionally labelled as 'illocutionary adverbs' as well as from a group of adverbs that usually appear under 'epistemic' adverbs, also known as 'expectation markers'. The reason for listing these two groups as the linguistic realisation of this way of qualifying standpoints is that adverbs from both groups add a comment about the act that is being performed as a whole, rather than about the content of that act, unlike the adverbs listed under the other two ways of qualifying. Their discourse effect, when they are used to qualify the standpoint in an argumentative discussion, is that they emphasise the protagonist's cooperativeness and thereby indirectly suggest that the protagonist has strong arguments in support of the standpoint.

PART II
MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

So far, I have defined standpoint qualification as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of a standpoint, in Chapter 1, and I have described the discourse effect of the different ways of qualifying using English stance adverbs, in Chapter 2. In this part, I turn to the question: "Why would the protagonist qualify the standpoint?". The interest in answering this question is theoretical, not empirical. In order to be in a position to spell out the strategic function of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint in a certain way, I first need to specify what the protagonist aims at when making such a choice. In other words, I need to specify the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint. For this purpose, I make use of an argumentative concept that is essential for the move of advancing a standpoint, namely the concept of the burden of proof. By elaborating on how the burden of proof is incurred and discharged in the course of an argumentative discussion, it becomes possible to relate the move of advancing a standpoint to the rest of the discussion. In this way, the concept of the burden of proof can be of use in specifying what the protagonist aims at when designing the standpoint.

In Chapter 3, I elaborate on a procedural understanding of the concept of burden of proof. I thus refer to the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion in order to describe the burden of proof as the protagonist's obligation to contribute to the testing of the tenability of the standpoint by carrying out various tasks throughout in coordination with the antagonist. In this way, the process of incurring and discharging a burden of proof is analysed in four interconnected steps that can be used to illustrate the way in which the move of advancing a standpoint relates to the rest of the discussion.

In Chapter 4, I exploit the procedural view of the concept of burden of proof in order to describe the possible ways in which the protagonist may reach an optimal result at the end of the discussion. By assuming that the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint is to reach a favourable end of the discussion as far as the burden of proof is concerned, an argumentatively focused explanation is provided for the choices he has made when designing it. Such an explanation will be used for specifying the strategic function of qualification in *Part III* of the study.

CHAPTER 3
A PROCEDURAL VIEW OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that the concept of burden of proof can be used as the argumentative basis for understanding the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint. In particular, the way this concept is treated within Pragma-dialectics helps connect what happens at one stage (that is, the confrontation stage where the move of advancing a standpoint is performed) with the rest of the stages. The ideal model of a critical discussion, with the externalisation of the stages and the specification of the tasks that have to be carried out in each, offers a dialectical context, in which the move of advancing a standpoint can be studied in relation to moves and tasks performed at other stages. In this dialectical context, the move of advancing a standpoint brings an obligation to the one who plays the role of the protagonist to defend the standpoint by adducing argumentation in support of it. This probative obligation is described by the term *burden of proof*. The concept of burden of proof can help relate the move of advancing a standpoint to what happens in the rest of the argumentative discussion, and thus explain the follow-up after a standpoint has been advanced. Such a connection becomes clear when one takes a procedural view, relating the burden of proof to the various tasks that the protagonist performs at all the stages of the discussion.

In section 3.2, I briefly introduce the concept of burden of proof and argue that it can be used as a gauge for explaining in dialectical terms why the protagonist would qualify the standpoint, because it is the concept that relates the move of advancing a standpoint to the move of forwarding argumentation. In section 3.3, I present a procedural view of this concept in order to illustrate how the burden of proof underlies the various tasks that the protagonist of a standpoint has to carry out throughout the stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion. In section 3.4, I argue that the interactional dimension, which becomes prominent in the procedural view of the burden of proof, helps to understand why the burden of proof plays a crucial role not only in the progress of an argumentative discussion but also in the advancement of the protagonist's own goal in it.

3.2 A liaison between advancing a standpoint and forwarding argumentation

As argued in the first part of this study, a number of choices can be shown to have been made with respect to the way the move of advancing a standpoint is realised in actual discourse (that is, the design of the move of advancing a standpoint, see 1.2). In order to find out the argumentative relevance of these

choices, that is, whether they can play a role in the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the discourse, it is necessary to relate them to some concept that pertains to the procedure that the ideal model of a critical discussion describes. Since the aim of this study is to account for the strategic function of qualification when used in the design of the move of advancing a standpoint, the concept that can be of use in understanding this argumentative effect is that of burden of proof. The burden of proof constitutes the *liaison* between the standpoint and the argumentation, being the result of the act of advancing a standpoint and the reason for taking action by forwarding argumentation.

In the literature, *burden of proof* is the term used to refer to the obligation that a party who expressed an opinion has to bring forward evidence in support of that opinion when requested to do so. Other terms used include *onus probandi* and *onus of proof* (see Ilbert, 1910; Rescher, 1977). The concept of burden of proof originates in Roman law and has been used originally in legal studies. In the legal literature, various types of burden of proof are distinguished and rules are spelled out regarding questions about when a burden of proof is incurred, who has it, what is required for it to be met, when it is met, what the consequences are, and so forth (Gaskins, 1992; Kokott, 1998). Whately (1827) is said to have been the one who introduced the concept into argumentation studies. As Hahn and Oaksford (2007, p. 40) put it, the burden of proof "is the most successful jurisprudential 'export'".

Within argumentation studies, the concept of burden of proof is hardly ever treated in depth, even though it is so frequently used. Its treatment ranges from approaches that assume an institutionalised view of everyday communication, largely inspired by the jurisprudential model (Feteris, to appear; Walton, 1988), to approaches that make use of the concept without imposing a jurisprudential model on everyday argumentation (Kauffeld, 1995, 1998, 2003). In the various approaches, burden of proof is related to obligations and responsibilities that arguers have, but it becomes hard to identify where the particular obligation that it prescribes originates from: some rule of communication, general conventions of a particular setting in which communication takes place, the structure of communication or conventions that govern the use of language. Moreover, the interest in the burden of proof seems to be limited either to the evaluation of the strength of the argumentation forwarded (see Walton, 1988, 1996) or to the task of the allocation of the probative obligations in a discussion (see Prakken, Reed & Walton, 2005; Walton, 2007), and the fallacies related to these issues (see Brown, 1970; Krabbe, 1995; Walton, 1996).

A number of scholars inspired by the legal origins of the concept (Rescher, 1977; Ullman-Margalit, 1983a, 1983b) focus on the burden of proof as an obligation that is *assigned* to some party, and are concerned with questions such as what makes one incur a burden of proof, and under which conditions.

Scholars who depart from the jurisprudential tradition, notably Kauffeld (1995, 1998, 2003), focus on the burden of proof as an obligation that one *assumes*, and are concerned with questions such as why one would assume a burden of proof and how this comes about in communication. For authors like Rescher and Ullman-Marglit, the normativity that is related to the concept of the burden of proof originates in the goal that is to be reached in a given situation; that is, a decision needs to be reached on a practical matter over which there is doubt, so a burden of proof needs to be assigned to one or another party in order to let the deliberation process begin and to help reach some outcome. For authors like Kauffeld, the normativity is inherent in the structure of certain acts; that is, one assumes a burden of proof in order to secure that the goal one wants to reach by performing a particular act can be reached despite the doubt that the audience may raise in the context in which this act is performed. While in the view of the former, the concept of burden of proof is instrumental for the development of the discussion, in the view of the latter, the burden of proof is instrumental for the achievement of the arguer's goals.

A combination of both perspectives is required when one seeks to use the concept of burden of proof in order to provide an argumentation-based explanation for the choices that have been made for the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. In this way, the choices can be explained as serving the protagonist's goal by having a certain effect in the development of the discussion as a whole.

In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 2004; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002b, 2003a), the concept of the burden of proof receives attention both as a concept that plays a significant role for the beginning of an argumentative discussion and as a concept that relates to the various moves performed by the parties in the course of an argumentative discussion. In this framework, the burden of proof is an obligation that arises from the performance of the move of advancing a standpoint in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. Such an obligation requires that the protagonist of the standpoint respond to the antagonist's criticisms by forwarding argumentation that supports the tenability of the standpoint. In the pragma-dialectical framework, it is not the content or structure of one act as opposed to others in communication that incurs the burden of proof, but the argumentative function of that act, namely to advance a standpoint. Such a function can only be identified in the context of a procedure that has a goal, namely to resolve a difference of opinion by testing the tenability of the standpoint. It is in such a procedural and dialogical context that the concept of the burden of proof arises and plays a role.

The pragma-dialectical framework provides the basis for treating the concept of the burden of proof in procedural terms. In this framework, burden of proof can be studied not only as a concept that is important for the

development of an argumentative discussion but also as a concept that plays a significant role for the advancement of a party's own goals in it.

3.3 The procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof

In this section, I illustrate how the concept of the burden of proof can be understood in procedural terms and describe how it relates to the various tasks that need to be carried out in each of the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion. The focus is on the protagonist of a standpoint and on the instrumental function that the burden of proof has for the fulfilment of the protagonist's dialectical goal, that is his goal to have the standpoint tested at the end of the discussion.[52]

To resolve a difference of opinion, the acceptability of the standpoint needs to be tested by forwarding argumentation in response to the questions that a reasonable critic poses. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 58) write:

> A difference of opinion is only resolved if a joint conclusion is reached on the acceptability of the standpoint at issue on the basis of a regulated and unimpaired exchange of arguments and criticism.

In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, argumentative discourse is analysed as a discussion that goes through four stages, which constitute the ideal model of a critical discussion. These four stages are: the confrontation, the opening, the argumentation and the concluding stage.[53] They represent the functional components required for the testing of the acceptability of a standpoint, if it is to be conducted in accordance with the norm of critical reasonableness. First the standpoint needs to be externalised, then the parties need to agree on some common ground, on the basis of which they will engage in the critical testing of it. Subsequently, the argumentation in support (or in refutation) of the standpoint needs to be tested, and finally an agreement needs to be reached about the outcome of the discussion. Pragma-dialectics conceives of the various deliberations in the tasks that need to be carried out in each stage, and of the conduct of the discussion as a whole, as a fully externalised

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[52] As I have explained in the Introduction, the protagonist of a standpoint is also assumed to have a rhetorical goal, namely to have the standpoint accepted at the end of the discussion. I refer to this goal in the following chapter when presenting the protagonist's strategic goal for designing the standpoint.

[53] Krabbe (2007) offers a graphic illustration of the four stages in terms of a house consisting of four rooms. Nevertheless, Krabbe seems to suggest that the confrontation and opening stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion are only preparatory stages to the 'proper' argumentation stage. This view, however, does not do justice to the externalisation of argumentation that Pragma-dialectics advocates as a process that develops over four stages, each of which is of equal importance.

dialogue between party A and party B that agree to play the role of protagonist and antagonist, respectively.[54]

According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b), putting forward a complex speech act of argumentation that makes good use of starting points, that have been mutually agreed upon, is the only way to meet the burden of proof. The quantity and the quality of the arguments that need to be forwarded are determined by the requirements that the other party's criticisms impose on the first party. In the view of argumentation that Pragma-dialectics advocates, the testing of the tenability of the standpoint is not the exclusive goal of one particular task in a certain stage of the critical discussion but a procedure that develops over the four stages. In a fully externalised dialogical view of the discussion between party A and party B over the tenability of a standpoint, it is not only the argumentation that A has advanced in response to B's challenges, which constitutes A's attempt at meeting the burden of proof for the standpoint, but also his overall contribution to all the tasks that are carried out throughout the discussion.[55] As far as party A is concerned, engaging in a discussion over the tenability of a standpoint as the protagonist of the standpoint amounts to assuming a burden of proof for that standpoint.

Within Pragma-dialectics, van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b) have already emphasised the procedural role that the concept of burden of proof plays in the progress of an argumentative discussion as a whole. They have proposed a number of questions as a way to study this concept, which illustrate the procedural function it has in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. In their study, they discuss various moves and choices that the parties can make in the various stages of a critical discussion, which can be analysed as affecting the burden of proof. An implication of their study is that the concept of the burden of proof can be understood as being pervasive in all four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion.[56]

In what follows, I elaborate on van Eemeren and Houtlosser's procedural view of the burden of proof by relating this concept to the various tasks carried out in each of the four stages of a critical discussion. I thus present the four

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[54] Whether party A or party B plays the role of the protagonist or the antagonist is not a straightforward matter since it may be the case that, even though party A was the one who expressed an opinion over a disputed issue, both parties agree that party B should play the role of the protagonist for the standpoint that would normally be A's. To avoid confusion, I consider party A to be the one who assumes the role of protagonist and party B the one who assumes the role of antagonist.

[55] Correspondingly, B's challenges and requests for more arguments in support of the standpoint, in the course of the same discussion, as well as other moves he makes in the deliberations of the various tasks that need to be carried out constitute this party's own contribution to the joint procedure of testing the standpoint.

[56] Another implication of their study is that the concept of the burden of proof can be shown to relate to the perpetration of a number of fallacies that may occur in the various stages of a critical discussion.

steps into which the procedure of incurring and discharging a burden of proof can be analysed. In this view, incurring a burden of proof refers to two analytically distinct steps, namely *acquiring* and *assuming* a burden of proof, that correspond to the confrontation and opening stages of a critical discussion. Similarly, discharging the burden of proof consists of two analytically distinct steps, namely *meeting* and *acquitting* oneself of the burden of proof, that correspond to the argumentation and concluding stages of a critical discussion.

Table 3, on the next page, provides an overview of the main tasks that need to be carried out in each of the four stages and the implications that can be drawn for the protagonist's burden of proof. Such a procedural account of the burden of proof helps unpack the descriptive use of the terms 'incurrence' and 'discharge', showing that incurring and discharging the burden of proof is not a task of a particular stage of the critical discussion but a procedure that develops throughout. In the following subsections, I elaborate on the four stages and the questions about the protagonist's burden of proof that relate to each, as presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3
THE PROCEDURE OF INCURRING AND DISCHARGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

STAGES	**TASKS**	**IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE BURDEN OF PROOF (BOP)**			
Confrontation	Agree on what the difference of opinion is about	*Acquiring* the BOP	WHEN is the BOP acquired?	*A party performs an act that in the given context counts as the assumption of a positive (or negative) position with respect to a disputed issue.*	INCURRING the burden of proof
Opening	Agree on how to proceed to resolve the difference of opinion	*Assuming* the BOP	WHO assumes the BOP?	*One of the two parties accepts to substantiate the standpoint and thereby accepts to play the role of the protagonist.*	
Argumentation	Agree on whether the argumentation forwarded is conclusive	*Meeting* the BOP	WHAT does it take to meet the BOP?	*The protagonist forwards argumentation in response to the antagonist's objections.*	DISCHARGING the burden of proof
Concluding	Agree on whether the standpoint is tenable or not	*Acquitting* oneself of the BOP	WHEN has the protagonist acquitted himself of the BOP?	*The two parties decide that the doubt with respect to the tenability of the standpoint can (not) be removed in the light of the argumentation forwarded in support of it.*	

3.3.1 Acquiring the burden of proof

In this section, I argue that the burden of proof arises as a result of the performance of an assertive act in a context where doubt is expressed (or anticipated) regarding the tenability of the position assumed in that act. Clarifying what counts as advancing a standpoint in the pragma-dialectical model and how standpoints come to being in interactional terms helps distinguish the question '*when* does a burden of proof arise?' from the question '*who* assumes a burden of proof?' (see Table 3).

From the pragma-dialectical perspective, the obligation to defend is a constitutive condition for the act of advancing a standpoint, since it constitutes the essential condition for the performance of this act. Below are the felicity conditions for the act of advancing a standpoint (involving a positive position), as established by Houtlosser (1995, 2002):

Identity conditions

Propositional content condition

1. The propositional content of the standpoint consists of an expressed opinion O.
2. O consists of one or more utterances.

Essential condition

Advancing a standpoint counts as taking responsibility for a positive position in respect of O, that is, assuming an obligation to defend a positive position in respect of O if requested to do so.

Correctness conditions

Preparatory condition

1. The speaker or writer believes that the hearer or reader does not (already, at face value, completely) accept O.
2. The speaker or writer believes that he can justify O for the hearer or reader with the help of arguments.

Sincerity condition

1. The speaker or writer believes that O is the case.
2. The speaker or writer has the intention to justify O for the hearer or reader with the help of arguments if requested to do so.

As the felicity conditions above illustrate, a standpoint is analysed as an assertive speech act, by means of which a language user commits himself to the tenability of a positive (or negative) position with regard to an expressed

opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; Houtlosser, 1995, 2002).[57] In this sense, the standpoint is not just a proposition with a truth-evaluable or semantic content, as a logical approach or other semantics based approaches to argumentation would maintain, considering it to be the conclusion that follows from given premises. Moreover, the standpoint is not just any kind of speech act and it is not any type of the assertive speech act either. Performing an illocutionary act such as requesting, advising, proposing, accusing, and so forth, does not count instantly as advancing a standpoint. Similarly, performing an assertive illocutionary act is not identical to advancing a standpoint, either, as the discussion of the constructed dialogues in 1.2 has illustrated.

Certain conditions need to obtain, under which any of these illocutionary acts may have the argumentative function of advancing a standpoint. Such conditions require that in a context where two parties interact, the act performed by one language user be met with doubt by the other language user. Doubt can be expressed in communication in a variety of linguistic means or can be left implicit and be inferred from the co-text and/or the context of the situation in which the speech act is performed. In pragmatic terms, doubt can be interpreted as pertaining to any of the conditions for the felicitous performance of the speech act in question (van Eemeren, 1987; van Eemeren et al., 1993; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs, 1987, 1989). It is the expression or anticipation of such a doubt that confers upon the speech act performed in communication the function of advancing a standpoint.

The illocutionary analysis of standpoints within Pragma-dialectics makes clear that any type of act may function as a standpoint when doubt is expressed or anticipated regarding the felicitousness of the specific speech act (van Eemeren, 1987).[58] The interactional way in which a speech act starts functioning as a standpoint describes also the way in which a difference of opinion is externalised in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. Advancing a standpoint counts as assuming a position which is not accepted for the moment. In the confrontation stage, both the position and the non-acceptance of that position are externalised. The argumentative function of a speech act as a standpoint does not depend on its formal properties, but on its relation to the context of doubt in which it is performed.[59]

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[57] In 1.2, I have already argued for the need to analyse standpoints as illocutionary acts of the assertive type.

[58] See also the discussion of the constructed dialogues in 1.2.

[59] I adapt this point from van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) who note the following with respect to the speech act of argumentation: "The communicative force of a (complex) speech act does not depend exclusively on the formal properties of the verbal forms of expression that are used, but on their function in the context and situation concerned. This is why speech acts only form an argumentation if they are put forward in a context of a discussion of an issue that causes disagreement" (p. 63). I take their comment to apply equally on the act of advancing a standpoint.

As the essential condition for the act of advancing a standpoint stipulates, advancing a standpoint, unlike performing a different type of speech act, commits one to being ready to assume an obligation to defend it. Performing an assertive in a non-argumentative context does not raise a probative obligation to defend the position that is assumed by means of performing that assertive, but merely a discourse obligation[60] to provide explanation that justifies the truth of the proposition asserted. In this case, the speaker's refusal to answer to the listener's question: 'Why do you say that?' would not render the performance of the assertive infelicitous but merely make the speaker appear uncooperative to his interlocutor. However, when the assertive performed is interpreted as advancing a standpoint in a context of a difference of opinion, refusing to justify the position that one assumed would count as obstructing the critical discussion from developing any further.

From the above, it becomes clear that, in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the obligation to defend arises as a result of the interpretation of the argumentative function that a speech act acquires when met with doubt in a specific context. This view is different from Kauffeld's (1998, 2003), who maintains that the obligation to defend arises from special requirements that are involved in the performance of certain kinds of act (like accusing and proposing) and not of others (like advising and warning). According to him, the undertaking of a probative burden results from the need to create or to rebut special presumptions (other than the presumption of veracity) that play a role in the performance of certain acts and not of others. In accusations, the accuser cannot but assume a burden of proof as a result of the commitment to veracity and fairness that he makes when stating the accusation, in order to rebut the presumption of innocence, to which the accused is expected to appeal. In proposals, where the audience is expected to act on the basis of a presumption of self-reliance, which initially predisposes them unfavourably towards any new proposal, assuming a burden of proof is to the best interest of the proposer who has to rebut such a presumption, if he wants his proposal to be accepted.

Kauffeld (1995, 1996) contrasts these two paradigm cases with acts like warning and advising. In performing either of these acts, no presumption other than the presumption of veracity is required to guarantee that the speaker's act will be successful in achieving its goal. So a language user who would rebut the presumption of veracity that is assumed when one is offering a warning or a piece of advice would not incur a probative obligation. Similarly, if the one who offers a warning or a piece of advice refuses to justify himself to someone who is not willing to take the warning or advice, he cannot be accused of not meeting an argumentative obligation, but simply of being uncooperative.

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[60] By discourse obligation I refer to the obligation to respond to a question or to a summons that arises as a result of linguistic rules or turn-taking rules in conversation.

In the pragma-dialectical view, performing any of the acts discussed by Kauffeld would count as having advanced a standpoint the moment the other party would react to it by expressing disagreement *and* the one who performed the act would in turn provide support for it. The language user's attempt to repair the disagreement by advancing argumentation would then count as assuming an obligation to defend that standpoint. If no doubt is expressed or anticipated, none of the above speech acts could count as advancing a standpoint and no argumentation would have to be advanced, since there is no disagreement to be repaired. Whether it is more frequently the case that an argumentative discussion starts after an accusation has been made rather than after a warning has been given is an empirical matter that deserves further investigation, but is not what the pragma-dialectical answer to the question 'When does a burden of proof arise?' is concerned with.

As Brown (1970, p. 81) writes:

> There are no onus-assigning propositions of any sort. There are, it seems, only *onus-assigning contexts* [my italics] or situations in which disputants find themselves, and in which they may legitimately lay a burden of proof upon one another.

An obligation to defend does not arise because of the content of what is asserted, but because in the context in which an assertion was made opposition is expressed with respect to the tenability of the position asserted over this content. Moreover, it is not enough that someone positively asserts that *p*, as Cargile (1997) notes, for a burden of proof to be incurred upon him. He gives the following example:

> Suppose someone calls Smith's house asking for Smith. Smith replies, 'This is Smith'. The caller then demands proof. The mere fact that Smith has positively affirmed that it is Smith speaking does not entail that he has the burden of proof on this matter. (p. 62)

The author adds that there could be a scenario, however, in which the caller would be indeed entitled to ask for proof, such as when he has an important and confidential message to deliver to Smith and none else. He thus acknowledges that it all depends "on some restrictions to a situation in which participants take seriously the claims made by parties to the discussion" (1997, p. 62). Cargile (1997) rightly stresses that "it is not being opposed to popular opinion that should bring the burden of proof, but rather, being committed to a position" (pp. 67-8). Advancing a standpoint counts indeed as being committed to a position. Whether this is achieved in one context by performing a warning and in another by performing an accusation is a matter of how the standpoint is advanced in that particular context.

3.3.2 Assuming the burden of proof

In this section, I argue that it is not enough for the smooth development of an argumentative discussion that a burden of proof arises as a result of the performance of the act of advancing a standpoint. It is equally important that a party accepts that burden and takes the responsibility to act accordingly. In a fully externalised dialogical procedure of resolving a difference of opinion, the party that is committed to having advanced a standpoint in the confrontation stage is not obliged to defend it until the other party has challenged him to do so and he has accepted that challenge in the opening stage. This means that while the burden of proof is inherent in the act of advancing a standpoint it is not properly assumed until the parties have agreed on *who* should carry it as well as on *how* the discussion should proceed (see Table 3).

As the essential condition for the act of advancing a standpoint makes clear (see the felicity conditions presented in the previous subsection), the obligation to defend that arises with the performance of the act of advancing a standpoint is a conditional obligation. While the discussant indicates readiness to defend the position that he assumes when committing himself to a standpoint, he is not instantly obliged to do so. It is the request by another party to justify the standpoint or the anticipation of such a request that obliges the arguer to undertake the defence. So one is not obliged to defend simply because one has advanced a standpoint. Analytically speaking, the expressed or anticipated doubt, which is a requirement for identifying a standpoint in the confrontation stage, is not enough to make the one who advanced the standpoint assume an unconditional obligation to defend it. While in reality there may not be a distinction between expressing doubt and challenging one to defend a standpoint, the analytic distinction between the two stages of the ideal model allows for it.

The one who advanced the standpoint is obliged to defend it only when a request for justification has been filed (and only if he does not wish to withdraw it and abandon the discussion in the opening stage). According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), one of the rules that pertain to the opening stage concerns the obligation to defend:

> The discussant who is challenged by the other discussant to defend the standpoint that he has put forward in the confrontation stage is always obliged to accept this challenge, unless the other discussant is not prepared to accept any shared premises and discussion rules; the discussant remains obliged to defend the standpoint as long as he does not retract it and as long as he has not successfully defended it against the other discussant on the basis of the agreed premises and discussion rules. (p. 139)

The importance of this rule for the progress of the testing procedure is quite clear: unless the party who has advanced the standpoint accepts the challenge

to substantiate it and to engage in a discussion over its tenability, no argumentation will be advanced and there will not even be the beginning of a resolution to the dispute. The party who accepts the challenge to defend the standpoint thus becomes the protagonist of the standpoint,[61] and thereby is obliged to bring forward argumentation in response to the attacks of the other party in the argumentation stage. Such an obligation burdens the protagonist throughout the discussion until he retracts the standpoint or until the antagonist retracts his doubt about the standpoint.[62]

The pragma-dialectical rule for the obligation to defend also specifies that a discussant is not obliged to assume a burden of proof for the standpoint unless the other party is willing to commit himself to propositions and rules that will constitute the common ground, on the basis of which the testing of the argumentation provided in support of the standpoint will proceed. In this way, the arguer's acceptance of the obligation to defend commits in turn the other party to engage critically in such a discussion, in which the one will play the role of the protagonist and the other will play the role of the antagonist of the standpoint.

The analytic distinction between acquiring an obligation to defend and actually accepting that obligation, which is accounted for in the distinction between the confrontation and opening stage, makes it clear that incurring an obligation does not necessarily mean that one will also accept it, and that not accepting the obligation does not mean that the obligation was not incurred in the first place. With respect to the first issue, the analytic distinction between these two steps allows for the possibility that the party that assumes the role of protagonist, and is thereby the one who accepts the burden of proof for the standpoint, is not the one who actually advanced the standpoint in the first place. With respect to the second point, the analytic distinction makes it clear that there need not necessarily be argumentation advanced in a piece of discourse for that discourse to be identified as argumentative. It is enough if there are textual and contextual clues that a difference of opinion exists in which a standpoint, reconstructed from one or more of the actual utterances in that discourse, is advanced.

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[61] Such an equation between accepting the challenge to defend the standpoint and assuming the role of the protagonist of that standpoint is valid in non-mixed disputes where there is only one standpoint that needs to be tested (see van Eemeren et al., 2002). Note that the dialectical role of the protagonist is not identical to the discourse role of the speaker of the utterance by means of which a standpoint was advanced. It may well be the case that the two parties agree to exchange roles as far as the defence of the standpoint is concerned. Here for the sake of clarity and simplicity I refer to non-mixed disputes, where the role of protagonist is assumed by the one who produced the utterance by which the standpoint was put forward in the discourse.

[62] A distinction should be made between *retracting* doubt or standpoint and *abandoning* doubt or standpoint; while retraction comes as a response to a move that advances an argument or critical question, abandoning does not. For an elaboration on the issue of retraction, see Krabbe (2001).

The entitlement of the other party to ask for reasons and the acceptance of this challenge by the arguer, which occur in the opening stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion, are justified in terms of critical reasonableness. In this way, there is no need to have recourse to psychological, cognitive, social or other motives that language users may have when asking others to justify their opinions or when conceding to that request. The entitlement of the one party and the undertaking of the obligation by the other party are requirements for the development of the discussion as a whole; if the parties do not agree on the roles that each will play in the testing of the tenability of the standpoint, the discussion cannot proceed.

Accepting the obligation to defend is not only an important step forward in the dispute resolution procedure, but also a precondition for the success of the protagonist's attempt to convince the other party that the standpoint is indeed tenable. When fulfilling the obligation to defend, the protagonist forwards arguments in the argumentation stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion; it is on the basis of these arguments that it can be determined whether the protagonist has acquitted himself of the obligation in the concluding stage. Nevertheless, accepting a burden of proof cannot by itself guarantee that any of these goals will actually be achieved.[63] In the pragma-dialectical view of argumentation, carrying out the tasks required in all the stages of a critical discussion and observing the respective rules for each are equally instrumental for securing the resolution of a dispute.

3.3.3 Meeting the burden of proof

In this section, I argue that while adducing argumentation in support of a standpoint in the argumentation stage constitutes what it takes to meet[64] the burden of proof, it does not exhaust the concept of the burden of proof. In the procedural view adopted here, the arguments by means of which the burden of proof is being met rest on starting points that result from agreements reached prior to the argumentation stage. Moreover, the whole testing procedure relies on the interaction of moves and countermoves, which seek to assess the strength of the argumentation in the light of the intersubjective agreements between the two parties.

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[63] This means-ends explanation of why one who has advanced a standpoint is also, in principle, ready to assume the obligation to defend it originates in Kauffeld's (1998, 2003, 2007) 'interactionist' view of how argumentative burdens arise. The difference is that while he takes this means-ends approach to work at the pragmatic level of communication, where various speech acts are performed, I take this view to work at the ideal level of a critical discussion, where the act of advancing a standpoint is reconstructed from the actual discourse.

[64] I have chosen to refer to this step of the procedure of incurring and discharging a burden of proof as 'meeting the burden of proof', assuming that 'to meet' stresses the ongoing aspect of this step of the procedure rather than the end result of it, as opposed to the verb 'to acquit', which I use in order to refer to the last step of the procedure, see 3.3.4.

As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b, p. 20) put it, "In our pragma-dialectical approach, the only means of meeting the burden of proof is advancing argumentation". The interactional way in which it is tested whether the argumentation is an acceptable and sufficient support for the standpoint describes *what* it takes to meet the burden of proof in the pragma-dialectical approach (see Table 3).

In the argumentation stage, the argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint is tested. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 2004), the testing of the tenability of a standpoint involves the testing of the complex speech act of argumentation, as far as its propositional content and its justificatory (or refutatory) potential for supporting the standpoint is concerned. The propositional content of the argumentation refers to the element of the argumentation that can be proved true or be accepted as true or correct. The justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the argumentation refers to the relation that the asserted content has with the given standpoint as a sufficient or relevant support (or refutation) of it. Testing the propositional content amounts to what van Eemeren and Grootendorst call the *intersubjective identification procedure*, while testing the justificatory (or refutatory) potential amounts to what they call the *intersubjective testing procedure*.[65]

In testing the propositional content of the complex speech act of argumentation, the protagonist and the antagonist need to agree that its content is acceptable (or not acceptable) on the basis of a list of commonly accepted propositions. Such a list of shared propositions should ideally be drawn in the opening stage, based on what is explicitly agreed upon or what can be tacitly considered to be accepted by both parties (see also van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002b).

In testing the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the complex speech act of argumentation, the two parties need to agree that the reasoning by which the argumentation is linked to the standpoint is acceptable (or not acceptable) in justifying (or in refuting) the particular standpoint. For Pragma-dialectics, the soundness of the argumentation does not merely rest on logical validity (see the intersubjective inference procedure) but also on the acceptability of the argument scheme. It thus needs to be checked whether the argument scheme, which represents the relation between what is stated in the argumentation and what is stated in the standpoint, is correctly applied or not. For that purpose, the two parties need to have reached an agreement in the opening stage about

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[65] According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), prior to the *intersubjective testing procedure* there may be the need to make fully explicit the argument scheme that is used in order to bridge the transition from the premises to the conclusion, what they call the *intersubjective explicitization procedure*. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst acknowledge that a separate procedure should be followed for establishing the logical validity of the argumentation, called the *intersubjective inference procedure*. I do not make reference here to the intersubjective inference procedure, however, since I am not considering logical validity.

which argument schemes may or may not be used and what the relevant critical questions are for each scheme that may be used (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 96-98; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 149).

The testing procedures regarding the content and the potential described above cover the task of testing the acceptability of the complex speech act of argumentation. They are conceived of as a dialogue between the protagonist and the antagonist, in which the one expresses doubt regarding the content or the potential and the other responds by providing further arguments in support of the content or the potential of the initial argumentation.

By putting forward a complex speech act of argumentation in support of the standpoint, the protagonist invites the antagonist to test it. This means that the antagonist should check whether the argumentation draws from the list of starting points that have been agreed upon by both parties in the particular context and for the particular discussion. The antagonist should also check whether the argument scheme employed in the argumentation advanced complies with the agreements the two parties have about which schemes may or may not be used and how. If the argumentation is tested positively on both these questions, then the antagonist should accept the argumentation. If it is not, the antagonist may go on attacking the standpoint by expressing doubt regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation forwarded.

By expressing doubt with respect to the complex speech act of argumentation, the antagonist invites the protagonist to test it. This means that the protagonist should check whether the argumentation that he has put forward (in support of the standpoint or in support of another argument) is warranted by the list of commonly agreed starting points. He should also check whether the argument scheme is admissible and correctly applied given the agreements the two parties have. If it turns out that the argumentation does not draw from commonly agreed starting points or that the argument scheme is not admissible or correctly applied, then the protagonist should retract his argumentation.

The ideal model of a critical discussion prescribes what the questions that the other party may ask should be about, namely about the content and the potential of the complex speech act of argumentation that the protagonist has brought forward. Nevertheless, it cannot predict for which of the arguments forwarded these questions will be asked and how they will be formulated in discourse or whether questions concerning both the content and the potential will actually be asked in a given situation. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b, p. 18) note:

> According to our principle of externalization, only those objections need to be dealt with by the protagonist that are somehow advanced in the discussion, whether explicitly, implicitly or indirectly.

Pragma-dialectics does not set an a priori standard of proof that the argumentation forwarded by the protagonist of the standpoint should reach, so as to stipulate which questions about the content and/or the potential the antagonist should ask or when he may stop asking. It leaves it, each time, up to the intersubjective agreements between the two parties. Contrary to Johnson's (2000, 2007) view, the questions that the protagonist should answer are not all the questions that an antagonist could possibly think of asking on the matter, but all the questions that the specific antagonist in the given discussion has actually asked, or can be plausibly expected to ask, given the topic discussed and the context in which it is discussed.

Following from the above, the strength of the argumentation can only be defined theoretically in terms of whether adducing it in a particular discussion one would raise further questions about its content or potential, or not. In this sense, strong argumentation is one that after being forwarded raises no questions by the other party regarding its content and its potential. Weak argumentation is one that after being forwarded raises a host of questions by the other party regarding its content or its potential. Saying so does not mean that the strength of the argumentation depends upon the standards that the personal preferences of the other party may set, that is the other party's own standards of reasonableness. The reactions of the antagonist are bound to the same standards of critical reasonableness as the contributions by the protagonist. Both parties are committed to starting points that have been commonly agreed upon in the opening stage of the discussion. So the antagonist should accept the argumentation as an acceptable support for the standpoint when both its content and potential have been shown by the protagonist to rest on commonly agreed starting points.[66] The protagonist, in turn, should retract the argumentation originally forwarded as support for the standpoint when either the content or the potential is found not to rest on commonly agreed starting points.[67]

Accepting the argumentation or retracting it are the two possible outcomes of the testing procedures presented above. While acceptance of the argumentation by the antagonist would constitute the end of the testing in the argumentation stage, retraction of the argumentation by the protagonist would not instantly constitute the end of this stage. The end of the deliberations in the argumentation stage comes when it is agreed that the complex speech act of argumentation is conclusive. Although the protagonist may be ready to agree with the antagonist's acceptance of the argumentation, he may not so easily want to give up on the defence of his standpoint, in case the antagonist does not accept the argumentation in support of it. Retracting the argumentation

[66] This is the case of what van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) call 'successful defence of the content' and 'successful defence of the potential'.

[67] This is the case of what van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) call 'successful attack of the content' or 'successful attack of the potential'.

does not instantly force the protagonist to retract the standpoint as well. Pragma-dialectics allows the protagonist the chance to have another attempt at defending the standpoint, as long as he wishes to maintain the standpoint.

The argumentation stage ends not just when the intersubjective identification and testing procedures has a positive or a negative outcome but when, in addition, the two parties agree that there is nothing more to be said on the matter; that is, the antagonist does not have any further questions regarding the argumentation and the protagonist does not have any other argumentation to put forward in the particular discussion. In this sense, the two parties agree that the argumentation in support of the standpoint is conclusive when *both* the content *and* potential is accepted, *and* the antagonist has no further questions to ask (that is, request more argumentation). Conversely, they agree that the argumentation is inconclusive when *either* its content *or* its potential is not accepted, *and* the protagonist has no more argumentation to forward.[68]

When it is agreed that the argumentation in support of the standpoint is conclusive (or inconclusive), in the light of the above conditions, the testing of the argumentation has reached an end and this task of the argumentation stage is accomplished. In either case, the protagonist can be said to have met the burden of proof for the standpoint (but not yet that he has acquitted himself of it). It remains to be established in the concluding stage of the discussion what the final result of the discussion as a whole is and whether the discharge of the burden of proof was successful for the protagonist or not. It should be repeated, at this point, that answering the questions that the antagonist may pose regarding the content and/or the potential of the argumentation is not all that the concept of burden of proof amounts to. The contributions of the protagonist to the tasks in the confrontation and opening stage, as well as at the concluding stage (see Table 3) are all concerned with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint, and thus relate to the procedure of the incurrence and discharge of the burden of proof. The way the burden of proof is met in the argumentation stage is not all there is to be said about the procedural role that this concept plays in the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion.

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[68] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 151) phrase these conditions under the label of 'attacking and defending standpoints conclusively'. Such a formulation, however, gives the impression that the task that is to be carried out in the argumentation stage is to decide whether the standpoint is conclusively defended or not. I propose phrasing the task of the argumentation stage as 'agreeing whether the argumentation for the standpoint is conclusive or not', and distinguishing it from the task of the concluding stage, which is 'agreeing whether the standpoint has been conclusively defended or not' (see Table 3 and the following subsection). Agreeing that the argumentation is conclusive is different, analytically speaking, from agreeing that it constitutes a conclusive defence of the standpoint.

3.3.4 Acquitting oneself of the burden of proof

In this subsection, I draw the analytic distinction between the argumentation and the concluding stage as far as the discharge of the burden of proof is concerned. I argue that carrying out the intersubjective testing procedures in the argumentation stage is only one step on the way to discharging the burden of proof. The other step involves reaching an agreement between the two parties on the outcome of the discussion in the light of these intersubjective testing procedures. This step is carried out in the concluding stage, in which the protagonist acquits himself of the burden of proof. It is also in this stage that it becomes possible to say whether the protagonist has discharged the burden of proof successfully or not (see Table 3).

In a fully externalised dialogue aimed at resolving a difference of opinion, the end of the argumentation stage does not mark the end of the discussion as a whole. The argumentative discussion is concluded when an agreement is reached between the two parties concerning the interpretation of the result of the argumentation stage; only then can a resolution to the dispute that gave rise to it in the first place be reached.

One could consider that the burden of proof is discharged at the end of the argumentation stage, in the sense that answers have been provided to the questions asked (about content and potential) and that there remain no more questions to be asked and no further argumentation to be forwarded. Nevertheless, this is not entirely the case, since the answer to the question whether the result of the intersubjective testing should be to retract the doubt about the standpoint or to retract the standpoint is yet to be agreed upon in the concluding stage. While the argumentation stage concerns the way the burden of proof is met, it is in the concluding stage where it is decided whether the way the burden of proof was met constitutes a conclusive defence of the standpoint or not.

If the two parties agree that the result of the intersubjective identification procedure and the intersubjective testing procedure carried out in the argumentation stage constitutes a conclusive defence of the standpoint, the standpoint can be maintained and then the other party is obliged to retract his doubt about it. If the two parties agree that the result of the intersubjective testing procedures in argumentation stage does not constitute a conclusive defence of the standpoint, the standpoint has to be retracted and the other party may maintain his doubt about it. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 154), the antagonist should retract the doubt about the standpoint when the argumentation in support of it is found conclusive, while the protagonist should retract the standpoint when the argumentation in support of it is found inconclusive. Only when the doubt or the standpoint is retracted, as a result of a regulated and unimpaired exchange of arguments and criticisms, can the difference of opinion be resolved. In any other case, in which the protagonist would be obliged to retract the standpoint or the

antagonist obliged to retract the doubt not strictly on the basis of the outcome of the tasks carried out in the preceding stages, the difference of opinion could only be considered settled, if anything (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren et al., 2002).[69]

In both cases, described above, in which a resolution of the difference of opinion has been reached in the concluding stage, the protagonist of the standpoint could be considered acquitted of the burden of proof. Of the two cases, however, it is only the one in which the antagonist should retract the doubt about the standpoint that the protagonist can be said to have *successfully discharged* the burden of proof. In the other case, in which the protagonist should retract the standpoint, the protagonist has discharged the burden of proof but unsuccessfully so. Adding this qualification makes a clear distinction between 'discharging', which is used collectively in order to refer to the two analytic steps of 'meeting' and 'acquitting' the burden of proof, on the one hand, and 'successfully discharging', on the other hand, which refers to one of the two possible outcomes of the acquittal step. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b, pp. 20-1) appear not to make such a distinction when they write:

> The burden of proof has only really been discharged when the standpoint has been sufficiently defended in the critical discussion and can be maintained while the opposition has to be withdrawn.

In the above quotation, *discharging* the burden of proof amounts to having the tenability of the standpoint accepted at the end of the discussion. Such an interpretation would take the burden of proof to be equal to an obligation to prove the standpoint tenable and not to an obligation to defend the tenability of the standpoint regardless of whether it turns out to be accepted as tenable or not in the end of the discussion.[70] In what I have presented above, I take the *discharge* of the burden of proof to refer collectively to the two analytic steps of putting forward a complex speech act of argumentation in support of the standpoint in the argumentation stage and of deciding on the outcome of the discussion in the concluding stage. It is in the concluding stage where the parties jointly decide whether the standpoint is to be maintained or to be retracted in the light of the argumentation forwarded. While the result of the task carried out in the argumentation stage determines how the burden of proof

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[69] About the settlement of a dispute, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 58) write: "A dispute is settled when, by mutual consent, the difference of opinion has in one way or another been ended – for example, by taking a vote or by intervention of an outside party who acts as a judge or arbitrator".

[70] The following quotation from van Eemeren et al. (2007, p. 223) that describes the goal of the concluding stage acknowledges this distinction accurately: "In the concluding stage of a critical discussion the parties have to establish the result of the discussion. This implies that, together, they need to determine whether the protagonist has conclusively defended his initial standpoint or the antagonist has successfully attacked that standpoint".

is met, it is the result of the task carried out in the concluding stage that decides whether the burden of proof is discharged successfully or not.

The analytic distinction between the task of testing the argumentation and the task of agreeing on the result of the testing procedure allows the space for explaining cases where the protagonist of the standpoint would refuse to accept that he has to withdraw the standpoint even after it was clear that the standpoint was conclusively attacked, or cases where the antagonist would refuse to withdraw the doubt about the standpoint even after it was clear that the standpoint was conclusively defended. While adducing argumentation in response to the antagonist's objections in the argumentation stage is the way in which the protagonist can meet the burden of proof, the protagonist is not absolved of the responsibility he has accepted for the particular standpoint until he retracts it or until the antagonist retracts his doubt about it in the concluding stage. In this sense, meeting the burden of proof is an analytically distinct step that is prior to acquitting oneself of it. That is why the questions 'how' and 'when' the burden of proof is met pertain to two different stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion.

The procedural view of the burden of proof that I have expounded in subsections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4 helps relate the move of advancing a standpoint performed in the confrontation stage to the rest of the stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion. In this view, it is shown that the incurrence and the discharge of the burden of proof is a procedure that consists of four analytic steps, which interconnect. Each of these steps relates to the main task of one of the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion (see Table 3). Taken together, the steps of acquiring, assuming, meeting and acquitting oneself of the burden of proof describe the development of the discussion about the tenability of a standpoint from the protagonist's perspective. The protagonist who accepts to engage in such a discussion and to follow its rules has to assume the burden of proof if he is interested in testing the tenability of his standpoint, but also if he is interested in having its tenability accepted at the end of the discussion. The interactional dimension that becomes prominent in the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof helps understand why the concept of the burden of proof is crucial not only to the progress of an argumentative discussion but also to the advancement of the protagonist's own goals. This is what I discuss in the following section.

3.4 The interactional dimension in the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof

In a static view of the burden of proof as a task in which one has the obligation to provide argumentation in support of a standpoint, the burden of proof for a specific standpoint would amount to the arguments that are required in order to convince the other party of its tenability. In a procedural view, however, the burden of proof amounts to all the contributions that the protagonist is required to make in the stages prior to and following the adducing of arguments in support of the standpoint. More importantly, in this procedural view the focus is not merely on what the protagonist has to do but on what he does *in coordination* with what the antagonist does in each stage of the discussion. In this section, I put the emphasis on the interactional dimension of the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof in order to argue for the crucial role that the concept of the burden of proof plays in explaining the protagonist's argumentative behaviour.

Studying the concept of the burden of proof through the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion makes it clear that the burden of proof for a standpoint does not merely boil down to the task of adducing arguments in support of it, something which takes place in the argumentation stage. Neither is it primarily an issue of allocating the order of defence, a task of the opening stage. The analytic distinction of the four stages makes it clear that there are four steps involved in this procedure in total.[71] In this view, a burden of proof is incurred when a standpoint is advanced *and* the one who is committed to it accepts to defend it against the objections of the other party. Subsequently, a burden of proof is discharged when the two parties agree that the difference of opinion is resolved *on the basis of* the result of the testing of the argumentation that was forwarded in support of the standpoint.

The way a burden of proof is incurred in an argumentative discussion sets the frame within which it can be discharged. This means that the language user who accepts to play the role of the protagonist is obliged to defend the standpoint that he has advanced, by making use of starting points that he has mutually agreed upon with the other party in the context of the same discussion. The protagonist cannot pretend to properly defend the standpoint making use of starting points that have not been agreed in that particular discussion. Similarly the antagonist cannot attack the standpoint by drawing attention to starting points that are not part of the common agreements for that particular discussion.

In the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof, the concept of the burden of proof is understood not merely as an obligation that

[71] In argumentative reality, these steps may not be so clear, not any more than the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 57-62, and pp. 95-100).

the protagonist has to fulfil but as an obligation that he has to fulfil in coordination with the antagonist throughout the discussion. Testing the tenability of the standpoint is an interactional matter not only in the sense that it is conceived of as a dialogue between the two parties but also in the sense that the acceptability and sufficiency of the defence or of the attack is a matter of intersubjective agreement between the two parties concerned. This means that the argumentation that the protagonist forwards responds to objections that the antagonist has raised (or is anticipated to raise). Whether more or less argumentation is required depends on the objections raised against a specific standpoint in a specific discussion, not on some a priori standard set outside that particular discussion.

Whether a standpoint is conclusively defended or not at the end of the discussion is also a matter that is intersubjectively agreed upon in the context of a particular discussion and cannot be prejudged or, even worse, imposed by the protagonist alone. The only requirement of the rules for testing the argumentation in support of the standpoint is that questions regarding both the content and the potential be asked and that the questions asked receive an answer before the two parties can agree on the outcome of the testing procedure. The rules and requirements on the basis of which the testing of the tenability of a standpoint proceeds do not differ from one instance of an argumentative discussion to the other. It is the way in which the parties that engage in the discussion handle these rules and the way in which they perform the moves that they have to make that varies each time.

The procedural view of the burden of proof makes clear the role that this concept plays in the development of an argumentative discussion. The testing of the tenability of a standpoint cannot even begin if a party does not assume the role of the protagonist of it and thereby the conditional obligation to defend it, and does not end if there cannot be agreement as to whether the protagonist has discharged the burden of proof. At the same time, in the procedural view of the burden of proof, the interactional dimension becomes very prominent. The protagonist who is interested not only in testing the tenability of the standpoint but also in having it accepted at the end of the argumentative discussion, can only expect to achieve these goals within an interactional context, in which a burden of proof is incurred and discharged. While he cannot escape the burden of proof, assuming that he accepts to follow the rules of a critical discussion, the protagonist of a standpoint could still try to do the best he can to influence the procedure of the incurrence and discharge of the burden of proof. To this end, the protagonist would try to make the most out of the possibilities that the interactional context in which a burden of proof is incurred and discharged allows. Thus the burden of proof becomes not just an obligation that the protagonist *has to* assume but an obligation that he *happily* assumes as the only reasonable means for convincing the other party of the tenability of his standpoint.

3.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have expounded a procedural view of the concept of burden of proof, which can provide the basis for an argumentation-based explanation (as opposed to a cognitive, social or psychological one) of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint when designing it. The treatment of the concept in the pragma-dialectical literature so far and the ideal model of a critical discussion provided the inspiration and the starting points for such an elaboration of the concept. In this framework, the burden of proof is conceived of as a probative obligation that arises from the move of advancing a standpoint and burdens the party that assumes the dialectical role of the protagonist. It is the obligation to engage in the procedure of testing the tenability of the standpoint by forwarding argumentation in response to the other party's questions.

Being the liaison between the move of advancing a standpoint and the move of forwarding argumentation, the concept of burden of proof can be used to explain what the protagonist would be seeking when designing the move of advancing a standpoint and how the design of the standpoint could have an effect on the argumentation that is forwarded in support of it. Given that advancing a standpoint incurs a burden of proof and that the language user could make choices at the discourse level regarding the presentation of that move, it is plausible to assume that these choices would play a role on the burden of proof that is incurred by means of advancing that move. In order to spell out the argumentative relevance of these choices for the purposes of analysis and evaluation, an elaboration of the concept of the burden of proof is required that pays attention to the procedural aspect of the concept as far as the protagonist's own goals are concerned, in addition to the procedural function that the concept has for the development of the discussion as a whole.

Starting from the stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion, the burden of proof is understood as the obligation to defend the standpoint which amounts to a series of tasks that the protagonist has to carry out if he is to fulfil this obligation, namely to acquire, assume, meet and to acquit himself of the burden of proof (see the overview in Table 3, on page 87). In this view, the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint can be specified in relation to the burden of proof, which is the topic of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4
BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE STRATEGIC GOAL OF DESIGNING A STANDPOINT

4.1 Introduction

In the light of the procedural view of the burden of proof that I expounded in the preceding chapter, and following the strategic manoeuvring approach developed within Pragma-dialectics, I turn to specify the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint. In this chapter, I introduce the concept of the *management of the burden of proof* as the argumentatively focused explanation for the way the protagonist designs the standpoint. The rationale for designing standpoints presented here will be used for specifying, in the last part of the study, the strategic function that the various ways of qualifying have.

I have already referred to the strategic manoeuvring approach in Chapter 1 in order to describe what the design of a move amounts to and to propose an analysis of qualification as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. In this chapter, I draw on the strategic manoeuvring approach in order to describe the strategic goal of the protagonist as far as the burden of proof is concerned. By *strategic goal* I refer to the pursuit of a rhetorical goal that respects the boundaries of the dialectical set-up of a critical discussion. In this view, the protagonist is not only interested in resolving a difference of opinion but also in resolving it in a way that is favourable to his standpoint. As far as the burden of proof is concerned, this means that the protagonist is interested in *successfully discharging* the burden of proof in the concluding stage of the discussion, not merely in discharging it irrespective of the final outcome.

The procedural view of the burden of proof presented in the previous chapter can be used in order to describe what the protagonist should achieve in the various stages of an argumentative discussion in his attempt to pave the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof at the end of it. Aiming for a successful discharge, the protagonist should make sure that the burden of proof that he accepts to assume in the opening stage for the standpoint is commensurate to what he is ready to forward as argumentation while meeting his probative obligation in the argumentation stage. Given the possible developments of the procedure for the testing of the argumentation, three scenarios towards a resolution of the dispute with a successful discharge of the burden of proof can be spelled out. All three scenarios are shown to depend on the agreements about the common ground reached in the opening stage. The management of the burden of proof describes the protagonist's attempt to provide an interpretation of the common ground that could let the argumentative discussion develop along one of these three scenarios so that the

protagonist may achieve a successful discharge of the burden of proof at the end of that discussion.

In section 4.2, following the strategic manoeuvring approach, I argue that the favourable end of the discussion that the protagonist of a standpoint seeks with respect to the burden of proof is a successful discharge of it. In section 4.3, in the light of the procedural view of the burden of proof, I discuss the conditions that should apply in the stages of a critical discussion if the protagonist is to successfully discharge the burden of proof at the end of it. In section 4.4, I introduce the concept of the management of the burden of proof as a theoretical explanation for the protagonist's design of the move of advancing a standpoint. In section 4.5, I present three scenarios that can be theoretically identified, according to which the protagonist seeks to manage the burden of proof in the course of an argumentative discussion.

4.2 Seeking a successful discharge of the burden of proof

In the strategic manoeuvring approach, the protagonist is assumed to be interested not only in having the standpoint tested but also in having it accepted at the end of the discussion as a result of the testing procedure. In the light of the procedural view of the burden of proof that I presented in the previous chapter, this goal of the protagonist can be related to one of the outcomes of the concluding stage. In this section, I argue that the strategic manoeuvring approach allows one to distinguish between favourable and unfavourable outcomes to the dispute resolution process, which can ideally be reached without breaching the dialectical requirements of argumentative discussion. One such favourable outcome, as far as the protagonist of the standpoint is concerned, is the successful discharge of the burden of proof.

The strategic manoeuvring is a theoretical assumption proposed within the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation in order to account for the effectiveness of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007b). In this way, it complements and extends the standard pragma-dialectical theory that has been focusing on the reasonableness of argumentative discussions (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2004). The assumption about the strategic manoeuvring acknowledges that, when they contribute their moves in argumentative discourse (spoken or written), language users do not only observe the dialectical standards of reasonableness but at the same time seek to make the best of what the dialectical situation allows, so that eventually the outcome of the discussion will be favourable for them. This means that a party in an argumentative discussion is interested in engaging in the various tasks in each stage not only because this is the way the discussion should proceed, if a resolution of the dispute is to be reached according to standards of reasonableness, but also because this is the way he can expect to reach a favourable outcome, that is, expect that the discussion proceeds in an effective way as far as his own interests are concerned.

The dialectical and rhetorical goals that each party has when engaging in an argumentative discussion can be specified with respect to the various tasks that need to be carried out in each stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2000, 2002a). In the confrontation stage, the dialectical objective is to achieve clarity concerning the specific issues that are at stake, while the rhetorical objective is to define the difference of opinion in the most favourable way from one's own perspective. In the opening stage, the dialectical objective is to establish an unambiguous point of departure for the discussion, while the rhetorical objective is to establish a point of departure that serves one's own interests best. In the argumentation stage, the dialectical objective is to test the argumentation forwarded, while the rhetorical objective for each of the parties is to make the strongest case or launch the strongest attack, respectively. In the concluding stage, the dialectical objective is to establish the result of the critical testing procedure, while the rhetorical objective for each party is to have the case decided in his own favour.

Throughout the stages, each party is assumed to contribute to the various tasks in such a way that a favourable outcome is reached for him, not only with respect to each stage but also as far as the end of the discussion is concerned. Thus, the party that plays the role of protagonist is assumed not only to be interested in having the standpoint tested when forwarding argumentation in support of it but also in having the other party retract the doubt about it as a result of the testing procedure. Conversely, the party that plays the role of antagonist is assumed not only to be interested in having the standpoint tested when casting doubt on the argumentation in support of it but also in having the other party retract the standpoint as a result of the testing procedure.

As far as the protagonist is concerned, of the two possible outcomes for the resolution of the dispute in the concluding stage that I have presented in the preceding chapter (see 3.3.4), he would be interested in the one in which the antagonist should retract the doubt about the standpoint. That is the case in which the protagonist maintains the standpoint and he can thereby be said to have successfully discharged the burden of proof. In the strategic manoeuvring approach, the successful discharge of the burden of proof is what the protagonist would ideally seek to reach when the dispute is resolved.

The integration of rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectical framework that the strategic manoeuvring approach advocates allows one to focus not only on the way the procedure of dispute resolution develops but also on the result of the discussion, and to distinguish between a favourable and an unfavourable result for one or the other party. This view is a more encompassing one than the strictly dialectical view that was favoured in the early stages of the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992), as it pays more attention to the pragmatics of ordinary language argumentation. In a strict dialectical sense, incurring and discharging the burden of proof is to the best

interest of the protagonist since it is the means for discovering whether the standpoint he advanced is tenable or not; it should be the discovery as such and not the discovery of the tenability or of the untenability that counts. On the contrary, the integrated pragma-dialectical view of argumentation makes it possible to study how a favourable outcome for an arguer could be reached without breaching the standards of reasonableness.

In order to have an insight into how the result of a successful discharge of the burden of proof (favourable for the protagonist) can be reached at the end of a critical discussion, one can look at the possible combinations of steps in the ideal model of a critical discussion that can lead to it. This is what I look into in the following section.

4.3 Conditions for a successful discharge of the burden of proof

As explained in the previous chapter, the procedural view of the incurrence and discharge of the burden of proof makes it possible to relate the move of advancing a standpoint to what follows in an argumentative discussion. In such a procedure, the steps that are followed are interconnected. Therefore, if one wants to postulate how the protagonist can reach the favourable outcome of a successful discharge of the burden of proof in the concluding stage of the discussion, one can examine what should be the case in the previous stages preparing for it. In this section, I describe what should be the case in the stages of a critical discussion so that (other things being equal) the protagonist of a standpoint could expect the dispute to be resolved and the standpoint to be accepted; that is, if the protagonist were to successfully discharge the burden of proof in the concluding stage. In this way, a description is provided of how an argumentative discussion would have developed if it would end up with a favourable outcome for the protagonist. Such a description will be of use when specifying the ways in which the protagonist may expect to successfully discharge the burden of proof.

Of the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion, and the related steps in the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof, I focus on the opening and the argumentation stage (that is, the steps about assuming and meeting the burden of proof, see Table 3). This is because I take for granted that the concluding stage of the discussion ends with a favourable outcome for the protagonist, meaning that the protagonist maintains the standpoint while the antagonist retracts the doubt with respect to it. Similarly, I assume that for a discussion to be resolved in this way, it is clear in the confrontation stage that there is a difference of opinion, in which a language user has advanced a standpoint, for which a burden of proof is incurred. Moreover, I assume that the language user who has advanced the standpoint is

also the one who accepts to play the role of the protagonist of that standpoint.[72]

In the following two subsections, I describe what should be the case in the opening and the argumentation stages of a discussion that ends with such a favourable outcome for the protagonist of the standpoint, namely with a successful discharge of the burden of proof. In order to make more prominent the dependence of the outcome of one stage on the outcome of the previous stage, I present the stages in the reverse order. Section 4.3.1 is about the argumentation stage, and section 4.3.2 is about the opening stage.

4.3.1 Conclusive argumentation

As I have discussed in the preceding chapter, the argumentation stage ends when it is agreed that the argumentation in support of the standpoint is conclusive or that it is inconclusive. Of these two outcomes, the one that promotes the protagonist's interest in a successful discharge of the burden of proof is an agreement that the argumentation is conclusive (what van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) refer to as 'successful defence of the content' and 'successful defence of the potential'). Given that there are specific procedures for the testing of the argumentation (see the intersubjective identification and the intersubjective testing procedure presented in section 3.3.3), it is possible to specify the conditions under which the argumentation could be found conclusive at the end of the argumentation stage.

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), the argumentation constitutes a conclusive defence for the standpoint when both its content and its potential have been successfully defended by the protagonist against the criticisms of the antagonist. This means that the protagonist has answered sufficiently the questions that the antagonist has posed with respect to both the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, and that there are no further questions regarding either the content or the potential to be asked. The protagonist who is interested in reaching an agreement about the argumentation being conclusive would seek to have any of three possible developments of the testing of the argumentation in the argumentation stage.

Namely, the protagonist would seek to have the argumentation found conclusive a) after no questions were asked about its content or its potential, b) after one question was asked, or c) after both questions were asked about its content and potential. In the second case, of the two questions, about content and about potential, the one that the protagonist would seek to receive is the one about potential. This is because I take the order in which questions

[72] It is possible that under certain circumstances and in certain situational contexts a strategic effect can be found for a language user's choice to let or make the other party defend the standpoint that he has originally advanced. Such a possibility, however, falls outside the interests of this study.

regarding the content and questions regarding the potential of the argumentation can be asked to be fixed as follows: the intersubjective identification procedure (regarding the content of the argumentation) *precedes* the intersubjective testing procedure (regarding the potential of the argumentation). The antagonist would not ask about the potential of the argumentation unless he has asked about and accepted the content of it or unless he implicitly accepts the content of the argumentation.[73] If the argumentation were attacked in terms of its content and found lacking, the protagonist could not stand any chances having his argumentation accepted as conclusive. Instead if the content is accepted (implicitly or after a question about it has been satisfactorily answered) the protagonist may still have chances that the potential be accepted (implicitly or after a question about it has been satisfactorily answered).

With the above considerations in mind, three possible developments of the testing of the argumentation can be sketched in the argumentation stage. These developments represent a favourable development for the protagonist that leads to the argumentation being accepted as conclusive at the end of this stage and thereby increases the protagonist's chance for achieving a successful discharge of the burden of proof in the concluding stage. The argumentation in support of the standpoint could be found conclusive at the end of the argumentation stage after any of the following developments:

1) The antagonist has no questions to ask regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation forwarded.

2) The antagonist has no further questions to ask after answers are provided to his question regarding the potential of the argumentation forwarded.

3) The antagonist has no further questions to ask after answers are provided to his questions regarding the content and the potential of the argumentation.

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[73] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 151), when talking about 'optimal use of the right to attack', acknowledge that the antagonist is not obliged to ask questions about everything that the protagonist puts forward as argumentation in support of the standpoint or to ask these questions in a specific order or at a given moment of the discussion. They write: "It is quite possible, however – and very common in practice too – that in the course of the discussion the antagonist may suddenly realize that he was wrong in accepting the whole argumentation without objection. It may also happen that he has in the first instance only called into question the propositional content of an argumentation but not its force of justification or refutation, and regrets upon reflection". While this may be true about the way an argumentative discussion may develop in actual discourse, I do not consider these or other possibilities in the ordering of the questions here. The reason is that I am interested in the theoretical combinations of the possibilities that the intersubjective testing procedures allow.

In the first development, the outcome of the testing procedure is positive for the protagonist after the argumentation is accepted in terms of its content and is found to constitute a sufficient and relevant support for the standpoint in terms of its potential. In this development of the testing procedure, the content and the potential of the argumentation forwarded in response to the antagonist's initial request for justification of the standpoint, did not invite any further questions. The following constructed dialogue illustrates this development:

A:	John is not coming with us tonight.	Advance STANDPOINT
B:	What makes you think that?	Request JUSTIFICATION
A:	The trains are not running.	Forward ARGUMENTATION
B:	Yes you are right. Pity he will miss our little reunion.	ACCEPT argumentation

In the second development, the outcome of the testing procedure is positive for the protagonist after the antagonist's question regarding the potential of the initial argumentation is satisfactorily answered. In this development of the testing procedure, the argumentation originally forwarded invited only one question by the antagonist, the question regarding the potential the argumentation has in supporting the standpoint. Such a reaction presupposes that the content is already accepted. It would not make sense that after having received a satisfactory answer to his question regarding the potential, the antagonist would ask about the content of the initial argument. In this case, the antagonist accepts the argumentation as conclusive after the protagonist has forwarded argumentation in support of the standpoint *and* has further supported the potential of that argumentation in response to the antagonist's request. This development is illustrated in the following constructed dialogue:

A:	John is not coming with us tonight.	Advance STANDPOINT
B:	What makes you think that?	Request JUSTIFICATION
A:	The trains are not running.	Forward ARGUMENTATION
B:	But doesn't John have a car?	Request MORE ARG. (POT.)
A:	Yes, but it broke down.	Forward MORE ARG. (POT.)
B:	Yes you are right. Pity he will miss our little reunion.	ACCEPT argumentation

In the third development, the outcome of the testing procedure is positive for the protagonist after he has satisfactorily answered both the question about the content and the question about the potential asked by the antagonist. In this development, the argumentation originally forwarded invited questions regarding both the content and the potential it has in supporting the particular standpoint. The antagonist accepts the argumentation as conclusive after the protagonist has forwarded argumentation in support of the standpoint *and* has further supported the content *as well as* the potential of that argumentation in

response to the antagonist's questions. The following constructed dialogue illustrates this development:

A:	John is not coming with us tonight.	Advance STANDPOINT
B:	What makes you think that?	Request JUSTIFICATION
A:	The trains are not running.	Forward ARGUMENTATION
B:	How do you know that?	Request MORE ARG. (CONT.)
A:	I read it in the newspaper today.	Forward MORE ARG. (CONT.)
B:	I did not know about it. But doesn't John have a car?	Request MORE ARG. (POT.)
A:	Yes, but it broke down.	Forward MORE ARG. (POT.)
B:	What a pity, John will miss our little reunion.	ACCEPT argumentation

All three developments of the testing procedure in the argumentation stage that I have just presented result in the antagonist's acceptance of the argumentation as conclusive at the end of this stage, and thereby bring the protagonist one step closer to a successful discharge of the burden of proof in the concluding stage. Whether the testing procedure in the argumentation stage develops in one of the favourable ways for the protagonist described above depends on the agreements about the starting points in the opening stage of the specific discussion. The agreements about the starting points play a decisive role in determining whether the testing in the argumentation stage will develop in one or the other way or in none of these (in which case the necessary conditions for the burden of proof to be discharged successfully would not obtain). In the following paragraph, I discuss the agreements that constitute an expedient ground in the opening stage for a favourable development of the testing procedure towards one of the developments leading to an agreement that argumentation is conclusive.

4.3.2 Expedient starting points

In this section, I provide a description of what agreements are required in the opening stage for allowing the favourable continuation in the argumentation stage of the discussion that I have described in the preceding section. Whether the support for a standpoint provided in the argumentation stage is conclusive and whether agreeing on this should lead to an agreement to retract the doubt about the tenability of the standpoint in the concluding stage does not depend on whether agreements were made but on *which* agreements were made, in the opening stage of a particular discussion.

It is the specific agreements that were reached in the context of a specific discussion that make the difference between an argumentative discourse where the dispute was resolved in the protagonist's favour and a discourse where it was not.[74] This means that agreements about the common ground in a

[74] While carrying out a task in one stage is a prerequisite for the next stage, its result cannot predict the outcome of the task that is to be carried out in the next stage. The result of carrying out a task cannot be determined a priori outside the context of a particular argumentative

discourse in which the argumentation is found to be conclusive and the standpoint is eventually accepted as tenable differ from the agreements reached in a discussion that did not end with a favourable outcome for the protagonist. With respect to an argumentative discussion in which the protagonist has successfully discharged the burden of proof, it can be assumed that such agreements were established in the opening stage that can prepare for a development of the testing procedure in the argumentation stage, along either of the three paths described in the previous subsection: namely, that no questions are raised about the content or the potential of the argumentation; that a question about the potential of the argumentation is raised that the protagonist can answer convincingly; or that the protagonist is in a position to answer convincingly the questions about both the content and the potential of the argumentation that are raised (see pp.110-2). For the opening stage, this means that agreements are required along the lines described in each of the following cases:

In the first case, agreements are required that can promote a development of the discussion in which the antagonist has no questions to ask regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that the protagonist is ready to forward in the argumentation stage. In this sense, the protagonist should strive for establishing agreement in the opening stage on starting points that warrant both the content and the potential that the argumentation has in directly justifying the standpoint.

In the second case, agreement are required that can promote a development of the discussion in which the question that the antagonist may ask regarding the potential of the argumentation can be answered convincingly. This means that, in the opening stage, the protagonist should seek to establish agreement on starting points that warrant the content and the potential of the argument that he is ready to forward in support of the potential of the initial argumentation.

In the third case, agreements are required that can promote a development of the discussion in which, even if the antagonist asks questions regarding both the content and the potential of the initial argumentation, both can be answered convincingly. This means that, in the opening stage, the protagonist should seek to establish agreement on starting points that warrant the content and the potential of the argument that he is ready to forward in support of the content

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discourse. As a matter of fact, this is the way in which the various stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion interrelate; namely the result of the task carried out in one stage constrains the way the task will be carried out in the following stage but does not determine the outcome of that task. As I noted in the preceding chapter, the result of the deliberations in the argumentation stage about whether the argumentation in support of the standpoint is conclusive or not does not predetermine the result of the deliberations in the concluding stage about whether the defence for the standpoint is conclusive or not. Similarly, the result of the confrontation stage (that is, that a burden of proof is acquired) does not predetermine that the one who advanced the standpoint will actually be the one who assumes the burden of proof in the opening stage.

of the initial argumentation, as well as agreement on starting points that warrant the content and the potential of the argument that he is ready to forward in support of the potential of the initial argumentation.

The arguer who advances a standpoint and is ready to play the role of the protagonist for it would seek to suggest to the other party that one of the above is the case as far as the common ground of the discussion is concerned, provided that he is interested in successfully discharging the burden of proof. As the discussion so far shows, the agreements reached in the opening stage play a decisive role in steering the progress of the critical testing procedure towards a path that leads to the favourable outcome of a successful discharge of the burden of proof. The protagonist, however, cannot reach these agreements alone. It is the other party's endorsement that can make such agreements a valid common ground, on which he can expect to build a conclusive defence of the standpoint and thereby to successfully discharge the burden of proof.[75] While a reasonable protagonist cannot force starting points on the other party, he can nevertheless suggest an interpretation of the common ground that may turn out to be favourable for the testing of the tenability of the standpoint, leading to its conclusive defence and thereby to a successful discharge of the burden of proof. Making certain choices when designing the standpoint could help for such a purpose. In the following section, I explain what the strategic goal of the protagonist is when designing the standpoint.

4.4 The management of the burden of proof

In this section, I introduce the concept of management of the burden of proof in order to provide an argumentation-based explanation for the protagonist's design of the standpoint. I argue that the protagonist designs the standpoint in such a way that he suggests to the other party an interpretation of the common ground that creates favourable conditions for the progress of the testing of the standpoint towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

As I have explained in the preceding chapter, the burden of proof is a probative obligation which burdens only one of the two parties but is one that arises and is met in the interaction of both parties that engage in a discussion about the tenability of a standpoint (see 3.4). While only one of the two parties is burdened with this obligation (in a non-mixed dispute), it is not up to that party alone to decide who of the two will carry it; neither is it up to that party to decide alone how the burden of proof is to be met in the course of the discussion and whether it has indeed been met at the end of it. The party that assumes the burden of proof cannot have full and exclusive control of the conditions under which the burden of proof is acquired and is acquitted.

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[75] See also the discussion on the interactional dimension of the procedure of incurring and discharging the burden of proof in 3.4.

In this view, the party that assumes the burden of proof for a standpoint (and thus accepts to play the role of the protagonist) cannot anticipate fully the reactions of the other party to his contributions in the discussion. All he can do is anticipate or calculate what the reactions *could* be, given the general way in which communication and dialogue work and given the specific requirements that the rules of conduct of an argumentative discussion impose on the parties' contributions (assuming that the rules of conduct that Pragma-dialectics stipulates have some empirical basis[76]). While an arguer cannot change the fact that a burden of proof is incurred and cannot refuse to assume it – provided that he is acting reasonably and that he is interested in having the tenability of the standpoint both tested and accepted – he can still make choices regarding the way the move of advancing a standpoint is realised in discourse. Such choices may concern the design of this move. In a given context, the choices that a language user makes when designing the standpoint could optimize his chances for achieving a conclusive defence and thereby for successfully discharging the burden of proof.

Given that a successful discharge of the burden of proof can be reached upon condition that there are expedient starting points that warrant the conclusiveness of the argumentation (see paragraphs 4.3.1 to 4.3.2 above), the protagonist of the standpoint, who is interested in achieving this favourable result, would seek to have the procedure of testing the tenability of the standpoint develop along these lines. In other words, he would seek to have agreements on starting points in the opening stage that are expedient for adducing argumentation that will be deemed conclusive in the argumentation stage so that an agreement on the conclusive defence of the standpoint can be reached in the concluding stage. Since the agreements reached in the opening stage can shape the development of the discussion towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof, as explained in 4.3.2, the protagonist-to-be would seek to influence these agreements at the earliest possible opportunity, in the confrontation stage. This is possible by designing the standpoint in such a way that it gives him the opportunity to introduce information, which can be treated as part of the common ground, if unchallenged by the antagonist, and thereby useful for building a conclusive defence of the standpoint. The choices that a language user, who advances a standpoint and is ready to play the role of the protagonist, has made in strategically manoeuvring when advancing this move can thus be accounted for as seeking a successful discharge of the burden of proof. In this way, an argumentatively focused explanation is provided for

[76] On some empirical evidence regarding the intersubjective validity of the pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion, see van Eemeren, Meuffels and Verburg (2000), and van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009).

the choices that have been made regarding the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. I refer to this assumption as *the management of the burden of proof*.[77]

The assumption about the management of the burden of proof postulates that the protagonist makes choices when designing the standpoint in order to be able to go on to defend it and to eventually reach the end of the discussion by having the standpoint accepted instead of having to retract it, while observing the dialectical norms throughout. Such choices may pertain to the wording of the utterances, the nature of their content or the accommodation to a specific audience each time (see the discussion in 1.2). In principle, these choices are in accordance with the norms governing the conduct of a critical discussion. At the same time, they are strategic in the sense that they help the protagonist reach his goal in an optimal and effective way.

The management of the burden of proof does not predict what the effect of an actual choice will be and does not provide any empirical explanation for the effectiveness of certain choices against others, either. An argumentation analyst could make use of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof to interpret the choices that are made at the discourse level in a systematic and theoretically informed way, when analysing the piece of argumentative discourse in which they were made. The theoretical assumption, in the light of which the argumentative relevance of these choices is interpreted, is that they help the protagonist to successfully discharge the burden of proof. Whether a particular language user succeeded in convincing another language user of the tenability of the standpoint that he has designed in a certain way is a matter of empirical reality for which the management of the burden of proof does not aspire to offer an account.[78] The assumption about the management of the burden of proof can nevertheless provide a frame for a conceptual understanding of how choices that are made when designing a standpoint can achieve the desired result, that is, pave the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

The postulation of the management of the burden of proof provides a frame against which the strategic function of the choices made regarding the

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[77] In the pragma-dialectical literature until now, the phrase 'management of the burden of proof' appears twice: in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b, p. 26), and in the introduction of the book to which the chapter by these two authors belongs (van Eemeren, 2002, p. 6). In both instances it is used to describe the argumentative behaviour of the protagonist or the antagonist who seek to strike a balance between the dialectical and the rhetorical goals in each stage of the critical discussion, which can lead to constructive or fallacious moves that have an effect on questions regarding the burden of proof, such as who has it, how it is met, when it is discharged, among others. What I refer to in this study as 'management of the burden of proof', however, concerns the protagonist of the standpoint alone and is used as a technical term to designate the theoretical assumption about the strategic goal that the protagonist seeks to achieve when designing the move of advancing a standpoint.

[78] Of course, certain theoretical predictions could be formulated which would then call for an empirical testing, but such an endeavour falls outside the scope of this study.

design of the standpoint (and in particular, the choice to qualify it) can be assessed. While the move of advancing a standpoint occurs in the confrontation stage, the effect of the choices made regarding its design can be shown to have implications in the other stages, namely the opening, the argumentation and the concluding stage. As I have explained in the procedural view of the burden of proof (see 3.3), the moves performed in each stage interconnect to the effect of completing a task that pertains to a particular stage, the result of which is supplied in turn to the following stage, playing a role in the tasks that are to be performed there.

While qualifying is a choice that a language user makes regarding the way the move of advancing a standpoint is designed in actual discourse, the effect of such a choice does not merely show in one particular stage but runs through the stages that follow it. In the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof it becomes possible to explain in a systematic way the strategic function of the choices made when designing the standpoint in the course of an argumentative discussion. Before turning to the question regarding the strategic function of qualification, in particular, in *Part III* of this study, I shall, in the following section, specify the ways in which the management of the burden of proof can be understood as paving the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

4.5 Three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof

The assumption about the management of the burden of proof postulates that the protagonist designs the standpoint in such a way in order to successfully discharge the burden of proof at the end of the dispute resolution process. According to the conditions for a successful discharge of the burden of proof presented in section 4.3, a prerequisite for this is to propose an interpretation of the common ground in the opening stage, which promotes a favourable development towards one of the three possible ways in which the testing of the argumentation could proceed in the argumentation stage. In this section, I sketch the three theoretically possible scenarios that describe how the management of the burden of proof works in the course of an argumentative discussion.

Given that the dispute resolution is an interactional process that rests on intersubjective agreements between two parties, all the protagonist who seeks to successfully discharge the burden of proof could do is to prevent the other party from reacting in one or another way (given the general rules of communication and of the critical discussion). In particular, the protagonist would seek to prevent that the antagonist of the standpoint from challenging irreparably the argumentation that will be forwarded in support of it. For this purpose, the protagonist could introduce information that he takes to be

agreed, and thus part of the common ground, so that he can be confident that no questions are raised about the content or the potential of the argumentation or, in case they are raised, that they can be answered convincingly. The choices that the protagonist can make with respect to the design of the standpoint (regarding topical potential, adaptation to audience or presentation) can play a role for this purpose and thereby suggest an interpretation of the common ground that (other things being equal) paves the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

In accordance with the conditions for a successful discharge of the burden of proof, presented in 4.3, three scenarios can be described theoretically, according to which the protagonist's management of the burden of proof takes effect in the course of an argumentative discussion. These scenarios represent three theoretically possible ways in which, other things being equal, the discussion about the tenability of the standpoint could develop towards a favourable outcome, namely towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. These scenarios do not represent how an actual case of an argumentative discussion develops or how it should develop. They sketch the way in which an argumentative discussion would develop if it were to be resolved in the concluding stage with a favourable outcome for the protagonist of the standpoint (that is, with a successful discharge of the burden of proof). In each, the protagonist acts as if he is confident about the end result of the discussion. The three scenarios differ in the way the favourable result of a successful discharge of the burden of proof can be achieved, depending each on one of the three possible developments under which the argumentation in support of the standpoint can be found conclusive and on the set of expedient starting points that should be considered as agreed upon.

I refer to these scenarios as 'the short way', 'the middle way' and 'the long way', considering how short or long the path to a successful discharge of the burden of proof can become, given the antagonist's possible challenges to the argumentation. The 'short' way scenario describes a discussion in which the protagonist ends up successfully discharging the burden of proof without receiving any question about the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. The 'middle' way scenario describes a discussion in which the protagonist ends up successfully discharging the burden of proof after receiving a question about the potential of the argumentation, to which he can answer convincingly. The 'long' way scenario describes a discussion in which the protagonist ends up successfully discharging the burden of proof after receiving questions about both the content and the potential of the argumentation, to which he can provide convincing answers. In each of these scenarios, the design of the standpoint differs, signalling a different path along which the protagonist expects the standpoint to be tested and found tenable. Three designs of the standpoint can thus be distinguished, namely a 'solid', a 'moderate', and a 'weak' design.

The short way
In the 'short way' scenario, the protagonist acts as if the defence of the standpoint is an easy task, in the sense that the burden of proof for it is light. He is confident that he can successfully discharge the burden of proof based on the shared agreements that he takes to be established, which guarantee that no doubt arises regarding either the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. In this scenario, the protagonist acts as if there is strong and sufficient evidence in support of the particular standpoint. In such a scenario, the protagonist advances a standpoint that has a 'solid' design.

The middle way
In the 'middle way' scenario, the protagonist acknowledges that the defence of the particular standpoint may be not so easy a task and that the burden of proof for it is not so light. He is nonetheless confident that he can successfully discharge the burden of proof, based on the expectation that he can convincingly repair the doubt that may arise regarding the potential of the argumentation, thanks to the agreements that he takes to be shared between him and the antagonist of the standpoint. In this scenario, the protagonist acts as if there is strong evidence for the potential that the forwarded argumentation has in supporting the particular standpoint. In this scenario, the protagonist advances a standpoint that has a 'moderate' design.

The long way
In the 'long way' scenario, the protagonist acknowledges that the burden of proof for the particular standpoint is heavy, in the sense that he expects doubt to be raised regarding both the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. Nonetheless, the protagonist acts as if he is confident that he can successfully discharge the burden of proof by repairing convincingly the doubt that may arise regarding the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. He draws his confidence from the agreements that he takes to be shared between him and the antagonist of the standpoint. In this scenario, the protagonist acknowledges that the argumentation forwarded may strike as weak support for the standpoint but he is confident that the support forwarded for the content and the potential of this argumentation is strong. In this scenario, the protagonist advances a standpoint that has a 'weak' design.

The assumption about the management of the burden of proof and the proposed scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof are used in the last part of the study, where I specify the strategic function of the ways of qualifying a standpoint with reference to these scenarios. Table 4 presents an overview of the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof.

TABLE 4
THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

	THE SHORT WAY	**THE MIDDLE WAY**	**THE LONG WAY**
Confrontation stage:	*'Solid' design of the standpoint*	*'Moderate' design of the standpoint*	*'Weak' design of the standpoint*
Opening stage: *Expedient starting points*	Agreements are established that promote a development of the discussion in which the antagonist asks no further questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.	Agreements are established that promote a development of the discussion in which the antagonist asks no further questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the potential of the initial argumentation.	Agreements are established that promote a development of the discussion in which the antagonist asks no further questions regarding the content or the potential neither of the argumentation that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the content nor of the argumentation in support of the potential of the initial argumentation.
Argumentation stage: *Conclusive argumentation*	As a result, no questions are asked regarding either the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint.	As a result, no further questions are asked regarding either the content or the potential of the initial argumentation after its potential in supporting the standpoint has been defended.	As a result, no further questions are asked regarding either the content or the potential of the initial argumentation after both its content and potential have been defended.
Concluding stage:	*Conclusive defence of the standpoint = Successful discharge of the burden of proof*		

4.6 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I introduced the assumption about the management of the burden of proof to answer the question about why the protagonist would design the standpoint in a certain way. The assumption about the management of the burden of proof postulates that the protagonist has made choices when designing the standpoint in order to be able to go on to defend it and to eventually reach the end of the discussion by having the standpoint accepted instead of having to retract it, while observing the dialectical norms throughout.

I have built this idea on the central tenet of the strategic manoeuvring approach regarding the protagonist's strategic goal in an argumentative discussion, namely that he is not only interested in the progress of the dispute resolution process but also in the advancement of his own interests in it. Of the two possible outcomes for the resolution of a dispute, the protagonist is interested in the one in which the standpoint is accepted instead of withdrawn. With respect to the burden of proof, this means that the protagonist is interested in successfully discharging it at the end of the dispute resolution process. In the light of the procedural view of the burden of proof, I discussed what should be the case in the opening and argumentation stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion for a way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof to be expected at the end of it. In the opening stage, starting points should be agreed upon that can promote a favourable development towards one of three possible ways, in which the argumentation could be deemed conclusive in the argumentation stage, leading thus to an agreement about a conclusive defence of the standpoint in the concluding stage.

When considering the conditions for a successful discharge of the burden of proof, three scenarios can be theoretically distinguished; namely, 'the short way', 'the middle way' and 'the long way' scenario. In each, the protagonist's strategic goal would be to successfully discharge the burden of proof. The scenarios differ with respect to the way this strategic goal is achieved, based on the agreements that are required in the opening stage for a development of the testing of the argumentation in the argumentation stage that is favourable for the protagonist. The way a standpoint is designed in a particular discourse can thus be considered as signalling one of these scenarios; namely a 'solid' design signals the 'short' way, a 'moderate' design signals the 'middle' way, while a 'weak' design signals the 'long' way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

Considering the management of the burden of proof as the rationale behind the choices made at a given moment for the design the standpoint helps the analyst to account for these choices when analysing and evaluating the argumentative discussion in which that qualified standpoint is advanced. The choice to qualify, being one choice regarding the design of this move, and to qualify in one of the ways presented in *Part I* of this study, can now be studied in a systematic way as far as its strategic function is concerned.

PART III
QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT AND MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

So far, I have argued that qualifying a standpoint is a choice that the protagonist makes as far as the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint is concerned. I have identified three ways in which a standpoint can be qualified and I have presented the stance adverbs in English that can be used to linguistically realise each of these ways. In addition, I have postulated that the explanation for the choices that the protagonist makes when designing the standpoint lies in his interest in successfully discharging the burden of proof. I have referred to this assumption as the management of the burden of proof, and I have identified three scenarios along which it is theoretically possible to successfully discharge the burden of proof.

In this part, I seek to answer the question: "How does qualification of a standpoint function strategically in an argumentative discussion?". For this purpose, I bring together the results of the two preceding parts; namely the three ways of qualifying standpoints and the stance adverbs used for each, as presented in *Part I*, and the three scenarios for a successful discharge in the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof, as presented in *Part II*. By relating each of the ways of standpoint qualification to one of the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof, I can specify what the strategic function of qualifying the standpoint in an argumentative discussion is. The description of the strategic function of each way of qualifying counts as the description of the conditions required for constructive use of qualification as a presentational device for the design of the move of advancing a standpoint; that is, for use of qualification by a protagonist who expects to have a resolution of the dispute in his favour while observing the dialectical requirements of the discussion. When one or more of these conditions are not fulfilled in a discourse in which a particular way of qualifying was chosen, it can be said that qualification was abused, with the result of obstructing the critical testing of the tenability of the standpoint.

In Chapter 5, I specify what the strategic function of qualification is. In Chapter 6, I describe the conditions under which qualification can be abused, resulting in an obstruction of the critical testing procedure. In both chapters, I present and discuss short fragments of argumentative discourse found in the BNC and COBUILD corpora or the Internet. The aim is to illustrate how the theoretical account of the management of the burden of proof can inform the analyst's interpretation of the choices that the protagonist makes when qualifying the standpoint advanced in an argumentative discussion. In Chapter 5, this interpretation concerns the constructive use of qualification, while in Chapter 6 the interpretation is about the obstructive use of qualification.

CHAPTER 5
USING QUALIFICATION TO MANAGE THE BURDEN OF PROOF

5.1 Introduction

As I have argued in the preceding chapter, the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint is to manage the burden of proof, as defined in 4.4. This means that a protagonist who is interested in having not only the tenability of the standpoint tested but also in having the standpoint accepted would look for ways by which he could secure a successful discharge of the burden of proof. Such ways would seek to emphasise the common ground that he shares with the antagonist, on the basis of which he would attempt to build a conclusive defence for the standpoint. The concessions that the protagonist can draw from the antagonist in the opening stage of the discussion can be of strategic use in building a conclusive defence of the standpoint as the discussion unfolds and thereby in raising his chances for a successful discharge of the burden of proof at the end of it.

Making choices when designing the move of advancing a standpoint is a means at the protagonist's disposal for suggesting a favourable interpretation of the common ground. Qualification is one such choice that the protagonist can make with respect to the presentational aspect of the design of the standpoint. Given that there are three ways of qualifying, I shall propose, in this chapter, how each of these ways suggests an interpretation of the common ground that signals a path along one of the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof.

In the ideal model of a critical discussion, the starting points that are agreed upon in the opening stage constitute the common ground, on the basis of which the testing of the argumentation brought forward proceeds in the argumentation stage. These starting points also constitute the ground on which a decision about the tenability of the standpoint is reached in the concluding stage. Stance adverbs can be used to add a comment to the move of advancing a standpoint. Such a comment plays a role in the interpretation of the common ground in the opening stage. As I have argued in 2.3, each way of qualifying adds a comment to the standpoint that creates a different discourse effect in the context of an argumentative discussion: the epistemic way of qualifying emphasises the quality of the evidence, the evaluative way emphasises the shared evaluation and the 'illocutionary' way emphasises the protagonist's cooperativeness. By qualifying the standpoint, the protagonist frames the discussion as one in which the antagonist implicitly endorses the comment added as far as the quality of the evidence, the shared evaluation and the cooperativeness are concerned. The protagonist can thus make use of the antagonist's endorsement in order to build a conclusive defence of the

standpoint via one of the ways described by the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof.

In this chapter, I specify how qualifying the standpoint in each of the ways identified in *Part I* works towards emphasising the common ground and thereby towards paving the way for a successful discharge of the burden of proof. Accordingly, I specify the strategic function of the qualification of the standpoint in an argumentative discussion. In section 5.2, I describe the strategic function of qualification by relating each of the ways of qualifying a standpoint to one of the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof. In section 5.3, I illustrate how an analyst should interpret a piece of argumentative discourse in which one of the three ways of qualifying the standpoint was chosen, by discussing examples drawn from written texts found in English corpora or the Internet.

5.2 Qualification of a standpoint and the progress of an argumentative discussion

An utterance from which the standpoint is reconstructed may have been qualified by means of a stance adverb (see Chapter 2 and Table 2 on p.50). In such a case, upon condition that the argumentation reconstructed in support of the standpoint does not provide support for the comment that the stance adverb adds to it, it can be said that the standpoint is qualified.[79] The analyst of that particular piece of discourse can then assume that the protagonist has chosen qualification when designing the standpoint, with the aim of managing the burden of proof (see the assumption about the management of the burden of proof in 4.4). This means that the way in which the standpoint is qualified suggests an interpretation of the common ground according to one of the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof presented in 4.5. The question to be answered in this section is: Which interpretation of the common ground does each of the ways of qualifying a standpoint suggest?

By matching the ways of qualifying with the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof, the strategic function of standpoint qualification can be specified. It can thus be shown which way of qualifying counts as a 'solid', a 'moderate' or a 'weak' design of the standpoint, as defined in 4.5. For this purpose, I first show, in section 5.2.1, how qualifying the standpoint helps insert information that can be considered as part of the common ground in an argumentative discussion. Then, in section 5.2.2, I show how the interpretation of the common ground, which the different ways of qualifying provide, signals one of the three scenarios along which a successful discharge of the burden of proof can be reached.

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[79] As I have suggested in the Introduction, not all qualified utterances count as qualified standpoints. See also the definition of qualified standpoints in 1.3.3.

5.2.1 Confronting the antagonist with a choice

In this section, I argue that the strategic function of qualification rests on the fact that it helps the protagonist of the standpoint to add information that he can consider endorsed by the antagonist. Such information counts as part of the common ground in the opening stage of a critical discussion. This strategic function arises from the two options for possible reaction that a qualified standpoint opens up to the antagonist, namely to express his disagreement about the choice of the qualifier or his disagreement about the position assumed in the standpoint.

As already argued in Chapter 2, an interlocutor who reacts to a speaker's utterance that is qualified by a stance adverb, by saying 'That is not true' or 'I disagree', can be considered by default as targeting the clause that is qualified by the adverb, and not the stance adverb.[80]

A: Perhaps, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: That is not true / I disagree [= that Clark Kent is Superman].
*B: That is not true / I disagree [= that it is possible that Clark Kent is Superman].

A: Fortunately, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: That is not true / I disagree [= that Clark Kent is Superman].
*B: That is not true / I disagree [= that it is fortunate that Clark Kent is Superman].

A: Frankly, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: That is not true / I disagree [= that Clark Kent is Superman].
*B: That is not true / I disagree [= that you are telling me frankly that Clark Kent is Superman].

The above constructed dialogues are meant to show that B's mere expression of disagreement cannot be interpreted as pertaining to the choice of the particular stance adverb, but only as pertaining to the clause within the scope of the adverb. To illustrate this point further, consider the following constructed dialogues, in which language user B does not merely express disagreement over the utterance produced by A but goes on to assert the opposite position:

A: Perhaps, Clark Kent is Superman.
B: That is not true / I disagree. Clark Kent is not Superman.

A: Fortunately, Clark Kent is Superman.

[80] Lyons (1977, p. 783) makes the following remark when discussing adverbs like *frankly* and *honestly*: "If a statement like 'Frankly, he's a fool' is denied by uttering 'That's not true', the person uttering this denial is not challenging the frankness or honesty of his interlocutor, but the assertion that the referent of 'he' is a fool".

B: That is not true / I disagree. Clark Kent is not Superman.

A: Frankly, Clark Kent is Superman
B: That is not true / I disagree. Clark Kent is not Superman.

In the above constructed dialogues, B assumes the opposite position, by negating the proposition asserted by A. By uttering 'That is not true. Clark Kent is not Superman', B may express the opposite position to A's position, regardless of whether A expressed his position by qualifying the utterance using *perhaps*, *fortunately* or *frankly*. As the unacceptability of B's reaction in the following constructed dialogues shows, the opposite standpoint to a standpoint presented by means of a qualified utterance is not one where the opposite qualifier is used or negated.

A: Perhaps, Clark Kent is Superman.
*B: That is not true / I disagree. Clearly, Clark Kent is Superman.

A: Fortunately, Clark Kent is Superman.
*B: That is not true / I disagree. Unfortunately, Clark Kent is Superman.

A: Frankly, Clark Kent is Superman
*B: That is not true / I disagree. You are not being frank when saying that Clark Kent is Superman.

In Chapter 2, examples like the ones presented above were used in order to illustrate that the qualifier is not part of the standpoint that can be reconstructed from the qualified utterance, since it cannot be targeted by the doubt that makes the qualified utterance function as a standpoint. The reason for discussing them again in this section is to show that the protagonist of a qualified standpoint does not have, in principle, a burden of proof for the choice of the particular stance adverb or for the comment that it adds to the standpoint. In this way, the comment that the stance adverb adds to the standpoint can be considered as part of the common ground that the two parties share.

As argued in Chapter 3, even though the expression of doubt with respect to the tenability of a standpoint triggers a burden of proof, it is not enough, analytically speaking, to invite the other party to assume the obligation to defend the standpoint.[81] The party that wishes to request the one who advanced the standpoint to actually assume the burden of proof for it and forward argumentation in support of it should go on asking something like 'Why do you think that *p*?' or 'What makes you think that *p*?'. In those cases

[81] See sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for the difference between 'acquiring' and 'assuming' a burden of proof.

where the standpoint is qualified, there is another option open for the other party, namely to request explanation for the use of the stance adverb. This latter request, which could be forwarded by uttering something like 'What makes you say adverb X?' or 'Why did you say adverb X?', can only count as a request for explanation for the use of the specific adverb.[82] Such a request, however, does not put a burden of proof on the other party.

The antagonist of a qualified standpoint is thus confronted with a choice: either request justification about the expressed opinion or request explanation for the choice of the particular adverb that was used to qualify the standpoint. In the first case, the antagonist appears as endorsing the comment that the particular way of qualifying adds, as long as he does not explicitly challenge it later on in the course of the same discussion. In the second case, the antagonist appears, temporarily at least, to agree with the expressed opinion. Of these two possible reactions from the antagonist, the one that contributes to the direct development of the testing procedure is the one in which he requests justification for the expressed opinion. Requesting explanation for the choice of the particular adverb would open an informative sub-discussion, which should be concluded before the parties continue with the main discussion about the testing of the tenability of the standpoint.

Assuming that the protagonist is also interested in proceeding with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint rather than in digressing into a discussion about the choice of the particular stance adverb, it is plausible that he would choose an adverb that adds a comment to the standpoint, with which he expects the antagonist to disagree the least, if at all. In this way, he can be sure that the discussion will develop in the direction of testing the tenability of the standpoint. At the same time, having done so, the protagonist can also expect that the comment that the specific way of qualifying adds counts as part of the common ground that both he and the antagonist share in the particular discussion.

From the above, it becomes clear that language user A is invited to assume the burden of proof for the standpoint he advanced by uttering 'Perhaps, Clark Kent is Superman', 'Fortunately, Clark Kent is Superman', or 'Frankly, Clark Kent is Superman', when the other party questions the core proposition and not the choice of the particular stance adverb. The choice of an adverb like *perhaps* instead of *clearly*, *fortunately* instead of *unfortunately*, or *frankly* instead of *actually*, helps the protagonist propose a certain interpretation of the common

[82] In these cases, the language user could provide the requested explanation by saying something like: 'I say adverb X, because', as the examples 16-19 in the Introduction illustrate. If a request like 'What makes you say adverb X?' is interpreted as a request for justification, the standpoint reconstructed from the qualified utterance would include the comment of the stance adverb. In this case, the qualified utterance would not be analysed as a qualified standpoint (see the definition of standpoint qualification in 1.3.3). That is why I do not consider this option here and why I take any request by the antagonist targeting the choice of the adverb to be a request for explanation, rather than a request for justification.

ground that he expects to be shared by the antagonist. Given the different kind of comment that each way of qualifying adds to the standpoint and their respective discourse effects, each can be used to provide a different interpretation of the common ground. This is what I discuss in the following section.

5.2.2 The strategic function of qualification

In this section, I argue that the strategic function of qualification is to be understood as signalling to the antagonist that there is an agreement about the interpretation of the common ground. It is on the basis of such an agreement that the protagonist can expect to successfully discharge the burden of proof along one of the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof described in 4.5. Given that each way of qualifying the standpoint has a different discourse effect (see 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.3.2), I discuss how each way signals a different scenario for the management of the burden of proof.

The function that the presence of a stance adverb qualifying the standpoint in an argumentative discussion can be understood in the light of the function of 'signalling' that Urmson (1952) has described with reference to parenthetical verbs. In 1952, Urmson published an article in which he examined a group of verbs such as *suppose*, *know*, *believe*, *deduce*, *suppose*, *regret*, which he called 'parentheticals'. These verbs can be used in the first person present either followed by *that* and an indicative clause or inserted independently in the middle or at the end of an indicative sentence:[83]

> *I suppose* that your house is very old.
> Your house, *I suppose*, is very old.
> Your house is very old, *I suppose*.

In describing the function of these parenthetical verbs, Urmson (1952) says that they propose to the interlocutor a certain frame in which to interpret the relevance of the speaker's statement. He writes:

> We make our statements in contexts, social as well as logical. For example, we often have an emotional attitude to the fact we state, or it is likely to arouse emotion in our hearers. To some extent, both by accident and by design, our manner, intonation, and choice of words betray[s] our attitude and prepares our hearers. […] Further, we make our statements sometimes with good, sometimes with moderate,

[83] Lyons (1977, p. 738ff) discusses the relation between performatives and parentheticals and points to the fact that the class of parentheticals that Urmson described could be broadened by also considering the performatives that can be used parenthetically. As Urmson admits, the use of the term 'parentheticals' is not a technical one: "No great significance should be attached to this title" (1952, p. 480). In the literature, the term is used in a more or less strict sense to refer to syntactic or semantic properties of words and expressions or to a combination of both (see, for example, Jayez & Rossari, 2004).

> sometimes with poor evidence; which of these situations we are in need not be obvious to the hearer, and it would be cumbersome always to say explicitly. It is my contention that parenthetical verbs are one of the sets of devices that we use in order to deal with these matters, though not the only set. By them we prime the hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of our statements. (p. 484)

Urmson further remarked that adverbs such as *admittedly*, *certainly*, *happily*, *luckily*, *possibly*, *presumably*, *probably*, *unfortunately* behave in the same way. They are thus used to signal to the hearer how a statement is to be taken, in the same way as parenthetical verbs are. These words (verbs, adverbs, and other linguistic elements that have a parenthetical use) function as a signal guiding "the hearer to a proper appreciation of the statement in its context, social, logical, or evidential" (Urmson, 1952, p. 495).

As I have argued (see 1.3.3), the comment that a stance adverb adds to the move of advancing a standpoint when qualifying it provides the other party with information, which does not play a role in the identification of that move as a standpoint. Moreover, the information added does not receive support by the argumentation that is forwarded in the ensuing discussion. In Urmson's words, the comment of the stance adverb frames the move of advancing a standpoint with a signal "read with care", which suggests a certain interpretation not only of the particular move but also (maybe more importantly) of what follows that move, that is, the argumentation forwarded by the protagonist in support of the standpoint.

If for the argumentation to be accepted as sufficient and relevant support for the standpoint the antagonist has to agree that it draws from commonly accepted starting points, then the qualification of the standpoint can be said to play a role in framing the argumentation as relying on starting points that may facilitate the defence of the standpoint. Thus, the protagonist seeks to underline and emphasise the common ground that he shares with the other party.

As shown in the previous section, qualifying helps the protagonist to signal to the antagonist that there is no disagreement about the comment that a specific way of qualifying conveys. In this way, the protagonist can treat the information that the comment of a specific way of qualifying provides as being endorsed by the other party. The protagonist, that is, when qualifying the standpoint signals to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, there is agreement about a certain interpretation of the common ground. The interpretation that is proposed depends on the comment that a certain way of qualifying adds to the standpoint. As suggested in Chapter 2, the discourse effect of the adverbs used to qualify an utterance that functions as a standpoint differs along the three ways of qualifying:

a) The adverbs that qualify the standpoint in the *epistemic way* add a comment about the commitment to the propositional content of the standpoint that emphasises the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.

b) The adverbs that qualify the standpoint in the *evaluative way* add a comment about the evaluation of the propositional content of the standpoint that emphasises the shared evaluation of the issue about which the protagonist has assumed his position.

c) The adverbs that qualify the standpoint in the *'illocutionary' way* add a comment about the act as a whole that emphasises the protagonist's cooperativeness when advancing the particular standpoint.

Qualifying the standpoint in any of these ways helps the protagonist to propose an interpretation of the common ground on the basis of which he can build a conclusive defence of the standpoint; that is, achieve a favourable resolution of the dispute according to which the doubt with respect to its tenability is retracted and the standpoint is maintained, and thereby an end of the discussion in which the burden of proof is successfully discharged. Each of these ways proposes a different interpretation of the common ground, depending on their respective discourse effect. In what follows, I present the strategic function of standpoint qualification by describing how each way of qualifying signals one of the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof.

When qualifying the standpoint in the epistemic way, the protagonist forestalls a possible reaction from the antagonist regarding the quality of the evidence. He signals to the antagonist that there is agreement regarding the quality of the evidence that he has at his disposal. It is in the light of this agreement that he proposes to proceed with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint. He thereby suggests that the argumentation he is about to forward in support of the standpoint rests on evidence that is known to the antagonist (either as being strong and clear or as being rather poor or scarce). Starting from such an agreement, the protagonist expects that the argumentation in support of the standpoint will be deemed conclusive. Because this agreement concerns the quality of the evidence, the protagonist expects it to directly affect the development towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. This means that he would not expect questions to be asked regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint. Thus, the epistemic way of qualifying the standpoint signals to the antagonist that, as far as the protagonist is concerned, the 'short way' to a successful discharge of the burden of proof is to be followed in the testing of the tenability of the standpoint. The strategic function of this way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'solid' design of the standpoint.

When qualifying the standpoint in the evaluative way, the protagonist forestalls a possible reaction from the antagonist regarding the evaluation of the position that he assumes in the standpoint. He signals to the antagonist that they both agree about this evaluation. In this way, he proposes an interpretation of the common ground, according to which both parties agree that it is fortunate, unfortunate, sad, strange and so forth, that the protagonist advances the particular standpoint, since both parties share the same evaluation of its propositional content, even though they disagree about the (positive/ negative) position that the protagonist has assumed with respect to it. The protagonist can exploit this agreement in order to partially support the conclusiveness of the argumentation that he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint. In this sense, the protagonist acknowledges that the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the argumentation that he is about to forward in support of the standpoint may be challenged. Nevertheless, based on the concord about the shared evaluation, he acts as if he expects the argument he is ready to forward in support of the potential of the initial argumentation not be questioned any further. Thus, the evaluative way of qualifying the standpoint signals to the antagonist that, as far as the protagonist is concerned, the testing of the tenability of the standpoint will follow the 'middle way' towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. The strategic function of this way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'moderate' design of the standpoint.

When qualifying the standpoint in the 'illocutionary' way, the protagonist forestalls a possible reaction from the antagonist regarding his cooperativeness. He signals that there is agreement about the fact that he is a cooperative discussant; namely that he is being sincere when advancing the specific standpoint acknowledging that the position he assumes in the standpoint is not what the other party may expect or prefer. In this way, the protagonist proposes an interpretation of the common ground, according to which both parties agree that the standpoint is advanced in a context in which the opposite standpoint can also be advanced (or has been advanced). He thereby expects the antagonist to acknowledge that there must be good reasons for him to assume the position he does. The protagonist can only make indirect use of this proposed interpretation of the common ground in order to support the conclusiveness of the argumentation that he is ready to forward. In this sense, he acknowledges that questions regarding both the content and the potential of the argumentation may be asked. Nevertheless, starting from the endorsement of his cooperativeness by the antagonist, he acts as if the arguments that he is ready to forward in support of the content and the potential of the initial argumentation will be accepted without any further questions. The 'illocutionary' way of qualifying a standpoint signals to the antagonist that, as far as the protagonist is concerned, the 'long way' for a successful discharge of the burden of proof is to be followed in the testing of the tenability of the

standpoint. The strategic function of this way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'weak' design of the standpoint.

5.3 Constructive use of the strategic function of qualification

So far I have shown how the assumption about the management of the burden of proof and the three scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof can be used to account for the strategic function of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint when designing it. According to this assumption, the protagonist has qualified the standpoint by using one of the three possible ways of qualifying in his attempt to have a testing of the tenability of the standpoint that could yield a favourable result for him at the end of the discussion. Given the three scenarios, along which such a favourable outcome of a successful discharge can be achieved, I have specified the strategic function of qualifying by relating each way to one scenario. Accordingly, the strategic function of a particular way of qualifying a standpoint amounts to reaching the favourable outcome of the successful discharge of the burden of proof in the way specified by the related scenario. In the following subsections, I illustrate how an analyst can interpret the strategic function of qualification in the light of the proposed correlation between the ways of qualifying standpoints and the scenarios for managing the burden of proof. The examples are not meant to justify the theoretical account about the management of the burden of proof and the strategic function of qualification that I have expounded in the preceding part of this study. They are examples of cases where a qualified standpoint is advanced, in which an analyst can make use of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof in order to interpret the strategic function of the specific way of qualifying the standpoint.

5.3.1 Signalling agreement regarding the quality of the evidence

In the epistemic way of qualifying a standpoint, modal, evidential or domain adverbs are used to qualify the utterance that is reconstructed as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion. This way of qualifying conveys a comment about the commitment to the propositional content of the assertive act that is being performed (see Table 2, p.50). The discourse effect of qualifying the standpoint in this way is to emphasise the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of the standpoint. The protagonist who chooses this way of qualifying acts as if the antagonist's doubt with respect to the tenability of the standpoint originates in his disbelief regarding the evidence that the protagonist may have for assuming the position he did. With the help of the epistemic stance adverb that he chooses, the protagonist signals that there is agreement about the quality of the evidence on which his

argumentation rests. Based on this agreement he expects that the antagonist will not ask any questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that is forwarded in support of the standpoint. When qualifying the standpoint in the epistemic way, the protagonist may choose a 'strong' epistemic adverb or a 'weak' one, or may choose to use a domain adverb. In all of these cases, the design of the standpoint would count as a 'solid' design. In this section, I discuss examples of all three cases.

For the arguer who accepts the role of the protagonist of the standpoint, the choice of a 'strong' epistemic stance adverb, such as *clearly*, means that he presents himself in the discussion as being sure about the claim he advances. Such certainty is also transferred to the argumentation that he is ready to forward. The protagonist, as it were, signals to the antagonist that he is sure about the correctness of the position he assumes with respect to the expressed opinion because he has strong evidence in support of it. He suggests to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, they would both agree that the evidence on the basis of which he has come to assert the position that he did is indeed clear and strong, in the sense that both the content and the potential of the argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint can be directly accepted by the antagonist without any further questions. In this way, the protagonist can expect that he can have the tenability of the standpoint accepted, reaching a successful discharge of the burden of proof through the 'short' way for the management of the burden of proof.

Consider the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the following fragment taken from a book on gliding safety. The fragment is about transporting one's glider with a trailer:

> The main thing to realise with trailer driving is that it only takes one mistake to wreck the trailer and a nice glider, as well as possibly writing off a new car. *Clearly*, it is important to consider each of the ways in which you can safeguard your equipment because it is no use avoiding all the flying hazards if you are going to write off your glider on the ground. Repairs take time and money to carry out and if they can be avoided gliding will be less expensive in the future. [BNC]

In this text, *clearly* qualifies the utterance from which the following standpoint can be reconstructed: *It is important to consider each of the ways in which you can safeguard your gliding equipment when you transport it on a trailer*. Three arguments can be reconstructed from the text in support of this standpoint, constituting a multiple argumentation structure:[84]

> 1.1 One mistake is enough to wreck the trailer and the glider, or even the car
> 1.2 A damaged glider will prevent you from flying

[84] On argumentation structures see Snoeck Henkemans (1992), and van Eemeren et al. (2002).

1.3 Repairing a damaged glider will cost time and money

In the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the above piece of discourse, the choice to qualify the standpoint using a 'strong' epistemic stance adverb allows the protagonist to act as if the other party (the implicit antagonist) would agree that the evidence forwarded is strong and clear. The protagonist could base such an expectation on the fact that he is a knowledgeable author on the topic of gliding,[85] addressing a specialized audience informed about the subject that can immediately accept the arguments forwarded and appreciate their relevance. In this argumentative discussion, the protagonist would thereby expect that the argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint would not be questioned any further as regards its content or its potential. To an antagonist who raised doubt regarding the content or the potential of the above arguments, the protagonist could answer by reminding him that these arguments are warranted by the specialised interest that they both share in the sport of gliding to which the text refers. The protagonist relies on the knowledge that he assumes to be shared between him and the implicit antagonist in order to reach a favourable outcome of the testing procedure.

For the language user who accepts the role of the protagonist, the choice to qualify the standpoint using a 'weak' epistemic stance adverb, such as *perhaps*, means that he presents himself in the discussion as being less sure about the claim he advances. Nevertheless, this does not mean that he gives up his chances of winning the discussion or that he merely admits defeat right from the start of the discussion. The protagonist who qualifies the standpoint by expressing a low degree of certainty signals to the antagonist that he is not so sure about the correctness of the claim he puts forward. By choosing this way of qualifying, he acknowledges that there is not very strong or a lot of evidence on the basis of which one could assume the position he has assumed. He suggests that the antagonist, too, agrees about the paucity of evidence, something which allows him to expect that the argumentation in support of the standpoint can be considered sufficient given the circumstances. In this way, the protagonist may still expect that at the end of the discussion he will have successfully discharged the burden of proof, following the 'short' way for the management of the burden of proof.

Consider the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the following fragment on fears that women who are about to give birth have:

> It is not unusual for mothers-to-be at this time, for example, to fantasize about giving birth to a handicapped child or of dying in childbirth. This is *perhaps* less fantasy than reality-gauging: Since multiple-handicap children are born yearly, and the still only partially understood mechanisms of chemically mutagenic and teratogenic

[85] The author of this fragment is Alan Derek Piggott, one of Britain's best-known glider pilots and instructors.

> factors are rife, it is not untoward to have an eye on potential complications of birth or defects in the child-to-be. [COBUILD]

In this text, *perhaps* qualifies the utterance from which the following standpoint can be reconstructed: *It is less fantasy than reality-gauging for mothers-to-be to have fears about giving birth to a handicapped child or of dying in childbirth*. The argumentation forwarded can be reconstructed as subordinative, as follows:

> 1.1. It is normal to be aware of potential complications of birth or defects in the child-to-be
> 1.1.1a. Multiple-handicap children are born yearly
> 1.1.1b. The factors that can cause mutagenesis and teratogenesis are widespread but their mechanisms are still only partially understood

The protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint using a 'weak' epistemic stance adverb in the argumentative discussion reconstructed from the above fragment allows him to act as if there is agreement about the quality of the evidence he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint. While the use of a 'strong' epistemic stance adverb would suggest that there is agreement that the evidence is strong and clear, the use of a 'weak' epistemic stance adverb suggests that there is agreement that the evidence is rather poor. The protagonist in this discussion shows awareness of the fact that the standpoint that he is about to defend concerns an issue over which certain facts are known but it is yet hard to reach a definitive conclusion about the way the factors that can cause mutagenesis, teratogenesis or death in childbirth interrelate. Nevertheless, this awareness does not keep him from asserting his standpoint. By choosing to qualify it with *perhaps*, he suggests that the antagonist agrees that the evidence from which one can defend this particular standpoint is rather poor. By doing so, he expects that the antagonist will not ask further questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that he forwarded in support of the standpoint, and thereby that he can reach an end of the discussion in which the tenability of the standpoint is accepted.

The use of a domain adverb like *technically*, *philosophically*, or *morally*, among others, indicates certainty about the truth of what is asserted upon condition that it falls within the field specified. The difference with the other two options for the epistemic way of qualifying is that in this case the protagonist is explicit neither about the evidence being clear and strong nor about the evidence being poor. Instead, the use of a domain stance adverb allows the protagonist to convey certainty that the evidence he forwards constitutes conclusive support for the standpoint to the extent that it falls within the field specified and also, by implication, to concede that the same evidence may not be conclusive for the same standpoint outside the field specified. The protagonist suggests to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, there is agreement about the field within which the tenability of the standpoint is to be tested. It is on the basis of such an agreement that the protagonist expects that the antagonist will not ask

questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, and thereby looks forward to a successful discharge of the burden of proof, along the 'short' way for the management of the burden of proof.

Consider the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the following fragment, in which the author of a book describes the women working in a bar he visited while in France as a member of the French Foreign Legion:

> The woman ran a number of girls who were not *technically* prostitutes but more hostesses. They would chat and flirt with the legionnaires, making them buy champagne and other expensive drinks, in return for which they would provide female company and, if they found the legionnaire attractive, they would sleep with them. [BNC]

In this text, the domain adverb *technically* qualifies the utterance from where the following standpoint can be reconstructed: *The girls that were run by that woman were not prostitutes but hostesses*. The argumentation that can be reconstructed from the above discourse fragment is structured coordinatively as follows:

> 1a. The girls were providing company to the legionnaires, chatting and flirting with them in return of the champagne and expensive drinks that they were buying
> 1b. The girls would only sleep with the legionnaires if they found them attractive

The protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint with the use of the domain adverb *technically* has allowed him to be explicit about the perspective from which he is defending the specific standpoint and thereby to frame the interpretation of the argumentation in support of it within this perspective. He thus signals to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, they both agree on the specific perspective and on the interpretation of the conclusiveness of the argumentation within this perspective. Agreeing on a 'technical' perspective suggests that one looks at the precise details of a matter and that one is interested in the procedural aspect of it. By qualifying the standpoint with technically the protagonist employs the argumentative technique of dissociation in order to delineate his standpoint against others and thereby to make it easier to defend.[86] From a technical perspective, the facts that the girls were providing company to the legionnaires in exchange for the drinks that these legionnaires were buying, and that they were sleeping only with the ones they found attractive, constitute support for concluding that these girls were not prostitutes. From a different perspective, however, which could be made explicit by the use of a prepositional phrase like *in reality* or *in practice*, for

[86] On the argumentative technique of dissociation see van Rees (2009).

example, the above arguments could have been used in support of a standpoint asserting that these women were prostitutes. By framing the forwarded argumentation within the 'technical' perspective, the protagonist suggests that there is agreement about a strict, technical perspective within which the above argumentation can be interpreted as conclusive. In this way, he can expect that there will not be any further questions asked by the antagonist regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation he has forwarded in support of this standpoint.

5.3.2 Signalling agreement regarding evaluation

In the evaluative way of qualifying standpoints, evaluative adverbs (see Table 2, p.50) are used to qualify the utterance that can be reconstructed as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion. This way of qualifying conveys a comment about the evaluation of the propositional content of the assertive act that is performed. As argued in 2.3.2, the discourse effect of qualifying the utterance that functions as a standpoint in this way is to emphasise the evaluation of the expressed opinion that the two parties share. The protagonist who chooses this way acts as if the antagonist's doubt about the tenability of the standpoint arises from a clash about the evaluative assessment of the expressed opinion, something which he hurries to repair by using this way of qualifying. In so doing, he signals to the antagonist that, as far as the evaluation of the expressed opinion is concerned, both parties share the same satisfaction or dissatisfaction about it, even though they differ in the position they assume with respect to the expressed opinion.

The protagonist who advances a qualified standpoint by uttering 'Fortunately, John is not coming with us tonight', assumes a positive position with respect to the expressed opinion 'John is not coming tonight', a claim in support of which he needs to put forward argumentation. By qualifying the standpoint with *fortunately* the protagonist expresses, in addition, his evaluation of the content of the standpoint, namely that, as far as he is concerned, that John is not coming is a fortunate fact. If the protagonist knows or expects that the other party does not share the same evaluation, it would be wise not to be explicit about his own evaluation in the first place. Doing so would expose him to a double obligation, namely to defend his position that John is not coming *and* to defend his position that it is a fortunate fact that John is not coming. That is why the evaluative comment that is added to a standpoint in order to qualify it, is by definition assumed to be one about which both parties agree (see also 2.3.2.2). If this were not so, the evaluative comment would raise the other party's doubt and should receive support by the protagonist, something which would make it count as being part of the standpoint rather than as qualifying it (see also the discussion in 1.4.1.2).

While the use of an adverb like *fortunately* to qualify the standpoint suggests that the protagonist shares with the antagonist the satisfaction that can be

caused by accepting the standpoint, the use of an adverb like *unfortunately* suggests that the protagonist shares with the antagonist the dissatisfaction that can be caused by accepting the standpoint. By qualifying the standpoint using *unfortunately* the protagonist concedes that the position he assumes opposes the antagonist's expectations or preferences and acknowledges that this is an evaluation he, too, shares. Nevertheless, the protagonist goes on to advance this particular standpoint. In both cases, the protagonist acknowledges not only that the other party has a certain evaluation and that accepting the standpoint may be gratifying (or not) but also that he shares this evaluation with the other party.

By adding a comment that conveys an evaluation that he expects the antagonist to share, the protagonist secures a concession regarding the evaluation of the propositional content of the standpoint, and as a consequence he expects to obtain the antagonist's (implicit) agreement on other propositions that could constitute grounds for that evaluation or that follow from it. In a discussion over the tenability of the standpoint 'John is not coming' qualified by *fortunately*, the protagonist could make use of such premises as 'John is boring', 'John is annoying' or 'It is a good thing that John is not coming', considering them as commonly shared between him and the antagonist. In a discussion about the tenability of the same standpoint, but qualified by *unfortunately*, the protagonist could consider as part of the common ground premises like 'John's company is always interesting', 'I like John as much as you do', and so forth. The protagonist might make use of the agreement on such premises in order to conclusively answer some of the antagonist's questions about the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. The evaluative way of qualifying counts as a 'moderate' design of the standpoint, signalling the 'middle' way to the successful discharge of the burden of proof.

In the fragment below, taken from a book on food allergy and intolerance, the evaluative adverb *fortunately* is used to qualify the standpoint:

> Living with chemical sensitivity: If you find that you are sensitive to various chemicals, then avoiding them is the best treatment. Complete avoidance is often very difficult, but *fortunately* it is rarely necessary. For most people, reducing their overall chemical load makes them far more robust and able to cope with everyday exposures. So simply avoiding cigarette smoke, household chemicals, food additives and tap water may be enough to eliminate symptoms, or reduce them to a bearable level. You should also avoid exposure to large doses of synthetic chemicals, such as from household timber treatment or crop-spraying. [BNC]

The standpoint reconstructed from the above text can be paraphrased as: *It is rarely necessary to avoid completely being exposed to chemicals in everyday life*. The argumentation in support of it can be reconstructed as follows:

> 1.1 Reducing the overall chemical load to which people are exposed everyday is enough to make most people more robust and able to cope with exposure to chemicals
> 1.1.1a. Avoiding exposure to only specific sources of chemicals like cigarette smoke, and so forth, is enough
> 1.1.1b. Avoiding exposure to large quantities of synthetic chemicals is enough

Having already conceded that complete avoidance of chemicals is considered very difficult, the protagonist in this discussion acknowledges that he is addressing an audience that finds it difficult to avoid exposure to chemicals. By choosing *fortunately* to qualify his point of view, the protagonist signals to the implicit antagonist, a role that can be assigned to the readers of the book, that he shares with them a positive assessment regarding the content of what he asserts in his standpoint: it is thus fortunate for both parties that complete avoidance is not necessary, even though it is not yet agreed between the two parties why it is not necessary. The protagonist expects to convince the antagonist on the latter point (and thereby to successfully discharge the burden of proof) by having him accept the potential of the argumentation forwarded as sufficient given that both parties value the content of the standpoint that is being defended positively. An antagonist who positively values the fact that complete avoidance of exposure to chemicals is not necessary would be ready to accept the potential of the arguments forwarded in support of such a standpoint as conclusive, on the premise that simply reducing exposure is a more convenient way of living with chemicals than trying to avoid them completely (especially when it comes to substances, to which one is exposed on a daily basis).

Had the protagonist in the above text chosen to qualify his position using *unfortunately*, he would have been open to the other party's criticism regarding the expression of a negative evaluation of the content of the standpoint, in addition to the criticism he has to answer regarding the reasons for the standpoint itself. A protagonist who qualifies the standpoint using *unfortunately* expects the other party to share the negative evaluation or dissatisfaction about the content of the standpoint.

Consider the following fragment where the author of a magazine article argues why he did not include a drug called Cane Toad in his list of 'Legal Drugs':

> CROAKING IT As my article "Legal Highs" (FACE 49) was so subjective, I knew somebody was going to take issue with it. (Why has he only given magic mushrooms four for euphoria, when Collis Brownes gets five?) Still, I have to admit, I didn't expect anybody to make a case for the inclusion of the Cane Toad (Letters, FACE 50). *Unfortunately*, the Cane Toad doesn't warrant inclusion, because

> anybody who scrapes the skin off the toad would find themselves in possession of a substance called Bufotenine, which happens to be listed as a Class A drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Just because nobody actually wants to use a drug that hops around on two legs, croaking, it doesn't mean that you can't get nicked for it. [BNC]

The author of this text responds to the readers' suggestion to include a drug called Cane Toad in the list of legal drugs, which he has compiled and presented in an earlier issue of the same magazine. He can thus be considered as the protagonist of a negative standpoint regarding the inclusion of Cane Toad in the list of 'legal highs', which can be paraphrased as: *Cane Toad cannot be included in the list of legal highs*.[87] The argumentation he provides in support of it can be reconstructed as follows:

> 1.1 Cane Toad, a drug that can be produced by scraping the skin off the toad, contains Bufotenine
> (1.1') (A drug that contains Bufotenine cannot be included in the list of legal highs)
> 1.1'.1 Bufotenine is listed as a Class A drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971

In the above reconstruction, the argument that Bufotenine is listed as a Class A illegal drug comes in support of the unexpressed premise that supports the potential of the initial argument that Cane Toad contains Bufotenine. By choosing the adverb *unfortunately* to qualify the utterance that functions as the standpoint, the protagonist signals to the implicit antagonist that he shares the dissatisfaction that can be caused by accepting the exclusion of Cane Toad from the list of 'legal highs'. The protagonist would have also liked that the particular substance be listed as a 'legal high'. Nevertheless, he goes on to assume a negative position on this matter and to argue in support of it. He expects that the other party will accept the argument that is forwarded in support of the potential of the initial argument and thereby accept the argumentation as conclusive support for the standpoint. He draws this confidence from the concession he has implicitly invoked from the antagonist concerning the shared evaluation over the content of the standpoint. By acknowledging that he shares the antagonist's dissatisfaction over the position he assumes in the standpoint, the protagonist signals to the antagonist that the argumentation forwarded is sufficient to remove his own doubts over the particular issue, despite the dissatisfaction this causes. He thereby also expects the antagonist not to raise any further questions, namely concerning the potential of the argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint.

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[87] The dispute is thus reconstructed as a mixed one, with the protagonist of the positive standpoint being the readers of the magazine who made a case in favour of the inclusion of the Cane Toad in the list of 'legal highs'.

5.3.3 Signalling agreement regarding cooperativeness

In the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying standpoints, illocutionary adverbs and expectation markers (see Table 2) are used to qualify the utterance that can be reconstructed as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion. This way of qualifying conveys a comment about the way the assertive act is performed. As argued in 2.3.3, the discourse effect of qualifying the standpoint in this way is to emphasise the protagonist's cooperativeness. The protagonist who chooses this way acts as if the antagonist's doubt about the tenability of the standpoint originates from the disbelief he has in the protagonist's cooperativeness, something which the latter hastens to repair by adding this comment. He thus signals to the antagonist that he is being fully cooperative in the Gricean (1975) sense; that is, he is as informative as is required and sincere about what he believes to be the case, as well as about the correctness of the information he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.

This way of qualifying would be the protagonist's last resort, as it were, to secure a successful discharge of the burden of proof. It counts as a 'weak' design of the move of advancing a standpoint. By using adverbs like *frankly*, which emphasise the sincerity of the speaker, or adverbs like *in fact*, which acknowledge the unexpectedness of the message for the interlocutor, the protagonist signals his awareness that the antagonist has the opposite point of view and that he is ready to cast doubt on the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. Nevertheless, the protagonist suggests that he can convincingly answer the questions that may arise regarding the content and the potential of the original argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint.

By acknowledging that he advances a standpoint that goes against the position that the other party may hold, the protagonist suggests that he has good reasons for doing so. He expects that the other party will accept the argumentation he is ready to bring forward in support of the content and the potential of the initial argumentation, because he will agree that they rest on premises that are commonly accepted. Such premises do not necessarily originate in agreements that the two parties have reached in the context of the particular discussion, but on agreements that rational discussants would be expected to share in general. Accordingly, he expects the antagonist to accept the argumentation as conclusive defence for the standpoint and thereby to reach a successful discharge of the burden of proof, through the 'long' way for the management of the burden of proof.

Consider the following discourse fragment, which comes from an appraisal of the performance of football player John Jackson, with the nickname 'Jacko', in the games of the 1968-1969 season with the Crystal Palace football club:

> No other Palace player ever attained one season's maximum appearances in our first three Division 1 seasons; 'Jacko' did, all three

> times. And, with all due respect to the other players, it was, *frankly*, as well that he did, because time and again it was his superb displays that salvaged precious points for Palace against the odds; points which, at the end of the season, made all the difference between survival and relegation. [BNC]

The author of this text is the protagonist of a standpoint paraphrased as: *It was a good thing that the football player with the nickname 'Jacko' attained the maximum appearances for one season three times*. By choosing to qualify this standpoint with the adverb *frankly*, the protagonist conveys his awareness that the antagonist, namely the other players in the team and those of the fans who have a preference for these other players, may not agree with this position. The fact that 'Jacko' attained one season's maximum appearances three times means that some of his co-players did not appear in the games as much as they would have wished and maybe that others did not appear at all. At the same time, the protagonist conveys his awareness that by advancing this standpoint he is indirectly criticising the performance of the other players. Nevertheless, the author assumes a positive standpoint and forwards argumentation in support of it which can be reconstructed as follows:

> 1.1 Jacko's superb displays salvaged precious points for the Palace team
> 1.2 The points that Jacko secured kept the Palace team in Division 1

By qualifying the standpoint with *frankly*, the protagonist does not only succeed in avoiding a direct clash between his opinion and the opposite opinion that may exist over the matter, but also in indirectly strengthening the force of the argumentation he forwards in support of his standpoint. He suggests that even those who would argue against his point of view would ultimately agree about the content of the argumentation that he has advanced. Despite the resentment that some other players, or the fans of these players, may feel for the fact that Jacko has appeared most times in the team's games and for the negative connotations this may have for the evaluation of their own performance, no one could deny the fact that the Palace team has earned points in the 1968-9 season that guaranteed its ranking in top division. Moreover, none could refuse that these points were earned thanks to Jacko's performance, even if one had wished that some other player had earned them, or even if this meant accepting that the other players' performance was not as good. At the same time, the protagonist suggests that the justificatory potential of the argumentation that he is forwarding can be convincingly supported, too. He bases this confidence on the fact that even if the other party would be of the opinion that it was not a good thing that Jacko attained a maximum number of appearances, they would still be interested in the team's ranking, something which was secured by the points that Jacko won, after all. Had the protagonist chosen to qualify the standpoint using an adverb like *clearly*, he would have openly confronted some

of the readers with a view that he knows they would not be happy to hear, and thus he would have had less chances for his argumentation having any effect in supporting his viewpoint. The same problem would arise if he had used *fortunately*.

Consider the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the following fragment on advice to alcoholics:

> Take it slow. You don't have to feel everything you've stuffed for the past thirty years - right now. *In fact*, in early recovery, it's best to avoid situations guaranteed to elicit intense feelings, since enough will come up on their own. Lynn, a newly recovering alcoholic, tried to attend a group for adult children of alcoholics but found she had to back off. "Too much rage came up for me. It felt like it was racing through my blood - and the only thing that would quell it was a drink." She decided to put those issues on a back burner for the moment and concentrate on staying sober. [COBUILD]

The standpoint of this text can be paraphrased as: *It is best to avoid situations that elicit intense feelings when entering into treatment for alcoholism*. The argumentation in support of this point of view can be reconstructed as follows:

> 1.1 There are enough intense moments awaiting one during the treatment period
> 1.2 The tension that one will feel during the treatment period could make one return to drinking

By qualifying the utterance that functions as a standpoint using *in fact*, the protagonist acknowledges that a different opinion on the matter may exist. The audience that he is addressing, consisting mainly of people (and their families) who are undergoing treatment for alcoholism or are in need of it, may expect that one should take the opportunity to confront situations with intense feelings in an attempt to let as many emotions as possible come up during the treatment period. Contrary to such a view, the protagonist is of the opinion that one should solely concentrate on staying sober. By qualifying the standpoint using *in fact*, he indirectly suggests that the argumentation that follows constitutes strong support for it. The protagonist expects that the other party will ultimately accept the content of the argumentation forwarded, even if that party would not have expected that the tension that one undergoes during the treatments can be such that makes one return to drinking. He draws this confidence from the fact that the other party acknowledges the knowledge and the experience that the protagonist of this standpoint has on matters relating to the treatment of alcoholism.[88] At the same time, he expects that the other party

[88] Since this is a leaflet providing advice to alcoholics, one could expect that the readers assume that the protagonist of the standpoint is someone who is knowledgeable and experienced in providing such a piece of advice.

will also ultimately accept the potential of the argumentation forwarded, based on the fact that the other party shares an interest in having a treatment against alcoholism that runs as smoothly and is as effective as possible.

An antagonist wishing to challenge the comment that adverbs such as *frankly* and *in fact* introduce to the argumentative discussion, by saying something like 'You are not talking sincerely' or 'This position is offending/insulting', would risk opening a new discussion, in which he would appear to accuse the protagonist of the qualified standpoint of being uncooperative. Refraining from explicitly challenging the qualifier implies that the antagonist tacitly endorses the protagonist's cooperativeness. In this case, the protagonist can act as if the antagonist has assumed or is ready to assume a position to which the standpoint he is advancing is opposed. In this context of a dispute, the protagonist, nonetheless, can suggest that there is common ground that he takes to be shared between rational parties in a discussion. It is on the basis of such common ground that the protagonist frames the argumentation that he forwards as strong support for the standpoint and thereby expects to have the tenability of the particular standpoint accepted by the other party.

5.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have specified the strategic function of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint in one of the three ways identified in *Part I*. I have argued that the strategic function of qualification rests on the two choices that a qualified standpoint allows to the antagonist, namely to react by expressing disagreement regarding the choice of the particular way of qualifying, or to react by expressing disagreement regarding the proposition within the scope of the qualifier. In the first case, the antagonist appears, temporarily at least, to agree with the expressed opinion. In the second case, he appears to endorse the comment that this particular way of qualifying the standpoint conveys, unless he explicitly challenges it later on in the course of the same discussion. Of these two possible reactions, the one that contributes to the direct development of the testing procedure and puts a burden of proof on the protagonist is the one in which the antagonist requests justification for the expressed opinion. This is the reaction that a reasonable protagonist, who is interested in proceeding with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint, would seek to obtain from the antagonist. At the same time, such a reaction to a qualified standpoint by the antagonist allows the protagonist to act as if the comment that the qualification conveys is endorsed.

In the light of Urmson's (1952) account of the function of parenthetical verbs and adverbs as signs prompting the interlocutor to "read with care", I have argued that the qualifier that the protagonist chooses each time signals to the antagonist that there is agreement, as far as the comment conveyed by the particular way of qualifying is concerned. In this way, the protagonist seeks to

underline the common ground that he shares with the antagonist, and to emphasise the agreement with what he knows or expects the other party to hold as correct, true, acceptable, plausible, and so forth, in order to proceed with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint under favourable conditions, expecting thereby to successfully discharge the burden of proof.

Given the different discourse effects that different ways of qualifying have (as described in 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.3.2), I specified the way in which qualification can be used constructively as a signal that one of the paths for the successful discharge of the burden of proof is to be followed. In this way, I specified the strategic function of the three ways of qualifying a standpoint by relating each to one of the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof:

The epistemic way of qualifying has the strategic function of counting as a 'solid' design of the standpoint. The protagonist who chooses this way to design the standpoint prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the quality of the evidence that he has for assuming the position he does. He signals to the antagonist that their common ground is such that he does not expect him to ask questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint. By qualifying the standpoint in the epistemic way, the protagonist signals that a 'short' way to the successful discharge of the burden of proof will be followed.

The evaluative way of qualifying has the strategic function of counting as a 'moderate' design of the standpoint. The protagonist who chooses this way to design the standpoint prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the evaluation of the proposition over which the difference of opinion has arisen. He signals to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint will not be challenged any further, since it can be warranted by the endorsement of the evaluative comment. In this way, the protagonist suggests that a 'middle' way to the successful discharge of the burden of proof be followed in the procedure of the testing of the tenability of the standpoint.

The 'illocutionary' way of qualifying has the strategic function of counting as a 'weak' design of the standpoint. The protagonist who chooses this way to design the standpoint prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the protagonist's cooperativeness. He signals to the antagonist his awareness that the antagonist may have the opposite point of view and that he may be ready to cast doubt on the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. He nevertheless suggests that the arguments he is ready to forward in support of both the content and the potential of the initial argumentation are strong. He draws this confidence from the belief that the antagonist would not suspect that the protagonist would have risked assuming the position he did, addressing someone who thinks opposite, unless he had

good reasons to do so. In this way, he proposes that a 'long' way to a successful discharge of the burden of proof be followed.

In order to illustrate how an analyst should interpret the use of a stance adverb that qualifies the standpoint in the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof and the strategic function of each of the three ways of qualifying, I have discussed examples of argumentative discourse found in corpora or the Internet. The proposed way of interpreting qualified standpoints represents the constructive use of qualification in an argumentative discussion. In the next chapter, I make use of this theoretical account in order to propose an understanding of the ways in which qualification could end up being abused and thus obstruct the critical testing of the tenability of the standpoint.

CHAPTER 6
ABUSING QUALIFICATION WHEN MANAGING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

6.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter I presented the strategic function of qualification as the argumentatively relevant information that the analyst can draw when confronted with a piece of discourse in which a qualified standpoint appears. I specified this strategic function by relating the ways of qualifying a standpoint to the possible scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof. The illustrations of the strategic function of qualification in Chapter 5 refer to the constructive use of qualification when designing the move of advancing a standpoint. In this chapter, I discuss those cases in which the use of qualification to design the standpoint in an argumentative discussion ends up obstructing the testing of its tenability. Given my account of the management of the burden of proof (Chapter 4) and the view of qualification as a presentational means for designing the move of advancing a standpoint (Chapter 1), the question I turn to in this chapter is: 'What do stance adverbs tell an analyst who seeks to determine whether the design of the move of advancing a standpoint is in agreement with the standards of critical reasonableness?'. To answer this question, I need to specify the role that qualification may play in those cases where the protagonist does not observe the dialectical exigencies of a critical discussion. For this purpose, I first need to determine which rule for a critical discussion governs the management of the burden of proof.

In section 6.2, I propose evaluating the management of the burden of proof with respect to the rule about the burden of proof that pertains to the opening stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion. In those cases where the protagonist designs the standpoint with the aim of reaching a favourable outcome, as far as his burden of proof is concerned, without observing the dialectical requirements of the discussion, it can be said that his attempt to manage the burden of proof has derailed. As a result, the burden of proof rule is violated, and qualification can then be said to have been abused. In section 6.3, I describe what happens when qualification has been abused, by referring to the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof presented in 4.5. In section 6.4, I discuss examples from corpora of written English, in which the design of the move of advancing a standpoint contributed to the obstruction of the critical testing, in order to illustrate how an analyst should evaluate cases where the strategic manoeuvring in designing the standpoint derailed.

6.2 Derailment of the management of the burden of proof

In the strategic manoeuvring approach (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2002a, 2003, 2007b) an explanation for the occurrence of fallacies is provided, according to which a fallacy is the result of a derailment of strategic manoeuvring, which leads to a violation of a rule for a critical discussion. In this view, the derailment leads to the realisation of a move that does not observe one or more of the dialectical rules that pertain at a given point of the critical discussion. The design of such a move has resulted from the party's interest in the rhetorical goal to the detriment of the dialectical goal.[89] Such a realisation of a move can be shown to violate one of the rules for the conduct of a critical discussion and thereby can be identified as a fallacy. In this view, a fallacy is not a move that is different in kind from the moves allowed by the ideal model of a critical discussion (an obstructive kind of move versus a constructive kind of move), but an infelicitous realisation of a move of one of the kinds allowed.

The move that is examined in this study is the move of advancing a standpoint. In designing it, that is, in making choices regarding each of the three aspects of topical potential, presentation and adaptation to audience, the protagonist's strategic goal, as I have argued in Chapter 4, is to manage the burden of proof. The design of the standpoint realised in a particular piece of argumentative discourse may be one that does not obstruct the dispute-resolution process or one that obstructs it. In those cases where the particular design of the move of advancing a standpoint results in obstructing the dispute-resolution process, the strategic manoeuvring that produced this move derailed, resulting in the violation of a rule of critical discussion. In this section, I discuss how qualification of a standpoint can be evaluated. For this purpose, I first describe what happens when the management of the burden of proof derails, then I specify the rule of the ideal model of a critical discussion that is violated by this derailment, and finally I discuss the role that qualification plays in these cases.

6.2.1 What derails?

In the preceding chapter, I described the strategic function of each way of qualifying a standpoint in the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof. In this view, the protagonist exploits the discourse effect of a particular way of qualifying in order to signal to the antagonist that there is agreement about the interpretation of the common ground, on the basis of which he can expect the testing of the tenability of the standpoint to develop

[89] There may be a number of reasons (cognitive, social, practical, among others) why a language user at a given instance of argumentative reality may act in a way that overlooks the dialectical exigencies of an argumentative discussion in favour of his rhetorical goals. Their examination, however, falls outside the scope of the pragma-dialectical study of argumentation.

according to one of the three scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof. The mapping between the three ways of qualifying and the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof presented in 5.2.2 describes what the strategic function of each way of qualifying is. It represents, as it were, the constructive use of qualification by means of stance adverbs when designing a standpoint. It is a constructive use in the sense that the protagonist would expect to have a favourable development of the discussion about the tenability of the standpoint that he has qualified in one of the three ways, while observing the dialectical requirements for the conduct of such a discussion throughout.

When the protagonist, in his attempt to reach a favourable end to the discussion, as far as his burden of proof is concerned, overlooks the dialectical exigencies of the discussion (that require that the standpoint be intresubjectively tested) in favour of the rhetorical goal of merely having the standpoint accepted, it can be said that his attempt to manage the burden of proof has derailed. This means that the protagonist was seeking to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical norms. In this case, the design chosen for the realisation of the move of advancing a standpoint in the specific discourse is not in accordance with the dialectical standards that pertain to the particular juncture of the discussion in which the move is performed. The strategic function of qualification has been exploited for the sole aim of having the standpoint accepted at any cost, even to the detriment of the dialectical standards, which should be observed if standpoints are to be tested critically.

6.2.2 Which rule is violated?

As argued in 4.4, the assumption about the management of the burden of proof attributes to the protagonist of a standpoint a strategic goal for designing it, namely to have the standpoint accepted at the end of the dispute resolution procedure, and thereby to successfully discharge the burden of proof. The protagonist is expected to pursue this goal by observing the rules for a critical discussion and the standards of reasonableness that govern the performance of the various tasks throughout the stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion. In order to be in a position to determine whether the way the standpoint has been designed in a particular discourse obstructed the dispute resolution process, it is important to know which rule it may violate. The rule that is affected by the derailment of the management of the burden of proof is the *pragma-dialectical rule of the burden of proof*, the violation of which yields the fallacy of evading or shifting the burden of proof.

In the pragma-dialectical account of fallacies, evading or shifting the burden of proof is recognised as a violation of a rule in the opening stage of the critical discussion, which postulates that "a party who advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party asks him to do so" (van Eemeren &

Grootendorst, 1992, p. 117).[90] In this way, Pragma-dialectics introduces the evading or shifting of the burden of proof as a fallacy committed in the opening stage of the critical discussion by the protagonist of the standpoint, a fallacy which was not recognised as such in the standard literature on fallacies until then (see van Eemeren, 2001, p. 158).[91]

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), the protagonist evades the burden of proof when he "presents the standpoint in such a way that there is no need to defend it in the first place" or when he "formulates the standpoint in such a way that it is protected from any adequate assessment" (pp. 118-119). In the presentation of the fallacy of evading the burden of proof, the authors list expressions such as *it is as clear as daylight that..*, *of course*, *it goes without saying* or *I can assure you that..*, *there's no doubt in my mind that..*, *I am absolutely convinced that..*, by means of which the protagonist's attempt to evade the burden of proof can be recognised in discourse. In other parts of the book, discussing other fallacies, such as 'falsely presenting a premise as a common starting point' (p. 151), '*argumentum ad verecundiam*' (p. 167), and 'making an absolute of the success of defence' (p. 186), the authors acknowledge that the evasion of the burden of proof can be the result of other means than just the wording of the protagonist's standpoint.

The fallacy of shifting the burden of proof differs from the fallacy of evading it in the sense that the protagonist of the standpoint expects or forces the antagonist of the standpoint to assume the role of protagonist for the opposite standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 120). In a non-mixed difference of opinion, this is a violation of the rule for the burden of proof, since there is only one standpoint that needs to be defended, and thus only one party should play the role of the protagonist for that standpoint. When this fallacy is committed, the party that should play the role of the protagonist of the standpoint treats the doubt that the other party casts over the tenability of the standpoint as an expression of the opposite point of view. He thereby fallaciously seeks to transform a non-mixed dispute into a mixed one, in which he acts as if only the opposite standpoint needs to be defended.

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[90] In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 191), the 'obligation-to-defend rule' is formulated thus: "Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so".

[91] Hamblin (1970, p. 170ff) has already pointed at the need to treat the sophistical move of shifting the burden of proof as a fallacy, something which Aristotle, according to him, failed to mention. Discussing the concept of the burden of proof in relation to the *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, described by Locke, Hamblin writes: "Locke's *argumentum ad ignorantiam* touches on another feature of argumentation that is all too often regarded as no business of the logician, the question of the burden of proof" (p. 162). However, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 123, 187-191) remark, the *ad ignorantiam* fallacy is about making an absolute of the failure of the defence, while shifting the burden of proof is about refusing to assume the obligation to defend for the standpoint that one has advanced. While the former pertains to the concluding stage of a critical discussion, the latter pertains to the opening stage.

When shifting the burden of proof, the party that should play the role of the protagonist acts as if he is not the one who should defend the standpoint.

The protagonist who seeks to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical requirements for a critical discussion ends up either evading or shifting the burden of proof. That is, the protagonist wishes to have the standpoint accepted and to be acquitted of the burden of proof at the end of the discussion, without however accepting to play the role of the protagonist (as described in the case of shifting the burden of proof), or without making an attempt of forwarding conclusive argumentation in response to the antagonist's doubt (as described in the case of evading the burden of proof). In other words, the protagonist wishes to have the standpoint accepted at the end of the argumentative discussion following one-sidedly his own standards for the conclusiveness of the argumentation that he has chosen to forward.

It is this unilateral imposition of starting points that may result in the protagonist's not forwarding argumentation at all or forwarding argumentation whose content and potential is not further supported despite the other party's requests. The protagonist of the standpoint, in his attempt to discharge the burden of proof in his favour, may seek to assume (in the opening stage) a burden of proof that is commensurate to what *he* is ready to forward as argumentation in support of the standpoint, rather than a burden of proof that is commensurate to the other party's criticisms. In this way, he may refuse to provide (further) argumentation in response to questions that the antagonist may pose or suggest that the antagonist should have no (further) questions to ask, contrary to the dialectical requirements for the intersubjective testing of the tenability of the standpoint (see also the discussion in 3.4). As a result of this, he fallaciously expects the argumentation that he chose to forward to be considered conclusive (in the argumentation stage), and a conclusive defence of the standpoint to be granted to him (in the concluding stage).

The protagonist who is interested in having the standpoint accepted at the expense of having it tested ends up violating the burden of proof rule and thereby commits the fallacy of evading or shifting the burden of proof. Thus, the derailment of his attempt to manage the burden of proof is shown to violate the burden of proof rule and to relate to the fallacy of evading or shifting the burden of proof, which constitutes an obstruction to the dispute resolution procedure that pertains to the opening stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion. The design of the move of advancing a standpoint that was chosen in a particular discourse, in which the fallacy of evading or shifting the burden of proof was committed, can thus be said to have contributed to the obstruction of the testing of the tenability of the standpoint.

6.2.3 What is the role of qualification?

So far, I have argued that the management of the burden of proof derails when the protagonist of a standpoint seeks to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical standards for a critical discussion. Moreover, I have argued that the rule that such a derailment violates is the burden of proof rule. The question that needs to be answered in this section concerns the role that qualification plays in a piece of discourse in which the management of the burden of proof derails, violating the burden of proof rule.

Qualification, which can be linguistically realised by means of stance adverbs, has a certain discourse effect, as described in Chapter 2 with reference to the three ways of qualifying a standpoint (2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2, 2.3.3.2). Such a discourse effect can be used strategically by the protagonist of the standpoint in order to suggest that there is a certain interpretation of the common ground, as far as he is concerned, on which he expects the antagonist to agree (see 5.2.2). Deciding whether the discourse effect of a certain way of qualifying has been used constructively or has been abused in the realisation of the move of advancing a standpoint does not depend on the stance adverb that was chosen but on the effect that its use can be shown to have in the critical discussion that can be reconstructed from the discourse. A qualified standpoint is not by definition a fallacious instance of advancing a standpoint, but may risk obstructing the progress of the critical discussion, under certain conditions. There is no causal relation between qualifying the standpoint and obstructing its critical testing.

There is nothing about the meaning of such stance adverbs as *perhaps*, *clearly* or *fortunately* and *frankly* that renders the move, which can be reconstructed from the utterance in which they appear, fallacious per se. If this were the case, 'weak' epistemic adverbs such as *perhaps* would invariably be interpreted as allowing the protagonist the space never to be committed openly to the truth of the proposition that is being asserted in the standpoint; 'strong' epistemic adverbs such *clearly* would be interpreted as hindering the testing of the standpoint because they present it as self-evident; evaluative adverbs such as *fortunately* would be interpreted as invariably obstructing the critical testing either because they make an appeal to emotions or because their use presupposes the truth of the embedded proposition; and illocutionary adverbs such as *frankly* would be interpreted as obstructing the critical testing because they make an appeal to the protagonist's ethos and authority to guarantee the acceptability of the arguments forwarded. While such a view could provide a fast and easy way to 'identify' fallacious instances in argumentative discourse, it is not one that does justice to argumentative reality: it dismisses a large array of argumentative moves where stance adverbs appear as intrinsically fallacious, and thereby suggests that the choice of language users to qualify their opinions is by definition unreasonable.

Moreover, to consider the presentational means by which a move that obstructs the dispute resolution process is designed as the main or as the exclusive way in which a fallacy may be committed is not in line with the insights that the strategic manoeuvring approach has introduced in the pragma-dialectical framework. In the light of strategic manoeuvring, the presentational devices are only one of the three aspects that play a role in the design of a move that the protagonist or the antagonist contributes to the argumentative discussion (see 1.2). The other two are the adaptation to audience and the choice from the topical potential (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2002a). The strategic manoeuvring in the realisation of a certain move does not derail because a certain presentational device is used or a specific topic is chosen or because the arguer chooses to accommodate to the audience in a certain way. It is the cluster of the choices made from all three aspects for the realisation of a particular move that constitute the design of that move, which, under certain circumstances, can be used in a way that overrides the dialectical standards and thus results in the violation of a rule of critical discussion in that particular discourse.[92]

In those cases where the protagonist ends up evading or shifting the burden of proof, the specific way of qualifying that is used to design the standpoint can only be said to have allowed the space for the obstruction of the critical testing to occur, but has not been the cause of that obstruction. In these cases, the strategic function of the way of qualifying chosen in that particular instance is abused. In the following section, I present the ways in which qualification can be abused, making reference to the constructive use of qualification presented in the preceding chapter (see 5.2.2).

6.3 Abuse of the strategic function of qualification

In the preceding section I have argued that the use of a specific stance adverb to qualify an utterance that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion cannot indicate in itself that the specific move has been designed in a way that obstructs the progress of the critical testing procedure. It is not the mere use of qualification in the design of the move of advancing a standpoint that causes the obstruction of the critical testing of the tenability of the standpoint. An obstruction to the dispute resolution procedure results from the derailment of the protagonist's attempt to manage the burden of proof. The management of the burden of proof derails as a result of the protagonist's interest in having the standpoint accepted without observing the critical

[92] Whether a specific presentational means is more likely to accompany a fallacious move than some other presentational means is an empirical matter that requires further investigation but one which falls outside the scope of this study. Similarly, whether a choice regarding the topical potential (or the adaptation to audience) can play a more decisive role in the derailment of the strategic manoeuvring of a particular move than a choice regarding its presentational aspect (or the other way round) is also a question that deserves further study.

standards that prescribe the way in which it should be tested. In pursuit of such an illicit goal, the protagonist ends up abusing the strategic function of qualification. This means that the protagonist has chosen a way of qualifying the standpoint, which constitutes a design of it by which, in the specific context in which this choice was made, he ends up evading (or shifting) the burden of proof. In this section, I specify how the protagonist can abuse the strategic function of each way of qualifying a standpoint when attempting to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical standards of a critical discussion.

As argued in the preceding chapter, the choice of the protagonist to qualify the standpoint in a certain way is strategic in the sense that it helps him suggest to the other party that there is agreement about the comment that the qualifier adds in the specific discussion, and thereby allows him to expect that such an agreement can be used for a favourable development of the testing procedure. The protagonist abuses this strategic function of qualification when he takes the comment that the specific way of qualifying adds to the discussion to compensate for the lack of (conclusive) argumentation in support of the standpoint. In these cases, the protagonist expects the standpoint to be found tenable or the argumentation to be found conclusive merely on the basis of the assumed endorsement by the other party of the comment that the specific way of qualifying adds to the discussion, neglecting the requirements that an intersubjective testing procedure imposes.

The different strategic function that each of the three ways of qualifying has (see 5.2.2) allows different opportunities for abusing it. In the following paragraphs, I describe in what way the protagonist can abuse the strategic function of each of the ways of qualifying a standpoint and what the result is.

The protagonist who abuses the 'solid' design expects to have the tenability of the standpoint accepted without adducing argumentation in support of it. In this case, the protagonist acts as if he is merely informing the other party of his point of view rather than being ready to argue in support of it. The argumentation forwarded, if any, appears as an explanation for the standpoint rather than as support for its tenability. The protagonist acts as if there is no difference of opinion to begin with, since he takes the antagonist's endorsement of the comment that the epistemic way of qualifying adds to mean that the standpoint is self-evident. In this case, the protagonist, who abuses the strategic function of the epistemic way of qualifying, ends up evading the burden of poof because he acts as if the standpoint needs no defence.

The protagonist who abuses the 'moderate' design expects that the tenability of the standpoint will be accepted without the need to further support the justificatory potential of the initial argumentation. In this case, the protagonist acts as if the antagonist's endorsement of the shared evaluation, that the use of the evaluative way of qualifying suggests, directly warrants the content and the potential of the argumentation forwarded, guaranteeing its

conclusiveness, despite the antagonist's remaining doubts. The protagonist ends up evading the burden of proof because he acts as if there is no need to answer any further questions on the argumentation forwarded for the standpoint.

The protagonist who abuses the 'weak' design expects to have the tenability of the standpoint accepted without assuming the role of protagonist for it. In this case, he acts as if the antagonist's endorsement of the protagonist's cooperativeness counts as a concession that the opposite position cannot be defended. In this way, the protagonist considers his standpoint tenable without even assuming the burden of proof for it, relying on the fact that the other party cannot provide a conclusive defence of the opposite position. In this case, the protagonist, who abuses the strategic function of the illocutionary way of qualifying, ends up shifting the burden of proof to the other party because he acts as if it is the opposite position that needs to be defended, instead of the position he has assumed in the particular discussion.[93]

Table 5 on the following page summarizes the three ways of qualifying standpoints presented in Chapter 1 and their discourse effect presented in Chapter 2, as well as the use and abuse of their strategic function as presented in Chapter 5 and in this chapter, respectively.

[93] Of the three ways of qualifying a standpoint, the 'illocutionary' way is the one that suggests an interactional situation in which the other party is ready to advance (or has already advanced) the opposite standpoint. When the protagonist abuses the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying a standpoint, it is thus more likely that he exploits this effect to illicitly turn the dispute into a mixed one in which he assumes that the other party cannot defend his standpoint.

TABLE 5

CONSTRUCTIVE USE AND ABUSE OF THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION OF THE THREE WAYS OF QUALIFYING A STANDPOINT

WAYS	COMMENT ABOUT:	DISCOURSE EFFECT:	STRATEGIC FUNCTION:	CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION:	ABUSE OF THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION:
EPISTEMIC	Commitment to the propositional content of the assertive speech act	Emphasis on quality of the evidence	Counts as a 'solid' design of the standpoint by which the protagonist forestalls the antagonist's doubt regarding the quality of the evidence, suggesting that there is agreement about the strength/ paucity/ field of the evidence.	The protagonist expects that no questions will be raised concerning the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, paving the 'short' way towards the successful discharge of the burden of proof.	The protagonist takes the antagonist's endorsement of the quality of the evidence to count as a guarantee for the tenability of the standpoint and thereby acts as if the particular standpoint needs no (further) argumentation, evading thus the burden of proof for it.
EVALUATIVE	Evaluation of the propositional content of the assertive speech act	Emphasis on shared evaluation	Counts as a 'moderate' design of the standpoint by which the protagonist forestalls the antagonist's doubt regarding the protagonist's evaluation of the content of the assertive, suggesting that there is agreement about this evaluation.	The protagonist acknowledges that there may be further questions regarding the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, but expects that the justification that he is ready to forward will be accepted, paving the 'middle' way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.	The protagonist takes the antagonist's endorsement of the shared evaluation to count as a guarantee for the conclusiveness of the argumentation forwarded in support of the standpoint and thereby acts as if there is no space for further questioning, evading thus the burden of proof for the particular standpoint.
'ILLOCUTIONARY'	Way in which the assertive speech act is performed	Emphasis on the protagonist's cooperativeness	Counts as a 'weak' design of the standpoint by which the protagonist forestalls the antagonist's doubt regarding the protagonist's cooperativeness, suggesting that there is agreement that the protagonist is being cooperative (telling the truth, not saying things that are of no interest, and so forth).	The protagonist acknowledges that there may be further questions regarding both the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, but expects that the justification that he is ready to forward in response to these questions will be accepted, paving the 'long' way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof.	The protagonist takes the antagonist's endorsement of his cooperativeness to count as the assumption of the opposite position, which he considers hard to defend, thereby acting as if his position is proved tenable. In this case, the protagonist ends up shifting the burden of proof to the other party.

6.4 Discussion of examples

In the following subsections, I discuss cases in which the choice of a particular way of qualifying obstructs the critical testing of the argumentation that can be reconstructed from the text under study. These are cases in which the protagonist abuses the strategic function of qualification either in order to prejudge the conclusiveness of his argumentation in support of the standpoint (thereby evading the burden of proof) or in order to prejudge the inconclusiveness of the argumentation for the opposite standpoint (thereby shifting the burden of proof). The examples are used in order to illustrate how an analyst should interpret a piece of argumentative discourse in which a qualified standpoint is being defended, when the choice of the particular way of qualifying obstructs the critical testing of the standpoint.

6.4.1 Abusing endorsement regarding the quality of the evidence

As argued in 5.3.1, the use of a modal or domain adverb to qualify the utterance that functions as a standpoint does not hedge the protagonist's commitment to take responsibility for the claim and to engage in a discussion over it but rather signals something about the quality of the evidence on which the argumentation that he is ready to forward rests. When qualifying the standpoint in the epistemic way, the protagonist expects that the antagonist will not raise questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, since he takes it that they both agree on the quality of the evidence: either that the evidence is strong and clear or that the evidence is rather poor. Nevertheless, this is only a suggestion from the protagonist's part concerning what the common ground is, and should not necessarily count as its definitive establishment, unless the antagonist explicitly or implicitly endorses such a proposal. After all, the language user who advances argumentation in support of a point of view does so with the aim of *convincing* his interlocutor about the tenability of his point of view, not with the aim of merely *reporting* to his interlocutor his own belief and conviction about it. This means that he should be ready to respond to criticisms that the other party may have.

The protagonist abuses the strategic function of a 'strong' epistemic qualifier when he is reluctant to forward support for the standpoint or further support for the content and/or the potential of an argument that he has already brought forward. In doing so, he presents the standpoint as a fact rather than an opinion and he asserts propositions as an explanation for that fact rather than as argumentation in support of the tenability of the point of view he has advanced. By framing the standpoint in this way, the protagonist makes it also difficult for the other party to cast doubt on the argumentation provided or on the standpoint in the first place. He creates confusion about the existence of a

difference of opinion and his willingness to support the position he assumes because he frames the standpoint as a fact already accepted. If the other party cast doubt on a standpoint thus qualified, he would appear as someone who challenges an established fact and would thereby run the risk of assuming a burden of proof for doing so.

Consider the following text that comes from a commentary column of a popular magazine:

> THE HULK'S OVER HERE! They took it off ITV; in a survey, WOMAN readers said no, they didn't want it back; It's fixed, it's theatrical and, at the end of the evening's entertainment, you feel every so slightly tacky. It could only be wrestling and the worst sort --; American wrestling. But *clearly* someone out there misses it because promoters are bringing over the Incredible Hulk Hogan, The Ultimate Warrior and a gentleman called Randy Savage, for eight dates in April and May, and they're all sold out. [BNC]

The author of the above text comments on the results of a survey conducted among readers of a life-style magazine concerning a wrestling entertainment show that was recently taken off TV. While the readers of the magazine have said that they do not want it back, the author of the text concludes that there are people who miss the particular show or some related kind of wrestling entertainment. His standpoint can be paraphrased as: *There are people who miss the kind of entertainment that American wrestling shows like The Incredible Hulk provide on TV*. His argumentation in support of this point of view can be reconstructed coordinatively as follows:

> 1a Entertainment promoters keep booking places for related wrestling shows such as the Incredible Hulk Hogan, The Ultimate Warrior and Randy Savage
> 1b Tickets for these shows are all sold out

The author of the text is the protagonist of a positive standpoint in a mixed dispute about whether people miss watching wrestling shows on TV or not. He forwards two arguments based on facts that he expects his readers to know, namely that the listed wrestling shows are to be seen in some theatre hall for eight dates in the months of April and May, and that the tickets for all these shows are sold out. That is how the choice of a strong epistemic qualifier such as *clearly* can be justified; the readers cannot object to the truth of the propositions that are put forward as arguments. Nevertheless, the protagonist ends up abusing the strategic function of this way of qualifying because he does not provide any further support for why, in his opinion, the justificatory potential of the two arguments is sufficient for a conclusive defence of the given standpoint. A critical reader of this text would wonder, for example, what the connection is between the fact that these shows are playing in town, given

that shows of other kinds, which have not been shown on TV, are also playing in town, and the claim that there are some people who miss such shows on TV. Another doubt that one could cast on the argumentation is why these facts are necessarily a sign that people miss such shows, rather than a sign that people are ready to pay for this kind of entertainment only for one night but would not necessarily be interested in watching these shows on a regular basis on TV.

The standpoint is presented as requiring no further scrutiny because of the strong and factual argumentation that is provided assuming that the acceptance of the content of these arguments warrants acceptance of the potential they have to conclusively support the standpoint. Such a choice of qualification for designing this standpoint ends up obstructing the critical testing of it, since the protagonist abuses the strategic function of this way of qualifying in order to evade the burden of proof.

The protagonist abuses the strategic function of a 'weak' epistemic qualifier when he appears to consider the argumentation to count as conclusive support because there can be no more or better arguments in support of the standpoint other than what he has already produced. By choosing a 'weak' epistemic qualifier, the protagonist presents the standpoint as a mere conjecture rather than a clear opinion of his own, which can be sufficiently justified by just the argumentation forwarded in support of it. By framing the standpoint in this way, the protagonist makes it hard for the antagonist to cast doubt on it because it does not become clear in the first instance that the speaker assumes indeed a position with respect to a matter that is disputed. In this case, casting doubt would make the other party appear to assume a negative position and thereby would put him at risk of having to assume a burden of proof for it. The protagonist ends up evading the burden of proof because he treats the argumentation as conclusive on the assumption that there *cannot* be anything more to be asked, since the available evidence is agreed to be poor.[94]

Consider the following fragment, which comes from the speech of a member of the British parliament asking the government to pay attention to the financial problems that his constituency faces due to the destruction of its mining industry:

> To someone who lives in Upton, Upton is the centre of the universe. *Perhaps* Upton people are right to say that because they have a tremendous history. I am sure that they will have a tremendous future. They populate the world. It is said that one cannot go anywhere – I know that this was true in West Africa – without meeting someone from Upton who will give good and wise advice. [BNC]

[94] In the abuse of 'strong' epistemic qualifiers, presented earlier, the protagonist evades the burden of proof because he treats argumentation as conclusive on the assumption that there *should* not be anything more to ask, given that the evidence is so obvious.

In this fragment, the speaker praises the patriotism that the villagers in his constituency show and advances a standpoint that can be reconstructed as: *Upton people are right to consider Upton to be the centre of the universe*. The argumentation that the speaker forwards in support of his point of view can be reconstructed as follows:

1.1 Upton people have a tremendous history
1.2 Upton people will to have a tremendous future
1.2.1a Upton people have reached many places around the world
1.2.1b It is said that Upton people are recognized everywhere – or at least in West Africa – for their good and wise advice

All reasons given are rather subjective in the sense that, to some extent, one should be already convinced about the truth of a proposition like 'Upton is the centre of the world' in order to accept them as a sufficient support for the standpoint in question.

By qualifying the above standpoint using a 'weak' epistemic adverb such as *perhaps*, the protagonist appears to make a conjecture for which not much scrutiny is required, and for which the argumentation forwarded can be considered as sufficient support. He also appears to take some distance from the truth-value of the propositions he forwards as arguments in support of his point of view. Notice the combination of the passive construction 'It is said that' used to introduce some general fact about Upton people's good and wise advice, followed immediately by a parenthetical comment where the first person is used: 'I know that this was true', to specify that the previous information holds true in West Africa at least.

While the choice of a 'weak' epistemic adverb has presumably saved the speaker from appearing extremely patriotic to his audience,[95] it has not saved him from committing the fallacy of evading the burden of proof. The protagonist in the above text takes the assumed agreement about the paucity of evidence that the epistemic comment adds to the discussion as warranting agreement about the tenability of the standpoint in the light of the evidence he is ready to forward. He thus substantiates neither the content nor the potential of the arguments he forwards, suggesting that the other party shares some of the responsibility for accepting them. In this case, the protagonist abuses the strategic function of the epistemic way of qualifying in his illicit attempt to have the standpoint accepted without putting it to the intersubjective scrutiny that the critical discussion requires.

[95] Compare the effect that the same standpoint qualified by *clearly* would have had.

6.4.2 Abusing endorsement regarding shared evaluation

By conveying a comment that signals a certain evaluation (fortunate, happy, lucky, ironic, paradoxical, and so forth), the protagonist projects his own evaluation concerning the expressed opinion with respect to which he assumes a positive (or negative) position. As argued in 2.3.2.2, the protagonist who chooses the evaluative way of qualifying suggests agreement with what the antagonist's evaluation is on the same matter. Doing so is not by definition an obstruction to the critical testing procedure, since it counts as a means at the protagonist's disposal for suggesting what is part of the common ground in the particular discussion (see 5.3.2), at least as far as he is concerned.

The protagonist abuses the strategic function of the evaluative way of qualifying when he unilaterally assumes that the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the argumentation is warranted by the evaluation of the issue under dispute that he takes both parties to share. In this case, the protagonist ends up evading the burden of proof because he does not provide argumentation in response to the antagonist's question about the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the original argument. Instead, the protagonist justifies the choice of the particular evaluative adverb, when what is required is argumentation in support of the proposition that is embedded in the evaluative comment.

The text below comes from the section 'Frequently asked admissions questions' on the web page of an American college answering the first year students' question 'What do I do about parking?':

> Because campus is situated in the middle of an urban area, it is difficult and expensive to park. *Fortunately*, because of the location, it is not necessary to have a car. Freshmen who have less than 30 semester hours of college work are not eligible for campus parking. The Auxiliary Services Office (843) 953-7834 does provide listings of off-campus parking spaces available to students. [GOOGLE]

Instead of answering the question, the text starts with two sentences, each of which contains a *because*-clause – one of them right at the beginning of the text. This gives the impression that the authors feel the need to give reasons in a passage that should initially provide information in response to the students' question regarding parking facilities. In fact, the original question receives a direct answer only in the second half of the text. The answer given there, however, states that not everyone is eligible for parking on campus and that a solution to the question regarding available parking is to be found outside the campus. All this suggests that the text can be analysed as a piece of argumentation produced with the aim of resolving the difference of opinion between college authorities and freshmen regarding the latter's need for parking space on campus.

Of the three propositions asserted in the first two sentences of the text, namely: 'The campus is situated in the middle of an urban area', 'It is difficult

and expensive to park', and 'It is not necessary to have a car', the standpoint can be reconstructed from the last one, namely:

The college's point of view is that it is not necessary have a car on campus[96]

The other two propositions can then be reconstructed as coordinatively compound argumentation in support of the above standpoint:

1a The campus is situated in the middle of an urban area
1b It is difficult and expensive to park in such a centrally located area

Note that the two propositions are coordinatively structured in a complementary way because none could stand alone as sufficient support for the standpoint.[97] Asserting the proposition in 1a alone assumes that the students that this text addresses do not need cars to reach the college campus or that they live in it. Those freshmen who have cars and/or use them to drive to college from outside the centre could thus rebut it as insufficient. The proposition in 1b anticipates such a challenge by pointing that even if students did use their car, it would cost them a lot of money and trouble to park it on or close to campus.

The evaluative adverb *fortunately* functions as a qualifier for the standpoint in the sense defined in 1.3.3. The presence of the adverb does not affect the identification of the standpoint in the text and the argumentation that supports the standpoint would still stand and be relevant even if the adverb were omitted. Following the analysis of the strategic use of evaluative adverbs presented in the preceding chapter (5.3.2), the choice of *fortunately* can help understand what the protagonist of the standpoint takes the starting points of the discussion to be.

As far as college students are concerned, to have a car is a fact evaluated positively.[98] That is something that the college authorities are assumed to know when addressing first year students on the issue of on-campus parking facilities. By selecting the adverb *fortunately* instead of *unfortunately* to qualify their claim that it is not necessary to have a car on campus, however, they choose to ignore it. If they would openly acknowledge the positive evaluation of the freshmen as

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[96] I take this to be the standpoint in support of which the other propositions are asserted because the text comes as an answer to the question 'What do I do about parking?', presumably asked by those freshmen who have a car and expect to be able to park it on campus. The standpoint is paraphrased as a negative standpoint because it is assumed that there is a mixed difference of opinion, in which the college authorities refute the freshmen's standpoint that it is necessary to have a car on campus.

[97] On complementary coordinative argumentation structure see Snoeck Henkemans (1992).

[98] To understand this point it is necessary to consider the American cultural context in which possession of a car is a necessity and the possibility of using it to drive from one place to another provides a freedom that is highly valued. It is from this perspective that for an American it is expected that parking facilities be offered by default.

far as having a car on campus is concerned, they would make it harder for the college to argue for the paucity of parking space on campus.

Alternatively, the college authorities could have opted to argue in support of a standpoint that includes the evaluative comment, namely that 'It is a fortunate fact not to need a car on campus'. In such a case they could have asserted only a proposition like the one in 1b above, namely: 'Because it is difficult and expensive to park in such a centrally located area' in support of it. Had they chosen to directly argue for such a standpoint, however, the authors of the text would have risked an open clash with the students' judgment over the issue and would thereby have reduced their chance of convincing the students of their point of view, namely that having a car on campus is not necessary. Instead, the authors of this text have chosen to provide coordinatively compound argumentation that supports the claim 'It is not necessary to have a car on campus'.

By qualifying the standpoint using *fortunately*, the authors of the text shift the perspective from one where the students value the central location of the campus negatively, as far as the parking options are concerned, to one that is positively valued. Everyone who has a car and drives to the university would agree that paying a lot and having difficulty parking, due to the university's central location, is a problem. A solution would be that the university offers parking spaces. Instead, the university presents the central location of the campus as a favourable solution to the problem of paying a lot and having difficulty parking. Such a solution, however, is favourable only for those students who have no cars or use no car to drive to college. But the above text is meant as an answer to the question 'What do I do about parking' presumably asked by those who have a car and want to know where and how to park it.

The college authorities have ended up abusing the strategic function of the evaluative way of qualifying with which they chose to design their standpoint. They have one-sidedly assumed that the agreement on a positive evaluation regarding a solution to the problems of money and space one faces when one wants to park warrants an agreement on the conclusiveness of the argumentation in support of the position that it is not necessary to have a car on campus. The lack of parking space, which could have been a negative point for the college's image, is turned into a problem that potential students may have (namely paying a lot in order to park) and one that the college *fortunately* solves by being centrally located. Such a solution, however, as well as the argumentation forwarded, addresses the interests of those who actually do not have a car rather than of those who have one and want to use it on campus.

6.4.3 Abusing endorsement regarding cooperativeness

There is nothing intrinsically wrong about the protagonist's choice to explicitly acknowledge that the standpoint he is advancing goes against what the other party may be expecting. And there is nothing intrinsically fallacious or condemnable in his choice to do that either by emphasising his own sincerity or the actuality of what he is asserting, using adverbs such as *frankly* or *in fact*. The problem starts when the comment that the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying adds to the standpoint is exploited in order to unilaterally conclude that the standpoint is tenable. The protagonist abuses the strategic function of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying when he acts as if the tenability of his standpoint is proven by the mere fact that the opposite position cannot be held or lacks sufficient support, even if the other party has not assumed an opposite position. In this section, I discuss two examples of argumentative discourse where the choice to qualify the standpoint using the adverb *frankly* and *in fact* leads to the obstruction of the critical testing of that standpoint.

The first example comes from the section of frequently asked questions of an Internet site called Indie911, an entertainment network that allows emerging artists to have their own web space where they can upload their music and share it with other members and visitors of that site:

> Can any musician or artist upload their music to Indie911?
> YES. But *frankly* since the focus of the site is on actually USING quality music, we would appreciate you using your judgment: Indie911 is mostly for artists and artists' representatives wishing to feature FINISHED, QUALITY RECORDINGS.[99] [GOOGLE]

In answer to the question enquiring information whether anyone who wishes to upload their music is allowed to do so, the authors of the website are affirmative. Immediately after 'Yes', however, an utterance prefaced with 'But frankly' follows, inciting the visitors to use their judgment: 'We would appreciate you using your judgement'. In the light of the question that precedes it, this utterance could be understood as inciting visitors to 'Use their judgment before uploading their music'. The subordinate clause 'Since the focus of the site is on actually using quality music'[100] appears as supporting the inciting standpoint 'Use your judgment'. The last sentence of the text specifies the kind of audience that Indie911 mostly addresses and wishes to attract, namely 'Artists and artists' representatives wishing to feature finished, quality

[99] The use of capitals for emphasis is kept as it appears in the original text.

[100] The adverb *actually* in this utterance has the function of putting emphasis on the prepositional phrase 'on using quality music' and does not qualify the whole clause 'the focus of the site is on using quality music'. Even if it would have been used to qualify the clause, its meaning, suggesting that it may not be expected by everyone that the main focus of the site is on using quality music, cannot be said to have an effect on the burden of proof, since it does not qualify the clause that functions as the standpoint, but the clause that functions as an argument.

recordings'. Both the subordinate clause and the last sentence can be reconstructed as argumentation in support of the inciting standpoint: *Use your judgment before uploading your music to Indie911*. The argumentation is reconstructed subordinatively as follows:

> 1.1 The focus of Indie911 is on using quality music
> 1.1.1 Indie911 is mostly for artists and artists' representatives who wish to feature finished, quality recordings

The use of the adverb *frankly* implies that the authors of the text do not expect that everyone would use their judgment before uploading their music on the website. The emphasis that the website gives on the idea of an open network for artists that provides a forum for exposure and feedback may give the impression that anyone can upload their music, an idea that the authors of the text want to repair by introducing *frankly*. Moreover, the choice of *frankly* indicates that the authors are aware that they are advancing an inciting standpoint that addresses people who (may) hold a different view, namely the view that every upcoming musician or artist should be able to upload their music to Indie911, even if it is unfinished or of poor quality.

As discussed in section 5.3.3, the choice of *frankly* or of similar adverbs to qualify a standpoint constitutes a presentational means for managing the burden of proof because it helps to frame the argumentation as strong support for the standpoint while acknowledging that the other party is ready to cast doubt on it. In the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from the above fragment, the protagonist expects the argumentation in support of the inciting standpoint to be accepted, assuming that there is mutual agreement on the definition of 'quality music'. The authors of the text, however, do not provide any explicit definition and leave it up to the readers to decide what constitutes 'finished quality recordings'. In this way, they avoid taking responsibility for being the ones who set certain standards on the basis of which music can be uploaded on the website. Instead, they ask those who wish to upload their music to decide for themselves what these standards are and to judge whether they satisfy those standards or not before uploading their music.

In doing so, the authors of the text do not allow space for any critical reaction regarding the definition of 'quality music' or the potential that the premise concerning quality music has for supporting the inciting standpoint. By appealing to the standards of quality and finished recordings that everyone should be expected to endorse, they suggest that the other party could not possibly wish to defend the opposite standpoint, namely that music of bad quality should also be uploaded on the website. In this way, they have made their inciting standpoint tenable by having fallaciously shifted the burden of proof to the other party.

The second example comes from an advertisement for golf balls addressing non-professionals who play golf for recreation.

> If you want to give your golf partners an unexpected surprise, drive off with one of these new American super balls. *In fact*, you'll probably surprise yourself too, because the Condor Extra-Distance Ball offers phenomenal performance - a long ball hitting champion in Texas drove one 400 yards! Thanks to its revolutionary dimple design and top-secret core, it gains altitude quickly and then seems to sail along like a glider! Comes in pack of 12 balls. Not approved for competition use. [COBUILD]

The standpoint of advertisements can be generally reconstructed as an inciting one, namely 'Buy product X'.[101] In this text, the standpoint can be reconstructed from the main clause 'Drive off with one of these new American super balls' appearing after the conditional 'If you want to give your golf partners an unexpected surprise' in the first sentence of the text. The second sentence prefaced by the adverb *in fact* functions as an argument in support of the general standpoint of the text, but also as a sub-standpoint because it receives further support by the subordinate clause 'Because the Condor Extra-Distance Ball offers phenomenal performance'. For the analysis that follows, I refer to the sub-standpoint as the standpoint of the part of this text to be analysed, namely: *Using Condor Extra-Distance Balls will surprise you*.

By using the adverb *in fact* to qualify this standpoint, the author of the text acknowledges that the reader is not one who is easily surprised. Note also that the verb in the utterance from where the standpoint is reconstructed is modified by *probably*, thus conveying the author's acknowledgement of the possibility that it may turn out that one is not surprised by the phenomenal performance of the super ball. Nevertheless, the author of the text is of the opinion that in the case of the 'new American super balls' the reader will be surprised. The argumentation can be reconstructed as follows:

> 1.1 The Condor Extra-Distance balls have phenomenal performance
> 1.1.1a The Condor Extra-Distance balls have a revolutionary dimple design and a top-secret core which allow them to gain altitude quickly
> 1.1.1b A long ball-hitting champion in Texas drove one such ball 400 yards

The presence of the adverb *in fact* strengthens the author's opinion by contrasting it with the reader's expectation about the opposite, and backgrounds the weak degree of certainty whether this will turn out to be the case or not. In this representation of the context of doubt that the choice of the adverb *in fact* suggests, the argumentation forwarded appears as strong support for the standpoint. Were the adverb omitted from the formulation of the

[101] See also the argumentative analysis of an advertisement in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2004).

utterance that functions as a standpoint, the argumentation that follows in support of it would appear less conclusive.[102]

The protagonist in the argumentative discussion that can be reconstructed from this advertisement acts as if the conclusiveness of the argumentation in support of the specific standpoint is warranted by the reluctance of the other party to assume the opposite position, namely that he is someone who is not easily surprised. To assume such a position would require that the reader prove false the content of the propositions asserted in the argumentation; namely, to prove that there is no such top-secret core, which allows the ball to glide in the air, or that a long ball hitting champion did not actually drive the ball 400 yards. Since it is hard to disprove either of these facts or to prove that one is not surprised by them, if one accepts them, the protagonist can be sure to have the tenability of the above standpoint accepted. Nevertheless, the protagonist succeeds in doing this, by shifting the burden of proof to the reader of the text.

6.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have tried to answer the question: 'What do stance adverbs tell an analyst who seeks to determine whether the design of the move of advancing a standpoint is in agreement with the standards of critical reasonableness?'. For this purpose, I have argued that there is no causal relation between qualifying a standpoint and obstructing the critical testing of it. Qualification is abused and thereby contributes to the obstruction of the dispute resolution procedure when the protagonist exploits its strategic function to design the standpoint in his attempt to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical requirements of the discussion. Such an illicit goal constitutes a derailment of the management of the burden of proof, which violates the burden of proof rule.

The abuse of the strategic function of qualification results in a design of the move of advancing a standpoint that obstructs the critical testing by either evading or by shifting the burden of proof. The protagonist evades the burden of proof when he abuses the strategic function of qualification in order to prejudge the conclusiveness of his argumentation in support of the standpoint. He shifts the burden of proof when he abuses the strategic function of qualification in order to prejudge the inconclusiveness of the argumentation for the opposite standpoint. In either case, the protagonist overlooks the requirement for an intersubjective testing procedure and imposes unilaterally his own standards of conclusiveness.

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[102] Consider the effect that the following formulation would have without the qualifier *in fact*: 'You'll probably surprise yourself too, because the Condor Extra-Distance Ball offers phenomenal performance - a long ball hitting champion in Texas drove one 400 yards'.

The different strategic function of each way of qualifying a standpoint allows for different ways in which this function can be abused, leading to an obstruction of the critical testing.

When abusing a 'solid' design of the standpoint, the protagonist acts as if there is no difference of opinion over an issue to begin with, since he takes the antagonist's endorsement of the comment that the epistemic qualification adds to mean that the standpoint is self-evident.

When abusing a 'moderate' design of the standpoint, the protagonist acts as if the antagonist's endorsement of the shared evaluation, which the use of the evaluative way of qualifying suggests, warrants the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of the argumentation, guaranteeing the conclusiveness of the argumentation, despite the antagonist's remaining doubts.

When abusing a 'weak' design of a standpoint, the protagonist acts as if the antagonist's endorsement of the protagonist's cooperativeness counts as a concession that the opposite position cannot be defended conclusively, thereby entitling the protagonist to consider the tenability of his standpoint accepted without assuming the burden of proof for it.

I have discussed examples of texts from English corpora and the Internet in order to illustrate what the evaluation of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint should be in those cases where the strategic function of qualification is abused and the management of the burden of proof derails.

CONCLUSION

Main findings

The aim of this study was to identify the strategic function of the qualification of a standpoint. To this end, I have specifically examined those cases where a stance adverb is used to qualify the utterance that functions as a standpoint in the argumentative discussion reconstructed from the discourse. The following examples, taken from the COBUILD corpus, illustrate this use of stance adverbs:

(1) *Clearly*, the figures in the text are incorrect, since they do not add up to 113, and the number of lunar months in the Saros cycle is in any case almost double that given by Ssu Ma Ch'ien.

(2) *Unfortunately*, because the Earth's climate mechanisms are so extremely complex, predictions of what could happen are very uncertain.

(3) *Quite frankly*, council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department.

The theoretical framework within which I sought to specify the strategic function of stance adverbs qualifying a standpoint is the pragma-dialectical approach to the study of argumentation, developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004), and extended by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007b, 2007c). Within this framework, the strategic function that qualification has is understood as the way in which it simultaneously serves the dialectical and the rhetorical goal of the protagonist of the standpoint in the course of an argumentative discussion. The main question of this study was:

How does qualification of a standpoint function strategically in an argumentative discussion?

In order to specify how it functions, I provided a theoretical definition of qualification that is relevant to the move of advancing a standpoint, and I explained what the strategic goal of the protagonist is when qualifying the standpoint. Below are the two questions that I set out to answer before tackling the main question of this study:

1) What is a qualified standpoint?

2) Why would the protagonist qualify the standpoint?

In the pragma-dialectical theory, the concept of a standpoint is a theoretical concept that refers to the move by means of which a party assumes a (positive or negative) position with respect to an expressed opinion. This is an

analytically relevant move performed in the confrontation stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion. It is analysed in illocutionary terms as an assertive speech act with the relevant felicity conditions (Houtlosser, 1995, 2002). According to the strategic manoeuvring approach (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2000, 2002a), the way in which this analytically relevant move is realised in actual discourse depends on the choices that the arguer makes regarding the topical potential, the adaptation to audience and the presentational devices. In line with this approach, I have argued that qualification can be studied as one such choice, regarding, in particular, the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint.

In order to define qualification in a theoretically informed way that pays attention to the illocutionary analysis of the move of advancing a standpoint, I proposed an integration of a structural and a semantic view of this linguistic phenomenon. In this sense, qualification is understood as the addition not merely of an extra element, but also of a certain comment associated with that extra element. Following Biber et al.'s (1999) account of stance as the expression of a comment concerning commitment, evaluation or style that can be added to the factual meaning of an utterance, I have defined standpoint qualification as follows:

> The addition of an extra element to the sentence that functions as the standpoint in an argumentative discussion, which is not an indispensable constituent of that sentence, and which adds a comment that conveys information regarding the commitment, the evaluation or the style, which is not questioned or defended in the ensuing argumentative discussion.

According to this definition, when the comment about commitment, evaluation or style qualifies the standpoint, it does not receive support in the ensuing argumentation, and does not play a role in the identification of the argumentative function of the utterance as a standpoint (consider the standpoints advanced in examples 1-3 above). In terms of the illocutionary analysis of standpoints, this means that the comment should not be analysed as being part of the propositional content and should not be considered as changing the assertive illocutionary force either. Instead, the comment that qualification adds should be analysed as being *about* the propositional content of the assertive or *about* the performance of that assertive. Of the three kinds of stance comment, the comment conveying commitment or evaluation is about the propositional content, while the comment conveying style is about the act as a whole. I therefore distinguished the following three ways of qualifying standpoints:

a) The *epistemic way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint, conveying commitment to the propositional content of the assertive speech act.

b) The *evaluative way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint, conveying an evaluation of the propositional content of the assertive speech act.

c) The *'illocutionary' way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint, conveying information about the performance of the assertive speech act as a whole.

Of the class of single word stance adverbs in English, different groups and sub-groups can be shown to constitute the linguistic realisation of the different ways of qualifying a standpoint. Following Biber et al.'s (1999) classification and a review of the relevant literature on sentence and stance adverbs, I identified the groups of stance adverbs that can be considered as the linguistic realisation of the above ways of qualifying standpoints. Specifically, modal adverbs (*certainly, clearly, perhaps, probably*), evidential adverbs (*apparently, obviously, supposedly*) and domain adverbs (*financially, officially, technically, theoretically*) constitute the linguistic realisation of the epistemic way of qualifying. Event-oriented evaluative adverbs (*fortunately, funnily, happily, interestingly*), which are a sub-set of evaluative adverbs, constitute the linguistic realisation of the evaluative way of qualifying. Illocutionary adverbs (*frankly, honestly, personally*) and expectation markers (*actually, in fact, of course*) constitute the linguistic realisation of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying.

The comment that each of the three ways of qualifying adds to the standpoint can be interpreted in a specific way when considering the context of a critical discussion in which a standpoint is advanced. In such a context it is assumed that the protagonist is committed to a certain standpoint, that he evaluates its content in a certain way and that he is ready to cooperate in the testing of it. The use of a stance adverb belonging to one of the above groups can thus be interpreted as having a certain *discourse effect* in the context of an argumentative discussion. In this light, the comment that the stance adverbs of the epistemic way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to forward in support of it. The comment that the stance adverbs of the evaluative way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the evaluation of the expressed opinion that the two parties share. The comment that the stance adverbs of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the protagonist's cooperativeness.

In order to describe the strategic use of the discourse effect of each of the ways of qualifying in the course of an argumentative discussion, it is necessary to specify first what the protagonist aims at when qualifying the standpoint. Specifying the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint is necessary because it helps describe the strategic function of the protagonist's choices as contributing to the attainment of his strategic goal. For this purpose, a concept is needed that helps relate the move of advancing a standpoint to the

other moves produced by the protagonist in the course of an argumentative discussion. The concept that is essential to the move of advancing a standpoint is that of the burden of proof. The *burden of proof* is the conditional obligation to defend the tenability of a standpoint, which is incurred by means of advancing a standpoint and discharged in the course of a discussion by forwarding argumentation in response to the questions of the other party.

By elaborating on the concept of the burden of proof and relating it to the tasks that need to be carried out in the four stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion, I argued that the incurrence and the discharge of the burden of proof constitute a procedure that can be described in four analytically distinct but interconnected steps: acquiring, assuming, meeting and acquitting oneself of the burden of proof. In this procedural view, the incurrence refers to the two analytically distinct steps of acquiring and assuming a burden of proof, which correspond to the confrontation and opening stage. The discharge of the burden of proof refers to the two analytically distinct steps of meeting and acquitting oneself of the burden of proof, which correspond to the argumentation and concluding stage. In this way, the concept of burden of proof is shown to underlie all the tasks that are carried out throughout the four stages of a critical discussion and thereby provides a basis for understanding what the protagonist is aiming at when designing the standpoint.

The procedural view of the burden of proof helps to make explicit the instrumental role of this concept not only for the development of the discussion towards a resolution of the dispute, but also for the advancement of the protagonist's own goal, namely the testing and eventually the acceptance of the tenability of the standpoint. In the light of the strategic manoeuvring approach, which helps to distinguish what is favourable for one particular party among the dialectically possible results of the dispute resolution process, I specified the favourable outcome that the protagonist is aiming for. As far as the burden of proof is concerned, the protagonist seeks to have the doubt with respect to the standpoint withdrawn and the standpoint maintained at the end of the dispute resolution process. In other words, he seeks to *successfully discharge the burden of proof*.

By assuming that the protagonist is interested in successfully discharging the burden of proof at the end of the discussion, it becomes possible to specify the *strategic goal* that he has when designing the standpoint. I thus described, with reference to the procedure of incurring and discharging a burden of proof, what the protagonist should seek in each stage if he is interested in paving the way for a successful discharge of the burden of proof at the end of an argumentative discussion. After advancing the standpoint in the confrontation stage, the protagonist would seek to have agreements on such starting points in the opening stage that constitute an expedient ground, on the basis of which the argumentation forwarded in the argumentation stage can be deemed

conclusive. As a result, an agreement about the conclusive defence of the standpoint could be reached in the concluding stage.

The protagonist who is interested in reaching an agreement about the argumentation being conclusive would seek to have the discussion develop according to any of three possible developments in the argumentation stage. Specifically, the protagonist would seek to have the argumentation found conclusive a) after no questions were asked about its content or its potential, b) after one question was asked, namely about its potential, or c) after questions were asked about both its content and potential. If the testing of the tenability of a standpoint were to develop in a favourable way for the protagonist, such agreements on starting points would be required in the opening stage that could allow for accepting the argumentation as conclusive according to any of the three cases described above. In total, three scenarios can be theoretically described, according to which the discussion over the testing of the tenability of the standpoint could develop towards a favourable outcome for the protagonist, namely towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. I refer to these scenarios as the 'short way', the 'middle way', and the 'long way' scenarios for the management of the burden of proof:

a) In the 'short' way scenario, the protagonist acts as if the defence of the particular standpoint is an easy task, in the sense that the burden of proof for it is light. He acts as if the shared agreements that he takes to be established in the opening stage guarantee that no doubt arises regarding either the content or the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint.

b) In the 'middle' way scenario, the protagonist acts as if the defence of the particular standpoint may not be so easy a task and that the burden of proof for it is not so light. He acknowledges that there may be doubt regarding the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint, but he acts as if there are shared agreements on the basis of which he can convincingly repair that doubt.

c) In the 'long' way scenario, the protagonist acknowledges that the burden of proof for the particular standpoint is heavy, in the sense that he expects doubt to be raised regarding both the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint. Nonetheless, he acts as if there are shared agreements on the basis of which he can convincingly repair the doubt that may arise regarding both the content and the potential of the argumentation in support of the standpoint.

Since the agreements reached in the opening stage can shape the development of the discussion along any of the ways described above, the protagonist would seek to influence these agreements at the earliest possible opportunity, in the confrontation stage. The choices that he makes when designing the standpoint can thus be accounted for as seeking a successful discharge of the burden of proof. I have referred to this assumption as *the management of the burden of proof*. This assumption postulates that the protagonist makes choices when designing the standpoint in order to be able to go on to defend it and to eventually reach the end of the discussion by having the standpoint accepted instead of having to retract it, while observing the dialectical norms throughout. Postulating the management of the burden of proof as the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint provides a frame within which the strategic function of the choices made regarding the design of this move (and in particular, the choices made when qualifying it) can be assessed.

The *strategic function* of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint in a certain way can be understood as signalling to the other party that such an interpretation of the common ground exists that allows a development of the testing of the tenability of the standpoint according to one of the three scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof. The antagonist who is invited to test the tenability of a standpoint qualified by means of a stance adverb is confronted with an option: either disagree with the choice of the qualifier, or disagree with the position assumed in the standpoint. In the first case, he would ask for justification for the choice of the particular qualifier, thus postponing the testing of the standpoint. In the second case, the antagonist would request justification for the standpoint advanced. Of these two reactions of the antagonist, the protagonist who is interested in the testing of the tenability of the standpoint would seek to avoid the one that would make the discussion digress. For this purpose, he would choose to add a comment to the standpoint, with which he expects the antagonist to disagree the least, if at all. In this way, the protagonist anticipates a possible reaction from the antagonist about the comment that a particular stance adverb adds, and can thereby be sure that no digression into a discussion about the choice of the particular stance adverb occurs. As a result, he could proceed in the discussion by considering the comment endorsed by the antagonist.

Thus the protagonist may strategically use the discourse effect, described earlier, of a certain way of qualifying in order to forestall the antagonist's disagreement about the quality of the evidence, the shared evaluation or the cooperativeness, thereby creating favourable conditions for the testing of the tenability of his standpoint. Given that there are three scenarios along which the testing of the tenability of the standpoint may develop towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof, the strategic function of qualification can be understood as the way in which strategically using the discourse effect of a

certain way of qualifying suggests that, as far as the protagonist is concerned, the testing should develop according to one or the other scenario. The ways of qualifying are matched to the scenarios for the management of the burden of proof as follows:

The strategic function of the epistemic way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'solid' design of the standpoint. When using this way of qualifying, the protagonist prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the quality of the evidence. In this way, he signals that there is agreement about the quality of the evidence, upon which the argumentation that he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint rests. Based on such an agreement, the protagonist acts as if the 'short' way for a successful discharge of the burden of proof will be followed, since he does not expect questions to be asked regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation that he is ready to forward in support of the standpoint.

The strategic function of the evaluative way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'moderate' design of the standpoint. When using this way of qualifying, the protagonist prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the protagonist's evaluation of the issue over which he has assumed a position. In this way, he signals to the antagonist that he shares the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that can be caused by assuming the specific standpoint. Based on the concord regarding the evaluation, the protagonist is confident that he can repair the antagonist's challenge of the justificatory (or refutatory) potential of his argumentation. He thereby acts as if the 'middle' way for a successful discharge of the burden of proof will be followed, since he expects that the argumentation he is ready to forward in support of the potential of the original argumentation will not be questioned any further.

The strategic function of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying is that it counts as a 'weak' design of the standpoint. When using this way of qualifying the protagonist prevents the antagonist from disagreeing about the protagonist's cooperativeness. In this way, he acknowledges that the antagonist may hold the opposite standpoint but he signals that he has good reasons for assuming the position he does. Starting from this acknowledgement, the protagonist appears confident that the argumentation will be deemed conclusive even if the antagonist challenges both its content and potential. He thereby acts as if the 'long' way for a successful discharge of the burden of proof will be followed, since he expects the argumentation that he is ready to forward in support of both the content and the potential of the original argumentation to be accepted without any further questions.

The strategic function of the three ways of qualifying presented above counts as the description of the constructive use that the protagonist of a standpoint can make of qualification when designing the standpoint. When the protagonist, in his attempt to discharge the burden of proof in his favour, overlooks the dialectical parameters of the discussion (that require that the

standpoint be intresubjectively tested) in favour of the rhetorical goal of merely having the standpoint accepted, it can be said that his attempt to manage the burden of proof derails. This means that the protagonist was seeking to acquit himself of the burden of proof without observing the dialectical norms. In this case, the design chosen for the realisation of the move of advancing a standpoint in the specific discourse is not in accordance with the dialectical standards that pertain to the particular juncture of the discussion in which this move is performed. The strategic function of qualification is exploited for the sole aim of having the standpoint accepted at any cost, even to the detriment of the dialectical standards, which should be observed if standpoints are to be tested critically. In those cases where the management of the burden of proof derails, the strategic function of qualification is abused.

The protagonist abuses the strategic function of qualification when he considers the comment that the specific way of qualifying adds to the discussion to substitute for the lack of (conclusive) argumentation in support of the standpoint. In this case, he expects the argumentation to be found conclusive merely on the basis of the endorsement by the other party of the comment that the specific way of qualifying adds, while neglecting the requirements that an intersubjective testing procedure poses. The abuse of the strategic function of qualification yields a design of the move of advancing a standpoint that obstructs the critical testing by either evading or by shifting the burden of proof. The protagonist evades the burden of proof when he abuses qualification in order to prejudge the conclusiveness of his argumentation in support of the standpoint. He shifts the burden of proof when he abuses qualification in order to prejudge the inconclusiveness of the argumentation for the opposite standpoint.

In the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof that I have introduced in this study, it has become possible to account for the strategic function of the qualification of standpoints and to describe how the use of stance adverbs should be interpreted when qualification has been used in a constructive way as well as when it has been used in a way that is obstructive for the testing of the tenability of the standpoint. The analyst of a piece of argumentative discourse, in which a qualified standpoint appears, can thus consider the strategic function of the various ways of qualifying as the argumentatively relevant information that can be drawn from the language user's choice to qualify the utterance by means of which that standpoint was advanced in the discussion.

Theoretical and practical implications

In this study, I have proposed a systematic way in which the pragmatic issue of the qualification of an utterance can be accounted for in pragma-dialectical terms, so that the insights provided can be exploited for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. This is the first book-length study that

builds on the strategic manoeuvring approach (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999, 2000, 2002b, 2007c) in order to account for the strategic function that a particular phenomenon of language use and its specific linguistic realisation have for the development of an argumentative discussion. In answering the main question of this study, I have elaborated on the strategic manoeuvring approach in two ways: first, by studying qualification as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint; second, by explaining the protagonist's motivation for designing the standpoint as seeking a favourable end to the dispute resolution process. I have referred to this assumption as the assumption about the management of the burden of proof.

By studying qualification as a presentational device at the protagonist's disposal for managing the burden of proof, I have proposed a systematic account of the strategic use of linguistic elements such as stance adverbs, which complements the study that has been carried out within Pragma-dialectics so far (see, for example, van Eemeren et al., 2007) of a number of these words and of other expressions as indicators in argumentative discourse. Such studies have paid attention to linguistic items used in the formulation of utterances in search for clues that the analyst can use when reconstructing the standpoint (Houtlosser, 2002), the argumentation structures (Snoeck Henkemans, 2003b), and the argument schemes (Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, 2003a). Until the introduction of the strategic manoeuvring approach, however, there was no systematic way to consider the strategic function that choosing one word instead of another has in the interpretation of argumentative discourse. In the strategic manoeuvring approach, both the dialectical and the rhetorical goals that the parties who engage in an argumentative discussion have are acknowledged, and thereby attention can be paid to the various choices at the arguers' disposal regarding the design of their respective moves.

Snoeck Henkemans (2005, 2007a, 2007b), in a series of articles, takes a similar interest in linguistic expressions and stylistic devices that can be used strategically for the presentation of moves performed in an argumentative discussion. In her studies, Snoeck Henkemans starts from the pragmatics of such devices and seeks to establish how they can be used in order to reconcile the arguers' dialectical and rhetorical goals in the various stages. The approach I have proposed here differs in that it starts from a specific move and seeks to establish the strategic function of the presentational devices that can be used in order to design it, by considering the specific function that this move has in the argumentative discussion. By focusing on the move of advancing a standpoint performed by the party that plays the role of the protagonist, and by considering qualification as a choice in the design of that move, it became possible in this study to explain the strategic function of qualification in relation to the commitments that arise from the performance of this particular move, namely in relation to the burden of proof.

The assumption about the management of the burden of proof that I have introduced in this study constitutes an elaboration of the concept of the burden of proof that goes beyond the purposes of answering questions regarding the order of defence or the strength of the argumentation and the fallacies associated with these issues, on which previous studies of this concept have focused (Krabbe, 1995; Prakken et al., 2005; Walton, 1988, among others). In this study, I elaborated on a procedural understanding of the burden of proof, inspired by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002b, 2003a), and by Kauffeld's 'interactionist' approach (1998, 2003, 2007) on how probative burdens arise and are met in discourse. In this view, the concept of the burden of proof is not exhausted in the tasks of the allocation of the argumentative roles (in the opening stage) or in the adducing of arguments in support of the standpoint (in the argumentation stage). Instead, the burden of proof underlies all the tasks that the protagonist of the standpoint has to carry out in coordination with the antagonist, from the moment a difference of opinion arises until the moment it is resolved. The procedural understanding of the burden of proof makes it possible to spell out the intermediate steps between advancing a standpoint and having the standpoint accepted in an argumentative discussion, and what needs to be the case in each if a favourable outcome is to be reached at the end, that is, a successful discharge of the burden of proof.

Furthermore, the procedural view of the burden of proof has made it possible to consider the obligation that arises and is fulfilled in the interaction of two parties that engage in an argumentative discussion as the motivation behind the protagonist's choices for the design of the standpoint. In this study, I have referred to the burden of proof in order to explain, from an argumentative perspective, choices that a language user makes when presenting his point of view in argumentative discourse. In this way, I treated the burden of proof as the argumentative counterpart to the concept of 'face' that has been used to provide a socially oriented motivation for choices at the lexical, syntactic or pragmatic level that language users make in communication. Brown and Levinson (1987) introduced the concept of 'face', borrowing it from Goffman (1967), in order to account for the motivation behind the various strategies of politeness that language users are observed to employ in communication. Within a dialectical study of argumentative discourse, choices that the protagonist of the standpoint can be shown to have made when designing it (similar to choices at the lexical, syntactic and pragmatic level that have been accounted for in politeness terms) can now be explained as originating in his interest in achieving the strategic goal of successfully discharging the burden of proof at the end of the argumentative discussion.

When it comes to the group of English stance adverbs, the aim of this study was not to propose yet another classification of them or to identify yet another function for these words in discourse in general, something which has already been accomplished by a number of studies (Biber & Finegan, 1988,

1989; Greenbaum, 1969; Hoye, 1997; Hunston & Thompson, 2000, among others). Studying stance adverbs in close relation to the move of advancing a standpoint made it possible to point to potential differences between effects that the presence of the same adverb may have in an utterance that functions as a standpoint and, for instance, in an utterance that functions as an argument in support of a standpoint. In this way, this study offers a purely argumentation-based account of the use and function of linguistic items that have been already treated in the discourse and pragmatics literature in general terms of verbal communication (Caffi, 1999; Fraser, 1980; Holmes, 1984; Lakoff, 1980; Sbisà, 2001; Stubbs, 1986), but have not been studied systematically in the context of the specific activity that argumentation is. By focusing on utterances qualified by stance adverbs that have the function of advancing a standpoint in argumentative discourse, this study proposes an interpretation of the strategic function of qualification which results from the interaction of the semantic and pragmatic properties of qualifiers, on the one hand, and the argumentative function of the utterance in which they are used, on the other hand.

Finally, the study of the pragmatics of stance adverbs within a normative approach to argumentative discourse that I have proposed here makes it possible to distinguish between a reasonable, strategic use and the unreasonable abuse of the effect that these adverbs have when chosen by an arguer to qualify the utterance by means of which a standpoint is advanced. This study has shown that there is nothing intrinsically fallacious in an arguer's choice to qualify the standpoint. Qualifying one's standpoint is a way of signalling to the other party what one takes the interpretation of the common ground to be, and constitutes a suggestion of how the testing of the standpoint could develop on such grounds. Such a choice becomes unreasonable when the arguer expects it to compensate for his lack of conclusive argumentation in support of the standpoint, forcing the other party to accept the proposed interpretation of the common ground.

Further research

In this study, I have accounted for the strategic function of the choice of a stance adverb to qualify the standpoint in an argumentative discussion as a presentational means for the management of the burden of proof. In future study, the assumption about the management of the burden of proof could be exploited in order to account for the strategic function of choices made regarding the two other aspects of the strategic manoeuvring for the realisation of the move of advancing a standpoint. In such a study, the focus would be on choices in the design of the standpoint regarding the topical potential and the adaptation to audience. In this way, it will be possible to gain a comprehensive view of how the cluster of choices made when designing the move of advancing a standpoint affects the protagonist's burden of proof. Understanding how choices that are made with respect to the three constitutive

aspects of the design of this move interrelate in the accomplishment of the protagonist's strategic goal for a successful discharge of the burden of proof will also make it possible to specify soundness conditions concerning the design of this move as a whole.

The steps followed in this study in order to specify the strategic function of qualification could provide a fruitful basis to account for the strategic function of choices that language users make with respect to the design of moves other than the move of advancing a standpoint. The strategic function of these choices could be established by considering the argumentative function that the specific move has in the discussion as well as the strategic goal that the specific party that performs that move can be assumed to have when designing it in this way. Qualification, for example, can be used not only in the presentation of the standpoint but also in the presentation of the argumentation advanced by the protagonist. Moreover, qualification can also be used in the presentation of moves made by the antagonist in an argumentative discussion, such as the move of expressing doubt regarding the standpoint or reacting critically to the argumentation. In these latter cases, an assumption parallel to the management of the burden of proof could be postulated that offers an argumentation-based explanation for the choices made by the antagonist, which takes into account the strategic goal that this party may have when designing his moves.

In this study, I have focused on single word stance adverbs (Biber et al., 1999) as a prototypical linguistic realisation of qualification in English, and I have discussed examples from English corpora and the Internet where stance adverbs are used to qualify a standpoint. However, the aim was not to suggest that stance adverbs constitute the sole means by which standpoints can be qualified in English or to provide an exhaustive list of all the stance adverbs that can be used for that purpose. In a more linguistically oriented study, a corpus search should be conducted in order to identify the variety of the linguistic means that can be used to qualify utterances by means of which a point of view is advanced. In such a study, the use of presentational devices other than stance adverbs should be examined in order to provide a survey of the available ways of qualifying standpoints and the patterns preferred in various registers. Biber et al. (1999) observe, for instance, that stance adverbs are most frequent in conversation and least frequent in the news register. This however, does not necessarily mean that language users do not qualify their standpoints in the news register but rather that there are ways of doing so other than by using a stance adverb. For such a corpus study to be possible, a corpus that is argumentatively tagged should be used. In such a corpus, information about the argumentative function that utterances or longer stretches of text have should be provided, in addition to the part-of-speech and semantic encoding of the words.

The theoretical account of the strategic function of qualification that I have provided in this study, by introducing the assumption about the management of the burden of proof, can also provide a basis to conduct empirical research. In such a study, tests could be carried to explain how arguers actually use the various ways of qualifying standpoints in order to manage the burden of proof. In this way, it would be possible to show how qualification of a standpoint plays a role in framing the argumentation in support of that standpoint as conclusive and the extent to which such a choice can guarantee acceptance of the standpoint by the other party.

APPENDIX

This is a comprehensive alphabetical list of all the adverbs that are dealt with in the following literature: Bartsch (1975) [Ba]; Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989), and Biber et al. (1999) [Bi]; Fraser (1996) [F]; Greenbaum (1969) [G]; Huddleston and Pullum (2002) [H]; Koktova (1986) [K] Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (2003) [L]; Quirk et al. (1985) [Q]; Sinclair et al. (1990) [S]. The letter in parenthesis indicates the study in which the particular adverb can be found. From the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, I have only included the adverbs that appear as a separate entry and are labelled 'sentence adverb'. The asterisk (*) indicates that the particular adverb is found in all nine sources listed above. The list is not meant to be exhaustive but it is quite comprehensive and illustrates the group of adverbs from where the ones I have studied are selected.

About (Bi)
Absurdly (G)(H)(S)
Accidentally (Ba)(K)
Accordingly (L)
Actually (Bi)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Additionally (L)
Admittedly (Ba)(Bi)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Aesthetically (S)
Alas (L)(S)
Allegedly (*)
Almost (S)
Alternatively (H)
Amazingly (Ba)(Bi)(F)(Q)(H)(G)(K)
Amiably (Ba)
Amusingly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Annoyingly (Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)
Anyway (L)(S)
Anyways (L)
Apparently (Bi)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Appropriately (F)(G)(H)
Approximately (Bi)(K)(Q)
Aptly (G)
Architecturally (Q)
Arguably (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(L)
Artfully (F)(G)(Q)
As a matter of fact (K)
Assuredly (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)
Astonishingly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
Astoundingly (G)
At least (S)
Avowedly (Bi)(Q)
Basically (Bi)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Besides (H)(K)
Bewilderingly (G)(H)
Biologically (S)
Bizarrely (G)
Blessedly (G)
Bluntly (Bi)(F)(Q)
Bravely (S)
Briefly (Bi)(F)(H)(K)(L)(Q)
Broadly (Bi)(Q)(S)
By chance (K)
By mistake (Ba)(K)
Candidly (Bi)(F)(H)(K)(Q)
Carelessly (Ba)(S)
Cautiously (Ba)
Certainly (*)
Characteristically (G)(S)
Chemically (S)
Clearly (Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Cleverly (F)(G)(Q)(S)
Coincidentally (S)
Comfortingly (G)
Commendably (Ba)
Commercially (S)
Conceivably (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(S)
Confidentially (Bi)(F)(H)(K)(Q)
Consciously (Ba)
Considerably (L)
Conveniently (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
Conventionally (G)
Correctly (Ba)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
Crucially (G)
Crudely (Bi)(F)(K)(Q)
Culturally (L)(S)
Cunningly (F)(G)(Q)
Curiously (Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Decidedly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Definitely (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(S)
Deliberately (Ba)
Delightfully (Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Desirably (K)
Disappointingly (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)
Disturbingly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Doubtless (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Ecologically (S)
Economically (H)(K)(L)(S)
Eerily (G)
Effectively (L)
Embitteringly (G)
Emotionally (K)(S)
Environmentally (S)

Equally (K)(L)
Especially (L)
Essentially
(Bi)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Ethically (S)
Evidently (*)
Exceptionally (Ba)
Expectedly (F)
Factually (Bi)(K)(Q)
Fairly (F)
Falsely (Ba)
Favorably (Ba)
Figuratively (Bi)(K)(Q)
Finally (L)
Financially (S)
Firstly (L)
Flatly (Q)
Foolishly (Ba)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
For certain (Ba)
Formally (Bi)(G)(Q)
Fortunately (*)
Frankly (Bi)(F)(H)(Q)(S)
Fundamentally
(Bi)(G)(Q)(S)
Funnily
(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Furthermore (L)
Generally (Bi)(F)(Q)(S)
Generously (S)
Geographically (S)
Gratifyingly (G)
Happily
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Harmfully (Ba)
Hence (L)
Honestly
(Bi)(F)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Hopefully
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Hypothetically (Bi)(K)(Q)
Ideally (Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)
Ideologically (S)
Illogically (G)(K)
Importantly (F)(H)
Improbably (H)
In all honesty (H)(S)
In brief (H)
In effect (K)
In essence (K)(S)
In fact (Ba)(Bi)(K)(S)
In fairness (S)
In general (S)
In practice (S)
In principle (K)
In reality (S)
In theory (S)
In vain (Ba)
Inappropriately (G)
Incidentally (K)
Incomprehensibly (Ba)
Incontestably
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)
Incontrovertibly (Bi)(F)(Q)
Incorrectly (F)(G)(Q)
Incredibly
(Bi)(F)(G)(L)(Q)(S)
Indeed (Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)
Indisputably (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Indubitably (Bi)(G)(H)(Q)
Ineluctably (H)
Inescapably (H)
Inevitably (Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)
Inexplicably (H)
Intellectually (S)
Interestingly (Bi)(G)(L)(S)
Intriguingly (G)
Ironically
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(L)(Q)(S)
Justifiably (F)
Justly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Kind of (Bi)
Kindly (S)
Lastly (L)
Legitimately (Ba)
Like (Bi)
Likely (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)
Likewise (L)
Linguistically (Q)
Literally (Bi)(H)(Q)
Logically (Ba)(K)(S)
Luckily (*)
Mainly (Bi)
Manifestly
(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Materially (K)(L)
Maybe
(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Meanwhile (L)
Mechanically (S)
Mentally (S)
Mercifully
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(S)
Meritoriously (Ba)
Metaphorically
(Bi)(F)(H)(K)(Q)
Mildly (Bi)
Miraculously (G)(H)(S)
Mistakenly (Ba)
Morally (H)(K)(S)
Moreover (H)(L)
Mysteriously (S)
Naturally
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(L)(S)
Necessarily (Ba)(H)
Nevertheless (H)
No doubt (Bi)(K)(S)
Nominally (Bi)(G)(Q)(S)
Nonetheless (L)
Normally (L)
Numerically (S)
Objectively (F)
Obviously
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(S)
Oddly
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(L)(Q)(S)
Of course (Bi)(H)(S)
Officially
(Bi)(G)(H)(L)(Q)(S)
Ominously (G)(H)
On average (S)
On balance (S)
On the contrary (H)
On the whole (S)
Ordinarily (L)
Originally (L)
Ostensibly
(Ba)(Bi)(G)(Q)(S)
Otherwise (L)
Outwardly (Bi)(G)(Q) (S)
Overall (L)(S)
Paradoxically (G)(H)(K)(S)
Patently (Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)
Perhaps
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Personally
(Bi)(F)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Physically (S)
Plainly (Bi)(G)(H)(L)(Q)(S)
Pleasantly (Q)
Please (S)
Politically (K)(L)(S)
Possibly
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)

Potentially (G)(S)
Practically (K)(S)
Precisely (F)
Predictably
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(S)
Preferably (Bi)(G)(K)(Q)
Preposterously (G)
Presumably (*)
Privately (L)(Q)
Probably
(Ba)(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(L)(S)
Prudently (Ba)(F)(G)(Q)
Psychologically (S)
Purportedly (Bi)(F)(Q)
Puzzlingly (G)
Racially (S)
Realistically (L)
Really
(Ba)(Bi)(G)(K)(Q)(S)
Reasonably (F)(G)(Q)
Refreshingly (Bi)(F)(G)
Regretfully (Bi)(L)
Regrettably
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(L)(Q)
Relevantly (G)
Remarkably
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(L)(Q)(S)
Reportedly
(Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)
Reputedly (Bi)(G)(L)(Q)
Right (H)
Rightly (Bi)(F)(G)(K)(Q)(S)
Roughly (Bi)(F)(Q)
Sadly
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Scientifically (S)
Secondly (H)(L)
Seemingly
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Selfishly (Ba)
Sensibly (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Seriously (Bi)(F)(L)(Q)(S)
Sexually (S)
Shamefully (Ba)(H)
Shamingly (G)
Shrewdly (G)(F)(Q)
Significantly
(Bi)(F)(G)(L)(Q)(S)
Similarly (L)
Simply (Bi)(F)(Q)
Socially (S)
Sort of (Bi)
Specifically (L)
Spiritually (S)
Splendidly (G)
Staggeringly (G)
Startlingly (G)
Statistically (S)
Strangely
(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(Q)(S)
Strictly (Bi)(F)(K)(Q)
Stupidly (F)
Suddenly (L)
Suitably (G)
Superficially (Bi)(G)(Q)(S)
Supposedly
(Bi)(F)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Surely
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(L)(Q)
Surprisingly
(Bi)(G)(H)(K)(S)
Suspiciously (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Technically
(Bi)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Technologically (S)
Thankfully
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(L)(Q)
Theoretically
(Bi)(G)(K)(L)(Q)(S)
Therefore (H)
To be sure (Ba)
To my surprise (K)
Topically (G)
Traditionally (G)
Tragically (Bi)(F)(G)(L)(Q)
True (S)
Truly (Bi)(H)(K)(Q)
Truthfully (Bi)(F)(K)(Q)
Typically (Bi)(G)(K)(S)
Ultimately (L)(S)
Unaccountably
(Bi)(G)(H)(L)
Unarguably
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(K)(Q)
Unavoidably (H)
Unbelievably (Ba)(Bi)(S)
Uncharacteristically (G)
Undeniably
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)
Understandably
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(S)
Undesirably (Ba)
Undoubtedly
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)(S)
Unexpectedly
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
Unfavorably (Ba)
Unfortunately
(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(L)(Q)(S)
Unhappily
(Bi)(F)(G)(L)(Q)(S)
Unjustly (Ba)(G)(Q)
Unluckily (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)
Unmistakeably (S)
Unnaturally (Bi)(G)
Unnecessarily (Ba)(S)
Unofficially (S)
Unprecedentedly (Ba)
Unprofitably (Ba)
Unquestionably
(Ba)(Bi)(F)(G)(H)(Q)
Unreasonably (F)(G)
Unremarkably (F)
Unsurprisingly (G)
Unusually (G)
Unwisely (G)(Q)
Usefully (Ba)
Uselessly (Ba)
Usually (Ba)
Virtually (S)
Visibly (S)
Visually (S)
Weather-wise (H)
Wisely (Bi)(F)(G)(Q)(S)
Without doubt (Bi)
Wrongly (F)(G)(Q)(S)

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INDEX OF ADVERBS, NAMES & TERMS

A

accidentally 62
actually 53, 70–73, 166
adjuncts 1, 26, 45
admittedly 73, 131
adverbs 44
  See also stance adverbs .....
  sentence adverbs 45
  vs. adverbials 46
aesthetically 53
Aijmer 54–56, 73
allegedly 52, 54
antagonist 5, 8, 96, 107, 146, 176
apparently 52, 54
appraisal 2, 27, 37, 63
architecturally 53
arguably 55
argumentation (move of forwarding ~) 21, 85, 96
  argumentation as an assertive ... 21
argumentation stage .....*See* critical discussion
assertive .....*See* speech acts
attitudinal adverbs.....*See* evaluative adverbs

B

Bach 64
Barth 5
basically 53
Bellert 38, 53, 64
Biber 1, 25, 28–29, 33, 44–47, 49, 51, 61, 69, 172, 182
BNC corpus .. 1, 12, 30, 67, 135, 138, 140, 144, 160, 161
Bonami 65
Brandom 21
broadly 53, 69
Brown, P. 2, 180
Brown, R. 91
burden of proof **11**–**12**, 20, **82**–**83**, 101, 114, 128, 174, 180
  acquiring 90
  acquitting 99, 101
  assuming 93, 128, 153
  discharging . **86**, **98**–**100**, 102, 107, 174
  incurring **86**, 93, 102, 107, 174
  meeting 94, 98, 101
  probative obligation vs. discourse obligation 20, 90
  successful discharge of the ~ .. **100**, **107**, 110, 113, 115, 118, 132, 134, 174, 177
burden of proof rule *See* obligation to defend rule

C

Capone 71
Cargile 91
certainly ... 47, 52, 54–56, 70, 74, 131
Chafe 55
clearly 36, 47, 52, 54–57, 70, 135–36, 154, 160–61
cleverly 61
COBUILD corpus ... 2, 12, 40, 56, 62, 137, 145, 168, 171
commitment 20
  to a standpoint 36, 60, 75, 159
  to the truth ... 4, 36, 54, 71, 90, 134
committedness ..... *See* commitment
common ground ... 5, 93, 95–97, 112–14, 118, 128–30, 146, 153, 159, 176
concluding stage.....*See* critical discussion
conclusive argumentation **97**–**98**, 110–12, 115, 153, 156, 165, 178
conclusive defence (of the standpoint)..... 103, 109, 132
confidentially 69

confrontation stage .....*See* critical discussion
context of doubt.... 21, 22, 32, 34, 38, 40, 44, **89**–**90**, 168
conveniently..... 61
conventional validity 6
critical discussion (ideal model of a ~)..... **5**, 8, 12, 23, 96
rules..... 6, 92, 151
obligation to defend rule **92**, 151
stages.. **5**–**6**, 84, 86, 102, 115, 117, 153, 174
argumentation.... 5, 95, 97, 100, 107, 112
concluding..... 6, 98, 100, 107
confrontation.... 5, 89, 107, 172
opening..... 5, 92–94, 107, 113, 151–53, 176
curiously..... 61

D

deliberately..... 61
derailment..... *See* management of the burden of proof. *See* strategic manoeuvring
design....**8**, **25**, 30, 115, 118–19, 132–34, 140, 143, 150, 155, 172, 176, 179. *See also* strategic manoeuvring
dialectical goal.....7, 10, 84, 107, 150
disappointingly..... 61
discharging the burden of proof....*See* burden of proof
discourse effect. 3, 12, 17, 44, 49, 51, 54, **60**, **67**, 72, **75**, 79, 131, 134, 139, 143, 147, 150, 154, 157, 173, 176
discourse markers 29, 45, 189, 192
disjuncts..... 1, 26, 45, 70
domain adverbs.....*See* stance adverbs
Downing..... 25

E

Edwards..... 74
Eemeren, van4–8, 20, 23, 37, 84, 92, 95–96, 99, 109, 135, 152, 171, 178–80
epistemic adverbs. *See* modal adverbs
epistemic modality ... 3, 55–56, 58, 63
essentially..... 53
evading the burden of proof.....*See* fallacies
evaluation..... *See* appraisal
evaluative adverbs *See* stance adverbs
evidential adverbs *See* stance adverbs
evidentiality 2, 55–56, 189
evidently..... 52
expectation markers .....*See* stance adverbs
expressed opinion.. 20, 34, **37**, 67, 89, 129, 135, 139, 146, 163, 171
See also propositional content of the standpoint .....

F

factually..... 53
fallacies. **6**, 82, 85, 150–52, 155, 180, 191
ad ignorantiam..... 152
evading the burden of proof.. 152–53, 156–57, 161, 163, 178
shifting the burden of proof... 152–53, 157, 167, 169, 178
Fasulo..... 74
figuratively..... 69
Finegan..... 1, 28, 51, 61, 69
foolishly..... 61
fortunately 61, 70, 140–41, 154, 163–65
compared to *unfortunately* 139–40, 164
frankly. 10, 33, 40, 53, 70, 72, 74–75, 143–45, 154, 166–67
compared to the other adverbs. 145
Fraser..... 1, 29, 51, 61, 69

fundamentally 53
funnily 61

G

generally 53, 69
Godard 65
Goffman 180
Green 32
Greenbaum 1, 45, 51, 53, 61, 70
Grice 74, 143
Grootendorst ... 4, 20, 23, 37, 84, 92, 99, 109, 152, 171

H

Hahn 82
Halliday 45
Hamblin 152
happily 61, 131
hearsay adverbs ..... *See* evidential adverbs
hedging 2, 53, 55
Holmes 32
honestly 68–70, 74
Houtlosser 7–9, 21, 23, 35, 37, 85, 88, 95–97, 100, 171, 178–80
Hübler 71
Huddleston 1, 45, 51, 53, 59, 61–63, 69
Hunston 28, 63
Hyland 2

I

ideally 53
Ifantidou 2, 64
illocutionary adverbs ..... *See* stance adverbs
illocutionary force 33, 40, 172
  of an assertive 32
in all honesty 74
in fact 40, 73–74, 145–46, 167–69
in reality 73
incurring the burden of proof ..... *See* burden of proof
indeed 70, 73
indicators 9, 23, 179
intentionally 61
interestingly 61
ironically 61

J

Jayez 57, 64
Johnson 97
Jucker 73
justificatory potential ..... *See* potential

K

Kauffeld 20, 83, 90–91, 94, 180
knowingly 62
Krabbe 5, 84, 93

L

Lakoff 32
Levinson 2, 180
linguistically 53, 59
literally 53, 69, 72
Locke 25, 152
logically 53
luckily 61, 131
Lyons 27, 56, 71, 127, 130

M

management of the burden of proof **116–17**, 134, 176, 181
  derailment of the ~ . **151**, 153, 155, 178
  scenarios for the ~ **118–19**, 132, 135, 138, 140, 143, 175
Martin 63
maybe 47
Merlini Barbaresi 55

metaphorically 69
mitigation 2, 32, 190, 192
modal adverbs .....*See* stance adverbs
modulation 27
morally 53
Myers 2

N

naturally 52
nominally 53
Nuyts 55, 57

O

Oaksford 82
obligation to defend rule ...*See* critical discussion
obviously 52, 55–57, 70
oddly 55, 61
of course 52, 70, 73
officially 53
Oh 73
onus probandi .....*See* burden of proof
opening stage .. *See* critical discussion

P

Papafragou 57
paradoxically 61
parentheticals 130
performative verbs 69, 72, 130
perhaps ...33, 36, 47, 54–57, 70, 136–37, 154, 161–62
personally 69
plainly 52
point of view ..... *See* standpoint
politically 53, 59
possibly 47, 55, 131
potential (justificatory/refutatory ~ of the argumentation) ... **95**, 109, 135, 163
pragmatic markers 1, 45
presumably 52, 55, 131
probably 47, 55, 131
probative obligation ..... *See* burden of proof
problem solving validity 6
propositional content
of an assertive 32, 58, 134
of the argumentation.. **95**, 109, 135
of the standpoint.... 34, 37, 49, 172
protagonist .. 5, 8, 39, 85, 93, 96, 101, 103, 107, 114, 117–19, 129, 137, 139, 152–53, 173, 176
Pullum ... 1, 45, 51, 53, 59, 61–63, 69

Q

qualification 3, 8, 10, **29**, 127, 154, 172, 178, 182
qualitative view 27–28
quantitative view 25–27
qualified standpoint.....*See* standpoint qualification
Quirk 1, 45, 51–54, 61, 68, 70

R

Ramat 45, 53, 61
really 53, 70, 74
reconstruction **7**, 21, 30, 35, 135, 138, 140, 160, 164, 167, 168
Rees, van 7, 138
refutatory potential .....*See* potential
regrettably 61
reportedly 52
Rescher 83
rhetorical goal ... 7, 10, 107, 150, 178, 179
Ricca 45, 53, 61
rightly 62
Rooryck 55
Rossari 57, 64
roughly 53, 69
rudely 61
rules ..... *See* critical discussion

S

sadly 61
Sbisá 32
Searle 32
seemingly 52, 55
seriously 70, 74
shifting the burden of proof ..... *See* fallacies
signalling **130**–**31**, 135, 138, 141, 176
Simon-Vandenbergen 73
simply 53, 69
Sinclair 45, 53, 61, 69
Smith 73
Snoeck Henkemans 9, 135, 164, 179
speech acts 5, 12
  accusing 89
    and burden of proof 90
  advising 89
    and burden of proof 90
  assertive 12, 20, 32, 88, 90
  directive 32
  insisting 32
  promising 20
  proposing 89
    and burden of proof 90
  requesting 32, 89
  warning
    and burden of proof 90
Sperber 65
stages ..... *See* critical discussion
stance **27**–**28**, 63, 172
  epistemic comment 28, 32
  evaluative comment 28, 32, 38
  grammatical realization of ~ 46, 49
  See also stance adverbs .....
  style comment 28, 33, 40
stance adverbs . 1, 10, 13, **46**–**47**, 131, 154, 173, 179, 180–82
  domain adverbs 51, 53, 59, 137
    compared to the other adverbs 53, 59
  evaluative adverbs . 38, 60, 63, 139
    vs. illocutionary adverbs 64, 66
    vs. modal adverbs 64
  evidential adverbs 51, 57
  expectation markers 68, 73, 143
  illocutionary adverbs ... 53, 68, 143
    compared to the other adverbs 69, 74
    vs. modal adverbs 75
  modal adverbs . 3, 9, 51, 54, 57, 70
  vs. stance adverbials 46, 49
standpoint (move of advancing a ~) 2, 5, 12, **21**–**23**, **34**–**35**, 92, 117, 150, 171, 179
  felicity conditions 21, 34, **88**, 92
  standpoint as an assertive ... 21, 31, 172
  vs. attitude 37
standpoint qualification. 4, 10, **28**–**31**, 49, 67, 75, 129, 134, 154, **172**, 176
  vs. utterance qualification 2–3, 10, 29–30, 129
  ways of ~ **33**, 131, 156, 177
    epistemic way 51, 60, **132**, **135**–**38**, 156, 159–61, 172, 177
    evaluative way 60, **133**, **139**–**40**, 156, 163, 173, 177
    'illocutionary' way . 68, 75, **133**, **143**, 157, 166, 173, 177
starting points .... *See* common ground
strangely 61
strategic function **10**, 11, 116, 127, **132**–**34**, 151, 156, 171, 176–77, 182
  abuse of the ~ ... 156–57, 159, 161, 163, 166, 177–78, 181
strategic goal **105**, 174
strategic manoeuvring ..... **7**–**8**, 23–24, **106**–**8**, 150, 172, 174, 179, 181. *See also* design
  derailment of the ~ 150, 155
strictly 69
Stubbs 63
stupidly 61
successful discharge of the burden of proof ..... *See* burden of proof
supposedly 52
surely 52, 54–56, 70
surprisingly 55, 61

T

technically..... 53, 59, 138–39
testing
the acceptability of the argumentation.. **95–96**, 98, 103, 109
intersubjective identification procedure..... 95, 110
intersubjective inference procedure..... 95
intersubjective testing procedure..... 95, 110
the tenability of the standpoint... 5, 84, 95, 98, 101, 102, 115, 129, 153, 156, 174, 176
theoretically..... 53, 59
Thompson..... 28, 63, 67
to be honest..... 74
truly..... 69, 74

U

Ullman-Marglit 83
unfortunately 30, 33, 61, 131, 141–42
compared to *fortunately* 141
Urmson..... 130–31

V

Vanderveken..... 32

W

Whately..... 82
White..... 63
willingly 62
Wilson 65

Z

Zhou 67

SUMMARY

Qualifying standpoints. Stance adverbs as a presentational device for managing the burden of proof

The main aim of this study is to specify the strategic function of the qualification of a standpoint. In particular, those cases are studied in which the utterance that functions as a standpoint is qualified by a stance adverb, as the following examples illustrate:

(1) *Clearly*, the figures in the text are incorrect, since they do not add up to 113, and the number of lunar months in the Saros cycle is in any case almost double that given by Ssu Ma Ch'ien.

(2) *Unfortunately*, because the Earth's climate mechanisms are so extremely complex, predictions of what could happen are very uncertain.

(3) *Quite frankly*, council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department.

Such words have been studied widely in the fields of semantics and syntax as well as pragmatics and discourse analysis, but not specifically with an interest in their use in an argumentative context. While argumentation scholars have only paid marginal attention to the use of stance adverbs, they have never treated them comprehensively as the linguistic realisation of a choice that an arguer can make when putting forward a specific move in a discussion.

The theoretical framework used to specify the strategic function of stance adverbs that qualify a standpoint is the pragma-dialectical approach to the study of argumentation, developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004), and extended by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007b, 2007c). Within this framework, the strategic function that qualification has is understood as the way in which it simultaneously serves the dialectical goal and the rhetorical goal of the protagonist of the standpoint in the course of an argumentative discussion. The main question of this study is:

How does qualification of a standpoint function strategically in an argumentative discussion?

In order to specify how qualification functions, the following preliminary questions need to be answered:

1) *What is a qualified standpoint?*
2) *Why would the protagonist qualify the standpoint?*

The study is thus divided in three parts. *Part I* and *Part II* provide an answer to questions 1 and 2, respectively, which is a prerequisite for answering the main question of the study in *Part III*.

In *Part I*, standpoint qualification is defined and the ways in which standpoints can be qualified are identified.

In **Chapter 1**, qualification is studied within the strategic manoeuvring approach as a choice regarding the presentational aspect of the design of the move of advancing a standpoint. Following the illocutionary analysis of this move as an assertive speech act, standpoint qualification is defined as the addition of a comment that is peripheral both structurally and semantically, and as such is not part of the propositional content of the standpoint. Such an additional comment may only be *about* the propositional content, in which case it conveys information about the commitment to it or about the evaluation of it, or *about* the act as a whole. In either case the comment does not become the bone of contention in the argumentative discussion that follows. Considering that the additional comment may convey commitment to or evaluation of the propositional content, three ways of qualifying a standpoint are distinguished, in total: a) an *epistemic way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint conveying commitment to the propositional content of the assertive speech act; b) an *evaluative way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint conveying evaluation of the propositional content of the assertive speech act; and c) an *'illocutionary' way*, in which a comment is added to the standpoint conveying information about the performance of the assertive speech act as a whole.

In **Chapter 2**, the group of single word stance adverbs in English is studied as one possible linguistic realisation of qualification in argumentative discourse. Following Biber et al.'s (1999) classification and a review of the relevant literature on sentence and stance adverbs, stance adverbs are identified that can be considered as the linguistic realisation of the three ways of qualifying distinguished in the previous chapter (see Table 2). Specifically, modal adverbs (*certainly, clearly, perhaps, probably*), evidential adverbs (*apparently, obviously, supposedly*), and domain adverbs (*financially, officially, technically, theoretically*) constitute the linguistic realisation of the epistemic way of qualifying. Event-oriented evaluative adverbs (*fortunately, funnily, happily, interestingly*), which are a sub-set of evaluative adverbs, constitute the linguistic realisation of the evaluative way of qualifying. Illocutionary adverbs (*frankly, honestly, personally*) and expectation markers (*actually, in fact, of course*) constitute the linguistic realisation of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying.

In addition, the discourse effect of using the listed adverbs is described with reference to the context of doubt and critical discussion, in which a standpoint is advanced. In this light, the comment that the stance adverbs of the epistemic way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the quality of the evidence that the protagonist is ready to adduce in support of the standpoint. The comment that the stance adverbs of the evaluative way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the evaluation of the expressed opinion that the two parties share. The

comment that the stance adverbs of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying add to the standpoint is understood as emphasising the protagonist's cooperativeness.

In *Part II*, the assumption about the management of the burden of proof is introduced in order to provide an argumentative-based explanation for the choices an arguer makes with regard to the design of the move of advancing a standpoint.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the concept of the burden of proof as the obligation that accompanies the act of advancing a standpoint and requires that the party who assumes the role of the protagonist defend it by carrying out the tasks required throughout the discussion. It is argued that by virtue of its omnipresence in the stages of an argumentative discussion, the concept of the burden of proof can be used in order to specify the strategic goal that the protagonist aims for when designing the standpoint. For this purpose, a procedural view is expounded that specifies four analytically distinct but interconnected steps of the incurrence and the discharge of the burden of proof: acquiring, assuming, meeting and acquitting oneself of the burden of proof (see Table 3). In this procedural view, the incurrence refers to the two analytically distinct steps of acquiring and assuming the burden of proof, which correspond to the confrontation and opening stages. The discharge of the burden of proof refers to the two analytically distinct steps of meeting and acquitting oneself of the burden of proof, which correspond to the argumentation and concluding stages. In this way, the concept of the burden of proof is shown to underlie all the tasks that are carried out throughout the four stages of a critical discussion, and thereby provides a basis for understanding what the protagonist aims at when designing the standpoint.

In **Chapter 4**, the protagonist's strategic goal as far as the burden of proof is concerned is described with reference to the strategic manoeuvring approach. *Strategic goal* is defined as the pursuit of a rhetorical goal that respects the boundaries of the dialectical requirements of a critical discussion. From this perspective, the protagonist is not only interested in resolving a difference of opinion but also in resolving it in a way that favours his standpoint. As far as the burden of proof is concerned, at the end of the dispute resolution process the protagonist would seek to have the doubt over the standpoint withdrawn and the standpoint maintained. In other words, the protagonist would seek to *successfully discharge* the burden of proof. The procedural view of the burden of proof presented in the previous chapter is used in order to describe what the protagonist should achieve at the various stages of an argumentative discussion in his attempt to pave the way towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof. Aiming for a successful discharge, the protagonist should make sure that the burden of proof that he assumes in the opening stage is commensurate to what he is ready to adduce as argumentation while meeting his probative obligation in the argumentation stage.

Given the possible developments of the procedure for the critical testing of the argumentation, three scenarios towards a resolution of the dispute with a successful discharge of the burden of proof are described (see Table 4). All three scenarios for a successful discharge of the burden of proof are shown to depend on the agreements about the common ground reached in the opening stage. Since the agreements reached in the opening stage can shape the development of the discussion towards a successful discharge of the burden of proof, it can be assumed that the protagonist would seek to influence these agreements, at the earliest possible opportunity, in the confrontation stage. The choices that he makes when designing the standpoint can thus be accounted for as seeking a successful discharge of the burden of proof. According to this explanation, the protagonist makes choices when designing the standpoint in order to be able to go on to defend it and to eventually reach the end of the discussion having the standpoint accepted instead of having to retract it, while observing the dialectical norms throughout. This assumption is referred to as *the management of the burden of proof*. Postulating the management of the burden of proof as the protagonist's strategic goal when designing the standpoint provides a frame in which the strategic function of the choices made regarding the design of this move can be specified.

In *Part III*, the results of the two previous parts are combined; namely, the three ways of qualifying standpoints and the stance adverbs used for each, as presented in *Part I*, and the three scenarios for a successful discharge in the light of the assumption about the management of the burden of proof, as presented in *Part II*. By relating each of the ways of qualifying standpoints to one of the three scenarios for the management of the burden of proof, the strategic function of qualifying the standpoint in an argumentative discussion can be specified.

In **Chapter 5**, the strategic function of each of the ways of qualifying a standpoint is presented. The strategic function of qualification rests on the two choices that a qualified standpoint opens to the antagonist; namely, to react by expressing disagreement regarding the choice of the particular way of qualifying, or to react by expressing disagreement regarding the proposition over which the particular qualifier scopes. In the first case, the antagonist appears, temporarily at least, to agree with the expressed opinion. In the second case, he appears to endorse the comment that the particular way of qualifying adds, as long as he does not explicitly challenge it later on in the course of the same discussion. Of these two possible options for disagreement, the one that contributes to the direct development of the testing procedure by placing the burden of proof on the protagonist is the one in which the antagonist requests justification for the expressed opinion. This is the reaction that a reasonable protagonist interested in proceeding with the testing of the tenability of the standpoint would seek to obtain from the antagonist. At the same time, such a reaction to the qualified standpoint by the antagonist allows the protagonist to

act as if the comment that the qualifier conveys is endorsed. The qualifier that the protagonist chooses signals to the antagonist that there is agreement, as far as the comment that the particular way of qualifying adds to the discussion is concerned. In this way, the protagonist seeks to underline the common ground that he shares with the other party; that is, to emphasise agreement with what he knows or expects the other party to hold as correct, true, acceptable, plausible, and so forth, in order to proceed in the testing of the tenability of the standpoint under favourable conditions, expecting thereby to discharge the burden of proof successfully.

The strategic function of the epistemic way of qualifying is that it helps the protagonist signal to the antagonist that there is such common ground on the basis of which he does not expect him to ask questions regarding the content or the potential of the argumentation he is ready to adduce in support of the standpoint. The strategic function of the evaluative way of qualifying is that it helps the protagonist to signal to the antagonist that, as far as he is concerned, the potential of the argumentation adduced in support of the standpoint will not be challenged any further, since it can be warranted by the endorsement of the evaluative comment. The strategic function of the 'illocutionary' way of qualifying is that it helps the protagonist to signal to the antagonist his confidence that the argumentation adduced will be deemed conclusive even if the antagonist challenges both the content and the potential. He draws this confidence from the belief that the antagonist would not suspect that the protagonist would have risked assuming the position he did, addressing someone who believes the opposite, unless he had good reasons to do so.

Chapter 6 concerns the evaluation of the protagonist's choice to qualify the standpoint in a specific way. A description is provided of what counts as abuse of the strategic function of qualification and the conditions under which qualification can be said to have obstructed the critical testing of the standpoint. Qualification is abused when the protagonist exploits its strategic function to design the standpoint in his attempt to discharge the burden of proof in his favour without observing the dialectical requirements of the discussion. Such an illicit goal constitutes a derailment of the management of the burden of proof, which obstructs the dispute resolution procedure by violating the burden of proof rule. This violation results in the fallacy of evading or shifting the burden of proof. The protagonist evades the burden of proof when he abuses the strategic function of qualification in order to prejudge the conclusiveness of his argumentation in support of the standpoint. He shifts the burden of proof when he abuses the strategic function of qualification in order to prejudge the inconclusiveness of the argumentation for the opposite standpoint. In either case, the protagonist overlooks the requirement for an intersubjective testing procedure and imposes unilaterally his own standards of conclusiveness (see Table 5).

SAMENVATTING

Gekwalificeerde standpunten. Bijwoorden als presentatiemiddelen om met de bewijslast te manoeuvreren

Een taalgebruiker kan zijn standpunt kwalificeren; de volgende voorbeelden illustreren dat.

(1) *Clearly*, the figures in the text are incorrect, since they do not add up to 113, and the number of lunar months in the Saros cycle is in any case almost double that given by Ssu Ma Ch'ien.

(2) *Unfortunately*, because the Earth's climate mechanisms are so extremely complex, predictions of what could happen are very uncertain.

(3) *Quite frankly*, council officers should not have anything to do with the investigation because they are council officers who are involved with the department.

De bijwoordelijke bepalingen *clearly*, *unfortunately* en *quite frankly* kwalificeren een standpunt.

In deze studie worden de strategische functies beschreven van de keuzemogelijkheden die een discussiant heeft bij het kwalificeren van zijn standpunt. In het bijzonder gaat het daarbij om die gevallen waarin een standpunt wordt gekwalificeerd door een bijwoord. De vraag die in deze studie centraal staat, is dan ook: *Op welke wijze kan het kwalificeren van een standpunt strategische worden ingezet in een argumentatieve discussie?*

Bijwoorden zijn veelvuldig bestudeerd vanuit een semantisch, syntactisch of pragmatisch perspectief, maar daarbij is zelden of nooit aandacht besteed aan hun gebruik in een argumentatieve context. Argumentatietheoretici hebben daarentegen wel onderzoek gedaan naar het gebruik van bijwoorden, maar zij hebben deze nooit uitvoerig behandeld als verbale realisaties van een keuze die een discussiant heeft gemaakt bij het uitvoeren van een specifieke zet in een discussie.

Het theoretische kader dat wordt gebruikt om een beschrijving te geven van de strategische functies van de kwalificatie van standpunten met behulp van bijwoorden, is de pragma-dialectische benadering van argumentatie, die is ontwikkeld door Van Eemeren en Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) en uitgebreid door Van Eemeren en Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2007b, 2007c). Binnen dit kader wordt de strategische functie van de kwalificatie van een standpunt opgevat als een manier om tegelijkertijd het dialectische en het retorische doel van een protagonist in een argumentatieve discussie te dienen.

Om de strategische functies van het kwalificeren van een standpunt te kunnen beschrijven, wordt eerst een theoretische definitie hiervan opgesteld.

Daarna wordt besproken wat het strategische doel van de protagonist is, wanneer hij een standpunt kwalificeert. De volgende twee preliminaire vragen zijn daarbij leidend: 1) Wat is een gekwalificeerd standpunt? 2) Waarom zou de protagonist ervoor kiezen om zijn standpunt te kwalificeren? De delen I en II van deze studie geven antwoord op respectievelijk de vragen 1) en 2). Voortbouwend op deze inzichten wordt in deel III de centrale vraag van deze studie beantwoord.

In *Deel I* wordt het kwalificeren van een standpunt gedefinieerd en worden verschillende typen kwalificatie onderscheiden. In **Hoofdstuk 1** wordt het kwalificeren van een standpunt gedefinieerd vanuit het perspectief van 'strategisch manoeuvreren'. Dit houdt in dat het verschijnsel wordt opgevat als een keuze voor een bepaalde presentatiewijze van een discussiezet. Op basis van een illocutionaire analyse van het standpunt als een bewerende taalhandeling, wordt kwalificatie van een standpunt gedefinieerd als het toevoegen van een *karakterisering* ervan die zowel syntactisch als semantisch perifeer is en geen deel uitmaakt van de propositionele inhoud van het standpunt. Een dergelijke karakterisering betreft dus alleen de propositionele inhoud van de taalhandeling, wat betekent dat de karakterisering informatie geeft over de gebondenheid van de spreker aan de propositie of zijn evaluatie van deze propositie, of over de taalhandeling als geheel. In geen van beide gevallen fungeert de karakterisering zelf als onderwerp van discussie. Op basis van deze definitie worden drie typen van kwalificatie onderscheiden: a) *epistemische* kwalificatie, waarbij een karakterisering aan het standpunt wordt toegevoegd om gebondenheid van de spreker aan de propositionele inhoud van de bewerende taalhandeling uit te drukken; b) *evaluatieve* kwalificatie, waarbij een karakterisering aan het standpunt wordt toegevoegd om een evaluatie van de propositionele inhoud van de bewerende taalhandeling uit te drukken; en c) *illocutionaire* kwalificatie, waarbij een karakterisering aan het standpunt wordt toegevoegd om informatie te geven over de uitvoering van bewerende taalhandeling als geheel.

In **Hoofdstuk 2** worden Engelse bijwoorden geanalyseerd als verbale middelen met behulp waarvan een standpunt kan worden gekwalificeerd. Op basis van de classificatie van bijwoorden in Biber et al. (1999) en na een kritische behandeling van de relevante literatuur over bijwoorden wordt bepaald welke bijwoorden beschouwd kunnen worden als de verbale realisatie van de drie in het vorige hoofdstuk onderscheiden typen kwalificatie (Table 2). De modale bijwoorden (*certainly, clearly, perhaps, probably*), evidentiële bijwoorden (*apparently, obviously, supposedly*) en domeinbijwoorden (*financially, officially, technically, theoretically*) vormen de verbale realisatie van epistemische kwalificatie. Evaluatieve - of specifieker: op een gebeurtenis georiënteerde evaluatieve - bijwoorden (*fortunately, funnily, happily, interestingly*), vormen de verbale realisatie van evaluatieve kwalificatie. Illocutionaire bijwoorden (*frankly, honestly, personally*)

en bijwoorden die een verwachting aanduiden (*actually, in fact, of course*) vormen de verbale realisatie van illocutionaire kwalificatie.

In hoofdstuk 2 wordt tevens het effect beschreven dat het gebruik van de verschillende bijwoorden in een argumentatieve context kan hebben op een discussie als geheel. Deze beschrijving vindt plaats op basis van het uitgangspunt dat in een kritische discussie twijfel een centrale rol speelt. Vanuit dit perspectief wordt kwalificatie met behulp van een epistemisch bijwoord opgevat als een middel waarmee de protagonist de kwaliteit van zijn argumentatie wil benadrukken. Een bijwoord dat het standpunt op een evaluatieve manier kwalificeert wordt beschouwd als een middel waarmee de protagonist wil benadrukken dat hij en de antagonist een bepaalde evaluatie van het standpunt delen. Een bijwoord dat het standpunt op een illocutionaire manier kwalificeert wordt beschouwd als een middel waarmee de protagonist zijn bereidwilligheid tot samenwerking benadrukt.

In *Deel II* wordt het idee van 'de hantering van de bewijslast' (*management of the burden of proof*) geïntroduceerd, om zo een verklaring te kunnen bieden voor de keuzes die een discussiant maakt met betrekking tot de vorm waarin hij zijn standpunt giet. In **Hoofdstuk 3** wordt de gedachte uitgewerkt dat de bewijslast een verplichting vormt die voortvloeit uit het naar voren brengen van een standpunt. Gezien het feit dat de bewijslast in elke discussiefase een rol speelt, kan het concept van de bewijslast gebruikt worden om het strategische doel te specificeren dat de protagonist heeft wanneer hij zijn standpunt vormgeeft. De wijze waarop een discussiant de bewijslast op zich neemt en zich er uiteindelijk van kwijt, moet gezien worden als een procedure die bestaat uit vier analytisch gescheiden, maar nauw met elkaar verbonden onderdelen: het toebedelen van, het aanvaarden van, het voldoen aan en het ontslagen worden van de bewijslast (Table 3). Vanuit dit procedurele oogpunt verwijst het 'op zich nemen' van de bewijslast naar de eerste twee stappen in deze procedure, die overeenkomen met de confrontatie- en de openingsfase. Het 'zich ontdoen van' van de bewijslast verwijst naar de twee laatste stappen, die overeenkomen met de argumentatie- en de afsluitingsfase. Op deze wijze wordt tot uitdrukking gebracht dat de bewijslast ten grondslag ligt aan alle taken die verbonden zijn met de vier discussiefasen. Dit inzicht moet ook als basis dienen voor het antwoord op de vraag welke strategische doelen een protagonist nastreeft bij het vormgeven van zijn standpunt.

In **Hoofdstuk 4** wordt het concept van strategisch manoeuvreren gebruikt om te beschrijven wat het strategische doel van de protagonist is met betrekking tot de bewijslast. Onder *strategisch doel* wordt het najagen van een retorisch doel binnen de dialectische grenzen van een kritische discussie verstaan. Vanuit dit perspectief is de protagonist niet alleen geïnteresseerd in het oplossen van een verschil van mening, maar ook in een oplossing ten gunste van zijn standpunt. Voor de bewijslast betekent dit dat de protagonist ernaar streeft om aan het einde van de discussie zijn standpunt te kunnen

handhaven, doordat hij twijfel aan zijn standpunt heeft kunnen wegnemen. Hij beoogt, met andere woorden, zich *succesvol van de bewijslast te ontdoen*. De procedurele kijk op de bewijslast die is gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 3, wordt in hoofdstuk 4 gebruikt om te beschrijven wat de protagonist in de verschillende discussiefasen zou moeten doen om zijn strategische doel te realiseren. Zo moet de protagonist er bijvoorbeeld in de *openingsfase* voor zorgen dat het gewicht van de bewijslast die hij aanvaardt, is toegesneden op de argumentatie die hij wil aandragen in de *argumentatiefase*, waarin hij aan zijn bewijslastverplichting moet voldoen.

Op basis van de mogelijke paden die kunnen worden doorlopen om tot de oplossing van een verschil van mening te komen, worden drie scenario's onderscheiden waarin de discussiant zich op succesvolle wijze ontdoet van de bewijslast (Table 4). In alle drie de scenario's hangt het succes af van de gemeenschappelijke uitgangspunten die zijn vastgesteld in de openingsfase. Daarom wordt aangenomen dat de protagonist zo vroeg mogelijk in de discussie, al in de confrontatiefase, zal proberen zijn invloed uit te oefenen op de vaststelling van deze uitgangspunten. De keuzes die hij maakt bij het presenteren van zijn standpunt staan dus in dienst van het doel om zich op succesvolle wijze van de bewijslast te kwijten. Dit wordt *manoeuvreren met de bewijslast* genoemd. Dat houdt in dat de protagonist zijn standpunt zodanig vormgeeft dat hij, terwijl hij binnen de grenzen van de dialectische redelijkheidsnormen blijft, een zo gunstig mogelijke uitgangspositie heeft bij de verdediging ervan, met als uiteindelijk doel dat het standpunt wordt geaccepteerd in plaats van dat het moet worden ingetrokken. Op basis van het idee dat de protagonist manoeuvreert met de bewijslast om dit doel te bereiken, kunnen de strategische functies worden gespecificeerd van de keuzes die hij maakt bij het vormgeven van zijn standpunt.

In *Deel III* worden de resultaten van de twee eerdere delen met elkaar in verband gebracht. Door elk van de drie typen kwalificatie te associëren met één van de drie scenario's voor het manoeuvreren met de bewijslast, worden in dit deel de strategische functies van het kwalificeren van een standpunt gespecificeerd. In **Hoofdstuk 5** wordt uiteengezet dat de strategische functie van kwalificatie van een standpunt afhangt van de twee mogelijkheden die een antagonist heeft om daarop te reageren, namelijk door uit te drukken dat hij met de protagonist van mening verschilt over a) de kwalificatie van het standpunt of b) de propositie waar de kwalificatie betrekking op heeft. In de eerste situatie lijkt de antagonist het (op z'n minst voorlopig) eens te zijn met het inhoudelijke standpunt van de protagonist. In de tweede situatie lijkt hij (op z'n minst voorlopig) de karakterisering die de betreffende kwalificatie van het standpunt geeft, te accepteren. Van deze twee mogelijke reacties van een antagonist is het de tweede die een redelijke protagonist die is geïnteresseerd in het testen van de aanvaardbaarheid van zijn standpunt, voor ogen heeft bij het ontwerpen van zijn standpunt. Tegelijkertijd maakt deze tweede reactie van de

antagonist het voor de protagonist mogelijk om te handelen alsof de antagonist de kwalificatie onderschrijft. De kwalificatie die de protagonist kiest, geeft aan de antagonist steeds het signaal dat er tussen hen eensgezindheid bestaat, op z'n minst met betrekking tot de karakterisering van het standpunt. Op deze manier probeert de protagonist te benadrukken dat hij en zijn antagonist gedeelde uitgangspunten hebben. Zodoende probeert de protagonist ervoor te zorgen dat de aanvaardbaarheid van zijn standpunt onder gunstige omstandigheden wordt getest, zodat hij zich op succesvolle wijze kan ontdoen van de bewijslast.

De strategische functie van *epistemische kwalificatie* is de antagonist erop te wijzen dat de protagonist en hij zeer veel uitgangspunten delen; hierdoor hoopt de protagonist te bewerkstelligen dat de antagonist geen verdere vragen zal stellen over de inhoud of de kracht van de argumentatie die hij ter ondersteuning van zijn standpunt zal aandragen. De strategische functie van *evaluatieve kwalificatie* is de antagonist erop te wijzen dat, wat de protagonist betreft, de kracht van de argumentatie ter ondersteuning van het standpunt niet verder hoeft te worden betwist vanwege de instemming van de antagonist met de evaluatieve opmerking. De strategische functie van *illocutionaire kwalificatie* is de antagonist erop te wijzen dat de protagonist ervan uitgaat dat de aangevoerde argumentatie als afdoende beschouwd zal worden, zelfs al zou de antagonist zowel de inhoud als de kracht ervan aanvallen. De protagonist baseert dit vertrouwen op het idee dat hij zijn positie niet zou innemen ten opzichte van iemand met een tegenovergestelde mening, tenzij hij daar goede redenen voor heeft.

In **Hoofdstuk 6** wordt ingegaan op het mogelijke misbruik van kwalificatie en meer in het bijzonder op de vraag onder welke voorwaarden kwalificatie kan worden opgevat als het ondermijnen van het kritisch testen van een standpunt. Kwalificatie kan de redelijke oplossing van een verschil van mening ondermijnen, als een protagonist de strategische functie van de kwalificatie uitbuit om zich op een succesvolle wijze te ontdoen van de bewijslast *zonder* daarbij de dialectische eisen in acht te nemen. Een dergelijk ongeoorloofd doel vormt een ontsporing van het manoeuvreren met de bewijslast, die de *verdedigingsplichtregel* overtreedt en zodoende resulteert in de *drogreden* van het *ontduiken* of *verschuiven van de bewijslast*. De protagonist ontduikt de bewijslast als hij de strategische functie van kwalificeren misbruikt om zijn argumentatie voorbarig als afdoende ondersteuning voor het standpunt te presenteren. Hij verschuift de bewijslast als hij de strategische functie van kwalificeren misbruikt om de argumentatie voor het tegengestelde standpunt voorbarig als onafdoende te beschouwen. In beide gevallen gaat de protagonist voorbij aan de intersubjectieve toetsingsprocedure (Table 5).

CURRICULUM VITAE

Assimakis Tseronis was born in Athens, Greece on July 18, 1975. He graduated from the University of Athens in 1998 with a Degree in Philology, major: Theoretical Linguistics. In 1999, upon successful examination, he received a three-year scholarship from the State Scholarships Foundation of Greece (I.K.Y.) in order to continue his studies abroad. In 1999-2000 he studied at Lancaster University, U.K. and graduated with an M.A. in Language Studies: Critical Discourse Analysis. In 2002 he came to the Netherlands to study argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, where he obtained an M.Phil. in Logic, Language and Argumentation cum laude. In 2004 he was accepted as a paid doctoral researcher (Assistent in Opleiding) at Leiden University, where he carried out his doctoral research within the Leiden University Centre for Linguistics.